1. This is an appeal preferred by the insurer, under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('the M.V. Act') against the award, dated 11.4.2003, passed, in Mac Case No. 207 of 2001, by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Darrang, whereby the learned Tribunal has directed the insurer-appellant to pay, in all, a sum of Rs. 1,87,000 as compensation to the claimant-respondent No. 1 with interest @ 9% per annum on the awarded amount with effect from the date of making of the claim application. 2. I have heard Mr. S. K Singh, learned counsel for the insurer-appellant, and Mr. S.C. Biswas, learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the claimant-respondent. 3. The case of the claimant-respondent No. 1 herein may, in brief, be described, thus: On 15.3.2001, while the claimant was driving the offending vehicle, which belonged to his wife, i.e., the respondent No. 2 herein, from Gauhati to Mangaldoi, the vehicle caught fire due to some mechanical defect. The claimant lost control on the vehicle and the vehicle dashed against a tree standing by the side of the road. As a result of the said accident, the claimant suffered fracture of the shaft of his right femur and lost his two teeth. The claimant was admitted into a hospital, on 15.3.2001 itself, at Guwahati and discharged from there on 26.3.2001. For the injuries sustained on his leg, the claimant had to undergo intra-medellary nailing on 16.3.2001. Even after his release from the hospital, the claimant has continued to remain under treatment as an indoor patient of the said hospital and he is, even today, required to visit the hospital regularly for check up and treatment and as the claimant had lost two central (upper) incisor teeth in the accident, an artificial denture has been implanted into his upper jaw, which has resulted into reduction of his chewing capacity. This apart, because of the injuries suffered by him on his leg, the claimant is unable to walk properly. Thus, the claimant, who is a lawyer, aged about 39 years, suffered from 'permanent disablement'. The claimant, accordingly, sought for compensation of a sum of Rs. 5 lakh. 4. This apart, because of the injuries suffered by him on his leg, the claimant is unable to walk properly. Thus, the claimant, who is a lawyer, aged about 39 years, suffered from 'permanent disablement'. The claimant, accordingly, sought for compensation of a sum of Rs. 5 lakh. 4. The owner of the offending vehicle filed her written statement supporting the case of the claimant by contending, inter alia, that the compensation, if any, shall be payable by the insurer inasmuch as the vehicle stood comprehensibly insured on the date of the accident. The insurer also filed their written statement and contested the claim contending, inter alia, that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the claimant was not entitled to any compensation. The insurer did not, however, seek, or was granted, permission, under section 170 of the M.V. Act, to contest the claim on grounds other than the statutory grounds available to an insurer under sub-section (2) of section 149 of the M.V. Act. 5. Upon considering the evidence on record, the learned Tribunal passed the award, as indicated hereinabove, directing the payment to be made to the claimant. 6. The first contention of the insurer-appellant is that though the claimant had not mentioned the provisions of the M.V. Act, whereunder he had made the claim for compensation, the learned Tribunal treated the claim application as an application made under section 166 of the M.V. Act and accordingly, granted, in tune with the prayer made by the claimant in his claim application, a sum of Rs. 25,000 as compensation on the basis of no-fault in terms of the provisions of section 140 of the M.V. Act, but the claimant failed to establish any fault and, hence, in such circumstances, no claim, under section 166 of the M.V. Act, could have been allowed. In the alternative, it is submitted that even if the claim application was treated as one under section 163A of the M.V. Act (as has been treated by the learned Tribunal) at the time of passing the impugned award), the claim application could not have been allowed, for, there is no evidence on record to show that the claimant had sustained 'permanent disablement' within the meaning of section 163A of the M.V. Act. 7. 7. Resisting the submissions, so made, it is contended, on behalf of the claimant, that the claimant sustained 'permanent disablement', though may be partial in nature, and when it was not the claimant's case that the said accident had taken place due to any fault, the claim application, in question, has been rightly treated as an application under section 163Aand, therefore, the compensation, granted by the learned Tribunal, calls for no interference. 8. While considering the question as to whether the present claim application ought to have been treated as an application under section 166 of the M.V. Act or it was really an application under section 163A, it is imperative that the distinction between the provisions for compensation contained in section 166 vis-a-vis section 163A is taken note of. 9. While dealing with the above aspect of the matter, it is of paramount importance to note that an application for compensation can be made, under the scheme of the M.V. Act, either under section 166 or under section 163A. If a compensation is, claimed under section 166, the claimant has the responsibility to prove that the accident, in question, took place due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle; but if an application for compensation is made under section 163A, no negligence, wrongful act or default on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle need be proved. Similarly, when an application is made under section 163A, the Schedule framed under section 163A cast certain limitations on the powers of the Tribunal, while awarding the compensation. For