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2007 DIGILAW 625 (CAL)

Haremohan Das v. Chandi Charan Jana

2007-08-16

SADHAN KUMAR GUPTA

body2007
Judgment :- (1) THIS Second Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Diamond Harbour in title Appeal No. 307 of 1993 affirming the judgment passed by the learned munsif, 2nd Additional Court, Diamond Harbour in Title Suit No. 78 of 1990. (2) CASE of the appellant is that he filed the Title Suit No. 78 of 1990, which was disposed of by the learned Munsif, 2nd Additional Court, Diamond harbour on 30th January, 1993. It was stated in the plaint by the plaintiff/ appellant that the suit property, as mentioned in the schedule of the plaint, originally belonged to the plaintiffs/appellants father Raghunath Das. He was a tenant under the Zamindars Sarojini Debi and Baroda Prasad Roy chowdhury at a yearly rental of Rs. 81/ -. Sarojini Debi had 7 annas rent receiving interest while Baroda had 9 annas rent receiving interest in respect of the said property. Although, Raghunath Das was possessing the suit property, still in the settlement record his name was recorded as non-occupancy raiyat. This recording was erroneous. (3) IN the subsequent settlement, the suit property was also recorded on the basis of C. S. record of rights and in it the name of Girish Jana and bina Pani Jana were recorded in respect of the suit property. Those two persons had no right, title and interest in respect of the suit property and as such, the recording of the names of those persons in the subsequent record of rights in respect of the suit property is apparently erroneous. As in the column No. 23 of the record of rights name of Raghunath Das was recorded, so Bina Pani and Girish filed a petition under Section 44 (2a) of the West bengal Estate Acquisition Act praying for rectification of the record of rights. Said proceeding was dismissed by the Revenue Officer, as Bina Pani and girish failed to produce any relevant document in support of their claim. (4) THE plaintiff has claimed that thereafter Raghunath Das became the tenant in respectofthe suit property underthe State of Westbengal and after the death of Raghunath Das, the plaintiff, being his only heir started possessing the suit property under the State of West Bengal. Although, he possessed the suit property but failed to pay the rent. (4) THE plaintiff has claimed that thereafter Raghunath Das became the tenant in respectofthe suit property underthe State of Westbengal and after the death of Raghunath Das, the plaintiff, being his only heir started possessing the suit property under the State of West Bengal. Although, he possessed the suit property but failed to pay the rent. But subsequently, on receipt of notice, the plaintiff paid all the arrear rent in respect of the suit property. (5) THE plaintiff has further claimed that Raghunath Das, during his life time, never surrendered the suit property in favour of Zamindars, viz. Sarojini debi and Baroda Prasad Roy Chowdhury. Those Zamindars never got delivery of possession from Raghunath Das during 1335 to 1336 B. S. Raghunath also never took tenancy from the Zamindars for a period of one year by way of executing Kabuliyat in favour of Sarojini Debi and Baroda Prasad on 26th shraban 1337 B. S. (6) THE plaintiff has further claimed that Bina Pani never took settlement of the suit property either from Sarojini Debi or from Baroda Prasad. According to the plaintiff, in order to create title in respect of the suit property, Bina pani and Girish Jana fraudulently manufactured some documents showing, sale of the suit property to different persons. Those transactions are all collusive in nature and no consideration was paid in those transactions. (7) ON the basis of those alleged transfer deeds, the defendants started claiming title in respect of the suit property and thereby threatened to dispossess the plaintiff. As such, as the title of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property became clouded, so he filed the suit praying for declaration and for permanent injunction. (8) THE suit was contested by the defendant Nos. 30, 31 (ka. ga and gha) by filing two written statements. The case of the defendants is that raghunath Das, father of the plaintiff, was a non-occupancy raiyat in respect of Khatian No. 28 under Sarojini Debi and Baroda Prasad of Bhawanipore Ward estate. Raghunath failed to pay the rent in time and became defaulter. As he was unable to pay the rent so he surrendered his right in the suit property in favour of Zamindars. The Zamindars took possession of the suit property. Raghunath failed to pay the rent in time and became defaulter. As he was unable to pay the rent so he surrendered his right in the suit property in favour of Zamindars. The Zamindars took