JUDGMENT M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J. 1. Manish Kumar Jayaswal has filed this petition under Article 228 of the Constitution of India for a direction to transfer Civil Misc. Case No. 127/1999 pending in the Court of Special Judge, CBI, VIth, in which attachment order has been passed on the strength of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944, (hereinafter referred to as Ordinance, 1944) and to declare the said Ordinance, 1944, to be not in force and consequently to cancel the entire proceedings. 2. The short facts are as follows: CBI, on the basis of the orders passed by the High Court and the Supreme Court, conducted investigations relating to Fodder Scam cases and ultimately filed charge-sheet against the petitioners father. On 3.6.1999, CBI filed an application under Section 3 of the Ordinance, 1944, for ad interim order of attachment of properties and also for making the same absolute as envisaged under Section 5 of the Ordinance, 1944. Ultimately the trial Court passed ad interim order of attachment under Section 4(b) of the Ordinance, 1944. An application has been filed by the petitioner before the Court below challenging the proceedings under the Ordinance, 1944, as unconstitutional as the Ordinance, 1944, is not an existing law. Without pursuing the matter, the petitioner has filed this petition under Article 228 to transfer the said case from the Court below to this Court and to declare the Ordinance, 1944, to be not an existing law. 3. The sum and substance of the contentions urged by the counsel for the petitioner is as follows: (a) As laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. D.C. Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. the Ordinance. 1944, does not remain in force beyond six months unless ratified by the competent legislature. (b) In view of Explanation III to Article 372 that the Ordinance, 1944, does not remain valid on expiry of six months, the Ordinance, 1944, cannot be said to be in existence. This has been accepted by the Delhi High Court which declared the provisions of the Ordinance. 1944, as ultra vires in W.P. No. 223/1988. Therefore, this Court may be pleased to declare the proceedings pending before the Court below in pursuance of the Ordinance, 1944, as illegal and the Ordinance, 1944, to be not an existing law. 4. This has been accepted by the Delhi High Court which declared the provisions of the Ordinance. 1944, as ultra vires in W.P. No. 223/1988. Therefore, this Court may be pleased to declare the proceedings pending before the Court below in pursuance of the Ordinance, 1944, as illegal and the Ordinance, 1944, to be not an existing law. 4. In reply, the counsel for CBI would make the following submissions: This point has already been decided by this Court in a similar matter in W. P. (C) No. 1898 of 2007. The Delhi High Court judgment, as referred to by the counsel for the petitioner rendered in W.P. No. 223/ 1988, has been stayed by the Supreme Court in S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 5738/05 by the order dated 31.3.2006. Therefore, this petition is liable to be dismissed. We have heard the counsel for the parties and also perused the records inclusive of written submissions made by the respective counsel for the parties. 5. As correctly pointed out by the counsel for the respondent- CBI that the very same point has been dealt with by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 1898/07 by the order dated 21.6.2007. the Ordinance, 1944, " cannot be said to be non-existing; on the other hand, the Ordinance, 1944, is still a good law. 6. This Court while dealing with this point, took the support of the Division Bench judgment of Patna High Court State of Bihar v. Santo Kumar Mitra and Ors. There is no reason to change the view taken by this Court. It was decided in the aforesaid case that on the date when the Indian Independence Act came into force on 15th August, 1947, power of the Governor General under the 9th Schedule was available and Sections 18(3) and 8(2) of the Indian Independence Act refer to continuance of the Government Act, 1935. Admittedly, the Government Act, 1935, is continuing and the same has been endorsed not only by the provisions of the Indian Independence Act of 1947 but also by Article 295 of the Constitution of India. 7. While dealing with the similar point, Patna High Court referred to Section 18(3) of the Indian Independence Act and Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India. 7. While dealing with the similar point, Patna High Court referred to Section 18(3) of the Indian Independence Act and Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India. The reading of Section 18(3) of the Indian Independence Act and Article 372(1) of the Constitution of India would make it clear mat both these provisions have kept the Ordinance, 1944, alive and the omission of 9th Schedule did not affect the continuance of the existence of the Ordinance, 1944. 8. Counsel for the petitioner has made an attempt to distinguish the judgment of this Court in the decision referred to above from that of the Patna High Court stating that there was no occasion for this Court to deal with Article 372(3), Explanation III. According to him, since nothing in this article shall be construed as continuing any temporary law in force beyond the date fixed for its expiration or the date on which it would have expired if this Constitution had not come into force, the Ordinance, 1944. is non-existent. 9. This contention does not deserve acceptance, in view of the fact that in respect of the Ordinance, 1944, the only Article, which would apply, is Article 372(1) and not Article 372(3), Explanation III, as the same deals with temporary law in force beyond the date fixed for its expiration. Furthermore, recently the Supreme Court was hearing another case arising out of the Ordinance, 1944, vide [2001] (3) Jhr Cr. 5 (SC) B.S. Sundarl and Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, and the appeal preferred by the party was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court and the order passed under the Ordinance, 1944, was confirmed. 10. Further the counsel for the petitioner, while arguing the case, would request this Court to invoke Article 139A to refer the matter to Supreme Court where the issue is pending with reference to the existence of the Ordinance, 1944. 11. This contention also, in our view, is nor sustainable since Article 139A confers power on the Supreme Court, either on the application of the petitioner or suo moiu on its own motion, to withdraw the case pending before the High Court or High Courts and dispose of the same. That power has not been conferred on the High Court. 12. As indicated above, this petition has been field under Article 228 of the Constitution. That power has not been conferred on the High Court. 12. As indicated above, this petition has been field under Article 228 of the Constitution. Under this Article, the petitioner requests this Court to transfer the case from the trial Court to this Court and to decide the substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. Thus, the counsel for the petitioner wants this Court to decide about the existence of the Ordinance, 1944, especially in view of the orders passed by the Delhi High Court declaring the Ordinance, 1944, to be ultra vires. 13. This Court cannot also decide the matter on the basis of the order passed by the Delhi High Court, especially when the copy of the order has not been produced before this Court. Further as indicated above, the said order of the Delhi High Court has been stayed by the Supreme Court. This Court has also taken the view on the basis of the decisions of Patna High Court and the Supreme Court that the Ordinance, 1944, is in existence. No valid reason has been shown to this Court to differ from the said view taken by us earlier. Therefore, this petition is dismissed. Amareshwar Sahay, J. 14. I agree.