instance, while considering an application made under section 163A, though the Tribunal can direct payment of the medical expenses actually incurred by a claimant, it cannot direct payment of medical expenses exceeding Rs. 15,000 even if the expenses incurred is more than under section 163A. However, when an application is made under section 166, the Tribunal's powers suffer from no such limitation inasmuch as it can direct payment of medical expenses incurred by the claimant, whatever may be the amount so incurred and even if the amount exceeds the sum of Rs. 15,000. Similarly, when the application is made under section 166, the Tribunal can grant compensation of an amount exceeding Rs. 5,000 in the case of grievous injuries and an amount exceeding Rs. 15,000. Similarly, when the application is made under section 166, the Tribunal can grant compensation of an amount exceeding Rs. 5,000 in the case of grievous injuries and an amount exceeding Rs. 1,000 in the case of non-grievous injuries provided that the nature of the case set up by the claimant so warrants, {See Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bina Bhattacharjee & Ors., (2005) 3 GLR 380.} 10. I may pause here to point out that the Indian Motor Vehicles Act, 1914, which was the first enactment relating to motor vehicles, in India, was replaced by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which consolidated and amended the laws relating to the motor vehicles in India. I may also point out that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which was based on the Fatal Accident Act, 1855, recognized award of compensation solely based on the law of torts. The year 1956 saw, for the first time, birth of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals in India, which were established to expedite the process of determination of cases for compensation arising out of motor vehicular accidents. However, proof of negligence remained embodied as a condition precedent for grant of compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It was section 92Aof the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which introduced, in the year 1982, the first departure from the usual common law principle that a claimant must establish negligence on the part of the owner or the driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disability caused on account of a motor vehicular accident. 11. It is worth noticing that section 92Aof the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, stood replaced by section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, when the latter statute came into force. 11. It is worth noticing that section 92Aof the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, stood replaced by section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, when the latter statute came into force. Since section 92A is replaced by section 140 and sub-section (3) of section 140 embodies the same provisions as were contained in the sub-section (3) of section 92A, it logically follows that even after coming into force of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Apex Court's decision in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Another, AIR 1987 SC 1690 still holds the field and the effect is that for receiving compensation on the basis of no-fault liability under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement, in respect of which the claim has been made, was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. In other words, regardless of the fact as to whether the victim, as injured or as legal representative of the person, who died in a motor vehicular accident, pleads and/or establishes or not that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person, the victim can maintain his application under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 12. Turning to section 163A, which is the real subject-matter of controversy at hand, it may be pointed out that no provision, such as, the one that we have, now, in the form of section 163A, existed in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. No such provision existed even in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, when this Act, initially, came into force. As a matter of fact, section 163Ahas been introduced by amendment Act No. 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994 as against the fixed minimum interim compensation awardable, on the principle of no-fault, under section 140, which merges, in terms of section 141, in the final award to be made on the basis of 'fault liability' under section 166. 13. As a matter of fact, section 163Ahas been introduced by amendment Act No. 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994 as against the fixed minimum interim compensation awardable, on the principle of no-fault, under section 140, which merges, in terms of section 141, in the final award to be made on the basis of 'fault liability' under section 166. 13. Section 163A allows a victim of a motor vehicular accident to obtain a final award of compensation based on the structured formula contained in the 2nd Schedule to the Act and such compensation may be obtained without the claimant being required to plead or establish that the injuries sustained or death caused was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other persons. The compensation finally payable under section 163A is, however, materially different from the minimum prescribed compensation payable under section 140, though both these provisions dispense with the proof of negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other persons. 