possession of the suit property. Thereafter, in the year 1337 B. S. Raghunath again took Bandobasto from Sarojini debi and from Baroda Prasad Roy Chowdhury for cultivation for a period of one year only and in recognition of that he executed and registered one Kabuliyat. After the expiry of one year period, Raghunath handed over possession of the suit property in favour of the Zamindars who remained in possession of the suit property for about two years. Thereafter, Sarojini Debi gave Bandobasto of her 7 annas share in respect of the suit property along with some other properties in favour of Bina Pani Debi for indefinite period and the rent was fixed annually at twelve rupees three paise and at that time a sum of Rs. 650/- was also paid by Bina Pani Debi to the Zamindars towards selami. A lease deed to that effect was executed in between the parties on 30th Chaitra 1339 b. S. Said deed was registered by the power of attorney of Sarojini Debi viz. Amritalal Monda). Similarly, Baroda Prasad Roy Chowdhury gave Bandobasto of his 9 annas share in respect of the suit property together with some other plots in favour of Bina Pani Debi at an annual rental of fifteen rupees and 5 annas and received Rs. 854/-towards selami on 6th Poush 1340 B. S. The manager of the Estate of Baroda Prasad and Bina Pani Debi executed a bilateral lease deed to that effect. Since then Bina Pani Debi was in possession of the entire suit property by paying rent regularly. (9) SUBSEQUENTLY, Bina Pani Debi sold her 1/4 th share of the suit property to one Girish Chandra Jana. She also gifted her remaining land to the defendant No. 30 by executing a registered deed of gift on 23rd Jaishtha 1373 B. S. But in the said deed instead of Plot Nos. 192, 196 and 213, inadvertently it was mentioned Plot Nos. 292 and 296. Due to this wrong recording Tahashildar of the State of West Bengal threatened the defendant and as such, he filed Title Suit No. 167 of 1975 against the State of West bengal. 192, 196 and 213, inadvertently it was mentioned Plot Nos. 292 and 296. Due to this wrong recording Tahashildar of the State of West Bengal threatened the defendant and as such, he filed Title Suit No. 167 of 1975 against the State of West bengal. The suit was contested and a decree was passed in his favour. Since, then the defendant was possessing the suit property by way of paying rent etc. in favour of the Government. (10) WHILE the defendant No. 30 was in possession of the suit property, he sold. 14 cents of land of the Suit Plot No. 117 in favour of one Duranta kapat and others by a registered deed dated 28. 5. 1974. He also sold some portions of the suit property to Kapat Hat Balika Vidya Niketan by a deed dated 16. 4. 1977. He also sold some of the suit property in favour of Radha rani Haider by a deed dated 06. 9. 1961. (11) ACCORDING to the defendants since his surrender of the suit property, raghunath Das, father of the plaintiff, never paid any rent to the Zamindars. The State of West Bengal also never accepted the plaintiff as tenant nor the state issued any rent receipt in his favour in respect of the suit property. The defendants have further claimed that name of Raghunath Das was wrongly recorded in the R. S. record of rights, as admittedly he died before 1359 B. S. The defendants have claimed that since the plaintiff has no right, title and interest in the property in question and since they are enjoying the suit property by virtue of execution of the different sale deeds and since they are in long possession of the suit property by way of paying rent to the appropriate authority, the plaintiff cannot get a decree for declaration of his title in respect of the suit property, as prayed for. (12) UPON the above pleadings, the learned Munsif framed several issues and thereafter he was pleased to hold that the plaintiff failed to prove his title in respect of the suit property and as such, the suit was dismissed. As against this, an appeal was preferred by the plaintiff. But the learned 1st appellate Court, after considering the entire material-on- record, confirmed the judgment, as passed by the learned Trial Court. As against this, an appeal was preferred by the plaintiff. But the learned 1st appellate Court, after considering the entire material-on- record, confirmed the judgment, as passed by the learned Trial Court. (13) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment, as passed by both the Courts below, this second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff/appellant. (14) ON 13. 12. 