JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 14.8.2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge(Fast Track) Anupgarh District Sri Ganganagar, in Sessions case No.117/2001 whereby he convicted the accused appellant for offence under Sections 363 & 376 IPC.For offence under Section 363 IPC he sentenced the accused appellant for 5 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine to further under go for 2 months rigorous imprisonment and for offence under Section 376 IPC, he sentenced him for 10 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.500/- and in default of payment of fine , to further under go two months rigorous imprisonment. Both the sentences ordered to run concurrently. 2. Prosecution case is as under : On 21.3.2001 at about 8- 9 P. M.in village Nirwana P.S.Suratgarh District Sri Ganganagar, Complaint was filed by Mukhityar Singh son of Santa Singh by caste Raisikh that his daughter Kumari Sukhvinder Kaur aged 7 years was playing in front of his house and at that time Darshan Singh by alluring her for giving toffees took her in nearby nursary near water diggi and rapped her.His daughter Sukhvinder Kaur was playing in front of his house. On asking Chinderpal singh, he informed that Darshan Singh took her for toffees. Sukhivinder Kaur narrated whole story before her mother that Darshan Singh call her for giving toffees and put off her clothes and do bad work (Burakam) on her. His wife physically examined her daughter and found bleeding. On asking Darshan, he denied for the same. On this report, an F.I.R.No.168/2001 P.S.Suratgarh (Ex.P-17) was registered for offences under sections 363, and 376 IPC. 3. After completion of investigation, police filed challan against the accused appellant before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Suratgarh, who on 30.5.2001 committed the case to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge No.2, Sri Gangangar camp Suratgarh who transferred the Sessions Case No.117/2001 who transferred the case on 1.11.2001 to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Anupgarh District Sri Gangangar, for trial of the case. 4. After hearing the accused appellant on charge, learned Judge framed charge for offences under sections 363, 376(2) (cha) IPC which were read over to accused person. He denied the same and claimed trial. 5. During trial, prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.18 i.e in all eighteen witnesses and produced documents exhibited. 4. After hearing the accused appellant on charge, learned Judge framed charge for offences under sections 363, 376(2) (cha) IPC which were read over to accused person. He denied the same and claimed trial. 5. During trial, prosecution examined P.W.1 to P.W.18 i.e in all eighteen witnesses and produced documents exhibited. Thereafter statement of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded in which accused appellant claimed innocence and vengeance and also stated that he has been falsely implicated due enemity. No defence evidence was produced by the accused. 6. After considering the evidence of the parties documentary as well as oral, the learned Additional Sessions Judge Fast Track,Anupgarh district Sri Ganganagar convicted and sentenced the accused appellant as stated here-in-before, so this appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant criticised the judgment of the trial court that the conviction of the accused appellant was illegal and unwarranted. In assailing the conviction, learned counsel for the appellant took various points on which I proposed to deal with as under : (i)It was pointed out by the learned counsel that there was a delay in lodging the report of the occurrence to police and that makes the entire prosecution story highly suspicious . He stated that police report was delayed by 9 hours. For this objection it is clearly come on record that police report Ex-P 17 shows that occurrence took place at 9 P.M. on 21.3.2001 whereas the matter reported on next day at 6.30 A.M. whereas distance of police station is 32 K.M. And the parents of prosecutrix P.W.13 Sukhvinder Kaur along with Mukhityar Singh P.W.12 and Pl.W.14 Paramjeet Kaur reached at police station at 3 A.M., looking to the distance and explanation given by the parents and other circumstances, delay of some hours cannot be made a ground to reject the whole prosecution story and objection cannot be sustained, therefore, objection is rejected. (ii) Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the prosecutrix P.W.13 Sukhvinder Kaur is a child of tender age of 7-8 years and thus, her evidence especially in this case is of child witness and for this it is necessary that such evidence should be seen and appreciated by the Court with due care and caution with the intent to ascertain that child is competent to justify the statement and in this matter no other eyewitness, so that evidence cannot be acted upon. It is well settled that the testimony of a child witness should only be accepted after the greatest caution and circumspection. The rational for this is that it is common experience that a child witness is most susceptible to tutoring. Both on account of fear and and inducement,he can be made to depose about things which he has not seen and once having been tutored, he goes on repeating in a parrot like manner what he has been tutored to state.That his book 'Outlines of Criminal Law'(page 386) Dr. KENNY DOWING (Professor of 'Laws of England' Cambridge University) stated as under:- "Children are most untrustworthy class of witnesses, for whom of a tender age as our common experience teaches us, they often mistake dreams for reality, repeat glibly as of their own knowledge what they have heard of others and greatly influenced by fear of punishment, by hope of reward and desire of notoriety." Rameshwar Kalyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1952 SC 54 ) the Apex Court observed that in the case of a child, it depends on capacity of the child, his appreciation of the differences between truth and falsehood as well as his duty to tell the former. The decision of this question rests with the trial Judge, who sees the proposed witness, notices his manner, his apparent possession or lack of intelligence. The trial Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose the capacity and intelligence and in the case of an oath, his understanding of the obligation of an oath.I have considered this submission. The trial Judge may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose the capacity and intelligence and in the case of an oath, his understanding of the obligation of an oath.I have considered this submission. Section 118 of Indian Evidence Act provides that the tender age of a child witness is to be taken with utmost care and caution and there should be close scrutiny of evidence of child before the same is accepted by the Court.In Inder Singh v. State of Pepsu (AIR 1953 Pepsu 193), it has been observed that the competency of a child to give evidence is not regulated by the age but by the decree of understanding he appears to possess.In Korangappa v. State of Kerala, (ILR (1967) 1 Ker 30), it has been held that there is no legal impediment to the admissibility of evidence of child.In Ghewar