Judgment K. M. MEHTA, J. The Food Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as F.C.I.)-appellant-original defendant has filed this appeal under Sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 against the judgment and award dated 30-12-1985 passed by the Civil Judge (S.D.), Kutch at Bhuj in Original Civil Suit No. 64 of 1979 filed by M/s. Harish Transport Corporation-original plaintiff along with Misc. Civil Application No. 36 of 1985 and Misc. Civil Application No. 37 of 1985. By the impugned judgment, the learned Judge has disposed of the civil suit and as regards Misc. Civil Application No. 36 of 1985, the learned Judge has observed that the application raising the objection for validity of the award must fail, and therefore, the same is dismissed. As regards Misc. Civil Application No. 37 of 1985, the learned Judge has observed that the said application raising the objection for demanding fees and costs of arbitration by the Arbitrator must fail, and therefore, the same is dismissed. The learned Judge has also ordered that the plaintiff and the defendant-Food Corporation of India (F.C.I.) shall be (sic.) paid the deficit amount of Rs. 5,500/- to the Arbitrator Shri P. D. Saxena and that amount of Rs. 5,500/- shall be first paid from the deposited amount of Rs. 10,000/- by defendant Food Corporation of India with a condition precedent that the Food Corporation of India shall be entitled to be (sic.) adjusted the half amount of Rs. 3,750/- in the payment to the plaintiff from the decretal amount and that the remaining deposited amount of Rs. 4,5001- shall be refunded back to the Food Corporation of India. In view of the same, suit has been disposed of. The parties shall bear their own costs. 2. I have heard Mr. Shakeel Kureshi, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of Food Corporation of India (F.C.I.)-appellant and Mr. Zubin Bharda, learned Advocate for the respondent. I have heard both the Advocates at length. 3. Mr. Kureshi, learned Advocate has made several contentions for quashing and setting aside the order of the learned trial Judge whereas on the other hand, Mr. Bharda, learned Advocate has tried to support the reasoning of the learned trial Judge and prayed to dismiss the present appeal. 4. I have heard both the Advocates at length. 3. Mr. Kureshi, learned Advocate has made several contentions for quashing and setting aside the order of the learned trial Judge whereas on the other hand, Mr. Bharda, learned Advocate has tried to support the reasoning of the learned trial Judge and prayed to dismiss the present appeal. 4. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as under : 4.1 M/s. Harish Transport Corporation-respondent herein is a partnership firm duly registered under the provisions of Partnership Act who is hereinafter referred to as original plaintiff in this behalf-respondent herein. The said firm is carrying on business of transport, contracts at Gandhidham-Kutch. 4.2 Food Corporation of India is a Corporation incorporated and registered under the Companies Act and carrying on its business and having their office amongst other places at Adipur-Kutch and having Zonal Office (W) at Bombay and having office of Managing Director at New Delhi. 4.3 The plaintiff had taken a contract from the defendant firm-F.C.I. i.e. work of "appointment of loading-unloading, handling and transport contractors at F.C.I. godowns and Rail Heads at Gandhidham and Kandla Port and near about H & T contract at (A. P. Storage Gandhidham-Kutch). For that purpose, both the plaintiff and defendant had entered into a contract agreement which was executed on 26-5-1976. The said agreement is produced in the record of the case at Exh. 18. Relevant clause which is for our purpose i.e. Clause 12(A) which provides for liability of contract for losses etc. suffered by Corporation and another important clause is Clause 20 which provides for arbitration. 4.4 According to the said contract, period of contract was for two years which was to start from 27-5-1976 till 27-5-1978. 4.5 It is the contention of the plaintiff that plaintiff has carried out execution of the contractual application which being undertaken under the contract agreement with specification of the defendant and work which was executed on 26-5-1976 was ended on 26-5-1978. In connection of the said contract, the plaintiff has rendered all the services which were called upon the defendants because it was supposed to be carried out the services as per terms of contract and contractor was bound to carry out the said terms of contract in this behalf. In connection of the said contract, the plaintiff has rendered all the services which were called upon the defendants because it was supposed to be carried out the services as per terms of contract and contractor was bound to carry out the said terms of contract in this behalf. It is the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff has carried out from time to time all the services with the satisfaction of the defendant. 