RAM MOHAN REDDY, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONERS, residents of Hubli, of whom 2 and 4 claim to be house wives, while the others businessmen, responded to the public auction notice dated 8/9/2006, by depositing Rs. 5,000. 00 each, offering the highest bids on 14/9/2006, and depositing 25% of the bid amount on 15/9/2006, for purchase of corner sites, in S. R. No. 131/2, of Mariyana Thimmasagara Taluk, hubl. It is the assertion of the petitioners that on account of the failure on the part of the respondent in not communicating the acceptance of their bids, were unable to deposit the balance of the amount, in terms of the auction notice. According to the petitioners, their offers being far, in excess of the value fixed by the State Government were entitled to be declared as successful bidders. It is alleged that the respondent by resolution dated 9/11/2006, Annexure-F, cancelled the auction held on 14/9/2006, on the premise, that the sites put up for auction, being valuable, would fetch more than the bids offered by the petitioners. Hence, this writ petition to quash item no. 15 of the Resolution dated 9/11/2006, Annexure-F, and to direct the respondents to execute the sale deeds, in favour of the petitioners, conveying the corner sites, as set out in the auction notification, by accepting the balance amount. ( 2 ) LEARNED Counsel submits that disposal of corner sites are governed by the Karnataka Urban development (Disposal of Corner sites and Commercial Sites) Rules, 1991 and that Rule 3 provides for auctioning of corner sites, while Rule 7 provides for cancellation, to be preceded by assigning reasons. Learned Counsel while pointing out to Clause (7) of the Auction Notification, annexure-A, reserving the right of the respondent to annul the auction, by assigning reasons, contends that mere expectation to secure a price higher than the offers made by the petitioners, is a perverse, arbitrary and irrational reason, for cancelling the auction. ( 3 ) HAVING heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners and perused the pleadings, the question that arises for decision making is, whether the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought for ? before proceeding to consider the merits of the case, it is useful to make reference to the following reported decisions in the matter of auction/tender. In the case of State of Orissa and ors. before proceeding to consider the merits of the case, it is useful to make reference to the following reported decisions in the matter of auction/tender. In the case of State of Orissa and ors. v. Harinarayan AIR 1972 SC 1816 , the rejection of the highest bid in an auction for country liquor shops, questioned as being violative of Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the constitution of India, when subjected to judicial review, the Apex Court observed thus; the Government's power to sell the exclusive privileges set out in Section 22 was not denied. It was also not disputed that those privileges could be sold by public auction. Public auctions are held to get the best possible price. Once these aspects were recognised, there was no basis for contending that the owner of the privileges in question who had offered to sell them could not decline that the price offered is inadequate. There was no concluded contract till the bid was accepted. Before there was a concluded contract, it was open to the bidders to withdraw their bids. By merely giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights. (emphasis supplied) ( 4 ) IN the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Ravindra Mohan Aggarwal, AIR 1999 SC 1256 , JT 1999 (2) SC 368, 1999 (I) OLR (SC) 537, rlw 1999 (3) SC 369, 1999 (2) SCALE 139 , (1999) 3 SCC 172 , 1999 (2) UJ 901 (SC), the apex Court observed thus: the acceptance of the bid recorded by the Vice-Chairman, DDA on the file was bad for two reasons. Firstly, it was so recorded after the passing of the interim order of stay by the High court though it was in the process of being communicated. Secondly, the acceptance was not communicated by the DDA to the respondents and therefore the acceptance was not complete. Merely because the respondents gathered knowledge of the acceptance having been recorded on the file would not make any difference. Reliance on Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act is entirely misconceived inasmuch as there was no transfer or grant ever made by the DDA in favour of the respondents. Acceptance of bid at a public auction and deposit of 23% of bid amount do not constitute a transfer of property. The respondents have no basis in law to support their claim. Acceptance of bid at a public auction and deposit of 23% of bid amount do not constitute a transfer of property. The respondents have no basis in law to support their claim. Even the equitable considerations would not justify a public authority like DDA being directed today to provide an alternate plot to the respondents in the same locality and the same price after a lapse of 14 years from the date of the auction. (emphasis supplied) ( 5 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar Srivastava v. State of U. P. , AIR 2004 SC 4299 , 2004 (4) AWC 3037 (SC), (2004) 4 Complj 576 (SC), JT 2004 (7) SC 35, (2005) 1 PLR 456, 2004 (7) SCALE 66 , (2004) 8 SCC 671 , (2005) 1 UPLBEC 209 while dealing with the concept of reserve price as not been synonymous with "valuation of property" since the said two terms operate in two different spheres, observed thus: the aforesaid ruling explains the meaning of the term 'reserve price'. It indicates the object behind fixing the reserve price viz. , to limit the authority of the auctioneer. In the present case, the Board resolution is meant to guide the officers of the 2nd respondent The resolution prescribes the guidelines for fixing the reserve price. The concept of reserve price is not synonymous with Valuation of the property'. These two terms operate in different spheres. An invitation to tender is not an offer. It is an attempt to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained with a margin. (emphasis supplied) ( 6 ) A conspectus of the principles laid down in the aforestated decisions lead to the following deductions: 1. Public auctions are held to obtain the best possible price. 