Ram v. State of Rajasthan {2001 Cr.L.J.4460 (para 16(Raj)}, it has been held that the evidence of a child witness is generally admissible in evidence but the quantum of weight to be attached to it, is a matter of consideration for the Court.In practice, it is not un-usual to receive the testimony of children of 8 or 9 years of age when they appear to possess sufficient understanding (Arulan Israel v. State, ILR,(1954) TC 1200). It is well settled that in a case of rape statement of prosecutrix is very important. Since in such cases normally direct evidence is not available and the Court is required to draw its own conclusion from the attending circumstances. The prosecutrix of sex offence cannot be put at part with accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. The evidence Act nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is corroborated in material particulars. In the instant case , prosecutrix is aged 7- 8 years and is a competent witness under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act and her evidence must receive the same weight as it attached to an injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must attach in evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. The same degree of care and caution must attach in evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is that the court must be alive to and conscious of the fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a person who is interested in the out come of the charge levelled by her. The onus to prove that the accused committed sexual intercourse with prosecutrix without her consent and against her will as laid down in Section 375 IPC is on the prosecution.Having closely analysed the material on record , I find that evidence of prosecutrix P.W.13 Sukhvinder Kaur could not be shattered in cross-examination and she categorically deposed that the appellant committed sexual intercourse with her against her will and there was bleeding from vaginal part , and thus, this was corroborated by her mother Paramjeet Kuar P.W.14 as well as Medical Officer P.W.6 Dr.Ratan Lal Agarwal and ,thus, after going through this evidence only on account of being the tender age , this evidence cannot be dis-believed and prosecution, in my opinion has able to established charges under Sections 363 and 376 IPC against the accused and trial Court has rightly convicted the accused appellant after due deliberation. Thus, the contentions cannot be accepted and deserves to be rejected. Hence, the same is rejected. (iii)Learned counsel further argued that no offence under Section 376 IPC is made out because there is no medical corroboration for the penetration, though, prosecutrix stated that there was sexual intercourse with her but the medical evidence does not support her on this material point and especially the prosecutrix is aged 7-8 years whereas appellant is of 22 years age so in case of rape injury is must on private parts of the prosecutrix which is lacking in this case. The offence is made out even if any partial penetration is admitted then it will constitute rape. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention relied on the case Bagdi Ram v. State of Rajasthan RLW1984 page 10. This contention requires consideration. 8. The medical examination of prosecutrix P.W.13 made vide Ex P-4 which runs as under:- "Genital Examination.- Public hair absent.Labia majora & minora are red congested. There is a tear on the posterior fornix of vagina C' bleeding on touch. Hymen is red & congested. This contention requires consideration. 8. The medical examination of prosecutrix P.W.13 made vide Ex P-4 which runs as under:- "Genital Examination.- Public hair absent.Labia majora & minora are red congested. There is a tear on the posterior fornix of vagina C' bleeding on touch. Hymen is red & congested. Vaginal on- fice (orifice) is very tight - hardy admits little finger on examination. Vagina is tender & painful." Medical Officer Dr. Ratan Lal Agarwal P.W.6 on the above facts gave opinion "On the above findings it appears that (Rape) sexual inter course has been done ." 9. Learned counsel for the appellant on this point relied on the cross-examination of Dr. Ratan Lal Agarwal P.W.6 wherein he said, " lkr lky dh mez esa ;ksfu dk }kj bruk VkbZV gksrk gS fd lkekU; rkSj ij ;fn toku mez dk O;fDr laHkksx djsa rks isful dk isuhV~s'ku gksuk vR;f/kd eqf'dy gSA " 10. It was argued by the learned Public Prosecutor that as per explanation annexed to Section 375 IPC, penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse to make out the offence of rape, it is immaterial to what extent and depth, the penetration has taken place. It was urged that even partial penetration has been accepted as sexual intercourse sufficient to make out the offence of rape. 11. Learned Public Prosecutor supported the judgment of the trial Court and stated that as per this cross-examination of Medical Officer, penetration might very difficult but it is not impossible as per Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology -Twenty First Edition at page 375 made it clear that in small children the hymen is not usually ruptured , but may become red and congested along with the inflammation and bruising of the labia. If considerable violence is used, there is often laceration of fourchette and perinaeum. 12. Learned Public Prosecutor also contended that appellant's counsel ruling relied Bagdi Ram v. State of Rajasthan is not applicable to the facts of the case as per the statement of doctor that there had been sexual act out side the vagina and up to the portion below the hymen, but there was no penetration into the hymen. Thus, this case is distinguishable from that one because in that case Medical Officer has sufficient stated that there was no penetration into hymen. 13. Thus, this case is distinguishable from that one because in that case Medical Officer has sufficient stated that there was no penetration into hymen. 13. Taken into the contentions raised by both the sides, it is true that all that is required to make offence of rape is that private parts of male must be inserted in those of female. As such even partial penetration is sufficient to constitute offence under Section 375 IPC. Prosecutrix PW.13 Sukhvinder Kaur deposed that penetration was fully and there was bleeding from her private part and that statement is corroborated by both parents and the Medical Officer and ruling cited by the counsel for the appellant cannot be applied and as per Modi 's Medical Jurisprudence , this may be possible in cases of small children that hymen is not usually rupture and looking to the facts and evidence produced, objection cannot be sustained and must be rejected. 14. For the reasons stated hereinabove, this is not a case to interference in the findings of the trial Court, judgment & order ,and this appeal of the appellant 's cannot be allowed and deserves to be dismissed. 15. In the result, the appeal of the accused appellant,Darshan Singh, is dismissed and his conviction under Section 363 and 376(2)(cha) IPC with fines, as ordered by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) Anupgarh,District Sri Ganganagar in Sessions Case No.117/2001 are upheld and maintained.Appeal dismissed. *******