1999, after hearing the learned Advocate for the appellant and on perusal of the materials-on-record, following substantial questions of law were framed:- " (1) Whether the learned Court of Appeal below erred in law in holding that the tenancy reverts back to the landlord on expiry of period of tenure without considering the provisions of Section 89 of the Bengal tenancy Act? (2) Whether in viewof the specific defence of the respondents to the effect that they have surrendered the tenancy to one of the landlords, the same, being in favour of one of the landlords, satisfies the requirements laid down under Section 86 of the Bengal Tenancy Act? (15) AT the time of hearing of the appeal, the learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that an application under Order XLI Rule 27 has been filed praying for acceptance of some documents as additional evidence on the grounds stated in the said petition. It appears from the said petition that the plaintiff/appellant wanted to bring it to the notice of this Court that he paid rent in respect of the suit property to the State Government. (16) LEARNED Advocate for the defendants/respondents submits that all those receipts show that the payment was made during the pendency of the suit/appeal and as such, he has got no objection if those documents are taken by this Court in this appeal as additional evidence. Under such circumstances, the prayer of the plaintiff/appellant is allowed. The documents which were filed along with CAN. No. 3695 of 2007 are accepted as additional evidence so far as this appeal is concerned. (17) BE that as it may, let us now see as to whether there is any scope for this Court to interfere with the concurrent finding of the Courts below in this second appeal. (18) AFTER hearing the learned Advocates for both the sides, it appears that it is the case of the plaintiff/appellant that the suit property originally belonged to the plaintiffs father Raghunath Das. (18) AFTER hearing the learned Advocates for both the sides, it appears that it is the case of the plaintiff/appellant that the suit property originally belonged to the plaintiffs father Raghunath Das. Name of Raghunath was recorded in the earlier record of rights but under the heading "non-occupancy raiyat". The plaintiff/appellant has claimed that Raghunath Das was a tenant under the Zamindars Sarojini Debi and Baroda Prasad Roy Chowdhury who had 7 annas and 9 annas rent receiving interest respectively in respect of the suit property. After the settlement, Raghunath was all along in possession of the suit property although, he was described in the record of rights wrongly as non-occupancy raiyat. The plaintiff/appellant has claimed that Raghunath never surrendered the tenancy in favour of the Zamindars, as claimed by the defendants/respondents. After the death of Raghunath the plaintiff became the owner of the suit property by way of inheritance and was in possession of the same. As the defendants/respondents threatened the title and possession of the plaintiff over the suit property by way of raising false claims, the plaintiff/appellant had to file the suit praying for declaration and injunction. (19) ON the other hand, the specific case of the defendants/respondent is that although, Raghunath was in possession of the suit property as a non-occupancy raiyat under the Zamindars, but subsequently Raghunath surrendered his tenancy in favour of the Zamindars and as a result of that, the possession of the suit property reverted back to the Zamindars. They have further claimed that thereafter Raghunath took a licence of the suit property for possessing the same for one year by executing a registered Kabuliyat afterthe expiry of the said one year period, the possession of the suit property came back to the landlords and while they were in possession the Zamindars gave bandobasto of the suit property. Bina Pani Debi took settlement of the suit property from the Zamindars in the year 1933. Since then the suit property was transferred to various persons by way of executing several deeds of transfer. After the surrender of the suit property by Raghunath he or his successor had no possession of the suit property and in fact they did not pay any rent either to the Zamindars or to the Government. Since then the suit property was transferred to various persons by way of executing several deeds of transfer. After the surrender of the suit property by Raghunath he or his successor had no possession of the suit property and in fact they did not pay any rent either to the Zamindars or to the Government. As such, the defendants/respondents claimed that since the plaintiff/appellant had no title or possession in respect of the suit property, so question of passing any declaration in his favour does not arise at all so far as suit property is concerned. (20) LEARNED Munsif was pleased to accept the contention of the defendants/respondents and dismissed the suit by holding that after the surrender Raghunath and his successor had no right, title and possession over the suit property Learned 1st Appellate Court also concurred with the view of the learned Munsif and dismissed the appeal preferred by the plaintiff/ appellant. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied, the plaintiff/appellant has filed this second appeal. (21) LEARNED Advocate for the appellant argued that first of all it should be held that the recording of the suit property in the name of Raghunath as non-occupancy raiyat had no basis at all. In fact, the name of Raghunath should have been recorded as a raiyat under the Zamindars in the record of rights. In this respect it is relevant to see the definition of "non-occupancy raiyat", as provided in the Bengal Tenancy Act (hereinafter referred to as the b. T. Act). In Section 4 (3) sub-section (c) it has been laid down that non-occupancy raiyat that is to say, raiyat not having such a right of occupancy. It necessarily means that the non-occupancy raiyats position is not similar with the raiyat in respect of the property for which his name was recorded in the record of rights. He could enjoy very limited right in respect of the property in question. So recording of the suit property in the name of Raghunath under the category of non-occupancy raiyat does not give any special right to him for claiming title in respect of those properties. Learned Advocate for the appellant argued that this recording of the name of Raghunath in the record of rights has no basis at all. So recording of the suit property in the name of Raghunath under the category of non-occupancy raiyat does not give any special right to him for claiming title in respect of those properties. Learned Advocate for the appellant argued that this recording of the name of Raghunath in the record of rights has no basis at all. But it is the settled position that in order to establish that an entry in the record of rights is wrong and without basis, onus lies on the person who is claiming the same. So far as this suit is concerned, it appears that the evidence on the side of the plaintiff is practically nil in this respect. There is nothing on record to establish that this recording of the name of Raghunath as non-occupancy raiyat in respect of the suit property was baseless. As such, this argument of the learned Advocate for the appellant cannot be accepted. (22) BE that as it may, there is no dispute that initially Raghunath was a tenant under the Zamindars. But the defendants/respondents have claimed that Raghunath surrendered the tenancy in favour of the Zamindars who, in turn, took back the possession of the suit property. It has further been claimed by the defendants/respondents that thereafter Raghunath again obtained a licence from the Zamindars for one year in respect of the suit property and in recognition of that he executed a registered Kabuliyat in favour of Sarojini Debi, one of the Zamindars on 07. 8. 1930. This document was marked as Exhibit-L before the learned Court below. So apart from the oral evidence, there is documentary evidence in support of this claim of the defendants/respondents. But the learned Advocate for the appellant argued that in order to surrender a tenancy in favour of the landlord by a tenant, special provisions have been made in the B. T. Act. Section 86 of the B. T. Act provides that learned Advocate for the appellant this provision means that"a raiyat or under-raiyat not bound by lease or other agreement for a fixed period may, at the end of any agricultural year, surrender his holding". According to the before the agricultural year the surrender could not take place. Section 86 of the B. T. Act provides that learned Advocate for the appellant this provision means that"a raiyat or under-raiyat not bound by lease or other agreement for a fixed period may, at the end of any agricultural year, surrender his holding". According to the before the agricultural year the surrender could not take place. But as per document and as per oral claim of the defendants/respondents, this alleged surrender took place before the end of the agricultural year and as such, it should be presumed that there was no proper surrender at all. The learned Advocate for the appellant further drew my attention to the provisions of Section 89 of the B. T. Act, wherein it has been provided that "no tenant shall be ejected from his tenure or holding except in execution of a decree". By referring to this provision. the learned Advocate for the appellant wanted to impress upon this Court that unless there is a decree from a competent Civil Court, the Zamindars could not accept the surrender of the tenant and to take possession of the property in question. But so far as this suit is concerned, learned Advocate for the appellant argued that there is practically no evidence as to whether the surrender was made