14. In fact, the present Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, provides an option to the claimant to obtain interim compensation under section 140 being the minimum prescribed compensation until final adjudication of his claim, under section 166, on the basis of 'fault liability'. In the final award, which may be so reached, would get merged the interim compensation, if any, already received by the claimant under section 140 on the basis of 'no-fault liability'. The other course, which the claimant can opt for, is to obtain a final award of compensation on the basis of structured formula as depicted in the 2nd Schedule under section 163A. The provisions embodied in section 166 as well as under section 163A have both advantages as well as disadvantages appended thereto. For instance, while section 166 requires proof of fault as a condition precedent for granting of compensation, there is no ceiling in the amount of compensation, which can be granted under section 166, and, further, section 166 can be resorted to irrespective of the income of the person, who has sustained injuries or met with death. As against this, while section 163A dispenses with the proof of fault, this section (i.e., section 163A) can be resorted to only when the annual income of the deceased does not exceed Rs. 40,000. As against this, while section 163A dispenses with the proof of fault, this section (i.e., section 163A) can be resorted to only when the annual income of the deceased does not exceed Rs. 40,000. Similarly, while in section 166, as already indicated hereinbefore, there is no limit to which expenses for treatment incurred by the injured can be awarded, the total medical expenses to be awarded cannot, in a proceeding under section 163A, exceed Rs. 15,000. There are several other such limitations if one takes recourse to section 163A for obtaining compensation. For instance, the loss of consortium under section 163A is limited to Rs. 5,000 whereas, in the light of the decision in Lata Wadha & Others v. State of Bihar & Others, (2001) 8 SCC 197 , the consortium can be, in an appropriate case, as high as Rs. 50,000 in a proceeding for compensation under section 166. Yet another advantage of taking recourse to section 163Ais that it reduces the delay, which, ordinarily, occurs due to the fact that the claimant is required to prove fault. Noticing some of these prominently distinguishing features of section 163A, the Apex Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Others v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2004) 5 SCC 385 , observed as follows: "Section 140 of the Act dealt with interim compensation but by inserting section 163A, the Parliament intended to provide for making of an award consisting of a pre-determined sum without insisting on a long-drawn trial or without proof of negligence in causing the accident. The Amendment was, thus, a deviation from the common law liability under the Law of Torts and was also in derogation of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act. The Act and the Rules framed by the State in no uncertain terms suggest that a new device was sought to be evolved so as to grant a quick and efficacious relief to the victims falling within the specified category. The heirs of the deceased or the victims in terms of the said provisions were assured of a speedy and effective remedy which was not available to the claimants under section 166 of the Act. Chapter XI was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a section of people whose annual income is not more than Rs. The heirs of the deceased or the victims in terms of the said provisions were assured of a speedy and effective remedy which was not available to the claimants under section 166 of the Act. Chapter XI was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a section of people whose annual income is not more than Rs. 40,000 having regard to the fact that in terms of section 163Aof the Act read with the Second Schedule appended thereto compensation is to be paid on a structured formula not only having regard to the age of the victim and his income but also the other factors relevant therefor. An award made thereunder, therefore, shall be in full and final settlement of the claim as would appear from the different columns contained in the Second Schedule appended to the Act. The same is not interim in nature. **** ***** ******* Payment of the amount in terms of section 140 of the Act is ad hoc in nature. A claim made thereunder, as has been noticed hereinbefore, is in addition to any other claim, which may be made under any other law for the time being in force. Section 163A of the Act does not contain any such provision. *** **** ***** If no amount is payable under the fault liability or the compensation which may be received from any other law, no refund of the amount received by the claimant under section 140 is postulated in the Scheme. Section 163A, on the other hand, nowhere provides that the payment of compensation of no-fault liability in terms of the structured formula is in addition to the liability to pay compensation in accordance with the right to get compensation on the principle of fault liability." 15. That one is required to prove fault to become entitled to receive compensation under section 166 and that the recourse to section 140 can be had as an interim arrangement subject to final determination under section 166 can be easily discerned from the observations made in Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra), which run as follows: "The scheme envisaged under section 163A, in our opinion, leaves no manner of doubt that by reason thereof the rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined finally. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. The amount of compensation payable under the aforementioned provisions is not to be altered or varied in any other proceedings. It does not contain any provision providing for set off against a higher compensation unlike section 140. In terms of the said provision, a distinct and specified class of citizens, namely, persons whose income per annum is Rs. 40,000 or less is covered thereunder whereas sections 140 and 166 cater to all sections of society. It may be true that section 163B provides for an option to a claimant to either go for a claim under section 140 or section 163Aof the Act, as the case may be, but the same was inserted 'ex-abundanti cautela' so as to remove any misconception in the mind of the parties to the its having regard to the fact that both relate to the claim on the basis of no-fault liability. Having regard to the fact that section 166 of the Act provides for a complete machinery for laying a claim on fault liability, the question of giving an option to the claimant to pursue their claims either under section 163 A or section 166 does not arise. If the submission of the learned counsel is accepted the same would lead to an incongruity." 16. From what have been pointed out above it becomes abundantly clear that the present Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, lays down two comprehensive and independent, but complete in itself, mechanism for receiving compensation for injuries sustained or death caused in motor vehicular*accidents. Both the schemes for compensation, one conceived under section 166 and the other perceived by section 163A, are mutually exclusive and independent of each other and it is for a person, who wants to claim compensation, to decide as to which procedure or mechanism he or she would opt for. 17. In the face of clearly laid down schemes for obtaining compensation under the two sections, namely, section 166 and section 163Aand when it is left with the claimant to choose the course of action, no one can maintain a claim both under section 166 as well as section 163A. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, also does not conceive of a situation, when, based on an application made under section 166, the Tribunal, on its own, on the failure of the claimant to prove fault, can award compensation by taking recourse to section 163A. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, also does not conceive of a situation, when, based on an application made under section 166, the Tribunal, on its own, on the failure of the claimant to prove fault, can award compensation by taking recourse to section 163A. When a claimant makes an application for compensation under section 166 and also receives interim compensation under section 140, he shall, so long as his application for compensation remains pending under section 166, prove, as a condition precedent for obtaining compensation under section 166, that the accident took place due to fault or negligent or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other persons. 18. The above aspect of law has been succinctly explained by the Apex Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni (supra) in the following words: "The question may be considered from different angles. As for example, if in the proceedings under section 166 of the Act, after obtaining compensation under section 163A, the awardee fails to prove that the accident took place owing to negligence on the part of the driver or if it is found as of fact that the deceased or the victim himself was responsible there for as a consequence whereto the Tribunal refuses to grant any compensation; would it be within its jurisdiction to direct refund either in whole or in part the amount of compensation already paid on the basis of structured formula. Furthermore, if in a case the Tribunal upon considering the relevant materials comes to the conclusion that no case has been made out for awarding the compensation under section 166 of the Act, would it be at liberty to award compensation in terms of section 163A thereof. The answer to both the aforementioned questions must be rendered in the negative. In other words, the question of adjustment or refund will invariably arise in the event if it is held that the amount of compensation paid in the proceedings under section 163 A of the Act is interim in nature." 19. Embedded, thus, in the scheme of section 166 is the requirement for the Tribunal to frame an issue or for the claimant to, at least, bring on record materials as regard fault or neglect or default, as indicated hereinbefore, in order to sustain his claim under section 166. Embedded, thus, in the scheme of section 166 is the requirement for the Tribunal to frame an issue or for the claimant to, at least, bring on record materials as regard fault or neglect or default, as indicated hereinbefore, in order to sustain his claim under section 166. If the claimant, in a proceeding under section 166, obtains interim compensation under section 140, but adduces no evidence to prove fault or negligence or default, his application under section 166 cannot succeed and the Tribunal cannot award compensation on the basis of the structured formula by taking recourse to section 163A, for, it is for the claimant really to decide which course of act on he or she shall opt for. Whether it is, on the basis of the application for amendment made by the claimant, permissible to amend a proceeding, under section 166, to one under section 163A is a question, which has not arisen in the present set of appeals and we are not inclined to make any comment on this aspect of the matter. These aspects of the law have been clearly pointed out in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Phelisha Bakai (supra). 