JUDGMENT L. MOHAPATRA, J. — This writ application is directed against the order dated 10.5.2007 passed by the learned District Judge, Puri in R.F.A.No. 43 of 2007 returning the memorandum of appeal for presentation before the appropriate Court on the ground that he had no pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. 2. The opposite party No. 1 had filed C.S.No. 119 of 2003 for specific performance of contract against opposite parties 2 to 8. During pendency of the suit, a compromise was effected between the parties and accordingly, the suit was disposed of in terms of the compromise on 3.7.2003. Opposite party No. 1-decree-holder filed Execution Case No. 15 of 2003 for executing the compromise decree. In terms of the writ issued by the executing Court, the Amin Commissioner visited the spot on 11.5.2004 and found the petitioner in possession of the disputed house and accordingly, he sought for police help to execute the decree. At that point of time, the petitioner came to know about such decree in respect of the suit house under possession of the petitioner and accordingly, he filed an application under Order 21, Rule 97 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a third party-intervenor and the said petition was treated as one under Order 21, Rule 99 C.P.C. During adjudication of the said peti¬tion, though the executing Court held that the petitioner is in possession of the house, rejected the petition on the ground that the petitioner being a tenant cannot be protected under the said provision since he has no right to possess the suit property. Challenging the said order, petitioner preferred R.F.A. No. 43 of 2007 before the learned District Judge, Puri. The suit was valued at Rs. 2,50,000/-. The learned District Judge in the impugned order held that the suit having been valued at Rs. 2,50,000/-, the application filed under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C.P.C. should also be valued at the same and, therefore he has no pecu¬niary jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. While holding thus, the learned District Judge directed for return of the memorandum of appeal for presentation before this Court. 3. The sole question raised in this writ application is as to whether an appeal filed against an order passed in an application filed under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C.P.C. has to be valued at Rs. While holding thus, the learned District Judge directed for return of the memorandum of appeal for presentation before this Court. 3. The sole question raised in this writ application is as to whether an appeal filed against an order passed in an application filed under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C.P.C. has to be valued at Rs. 2,50,000/- which is the valuation of the suit or it is to be treated like any other appeal arising of a petition. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the suit was for specific performance of contract between the decree-holder and judgment-debtor and the petitioner was not a party in the said suit. After coming to know about the compro¬mise decree, when the decree was put to execution, he had filed an application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C.P.C., which is treated to be like any other petition. It was further contended that any order passed under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C.P.C. has to be treated as a decree and, therefore, appeal lies. This appeal has no connection with the decree passed in the suit between the decree-holder and judgment-debtor and, therefore, the same need not be valued as that of the suit out of which the Execution Case arises. The learned counsel also contended that in the instant case, Section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court Fees Act is applicable for the purpose of valuation of the appeal and therefore, the learned District Judge was not justified in returning the memorandum of appeal on the ground that the appeal preferred against the order passed in the application under Order 21, Rule 97 C.P.C. has to be valued as that of the suit. The learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 referring to Section 16(2) of the Orissa Civil Courts Act, 1984 submitted that an appeal from the decree or order of a Civil Judge (Senior Divi¬sion) shall lie to a District Judge, where the value of the original suit in which or in any proceeding arising out of which the decree or order was made, did not exceed one lakh rupees. Referring to the aforesaid provision, it was contended by the learned counsel that the order passed on the application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C.P.C. has to be treated as a decree and, therefore, the valuation of the suit is relevant for the purpose. The learned counsel for both the parties have referred to some decisions, but it is fairly submitted by both the learned counsel that the said decisions are not directly on the point in issue before this Court. 