at the end of the agricultural year and whether possession was taken by the Zamindars by virtue of a decree of a Court. By pointing out all these things, learned advocate for the appellant argued that since there is no acceptable and believable evidence in respect of the alleged surrender of the suit property by raghunath, so no importance can be given to this claim that Raghunath surrendered the suit property in favour of the Zamindars. According to him, as there is no such evidence, so it should be presumed that Zamindars did not take back the possession of the suit property and consequently it must be held that Raghunath continued with his possession of the suit property. But it appears that so far as the present suit property is concerned, there is no question of taking possession by the Zamindars forcibly by way of evicting raghunath. But it appears that so far as the present suit property is concerned, there is no question of taking possession by the Zamindars forcibly by way of evicting raghunath. Section 89 of the B. T. Act provides a safeguard for the tenant in respect of his eviction from the suit property by the Zamindars and it was clearly laid down that the Zamindars could not evict a tenant without recourse to a decree of the Civil Court. But that does not mean that even if the raiyat surrendered his interest voluntarily, the Zamindars could not take back possession by virtue of such surrender. The special provision of surrender, as made in the Act justifies the claim that a raiyat was within his competence to surrender his tenancy at any time in favour of the Zamindars and if that was done then it is not obligatory for the Zamindars to observe the other formalities which have been provided in the B,t. Act. As such, I am unable to agree with this argument of the learned Advocate for the appellant. (23) LET us now see whether the defendants/respondents have been able to establish that in fact there was a surrender of the suit property by raghunath Das in favour of the erstwhile Zamindars. In this respect it appears from the Exhibit-L that there was a registered Kabuliyat executed by Raghunath in favour of Sarojini Debi, the landlady, on 7. 8. 1930. The contents of the kabufiyat clearly suggests that Raghunath undertook to remain in possession of the suit property for one year and thereafter he would return back the possession in favour of the Zamindars. This document was executed in the year 1930 and it was a registered document. Normally, such a document cannot be disbelieved by the Court unless it is established otherwise by the party, who is challenging the same. As there is no such evidence, so there cannot be any reason to disbelieve the Exhibit - L. (24) THE learned Advocate for the appellant further argued that since raghunath continued with his possession in the suit property, so it must be presumed that Kabuliyat in question, as allegedly executed by Raghunath, was obtained by way of fraud. As against this, learned Advocate for the defendants/respondents submits that it is for the plaintiff/appellant to establish that such a document was manufactured by practicing fraud. As against this, learned Advocate for the defendants/respondents submits that it is for the plaintiff/appellant to establish that such a document was manufactured by practicing fraud. Unless fraud is established, a document cannot be disbelieved by the Court. In this respect he has relied upon the decision reported in AIR 1951 Privy Council 93 (AL. N narayanan Chettyar v. Official Assignees, High Court); AIR 1918 Cal 398 (Amjad Ali Hazi and Ors. v. Ismail and Ors), AIR 1986 M. P. 106 (Hajra Bai and Ors. v. Jadavbai). Since there is no material to show that this Exhibit-L viz. the deed of Kabuliyat was obtained by fraud, I hold that both the Courts below were perfectly justified in relying upon such document. So the fact remains that the defendants/respondents have been able to prove that Raghunath executed a Kabuliyat deed in favour of the Zamindars, wherein he clearly undertook to handover possession of the suit property after one year. (25) LEARNED Advocate for the appellant further argued by citing decisions reported in 1996 (3) SCC 424 (Gopalan Krishnan Kutty v. K. P. Sarojini Amma)AIR 2000 A. P. 417 (S. A. Wall Quadri v. Sadar Anjuman-e-lsmalia), 6 Cal LJ 72 (Bama Charan Chowdhury and Ors. v. Administrator General of Bengal executor to the Estate of Kumar Inddra Chandra Singh Bahadur) and AIR 1975 SC 915 (Ram Chandra Keshavadke v. Govind Joti Chavase and Ors.) in order to substantiate his claim that no inference of surrender could be drawn unless there is clearly and cogent evidence to that effect. According to him, surrender of the lease cannot be inferred with and it must be proved on evidence. The principle, as decided in those