JUDGMENT P. C.: Hon’ble B.S. Verma, J. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have prayed for issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari setting aside the judgment and orders dated 3.5.2005, 20.4.2005 and 26.9.2004 (Annexure Nos. 22, 20 and 12 of the writ petition). 2. Relevant facts of the case are that the respondent no.3 Vachaspati Kotnala purchased property no. 199/10 situate at Subedaar Mohalla Lansdowne from one Mr. Bisht in the year 1990 and thus, respondent no. 3 is the landlord and the petitioners and the tenants in the II Floor accommodation since the time of their predecessor. The respondent No.3-landlord moved an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the Act) for release of the accommodation in his favour, which is in occupation of the tenant-petitioners on the ground of his bona fide need. Initially Sri Jaikrit Singh Negi (since deceased) and Smt. Yashoda Negi were the tenants of the disputed accommodation at the monthly rental of Rs. 50.00 each, total Rs. 100.00. The boundaries of the tenanted portion has been given at the foot of the release application. The house was purchased by the landlord for his own need. It is alleged that the tenants gave assurance that they are constructing their house at Kotdwar and they will vacate the accommodation when their house is got constructed. However, the tenant Yashoda Negi left for Kotdwar but she locked the accommodation and did not handover possession to the landlord. It is alleged that the applicant-respondent no. 3 has genuinely pressing and bona fide need for the accommodation. It is alleged that the O.P.No. 2 is demanding a sum of Rs. 50,000/- as Pagri from the applicant. On the assurance of the tenants to vacate the premises, no proceedings were drawn against them earlier. The land lord send notice to the tenants on 12.2.1999, but the opposite party No.1 wrongly replied the same, while the O.P.No. 2 refused to accept the notice. The tenants never made any effort to search for alternative accommodation. The accommodation in occupation of the landlord is in the ground floor and due to moisture it is not fit for residential purpose. 3. The O.P.No.1 Jaikrit Singh contested the applicant by filed his objection/reply. The tenants never made any effort to search for alternative accommodation. The accommodation in occupation of the landlord is in the ground floor and due to moisture it is not fit for residential purpose. 3. The O.P.No.1 Jaikrit Singh contested the applicant by filed his objection/reply. He admitted the tenancy but stated that Jaikrit Singh and Yashoda Negi are not separate tenants. It was stated that Jaikrit Singh and the husband of O.P.No. 2 Yashoda Negi were real brothers of Joint Hindu Family and they were continuing in the tenancy as such for the last 60-70 years from the time of their father. After the death of their father in the year 1987, the O.P.No.1, his deceased brother Yogendra Singh and Satish Singh were the tenants at monthly rental of Rs. 100/-. Subsequently, Yogendra Singh Negi died. As per agreement between the parties, it was agreed that the opposite parties will remain as tenants in the second story from 1.10.1995 @ Rs. 100/- per month as rent. O.P.No. 2 Yashoda Negi left Lansdowne for Kotdwar. Now the Opposite party No. 1 continues to be tenant of Second Floor. According to the opposite party, the landlord has no genuine and bona fide need and he has sufficient accommodation. O.P.No.1 raised a plea that he is serving in the defence canteen at Lansdowne after his retirement from the army. It was also pleaded that if the application of landlord is allowed, the tenant shall suffer irreparable loss. The landlord just wants to give the accommodation at higher rent. 4. During the pendency of the proceedings, O.P.No.1 Jaikrit Singh Negi died, therefore, he was substituted by his legal representatives. 5. Both the parties filed documentary evidence in support of their respective contentions. A commission was also issued to advocate commissioner, who filed his report 57-C. The learned prescribed Authority after hearing both the Parties and perusing the evidence found that the landlord has established bona fide need in his favour and that the balance of comparative hardship also titled in favour of the landlord. Accordingly vide order dated 29.6.2004 the Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlord for the release of accommodation. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order, the tenants preferred appeal before the District Judge Pauri Garhwal, which was registered as Rent Appeal No. 14 of 2004 Smt. Vidya Negi and others Vs. Vachaspati Kotnala and others. Accordingly vide order dated 29.6.2004 the Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlord for the release of accommodation. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order, the tenants preferred appeal before the District Judge Pauri Garhwal, which was registered as Rent Appeal No. 14 of 2004 Smt. Vidya Negi and others Vs. Vachaspati Kotnala and others. It may be mentioned that the District Judge did not find favour with the tenants and dismissed the appeal vide order dated 19.2.2005. The tenants challenged the order passed by the District Judge in writ petition (M/S)No 163 of 2005 Smt. Vidya Negi and others Vs. District Judge, Pauri Garhwal and others. In fact, the Prescribed Authority had recorded independent finding on the question of bona fide need as well as comparative hardship, but there was no finding of the appellate court on the question of comparative hardship. In the writ petition, this court observed that the District Judge while upholding the impugned order passed by the prescribed Authority had not recorded categorical findings on the point of bona fide need and particularly on the question of comparative hardship, therefore, the case was remanded to the appellate court vide order dated 02.05.2005. 7. After remand, the District Judge again heard both the parties. It was observed by the District Judge that the O.P.No.1 Jaikrit Singh Negi died during the pendency of proceedings, therefore, the ground taken in the objection regarding job of the tenant at Lansdowne came to an end. The appellate court came to the conclusion that O.P.No.2 Yashoda Negi resides at Kotdwar, therefore, the need of O.P.No.2 Yashoda Negi stands relinquished. The prescribed Authority and the District Judge both found that all the three sons of late Jaikrit Singh Negi are Major and they are doing their business. While considering the point of bona fide need, the Prescribed Authority has elaborately discussed the entire evidence. He had also dealt with the family structure of both the landlord and tenants vis-à-vis the accommodation available to them. While considering the point of bona fide need, the Prescribed Authority has elaborately discussed the entire evidence. He had also dealt with the family structure of both the landlord and tenants vis-à-vis the accommodation available to them. Finally, the prescribed Authority had observed that “thus on the basis of the foregoing discussion on the point, whether the need of the applicant is bona fide and genuine, I am of the view that the need of the applicant is real, sincere, honest, natural and in good faith, hence the need of the applicant is bonafide and is genuine.” The Prescribed Authority while dealing with the question of comparative hardship came to the conclusion that the tenants had not at all made any effort to find out any alternative accommodation since the filing of the application. Again after remand of the case, the appellate court elaborately discussed the point of bonafide need and that of comparative hardship. It was found on the basis of documentary evidence that family partition of deceased Jaikrit Singh Negi had taken place in the year 1999. The tenants have already constructed their house at Kotdwar and Aitta and they are residing there. It was also held that the wife of Jaikrit Singh Negi(Vidya Negi) may live with her sons and accordingly question of comparative hardship was answered in favour of the landlord vide order dated 3.5.2005, which gave rise to the present writ petition. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners Sri Ramji Srivastava as well as Sri Rajendra Dobhal, learned counsel for the respondent landlord and perused the material on record including the impugned judgment and orders. I have also given my anxious thought to the pleas raised in the counter Affidavit and the Rejoiner Affidavit filed by the parties before this court. 9. At the outset, it is pertinent to mention that in writ jurisdiction this Court cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or re-evaluate the evidence. I am fortified in my view by the Apex Court verdict in the case of Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash [2004(3) S.C.C. Page 682]. In the instant case, there is concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate court. I am fortified in my view by the Apex Court verdict in the case of Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash [2004(3) S.C.C. Page 682]. In the instant case, there is concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate court. Having gone through the impugned order passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the District Judge in appeal, it is evideny that the courts below, on the basis of evidence on record, have come to the conclusion that the need of the landlord is bonafide and the balance of comparative hardship also tilted in favour of the landlord. There is independent finding of fact arrived at by the trial court as well as appellate court. I do not find any perversity in the impugned judgment and orders passed by the courts below. The findings of fact recorded by two courts below do not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioners first hammered the order dated 20.4.2005 passed by the District Judge Pauri Garhwal and it was contended that the Smt. Vidya Negi filed affidavit before the appellate court on 20.4.2005 and the learned counsel for the appellant-tenant moved an application before the district Judge with a prayer for summoning the official record regarding transfer and payment of house rent allowance etc. to one Mahesha Nand Suyal, who had occupied some accommodation in ground floor and had allegedly delivered possession to the landlord in the year 2003. the application is Annexure No. 17 to the writ petition and the Affidavit is Annexure 18. So far as the rejection of the application of the tenant petitioner dated 20.4.2005 is concerned, the District Judge has rejected the said application on the ground that the case was remanded to the District Judge with a particular direction to record finding on the point of comparative hardship. The application of the tenant has been rejected on merit. The scope before the appellate court was very limited and there was a direction to the District Judge to conclude the finding within a period of one month from the date of production of certified copy. In the writ petition, there was no such direction regarding filing of additional evidence before the appellate court. It also appears that the tenant-appellant also filed another application 26-C for amendment of written statement. In the writ petition, there was no such direction regarding filing of additional evidence before the appellate court. It also appears that the tenant-appellant also filed another application 26-C for amendment of written statement. This application has also been rejected by the appellate court with the observation that the tenant-appellant wanted to reopen the entire case and to linger on the proceedings for a long time. Both the applications were rejected by the appellate court on merit. From a bare perusal of the affidavit filed by the tenant (Annexure-18) it is obvious that the matter related to the year 2003 of which record was sought to be summoned. There is even no such averment that the deponent had no knowledge of the alleged evidence even earlier. I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel that the District Judge had passed the order dated 20.4.2005 in a cursory manner. There is no good ground even to interfere with the interim order dated 20.4.2005 passed by the appellate court. 11. The petitioners have filed a copy of the notice purporting to have been issued allegedly by one Sri Dharmdeep Agrawal, Advocate dated 27.01.2006, which is Annexure No.1 to the Rejoinder Affidavit. This notice appears to have been sent by the petitioner no. 1 to her tenant (Vachaspati Kotnala). Though this notice is dated 27.01.2006, but it has not been shown that such a notice was served upon the landlord-respondent. Moreover, this notice Annexure No. 1 has no relevance with the proceeding of the present case. It is always open to a landlord or any other person to initiate proceedings under a legal frame. This notice does not help the petitioners in the present case. 12. In view of the discussion above, I do not find any perversity or illegality in the impugned orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge, Pauri Garhwal in appeal. The findings are fully based on proper appraisal of entire evidence led by the parties. The Appellate Court after remand of the case have recorded independent findings on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship. I do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment and orders under challenge. The writ petition is devoid of merit and must fail. 13. The writ petition is hereby dismissed no order as to costs. The Appellate Court after remand of the case have recorded independent findings on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship. I do not find any ground to interfere with the judgment and orders under challenge. The writ petition is devoid of merit and must fail. 13. The writ petition is hereby dismissed no order as to costs. The impugned judgment and orders dated 20.4.2005 and 3.5.2005 passed by the District Judge Pauri Garhwal and the impugned judgment and order dated 26.9.2004 passed by the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Junior Division) Lansdowne are maintained. 14. Interim order dated 25.5.2005 passed by this Court is hereby vacated.