4. Before proceeding to decide the point in issue, it is necessary to refer to some provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as well as the Orissa Civil Courts Act, 1984. Order 21, Rule 97 of the C.P.C. provides that where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person in obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction. It is further provided that where any such application is made under Sub-section (1), the Court shall pro¬ceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions contained in Order 21, Rule 98, 100 and 103. Order 21, Rule 103 prescribes that where any application has been adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or Rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. There is no dispute at the bar that a third party has also a right to file an application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C.P.C. and therefore, it is not necessary to go into the said question. There is no dispute at the bar that a third party has also a right to file an application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C.P.C. and therefore, it is not necessary to go into the said question. There is also no dispute at the bar that the order that may be passed on an application under Order 21, Rule 97 of the C.P.C. has to be either under Order 21, Rule 98 or Rule 100 of the C.P.C. and any order passed under the aforesaid two provi¬sions shall be treated as a decree in terms of the provisions contained in Order 21, Rule 103 C.P.C. Because of the aforesaid provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure, the learned counsel for both the parties agreed that against the order passed by the learned Civil Judge in the Execution Case, an appeal only can lie. However, the dispute is whether the appeal shall lie to the District Judge or to this Court, the valuation of the suit being Rs. 2,50,000/-. The other question that automatically comes up for determination is as to whether such appeal has to be filed under Section 96 or under Order 43, Rule 1 of the C.P.C. In this connection, a Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Gurram Seetharam Reddy v. Smt. Gunti Yashoda and another reported in AIR 2005 Andhra Pradesh 95 is required to be referred to. The Full Bench in the aforesaid decision dealt with the case under Order 21, Rule 58 C.P.C. Order 21, Rule 58 C.P.C. prescribes the mode for adjudication of claims to, or objections to attachment of property. Sub-rule (4) of the said Rule pre¬scribes that where a claim or an objection has been adjudicated upon, under the said rule, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. Sub-rule (4) of the said Rule pre¬scribes that where a claim or an objection has been adjudicated upon, under the said rule, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to appeal or otherwise as if it were a decree. This provision is more or less similar to that of Order 21, Rule 103 C.P.C. The Full Bench in the aforesaid decision held that an order passed under Order 21, Rule 58 C.P.C. is appealable under Section 96 C.P.C. as a regular appeal and not a miscellaneous appeal under Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 C.P.C. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment in this connection are quoted below : “Once it emerges that an order passed under Rule 58 of Order 21 is conferred the status of a decree, in the particular context of appeal, Section 96 gets attracted. Section 96 does not enumerate the types of decrees that can fall into its fold. Once the outcome of adjudication partakes the character of a decree, it gains an entry into the realm of Section 96. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appeals provided for under Section 96 are against original decrees and not other kinds of decrees is unacceptable. The word ‘original’ in the heading of Section 96 signifies the jurisdiction i.e. original jurisdiction in contradiction to appellate jurisdiction. Section 104, on the other hand is neither general, nor residuary in nature. It is only those orders, which answer the descriptions contained in its class, that are appealable under it. Section 104, as it stands now, provides for appeals against five categories of orders. There is no dispute that an order under Rule 58 does not fall into Clauses (ff), (ffa)(g) and (h). An effort can certain be made to bring it within the purview of Clause (i) of Sub-section (1), since it is an order made under a Rule. This effort would certainly have been successful, had the clause been “any order made under rules, without anything fur¬ther. The subsequent part of the clause, which obviously refers to Order 43, C.P.C. restricts its scope. In none of the clauses contained in Rule 1 of Order 43, an order passed under Rule 58 of Order 21, finds place. This effort would certainly have been successful, had the clause been “any order made under rules, without anything fur¬ther. The subsequent part of the clause, which obviously refers to Order 43, C.P.C. restricts its scope. In none of the clauses contained in Rule 1 of Order 43, an order passed under Rule 58 of Order 21, finds place. Further, if for any reason, the expression “an appeal ex¬pressly allowed by Rules” occurring in Clause (i) Section 104(1) can be taken as including Rule 58 of Order 21 in its fold, the fact that Rule 58(4) directs that the order passed under Sub-rule (3) shall have the same force of a decree, for the purpose of appeal cannot be ignored. On account of it, the order passed under Rule 58 of Order 21 stands physically lifted from the purview of Section 104 CPC. While right to file a suit is a common law remedy, right of appeal is one, which has to be specifically provided for by a statute. The procedure to be followed in filing the appeal as well as the forum to which it shall be presented, are to be specifically provided. This requirement becomes significant in the context of different kinds of remedies provided in the form of appeals and revisions, in the enactments like CPC. Each remedy has its own significance as well as limitations. The Legislature is deemed to have taken the relevant factor into account, when it provides for a particular kind of remedy against the