4.6 According to the plaintiff, they have submitted the bills in respect of the work done under the said contract, but the defendant has failed and neglected to make the payment from one reason and another. And thus, difference and dispute arose between the parties in connection with the payment of the bills. 4.7 Thereafter, the plaintiff has claimed of various amount, and in view of the same, the plaintiff has filed Civil Suit No. 64 of 1979 on 8-4-1979. In the said suit, the plaintiff has prayed for judgment and decree and order ordering the defendant to file the agreement dated 26-5-1976 executed between the plaintiff and defendant in respect of the above said contractual work and further prayed that the parties may be directed to file the disputes in details before him or before the Hon'ble Court. The plaintiff has further prayed that arbitration proceedings may be ordered to be commenced as per Sec. 20(5) of the Arbitration Act. He has further prayed that the Arbitrator may be ordered to submit the award before the Hon'ble Court and also prayed that decree in terms of the award, may be ordered to be passed, and the interest at the rate of 18% per annum on the amount outstanding from the date the same has been wrongly withheld by the defendant or at any rate or any date as deemed fit by the Hon'ble Court may be ordered to be paid to the plaintiff by the defendant. In the said suit, F.C.I. has filed application dated 18-71979. They have no objection if the Arbitrator is appointed in this behalf. Whatever the objections are they have filed the same and the same was at Exh. 15. In the said suit, F.C.I. has filed application dated 18-71979. They have no objection if the Arbitrator is appointed in this behalf. Whatever the objections are they have filed the same and the same was at Exh. 15. Thereafter, the Civil Judge (S.D.), Bhuj-Kutch has passed an order on 10-8-1979 and ordered the defendant No. 1 to file the Arbitration agreement in the Court and an Arbitrator shall be appointed for the adjudication of the dispute as per the Arbitration agreement and for filing the award in the Court within a period of six months or such other period extended, under Sec. 20 of the Arbitration Act. 4.8 Thereafter, the F.C.I. has filed application at Exh. 18 on 22-8-1979 and stated that there are power to suggest the name of Mr. P. D. Saxena as an Arbitrator. Thereafter, the defendant has filed an application dated 14-9-1979 and given address of Arbitrator Mr. P. D. Saxena i.e. Exh. 20. 4.9 Before the Arbitrator, the claimants have filed in all 21 claims and also cost of arbitration and other cost in this behalf. Said claims were filed on 4-12-1978. The F.C.!. has filed reply to the said claims somewhere on 27-4-1979 before the Arbitrator. Before the Arbitrator, the parties led their documentary as well as oral evidence in this behalf. The Arbitrator thereafter, passed the award somewhere on 13-4-1985. 5. It may be noted that before the Arbitrator, the F.C.I. has also raised their counter-claims, and ultimately, the Arbitrator by his award dated 13-41985, has made some findings as follows : 5.1 Issue Nos. 20, 21 and 40 : From the above findings the respective liabilities of the parties under the claims and the counter-claims is as under : Respondent F.C.I.s liabilities for the Contractors liabilities for F.C.I. counter-claim Contractor-claims Claim Nos. Rs. Counter-Claim Nos. Rs. (1) 96,922.62 (1) 37.691.07 (2) 1,50,529.50 (2) 6.100.00 (3) 45,520.41 (5) 17,988.05 (4) 12,739.22 (6) 4,189.75 (5) 16,168.53 (8) 2,938.63 (8) 53,253.35 (10) 2,654.60 (9) 2,92,084.04 (11) 378.80 (13) 47,678.34 (12) 25.00 (15) 10,029.60 (14) 823.60 (16) 2,40,398.94 759.75 3,25,563.83 2,537.10 (21) 1,80,000.00 (15) 30,597.42 Total - 1,06,683.47 Total - 14,70,888.47 5.2 After deducting the claimant contractors liabilities from the respondents liabilities, the actual amount due from the respondents to the claimants contractors is Rs. 13,64,205/-. 6. 13,64,205/-. 6. One of the parties did not pay his part of fees, and therefore, the Arbitrator did not file the award. 