Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Md. Mosin Mistri
2007-03-26
SYED MD.MAHFOOZ ALAM
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment Syed Md.Mahfooz Alam, J. 1. This Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed by the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. for setting aside the judgment dated 31.3.2000 passed by Sri Amitabh Kumar, Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gaya, in M.A.C. Case No. 23/97/52/96 whereby he has been pleased to award a total compensation to the tune of Rs. 2,56,000.00 with 12% interest per annum from the date of filing of the application till payment in favour of the claimant nos. 1 to 5. 2. The brief facts of the case are as follows: The deceased Md. Ehsan was a Motor Mechanic. On 11.8.98, he was hired by the owner of the truck bearing registration no. BR-17A/9020 to repair the said truck which had developed some problem at Sayed Raja (U.R). The deceased went to the spot and after checking the vehicle he removed the defect in the engine of the said truck. Thereafter, the driver of the truck took the truck to Gaya but on way to Gaya the vehicle again developed some trouble and since the deceased and the informant were accompanying the driver in the said truck they got down from the truck and while the deceased was checking the engine the driver started the truck, as a result of which, the deceased came under the wheel and died on the spot, whereas, informant Jamo Mian received serious injury. He was brought to the hospital and on his statement F.I.R. was instituted. It is said that the owner of the truck was also accompanying at that time and, as such, at his instance some wrong facts were entered into the F.I.R. Further case of the claimants is that at the time of accident the deceased was aged about 28 years and he was -earning Rs. 3500/-per month. 3. It appears from para 4 of the judgment that although the owner of the truck, namely, Janardan Sharma (opposite party no.1 in the claim case) appeared in the claim case but he did not file any written statement. However, appellant-Oriental Insurance Company filed written statement and contested the claim of the claimants mainly on the ground that as per the F.I.R. of Sheosagar RS. Case No.111/95 the offending vehicle BR-17A/9020 was not involved in the said accident and the claim application was filed on the basis of some false statements and, so, the appellant-Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation.
Case No.111/95 the offending vehicle BR-17A/9020 was not involved in the said accident and the claim application was filed on the basis of some false statements and, so, the appellant-Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation. From para 14 of the judgment, it appears that in the said para the learned Tribunal considered the plea of the appellant and after discussing the evidence available on record the learned Tribunal came to the conclusion that the vehicle bearing no. BR-17A/9020 was involved in the accident and then the learned Tribunal passed the Award against which this appeal has been filed. 4. During the hearing of the appeal, the learned Advocate Sri Ajay Kumar, appearing on behalf of the Oriental Insurance Company raised the plea that admittedly the F.I.R. with regard to the said accident was lodged on the basis of the statement of A.W. No. 3, Badiuz Zaman @ Jamo Mian, who had also received grievous injuries in the said accident. He submitted that this was his first version about the accident, according to which, some unknown vehicle was involved in the said accident and the F.I.R. will show that there is no such statement in the F.I.R. that truck bearing registration no. BR-17A/ 9020 was involved in the accident. He submitted that the learned Tribunal should have believed the very first version of witness Badiuz Zaman @ Jamo Mian and should have discarded his evidence given in the Court as being afterthought. In this regard, learned Advocate of the appellant has placed reliance upon an unreported judgment of this court given in M.A. No. 30 of 2001 (Branch Manager, The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., Bhagalpur vs. Yogendra Thakur & Another). He has referred para 6 of the judgment which is being quoted below: "On a comparison of the two versions, it appears to me that it is noticeable to state that the occurrence took place on 26.9.2001, and the F.I.R. was lodged on the same day. In other words, the informant (respondent no.1 herein) did not have the time to conspire in his mind or consult others about the future course of action. One can, therefore, be safely conclude that the version given in the F.I.R. was an accurate version, being contemporaneous in nature." 5.
In other words, the informant (respondent no.1 herein) did not have the time to conspire in his mind or consult others about the future course of action. One can, therefore, be safely conclude that the version given in the F.I.R. was an accurate version, being contemporaneous in nature." 5. On the basis of the above decision, learned Advocate of the appellant submitted that the very first version of witness Badiuz Zaman @ Jamo Mian made in the F.I.R. that the accident had occurred by some unknown vehicle should have been believed by the Tribunal as correct and being contemporaneous in nature. 6. Against the said contention of the learned Advocate of the appellant, learned Advocate of the respondents argued that the facts of M.A. No 30 of 2001 are entirely different with the facts of this case and, as such, the said decision is not applicable in the present case. I also find that the facts of M.A. No. 30 of 2001 are entirely different with the facts of this case as in that case the version of the F.I.R. and the version given in the claim application regarding the manner of occurrence was entirely different, whereas, in this case there is absolutely no controversy on this point that the deceased had not died in a motor vehicle accident. The only difference is that in the F.I.R. Badiuz Zaman @ Jamo Mian (A.W. 3) had stated that the accident was caused by some unknown vehicle, whereas, in the court he deposed that the accident was caused by Truck No. BR-17A/9020. 7. Perusal of lower courts record shows that Badiuz Zaman @ Jamo Mian was examined as A.W. 3. His cross-examination shows that his attention was drawn towards his statement made in the F.I.R. that he had stated before the police that the accident was caused by some unknown vehicle but he denied to have given the said statement before the police. The evidence of A.W. 3 finds corroboration from the evidence of A.W.1 Mohsin Mistry, A.W. 2 Md.
