Judgment :- Petitioner purchased an item of property, as per Ext.P2, on 14-12-1994 from one Sri K. Ummer against whom an order was issued on 5-12-1994 by the competent authority under Section 7 (1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the “Act”, for short. 2. The uncontroverted plea of the respondents through the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 is that Sri. K. Ummer had carried on certain business transactions along with Sri. L.K. Mohideen alias Haji Mohideen who was detained under the provisions of the Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, hereinafter referred to as the COFEPOSA Act and as such, Sri. K. Ummer was an “Associate” of that detenu, answering the description of a “person” under Section 2(2)(d) of the Act and still further, that notice dated 22-8-1980 under Section 6(1) of the Act proposing forfeiture of certain movable and immovable properties was issued to Sri. K. Ummer. 3. The contentions of the petitioner are that the statutory invalidation of transfers as per Section 11 of the Act does not affect Ext.P2 since it is a bona fide purchase by the petitioner without notice of proceedings against Sri. K. Ummer and that by virtue of Section 9, the competent authority was authorized to impose a fine in lieu of forfeiture and therefore Ext.P2 transaction is to be protected from proceedings under the Act. At the most, there could be only fine in lieu of forfeiture, it is contended. 4. Section 11 of the Act provides that certain transfers shall be null and void. It reads as follows: “Where after the issue of a notice under Section 6 or Section 10, any property referred to in the said notice is transferred by any mode whatsoever such transfer shall, for the purpose of the proceedings under this Act, be ignored and if such property is subsequently forfeited to the Central Government under Section 7, then the transfer of such property shall be deemed to be null and void.” 5. It is not in dispute that notice under Section 6 had been issued to Sri. K. Ummer before the order of forfeiture was passed under Section 7(1). Notice, having been issued under Section 6(1) to Sri. It is not in dispute that notice under Section 6 had been issued to Sri. K. Ummer before the order of forfeiture was passed under Section 7(1). Notice, having been issued under Section 6(1) to Sri. K. Ummer and because the property covered by Ext.P2 is one of the items of properties that belonged to him, which fact is not in dispute, transfer by any mode whatsoever of such property, shall, for the purpose of proceedings under the Act be ignored and on the subsequent forfeiture order issued by the competent authority under Section 7, the transfer of such property, if any entered into after Section 6(1) notice, shall be deemed to be null and void. 6. Section 24 of the Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. This means that the deeming provision in Section 11 as to the nullity and void status of the transfer would run to the hilt, notwithstanding any other provision which may be pointed out with reference to law relating to property or other legislation on the basis of which a bona fide transferee for valuable consideration could claim protection on grounds of good faith. 7. The Act under consideration is one enacted to provide for the forfeiture of illegally acquired properties of smugglers and foreign exchange manipulators and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The public policy that underlines such a piece of legislation is the primary national interest to effectively prevent smuggling activities and foreign exchange manipulations, which have a deleterious effect on the national economy. For such reason, the Parliament felt it necessary to deprive persons engaged in such activities and manipulations of their ill-gotten gains. The interpretation of a piece of legislation no more lies embedded exclusively in the black letters but is to be guided by the goal that is embodied therein. That goal is the rationality of law. Maximizing the efficiency of the point behind the rule can be attained by such purposive interpretation, which has gained considerable currency. It is apposite in the context to quote the Apex Court from State of U.P. v. Jeet S. Bisht (2007) 6 S.C.C. 586) to the following effect. That goal is the rationality of law. Maximizing the efficiency of the point behind the rule can be attained by such purposive interpretation, which has gained considerable currency. It is apposite in the context to quote the Apex Court from State of U.P. v. Jeet S. Bisht (2007) 6 S.C.C. 586) to the following effect. “Law, in its value-laden conception, is not entirely endogenous in its meaning and purpose: the construction thereof also depends on the statement of purport and object. There is a spillover of the aforementioned shift in philosophy of law to statutory interpretation.” In the context of the legislation in question and in the backdrop of the object sought to be achieved by its making, it is impermissible to read any principle of good faith, equity or good conscience, in any manner abridging the full and final effect of the deeming provision contained in Section 11 in the absence of any specific provision in that regard. That would only undermine the legislative goal. 8. That the aforesaid conclusion is inescapable is fortified upon assimilation of certain aspects of the Act. It is not as if the concept of “good faith and bona fide transaction for valuable consideration” is a jurisprudential connotation unknown to the Parliament. Such a concept is available in the innumerable decisions, which form the law laid by the Apex Court and in the plethora of precedents rendered by different High Courts. Those principles also find place in different statutes. The legislature has therefore to be imputed with the knowledge of that principle. The fact is that the concept of a “transfer in good faith for adequate consideration”, was well within the legislative mind even when the Act in question was made. A close reading of the provisions of the Act, particularly Section 2(2)(e) would show that the said concept was not only within the immediate legislative mind but was even considered and applied in crafting that provision in a manner that, an item of property that was at any time previously held by a person who falls within the net of clauses (a) or (b) of Section 2(2), would also be liable to be proceeded against unless the person, who holds such property after such person and before the present holder, is or was a transferee in good faith for adequate consideration. When such a provision is expressly made while dealing with the properties, which could have been dealt with by third parties on transfers in good faith for adequate consideration, the legislature did not extend any further benefit to transferees, who obtained the transfer subsequent to the notice of forfeiture under Section 6(1) though such a transfer may also be one “in good faith, for adequate consideration”. This explicitly shows that the legislature intended that no such claim as a “transferee in good faith for adequate consideration” should be extended to a transferee under a transaction after forfeiture notice under Section 6(1). This conclusion is also immediately supported by the non-obstante, over riding effect, that the provisions of the Act have by virtue of Section 24 thereof. 