7. Thereafter, before the trial Court, F.C.I. has filed two applications i.e. Misc. Civil Application No. 36 of 1979 and Misc. .Civil Application No. 37 of 1979 for quashing and setting aside the award only on the ground that the Arbitrator has charged very high fees. 8. In the said proceedings, the plaintiff filed application on 18-10-1985 being Exh. 17 that in view of this development, the entire suit being Special Civil Suit No. 64 of 1979 along with Misc. Civil Application Nos. 36 and 37 of 1985 to be heard together in this behalf. The F.C.I. has stated that they have no objection and the trial Court has passed an order on 18-10-1985. Therefore, the matters have been heard together. 9. Before the trial Court, various contentions have been led between the parties and the trial Court has framed some issues and after hearing the parties, the learned Judge has held that the Arbitrator has not mis-conducted in the proceedings so as to merit of the order for setting aside the order as per the allegations made in Misc. Civil Application No. 36 of 1985. The learned Judge has held that there is no error apparent on the face of the award and the award does not disobeying the principle of natural justice. The learned Judge has held that the award is not beyond the scope of jurisdiction and the reference as alleged by the F.C.I. in Application No. 36 of 1985. The learned Judge has held that there was a valid reference for appointment of Arbitrator. The learned Judge has held that the application filed by F.C.I. under Sees. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act namely Misc. Civil Application No. 36 of 1985 for quashing and setting aside the award is rejected as the F.C.I. has failed to prove any of the grounds contained in the application for quashing and setting aside the award. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the learned trial Judge has held that the plaintiff is entitled to decree in terms of the award in this behalf. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the learned trial Judge has held that the plaintiff is entitled to decree in terms of the award in this behalf. The learned Judge has also stated that the plaintiff shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 18 % per annum on the amount awarded from 11-4-1979 till the date of passing of the decree i.e. 30-12-1985. The learned Judge has further stated that from the date of the decree till realization, the plaintiff shall be entitled to 9 % interest per annum only on the amount awarded, and therefore, Misc. Civil Application No. 37 of 1985 is liable to be dismissed in this behalf which has been raised regarding fees of the Arbitrator. In view of the same, the learned Judge has passed the decree in terms of the award. 10. Mr. Kureshi, learned Advocate has assailed the aforesaid judgment of the trial Court on several grounds. One ground is of Clause 12 and Clause 20. Clause 12(A) which provides for liability of contract for losses etc. suffered by Corporation whereas Clause 20 provides for arbitration which I have already quoted earlier in this behalf. The learned Counsel submitted that in this case, if the dispute is covered by Clause 12 of the agreement then Arbitrator ought not to have decided the matter in this behalf. The learned Judge has rejected the said contention and relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court (Coram: J. M. Sheth (as he was then) and B. K. Mehta (As he was then) JJ.) in Appeal No. 34 of 1970 from Order in the case of Kantibhai Kalidas Patel v. State of Gujarat & Anr., decided on 20-1-1971. 11. Mr. Zubin Bharda, learned Advocate has tried to support the submissions in this behalf. However, it is not necessary to enter into this controversy because in this case, the plaintiff has prayed for Arbitration and defendant has agreed that the matter should be referred to Arbitrator Mr. P. D. Saxena and the defendant has also given the address of the Arbitrator as stated above. Earlier, the defendant filed application dated 18-7-1979 at Exh. 15 that they have no objection if the matter is referred for the arbitration, and thereafter, the plaintiff has filed affidavit in this behalf and subsequently as indicated above, by their application at Exh. 20, they were given address of the Arbitrator. Earlier, the defendant filed application dated 18-7-1979 at Exh. 15 that they have no objection if the matter is referred for the arbitration, and thereafter, the plaintiff has filed affidavit in this behalf and subsequently as indicated above, by their application at Exh. 20, they were given address of the Arbitrator. In view of the subsequent development, there is no need to decide the controversy in this behalf. 