20. Bearing in mind what is indicated above, when I revert to the case at hand, what attracts the eyes, most prominently, is that in the claim application, the claimant has not mentioned the provisions of law, where under the claim application has been made. In view, however, of the fact that the claimant sought for compensation, under section 140 of the M.V. Act, on the basis of no-fault, it logically follows that the claimant's application was aimed at receiving compensation under section 166 of the M.V. Act. In the light of the decision of the Phelisha Bakai (supra), the learned Tribunal ought not have treated the claim application as an application under section 163Aof the M.V. Act, for, it was the discretion of the claimant to make an application either under section 166 or under section 163Aof the M.V. Act. The claimant appears to have chosen to apply for compensation, as discussed above, under section 166 of the M.V. Act and when he had exercised his option, the learned Tribunal ought to have, in the light of the provisions of section 166, decided if the claim application deserved to be allowed or not. 21. The claimant appears to have chosen to apply for compensation, as discussed above, under section 166 of the M.V. Act and when he had exercised his option, the learned Tribunal ought to have, in the light of the provisions of section 166, decided if the claim application deserved to be allowed or not. 21. Moreover, the claimant's pleaded case, in the light of his claim application, was that his monthly income was more than Rs. 4,000. Thus, his annual income, admittedly, exceeded the limit of Rs. 50,000. Hence, the claimant, being a person, whose annual income was more than Rs. 50,000, not covered by the provisions of section 163A. 22. Coupled with the above, it is also worth noticing that under section 163A, the liability to pay compensation arises in the case of 'death' or 'permanent disablement', hence, when an injury, suffered by a person, does not cause 'death' or 'permanent disablement', section 163A cannot be resorted to. 23. It is pertinent to point out that the Explanation to sub-section (1) of section 163A lays down that for the purpose of determining as to whether a person has suffered from 'permanent disablement' or not, the 'permanent disability' shall have the same meaning and extent as the Workmen's Compensations Act, 1923. Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, permanent disablement means a disablement, which reduces the earning capacity of a workman. Permanent partial disablement is proportionate to the loss of earning capacity permanently caused by an injury and the percentage of loss shall be as assessed by a qualified medical practitioner. 24. In the present case, though the claimant examined the doctor, who had treated the claimant for the injuries sustained by him on his leg, the doctor nowhere deposed that the injuries, suffered by the claimant, had rendered him 'permanently disabled'. In fact, there is not even an iota of medical evidence on record showing or reflecting that the claimant has suffered from any 'permanent disability'. This apart there is not even a whisper of evidence that the claimant suffered loss of income due to the injuries sustained by him on his leg or on his jaw. Thus, when the injuries, sustained by the claimant, have not resulted in any loss of, or reduction in, his earning capacity, the claimant could not have been held to have suffered from any kind of 'permanent disability', 'total or partial'. 25. Thus, when the injuries, sustained by the claimant, have not resulted in any loss of, or reduction in, his earning capacity, the claimant could not have been held to have suffered from any kind of 'permanent disability', 'total or partial'. 25. Be that as it may, when the insurer-appellant has, admittedly, not sought for, and obtained, the permission to contest the claim proceeding, on merit, under section 170 of the M.V. Act, the insurer-appellant cannot, now, be allowed to contend that the claim application was not maintainable under section 163A(See New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Phelisha Bakai). 26 The second ground of challenge to the award is that the learned Tribunal has granted Rs. 50,000 towards future medical expenses of the claimant without any evidence in support thereof. In this context, it is also pointed out that the learned Tribunal has granted interest @ 9% per annum on the future medical expenses too, which is impermissible in law. 27. While considering the above ground of challenge posed to the award, it needs to be noted that interest has to be awarded for an amount, which has become due and payable. Any expenditure, which is required to be incurred in future, cannot be said to have become due and payable and no interest for non-payment of such dues can be directed to be paid. Considered, thus, it is clear that interest, on future medical expenses, is not awardable under the M.V. Act. A reference, in this regard, may be made to the case of R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P.) Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC551, wherein the Apex Court, clarifying this aspect of the law, observed and held as follows: "................The High Court should have clarified that the interest shall not be payable over the amount directed to be paid to the appellant in respect of future expenditures under different heads. It need not be pointed out that interest is to be paid over the amount which has become payable on the date of award and not which is to be paid for expenditures to be incurred in future. As such we direct that appellant shall not be entitled to interest over such amount." (emphasis added) 28. What is, now, important to note is that in support of his case that he requires medical treatment in future as well, the claimant has, admittedly, not adduced any medical evidence. As such we direct that appellant shall not be entitled to interest over such amount." (emphasis added) 28. What is, now, important to note is that in support of his case that he requires medical treatment in future as well, the claimant has, admittedly, not adduced any medical evidence. However, without entering into the question as to whether the learned Tribunal could have, in such circumstances, awarded compensation for future medical expenses and also directed payment of interest thereon, what needs to be noted is that even this ground of challenge relates to the merit of the impugned award and, hence, the impugned award cannot be interfered with on this ground, when the insurer had not obtained the permission to contest the claim proceeding as required under section 170. 