2. An invitation to tender is not an offer, but an attempt to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained with a margin. 3. That the owner of the privileges who offered to sell the same is entitled to decline the price offered as inadequate. 4. That there is no concluded contract untill the bid is accepted by a communication. 5. By offering bids, the bidders did not acquire any vested rights. 6. Acceptance of bid at a public auction and deposit of 23% of the bid amount do not constitute a transfer of property. 4. That there is no concluded contract untill the bid is accepted by a communication. 5. By offering bids, the bidders did not acquire any vested rights. 6. Acceptance of bid at a public auction and deposit of 23% of the bid amount do not constitute a transfer of property. ( 7 ) THE concept of "reserve price" is not synonymous with "valuation of the property", as the former is only indicative, to limit the authority of the auctioneer. 7. The disposal of corner sites by the respondent authority is governed by the Rules, of which reference is made to Rules 3 and 7. While Rule 3 provides for auction of corner sites after due publicity in not less than two daily newspapers published in the concerned urban area, in English and Kannada, having wide circulation, Rule 7 empowers the authority to confirm any sale in auction or to cancel any such sale after recording reasons and on such cancellation to refund the amount received from the auction purchaser, as deposit. The proviso to Rule 7 states that the authority cannot cancel the sale where the auction proceeding is confirmed. In the instant case the petitioners do not allege violation of either Rule 3 or Rule 7. ( 8 ) AN examination of the auction notification dated 8. 9. 2006 Annexure 'a' discloses the respondents intention to put up for sale the corner sites, in accordance with the Rules, so as to fetch the best possible price, while indicating the reserve price against each of the sites, (sarkari saval ). Clause 7 of the said notification, pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioners runs thus: (Editor: The text of the vernacular matter has not been reproduced. Please write to contact@manupatra. com if the vernacular matter is required.) the respondent, by incorporating the said clause made it apparent that it was empowered to put up for sale, by public auction the said plots while reserving to itself the right to cancel the auction by assigning reasons. This condition of auction is in consonance with Rule 7 of the rules. The petitioners, admittedly, with full knowledge of the said condition of auction, out of their free will and volition participated in the auction on 14. 9. This condition of auction is in consonance with Rule 7 of the rules. The petitioners, admittedly, with full knowledge of the said condition of auction, out of their free will and volition participated in the auction on 14. 9. 2006 and made their offers, which were the highest and higher than the "reserve price" notified in the auction notice Annexure 'a' and deposited 25% of the said bid on 15. 09. 2006. It is an admitted fact that the respondent did not communicate the acceptance of the petitioners bids. ( 9 ) APPLYING the principles of law as deduced supra, to the facts of this case, there can be no doubt that the public auction of the corner sites was with an intention to fetch the best possible price and to ascertain whether an offer can be obtained with a margin, while reserving the right to decline the offer as inadequate (reason ). The petitioners bids and the deposit of 25% of the said bids do not constitute a transfer of property nor by offering the bids the petitioners acquired any vested rights. In the absence of acceptance of bids there were no concluded contracts with the petitioners. ( 10 ) THE "reserve Price", (sarkari saval) is to limit the authority of the auctioneer. Having regard to the law that reserve price is not synonymous with "valuation of the property" which operate in different spheres, the contention of the petitioners that the price offered by them being in excess of the reserve price, must entitle them to a confirmation of their bids, is misconceived. ( 11 ) THE challenge to the resolution dated 9. 11. 2006, Annexure 'f' annulling the auction held on 14. 09. 2006, is on the premise that the expectation of the respondent to secure a price higher than what was offered by the petitioners, is unreasonable, irrational, perverse and arbitrary. In the factual matrix, coupled with the law declared by the Apex Court, the absence of a valid legal basis to contend that the respondent who had offered to sell the corner sites, could not decline the price offered as inadequate, the writ petition invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. In the factual matrix, coupled with the law declared by the Apex Court, the absence of a valid legal basis to contend that the respondent who had offered to sell the corner sites, could not decline the price offered as inadequate, the writ petition invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. Learned Counsel seeks to place reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Noble Resources Ltd. , v. State of Orissa, AIR 2007 SC 119 , 2006 (2) CTLJ 233 (SC), JT 2006 (12) SC 185, 2006 (9) SCALE 181 , (2006) 10 SCC 236 . According to the learned Counsel though the terms of the tender may not be open to judicial review, but courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, are empowered to scrutinize the award, by Government, or its agencies, in exercise of judicial review to prevent arbitrariness or favoritism. This submission must pale into insignificance on account of the feet that there is neither an award nor malafides alleged regarding favoritism, calling for judicial review. Nevertheless even assuming the petitioners could call in question the validity of the resolution annexure 'f', the observation of the Apex Court. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11 , [1994] Supp2 SCR 122 in the circumstances are apposite. The principles deductible relating to scope of judicial review of administrative decisions and exercise of contractual powers by government bodies are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fairplay in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of wednesbury principle of reasonableness including its other facts but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure. ( 12 ) THE Supreme Court in the case of Delhi Development Authority and Anr. v. UEE electricals Engineering Pvt. Ltd and Anr. ILR 2004 KAR 2205 (SC) having regard to the principles laid down in the known CCSU case and The Wednesbury's case, as well as Union of india and Anr. v. G. Ganayutham, AIR 1997 SC 3387 , JT 1997 (7) SC 572, (2000) II LLJ 648 SC, 1997 (5) SCALE 606 , (1997) 7 SCC 463 , [1997] Supp3 SCR 549, (1997) 3 UPLBEC 1649 and Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar, AIR 2003 SC 1843 , [2003 (97) FLR 411], JT 2003 (2) SC 295, (2003) II LLJ 150 SC, 2003 (2) SCALE4 81, (2003) 4 SCC 579 , [2003] 2 SCR 387, 2003 (2) SLJ 334 (SC), (2003) 2 UPLBEC 1206 observed thus: 16. Doubtness, he who seeks to invalidate or nullify any act or order must establish the charge of bad faith, an abuse or a misuse by the authority of its powers. While the indirect motive or purpose, or bad faith or personal ill-will is not to be held established except on clear proof thereof, it is obviously difficult to establish the state of a man's mind, for that is what the employee has to establish in this case, though this may sometimes be done. The difficulty is not lessened when one has to establish that a person apparently acting on the legitimate exercise of power has, in fact, been acting mala fide in the sense of pursuing an illegitimate aim. It is not the law that mala fide in the sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence. But it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the established surrounding factors which preceded the order. It is not the law that mala fide in the sense of improper motive should be established only by direct evidence. But it must be discernible from the order impugned or must be shown from the established surrounding factors which preceded the order. If bad faith would vitiate the order, the same can, in our opinion, be deduced as a reasonable and inescapable inference from proved facts (See S. Pratap Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 72 , (1966) I LLJ458 SC, [1964] 4 SCR 733. It cannot be overlooked that burden of establishing mala fides is very heavy on the person who alleges it The allegations of mala fides are often more easily made than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a high order of credibility. As noted by this Court in R. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr. , AIR 1974 SC 555 , 1974 Lablc 427, (1974) I LLJ 172 SC, (1974) 4 SCC 3 , [1974] 2 SCR 348. ( 13 ) APPLYING the aforesaid principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the matter of judicial review in administrative action, the impugned resolution Annexure 'f' cannot be said to be either irrational, illegal or procedural irregularity in the matter of cancellation of the public auction held on 14. 9. 2006. The challenge in this writ petition is not to the decision making process, but to the decision itself. In that view of the matter, the petitioners having not established charge of bad faith, abuse or misuse of power by the authority to invalidate the order or nullify the resolution, in my considered opinion, the petition is without merit ( 14 ) THERE can be no dispute that the respondent a statutory authority, is answerable to account its revenues. State largess cannot be disposed of at the whim and fancy of the individual holding office. The jurisdiction to decide the price at which the corner sites are to be sold is that of the respondent This Court does not sit as a court of appeal, and does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. It is said that if a review of administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be falliable. It is said that if a review of administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be falliable. Even supposing the petitioners' bids were higher than the reserve price, that by itself and nothing more cannot constitute a valid, legal ground to interfere and hold that the annulling of the auction was irrational or perverse. The reason for annulling the auction in the premise that the respondent expected to secure a much higher price for the sites in question, cannot be either whimsical or arbitrary. ( 15 ) THE petitioners with full knowledge that they have no right whatsoever, in the absence of a concluded contract, have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court Having taken public time, I think it appropriate that the petitioners must be saddled with costs. Having regard to the fact that except for petitioners 2 and 4 who are house wives, the other petitioners arc businessmen from hubli, a commercial hub of the State, it is appropriate to quantify costs of Rs. 8,000/-, which petitioners 1 to 10 other than petitioners 2 and 4 are directed to deposit with the Registrar of this court, within a fortnight from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. Writ petition is accordingly rejected with cost.