His cross-examination shows that his attention was drawn towards his statement made in the F.I.R. that he had stated before the police that the accident was caused by some unknown vehicle but he denied to have given the said statement before the police. The evidence of A.W. 3 finds corroboration from the evidence of A.W.1 Mohsin Mistry, A.W. 2 Md. Hasan Mistry, and A.W. 5 Rubina Nusrat and although one witness was examined on behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company, namely, Shashi Shekhar Verma, who is said to be the Investigator in Oriental Insurance Company but the said witness has also not stated in his evidence before the court that A.W. 3 Badiuz Zaman @ Jamo Mian has made a wrong statement before the court. It appears from his evidence that after enquiry about the accident he had prepared his report (Exhibit-A) but his cross-examination shows that he did not make any enquiry from any witness nor he met the owner of the Truck bearing No. BR-17A/9020. Under such circumstances, no evidentiary value can be given to Exhibit-A which has been prepared without examination of any eye witness of the occurrence and without making enquiry from the owner of the Truck (BR-17A/9020) as to whether his bus was involved in the accident or not. The record further shows that the owner of the Truck bearing No. BR-17A/9020 had appeared in the claim case but he did not refute the version of the claimants that his truck was not involved in the accident. His conduct amounts to admission in the claim case that his truck no. BR-17A/9020 was involved in the accident. In such circumstances, it is not possible to accept the plea of the learned Advocate of the appellant that since the F.I.R. discloses that some unknown vehicle was involved in the accident, as such, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the compensation and, so, I reject the contention of learned Advocate of the appellant in this regard. 8. It has been argued by the learned Advocate of the respondents that the above plea taken by the learned Advocate of the Appellant is not available to him as it does not fall within the purview of Sec.149(2)(a)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 .
8. It has been argued by the learned Advocate of the respondents that the above plea taken by the learned Advocate of the Appellant is not available to him as it does not fall within the purview of Sec.149(2)(a)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 . He submitted that before the Tribunal the appellant had not obtained any order of the court for contesting the claim on the grounds other than the grounds available to him under sub-section 2 of Sec.149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as such, this defence is also not available to the appellant in appeal also. 9. Against the said argument of learned Advocate of the respondents, learned Advocate of the appellant argued that the appellant had preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No. 473 of 1997 against the interim award which was dismissed by the High Court with observation that the appellant will be at liberty to raise the plea before the Tribunal and, therefore, as per the observation of the court the appellant is entitled to take all the defence which are beyond the scope of sub-section 2 of Sec.149 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 10. I am of the view that only because of the fact that while disposing of the Miscellaneous Appeal filed against the order of interim award this court had observed that the question raised by the counsel for the appellant can very well be settled at the time of final hearing of the appeal, the appellant cannot become entitled to contest the claim on all or any other grounds which are not available to the appellant under sub-section 2 of Sec.149 of the Motor Vehicles Act unless the appellant obtains the leave of the Court as provided under Sec.170 of the Motor Vehicles Act. I, therefore, accept the argument of learned Advocate of the respondents on this point and reject the contention of learned Advocate of the appellant. 11. It has further been argued by the learned Advocate of the appellant that in recent decisions the Apex Court has reduced the rate of interest from 12% per annum to 9% per annum on the ground that the banks have considerably reduced the rate of interest.
11. It has further been argued by the learned Advocate of the appellant that in recent decisions the Apex Court has reduced the rate of interest from 12% per annum to 9% per annum on the ground that the banks have considerably reduced the rate of interest. I find substance in the argument of learned Advocate of the appellant and, as such, I am of the opinion that in view of the recent decisions of the Apex Court, 12% interest per annum awarded by the Tribunal should be reduced to 9% per annum. Accordingly, I hold that the amount of the compensation, as ordered by the Tribunal, will fetch interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the application till the date of realisation. 12. In the result, I find no merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed with modification in the rate of interest which has been fixed at the rate of 9% per annum instead of 12% per annum. The appellant-Insurance Company is directed to pay the entire compensation amount with interest, as ordered above, within a period of two months from the date of this judgment after deducting the amount already paid, failing which, the amount will be realised through the process of the court. 13. The claimants will be entitled to withdraw the statutory amount deposited in this court.