outcome of an adjudication. By the process of interpretation, such remedies can neither be restricted nor expanded. When Section 96 CPC specifically provides for appeals against decrees, and Sub-rule (4) of Rule 58 of Order 21 directs that the order passed under Sub-rule (3) thereof shall have the force of a decree, there hardly exists any basis to deny such characteristics to such an order. An interpretation to the con¬trary would have the effect of setting at naught, the intention of the Parliament in attributing characteristics of a decree to an order. In view of a clear mandate under Sub-rule (4) of Rule 58, an order passed under Sub-rule (3) thereof, partakes a char¬acter of a decree for all practical purposes, more so, in the context of availing the remedy of appeal. Same reasoning holds good for the orders passed under Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21, CPC. In view of a clear mandate under Sub-rule (4) of Rule 58, an order passed under Sub-rule (3) thereof, partakes a char¬acter of a decree for all practical purposes, more so, in the context of availing the remedy of appeal. Same reasoning holds good for the orders passed under Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21, CPC. Hence there does not exist any justification to treat the same as different, in any way from decrees, at least in the context of deciding the forum and provision for appeal. The question as to what nomenclature is to be given to the appeals. Needs to be dealt with by the High Court or the District Courts, on administrative side. Hence, we are of the view that the judgment of this Court in Nookaraju’s case (supra) does not lay the correct proposition of law. Once it is held that orders passed under Rule 58(3) and Rules 98 and 100 of Order 21 CPC are appealable under Section 96 CPC it is axiomatic that a second appeal is maintainable against the order passed in such appeals. Though this question is not referred to this Full Bench, it is dealt with to put an end to the controversy and uncertainty.” 5. In view of what the Full Bench has decided in the above cited case, there cannot be any doubt in my mind that an appeal against the order passed under Order 21, Rule 98 or 100 is ap¬pealable under Rule 103 of the said order and such appeal has to be filed like a regular appeal under Section 96 C.P.C. Once an appeal is to be filed under Section 96 C.P.C., the valuation of the suit shall determine the jurisdiction of the Court where the appeal is to be filed. In the present case the valuation of the suit being Rs. 2,50,000/-, the appeal under Section 96 shall lie before this Court. 6. The other question raised before the Court is as to how the Court fee is to be computed in such a case even though the appeal is to be valued as that of the valuation of the suit. 2,50,000/-, the appeal under Section 96 shall lie before this Court. 6. The other question raised before the Court is as to how the Court fee is to be computed in such a case even though the appeal is to be valued as that of the valuation of the suit. The Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the aforesaid decision also dealt with this question in paragraph-39 of the judgment which is quoted below : “An examination of the provisions reveals that while Article 11(i) specifically and directly refers to the applications filed under Order 21, Rule 58, Section 38 is a general provision in relation to suits to set aside the attachment. It is true that an application filed under Rule 58 are to be decided in the same manner as a suit. However, they cannot be said to be suits referred to in Section 38. The occasion to file a suit to set aside the attachment under Section 38 would arise, if only the application filed under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 58 is not entertained and returned. It is on such suits, that the Court fee is payable under Section 38. On the other hand, if the applica¬tion is entertained, Clause 11 (i) of Section II gets straight¬away attracted. Even otherwise, it is settled principle of law that where situations are governed by a specific and a general provision, the latter has to give way. Therefore, the court fee payable for applications filed under Rule 58 of Order 21 shall be the one provided for under Clause 11(i) of Schedule II. Conse¬quently, the Court fee payable in an appeal filed against orders passed in such applications is the same as the one payable on the application, as provided for under Section 49 of the Act. The view expressed in Biksha Reddy’s case (supra) on the Court fee payable on applications filed under Rule 97 of Order 21, holds good for that category of applications as also the appeals aris¬ing out of them.” The Court held that Clause 11(i) of Schedule II in such cases gets acts straightaway attracted and the Court fee has to be paid in terms of the same. 7. 7. I, therefore following the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court hold that the appeal against the im¬pugned order shall be maintainable under Section 96 C.P.C. as a regular appeal before this Court, the valuation of the suit being Rs. 2,50,000/- but the Court fee payable shall be under Clause 11(i) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. In view of such finding, there is no reason for me to interfere with the impugned order. Before I part with this case, I must express my gratitude for the valuable assistance rendered by Shri S.P.Mishra and Shri R.K.Mohanty, two learned Senior Advocates, even though neither of them appeared for either party. The writ application is disposed of accordingly. Application disposed of.