decisions, are undisputed. At the same time it appears that in the decision reported in 5 CWN 351 (Khonka abdur Rahaman v. AH Hafez and Crs.), which was followed in the decision reported in 22 CWN 441 (Meyer v. Bengal Coal Co. Ltd.) it was clearly held that a surrender of tenancy can be made without written document. So far as this suit is concerned, it appears that there was a valid kabuliyat executed by Raghunath Das in favour of Zamindars, wherein he undertook to return back the possession of the suit property after one year. Ltd.) it was clearly held that a surrender of tenancy can be made without written document. So far as this suit is concerned, it appears that there was a valid kabuliyat executed by Raghunath Das in favour of Zamindars, wherein he undertook to return back the possession of the suit property after one year. This registered document, which was executed in the year 1930 clearly gives rise to the inference that Raghunath must have surrendered his tenancy in favour of the zamindars otherwise there would not have been any occasion for him to execute the kabuliyat in question. As such, from the materials-on-record it must be said that the defendants/respondents have been able to prove that raghunath actually surrendered the suit property in favour of the Zamindars. (26) IT further appears from the Exhibit-L-1 and Exhibit-L-2 that few years after the surrender the Zamindars settled the suit property in favour of bina Pani Debi. The defendants/respondents filed several registered documents to show that thereafter the suit properties were transferred from time to time by executing several registered deeds of transfer including one deed in favour of one Girls School. This shows that the settlement, as was made by Exhibit-L-1 and L-2 was actually acted upon and it necessarily means that by virtue of those two deeds Bina Pani came into possession of the suit properties. (27) LEARNED Advocate for the appellant argued that the suit properties were under the control of the Court of Wards and as such, without the permission of the said authority the properties could not be settled in favour in favour Bina Pani, as claimed by the defendants/respondents. But it appears from the Exhibit-L-2 that there it was mentioned that the order of the Board of Revenue was obtained regarding appointment of manager. So the claim of the appellant that the persons who executed those deeds had no authority at the relevant time, has not been substantiated. As such, there is no reason to disbelieve those registered documents, as executed on behalf of the zamindars in favour of Bina Pani Debi. (28) I have already pointed out that after the settlement Bina Pani Debi transferred the suit properties from time to time and various other persons including one Girfs School came into possession in respect of the suit properties. (28) I have already pointed out that after the settlement Bina Pani Debi transferred the suit properties from time to time and various other persons including one Girfs School came into possession in respect of the suit properties. lt necessarily means that Raghunath or his successor, the plaintiff/ appellant herein, had no possession over the suit properties. An attempt has been made by the plaintiff/appellant to establish his possession over the suit properties by pointing out the fact that those properties were recorded in the name of Raghunath in the R. S. record of rights. But admittedly at the time of R. S. recording Raghunath was dead. This will clearly appear from the deed executed by the plaintiff on 06. 6. 1952 which has been marked as. Exhibit-A-10. So, recording of the name of Raghunath in the R. S. record of rights must be held to be erroneous and without any basis whatsoever. So this entry in the record of rights can in no way establishes the alleged possession of the present plaintiff/appellant in the suit property. (29) LEARNED Advocate for the appellant pointed out that previously the defendants/respondents filed a petition under Section 44 (2a) of the Estate acquisition Act before the Revenue authority challenging this recording of the suit properties in the R. S. record of rights. That petition was rejected by the Revenue Authority and as such, it must be held that the defendants/ respondents failed to establish their title in the suit properties. But I regret i cannot agree with this argument Recording of the name of person in the record of rights does not necessarily create any title in his favour. Even if a persons name is omitted in the record of rights wrongly, then also there is no bar for the said person to challenge the said recording in respect of a particular property before a Civil Court in order to establish his title and possession. So long his possession is not disturbed, he is not bound