29. Yet another ground, on which the award stands challenged, is that in the present case, the relevant insurance policy did not cover a driver other than a 'paid driver' and in view of the fact that the claimant has not been proved to be a workman or an employee of the offending vehicle's owner (i.e., the respondent No. 2 herein), the insurer could not have been saddled with the liability to indemnify the owner of the said vehicle, which the owner may, otherwise, be liable to pay to the claimant. 30. While considering the above submissions, made on behalf of the claimant, it is pertinent to note that the claimant is, admittedly, an advocate and, even after the accident, he has continued to practise as an advocate. In his claim application, the claimant has categorically mentioned that he is a lawyer and nobody is his employer. It is, thus, clear that the claimant is not a 'paid driver' nor is he a workman or an employee of the respondent No. 2 herein (i.e., the owner of the offending vehicle). It also need to be pointed out by the insurer-appellant that Exhibits A and B, which form the relevant insurance policy, show that the insurance premium of Rs. 15.00 was paid by the insured to the insurer for the purpose of covering the risk of accident of a 'paid driver'. In the present case, it is pointed out that the claimant was not a 'paid driver' and, hence, he was not covered by the insurance policy, in question. 31. 15.00 was paid by the insured to the insurer for the purpose of covering the risk of accident of a 'paid driver'. In the present case, it is pointed out that the claimant was not a 'paid driver' and, hence, he was not covered by the insurance policy, in question. 31. While considering the above aspect of the case, it is imperative that the provisions of section 147(1) are taken note of. Section 147 is, therefore, reproduced herein below: "147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability. - (1) In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which - (a) is issued by a person who is an authorized insurer; and (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) - (i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person, including owner of the goods or his authorized representative carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place: Provided that a policy shall not be required - (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability." 32. A careful reading of section 147(1) leaves no room for doubt that under the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 147, a policy of insurance shall not be required '(i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee - (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or (b) if it is a public service vehicle engaged as a conductor of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the vehicle, or (ii) to cover any contractual liability. Thus, no compulsory insurance coverage is required under section 147(1), for the liability, which may arise in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any person, who may be allowed by the owner of the vehicle to drive his vehicle unless the person, who has been permitted or asked to drive the vehicle, js a person engaged as an employee to drive the vehicle. No wonder, therefore, that a driver has the choice, under section 147 of the M.V. Act, to either seek award under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, or under the scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act. Every person, therefore, who drives a vehicle, is not covered by the compulsory insurance obtained in terms of the provisions of section 147(1). Section 147(1) provides for compulsory insurance in respect of only such a person, who, as an employee, is engaged by the owner of the vehicle to drive the vehicle. It is for this reason that the insurance policies offer compulsory insurance coverage for paid driver and if there is an unpaid driver or a person, who is not paid by the owner of a vehicle to drive the vehicle, he is not covered by the compulsory insurance policy and special premium has to be paid to cover liability, which may be incurred by the owner in respect of unpaid drivers. 33. In the present case, the insurance policy covered only 'paid drivers'. 33. In the present case, the insurance policy covered only 'paid drivers'. Realizing this defect, learned Tribunal has pointed out that payment to a driver may be made either in cash or in kind. There can be, no doubt, that a person may be treated as a 'paid driver', even if he is not paid in cash and he is paid in kind. What is, however, important to note is that there has to be a relationship of an employee and employer or that of a workman and an employer between the owner of the vehicle, on the one hand, and the person, who drives the vehicle, on the other. In the present case, the claimant was, admittedly, not an employee of respondent No. 2 nor has he been proved to have been paid in cash or in kind, for driving the vehicle. This apart, being a lawyer, he could not have been paid in cash or kind for driving the vehicle. Viewed thus, it is clear that the insurance policy, in question, did not cover anyone other than a 'paid driver' and the claimant, not being a 'paid driver', was not covered by the relevant insurance policy. 34. In view of the fact that the impugned award puts a liability on the insurer-appellant to indemnify the insured-respondent No. 2 without the insurance coverage being available in this regard, as indicated hereinabove, it is clear that the liability imposed on the insurer is wholly illegal and cannot be sustained. 35. In the result, and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal succeeds and the impugned award is set aside to the extent that it makes the insurer liable to satisfy the award. The compensation, awarded to the claimant shall be payable, if he so wishes, by the owner-respondent No. 2. 36. Send back the LCR.