9. Therefore, no person claiming as a transferee of a property hit by the embargo of Section 11 of the Act, is entitled to plead that he is a bona fide transferee, for valuable consideration, and that therefore the said property may be saved from the effect of Sections 7 and 11 of the Act. Hence, Ext.P2 transaction is null and void in terms of Section 11 of the Act. 10. Now, I shall deal with the plea of the petitioner that the property in question is to be saved from forfeiture by imposition of fine in terms of Section 9 of the Act. 11. Where the competent authority records a finding under Section 7 to the effect that any property is an illegality acquired one, it shall declare that such property shall stand forfeited to the Central Government free from all encumbrances, subject to the provisions of the Act. Such a declaration under Section 7(3) would come only on conclusion of proceedings under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 7. Section 7(1) authorizes the competent authority to record a finding whether all or any of the properties in question are illegally acquired properties. Recording of such a finding has to be preceded by consideration of the explanation to the show cause notice issued under Section 6 and the materials available before it. A pre-decisional reasonable opportunity of being heard is also enjoined by sub-section (1) of Section 7. Recording of such a finding has to be preceded by consideration of the explanation to the show cause notice issued under Section 6 and the materials available before it. A pre-decisional reasonable opportunity of being heard is also enjoined by sub-section (1) of Section 7. While sub-section (1) enjoins a finding whether all or any of the properties are illegally acquired properties, sub-section (2) of Section 7 provides that when the competent authority is not able to identify specifically such properties, then it shall be lawful to specify the properties, which, to the best of the judgment of the competent authority, are illegally acquired properties and to record a finding accordingly under sub-section (1). Therefore, sub-section (2) only provides a mode of best of judgment decision regarding those properties, which cannot be specifically identified as illegally acquired properties. But, on a best of its judgment conclusion by the competent authority in that regard, those such properties which cannot be identified specifically as illegally acquired properties would also fall within the net of sub-section (1) of Section 7. Once it falls into that net, it makes no difference whether it is an item of property identified specifically as an illegally acquired property or identified so, following the best of judgment method authorized by law, as per sub-section (2) of Section 7. The forfeiture order under sub-section (3) would therefore cover all properties, which are brought within the net of the finding recorded in terms of Section 7(1), that is, even in relation to those properties, which are brought into the net of Section 7(1) by following the procedure of best of judgment authorized by sub-section (2) of Section 7. 12. While Section 9(1) provides for an order of fine in lieu of forfeiture, recourse to that provision can be made only in relation to any property, the part of the source for which, being less than one half of the income, earnings or assets, with which such property was acquired, has not been proved to the satisfaction of the competent authority. An order under Section 9(1) giving an option to pay fine in lieu of forfeiture is therefore one that would depend upon the identify of the earnings and assets with which that property was acquired. An order under Section 9(1) giving an option to pay fine in lieu of forfeiture is therefore one that would depend upon the identify of the earnings and assets with which that property was acquired. This is not a matter, which could be raised or decided at the instance of any person other than the one against whom proceedings for forfeiture of property are taken. The subject matter of Section 9 (1) is intricately connected with the subject matter of the decision making process referable to sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 7. In Aamendabai Tayebaly and others v. Competent Authority under SAFEMA and others (AIR 1998 SC 484) the Apex Court had held that a transfer subsequent to a notice under Section 6(1) shall be ignored in terms of the Act and such transfer will become null and void and that after the property is subsequently forfeited to the Central Government, it cannot be resurrected by recourse to Section 9, imposing fine in lieu of forfeiture. 13. That apart, Section 8 provides that the burden of proving that any property specified in the notice served under Section 6 is not illegally acquired property, is on the person against whom the proceedings are taken and therefore it is a matter within his knowledge, information and competence to claim that the fact situation established in a given case calls for the application of Section 9(1) of the Act. No such plea can be taken by a person like the petitioner who claims that he is a bona fide transferee, without the knowledge of the proceedings under the Act against his transferor Sri. K. Ummer. 14. Therefore, a contention based on Section 9 of the Act would be available only to the person against whom forfeiture proceedings are taken under the Act and not to a person claiming under him, as a transferee. For the aforesaid reasons, this writ petition fails. The same is dismissed. No costs.