to file any suit praying for such declaration. But since here the plaintiff/appellant has filed the suit claiming right, title and possession over the suit properties, the defendants/respondents had the opportunity to show that they are the actual owners of the said properties and also they are in possession of the same. But since here the plaintiff/appellant has filed the suit claiming right, title and possession over the suit properties, the defendants/respondents had the opportunity to show that they are the actual owners of the said properties and also they are in possession of the same. The defendants/respondents have filed series of rent receipts which have been marked as exhibits in the trial Court. This supports their claim that they are in possession of the suit property. On the other hand, the plaintiff/appellant has failed to produce any rent receipt showing that either he or his predecessors-in-interest were in possession of the suit property after the surrender in question. Only some rent receipts have been filed at the time of hearing of the Second Appeal by way of filing a petition under order XLI Rule 27 of Code of Civil Procedure for treating the same as additional evidence. Even if we accept those documents as additional evidence, then also there will be no improvement of the case of the plaintiff/appellant, because those rent receipts were granted during the pendency of this appeal. Naturally no importance should be attached to those rent receipts, as claimed by the learned Advocate for the appellant. (30) FROM the discussions, as made above I have got no hesitation to hold that the defendants/respondents have been able to prove that they have legal and valid title in respect of the suit properties by virtue of the settlement as well as by subsequent transfer deeds in their favour and as such, the question of declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff/appellant does not arise at all. (31) LEARNED Advocate for the appellant further argued that so far as this dispute in between the parties is concerned, main thing that is to be considered is whether Raghunath actually surrendered the suit properties or not. But the learned Courts below did not frame any issue in this respect and as such, according to the learned Advocate for the appellant the case of the parties was not considered properly and the judgments, as passed by both the Courts below suffer from perversity giving scope to the High Court to interfere with the matter by way of remanding the same to the Courts below. In this respect he has relied upon the decisions reported in 2003 (9) SCC 245 (Manikkoth Narayani Amma-and Ors. In this respect he has relied upon the decisions reported in 2003 (9) SCC 245 (Manikkoth Narayani Amma-and Ors. v. P. C. Kalliani Amma and Ors.) and 2004 (4) SCC 161 (Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihalsingh and Ors.). Undoubtedly, it is the settled position of law that the High Court in a second appeal normally should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But at the same time if it appears to the High Court that the judgments, as passed by the learned Courts below are the result of non-appreciation of the materials-on-record resulting in perversity, then it is always open for the High Court to interfere with the matter. But so far as this appeal is concerned, it appears that although, both the Courts below did not frame specific issue regarding the surrender of the suit properties by Raghunath Das, still it appears from the judgments that in fact the question of surrender was extensively discussed and thereafter a conclusion was arrived at. Under such circumstances, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Advocate for the plaintiff/ appellant that the judgments, as passed by the learned Courts below suffer from perversity, giving scope for this High Court to interfere at this stage. (32) THEREFORE, from my above discussion, I am of opinion, that both the courts below were justified in holding that there was legal and valid surrender of the suit properties in favour of the Zamindars by Raghunath Das and accordingly Raghunath Das and his successor, being the plaintiff/appellant of this suit/appeal, lost all the right, title and possession in the suit properties and as such they are not entitled to get the decree of declaration of title and permanent injunction, as prayed for in the suit. In my considered opinion, both the Courts below were perfectly justified in dismissing the suit and i find no reason whatsoever to interfere with the said concurrent findings of the Courts below. The questions, as framed in this appeal are answered accordingly. (33) IN the result, the appeal and the same is dismissed on contest with costs. C. A. N. No. 3695 of 2007 stands disposed of.