12. Another contention is that the Arbitrator has committed misconduct and has given award beyond terms of reference or in excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand Mr. Bharda, learned Advocate has submitted that in this case, before the Arbitrator the claimant has filed several claims. The F.C.I. has also filed counter-claims and the Arbitrator, who was retired District Judge has considered all the terms and entertained some of the claims of the claimant and rejected some claims and also granted counter-claim of the F.C.I. and ultimately passed an order. The learned Advocate has further submitted that the learned trial Judge has also supported the award of the Arbitrator, and therefore, the contention of the appellant that the Arbitrator has committed misconduct or has acted beyond the terms of reference or in excess of jurisdiction cannot be accepted. 13. For considering the aforesaid rival submissions, I consider the following authorities in this behalf. Finding regarding legality and validity of the award : 14. As regards legality and validity of the award, in the earlier part of the judgment, I have discussed the finding of the learned trial Judge. It may also be noted that in this case, the award is speaking award and the award cannot be challenged on that ground as far as present matter is concerned which arose out of the Arbitration Act. In view of the same, this Court has extremely limited jurisdiction to consider the legality and validity of the award in this behalf. In this behalf, the Arbitrator who is a retired judicial officer has passed an award after hearing the parties where the evidence has been led and he has given very reasoned order and also given very cogent and convincing reasons while dealing with the claims and counter-claims. Even the award of the Arbitrator is sixty-two pages reasoned order. Thereafter, the trial Court while considering the application under Secs. Even the award of the Arbitrator is sixty-two pages reasoned order. Thereafter, the trial Court while considering the application under Secs. 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, considered entire aspects in this behalf and upheld the said finding of the Arbitrator. 14.1 In this connection I refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. v. Eastern Engineering Enterprises, reported in 1999 (9) SCC 283 . In the said case, non-speaking award was challenged and the Hon'ble Apex Court in Para 44 page 309 of the said judgment, observed as under : "Para 44. From the resume of the aforesaid decisions, it can be stated that: (a) It is not open to the Court to speculate, where no reasons are given by the Arbitrator has reached his conclusion where it is not disclosed by the terms of the award. (b) It is not open to the Court to admit to probe the mental process by which the Arbitrator has reached his conclusion where it is not disclosed by the terms of the award. (c) If the Arbitrator has committed a mere error of fact or law in reaching his conclusion on the disputed question submitted for his adjudication then the Court cannot interfere. (d) If no specific question of law is referred, the decision of the Arbitrator on that question is not final, however, much it may be within his jurisdiction and indeed essential for him to decide the question incidentally. In a case where a specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator was referred for the decision of the Arbitrator by the parties, then the finding of the Arbitrator on the said question between the parties may be binding. (e) In a case of non-speaking award, the jurisdiction of the Court is limited. The award can be set aside if the Arbitrator acts beyond his jurisdiction. (f) To find out whether the Arbitrator has traveled beyond his jurisdiction, it would be necessary to consider the agreement between the parties containing the arbitration clause. The Arbitrator acting beyond his jurisdiction is a different ground from the error apparent on the face of the award. The award can be set aside if the Arbitrator acts beyond his jurisdiction. (f) To find out whether the Arbitrator has traveled beyond his jurisdiction, it would be necessary to consider the agreement between the parties containing the arbitration clause. The Arbitrator acting beyond his jurisdiction is a different ground from the error apparent on the face of the award. (g) In order to determine whether the Arbitrator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction what has to be seen is whether the claimant could raise a particular claim before the Arbitrator. If there is a specific terms in the contract or the law which does not permit or give the Arbitrator the power to decide the dispute raised by the claimant or there is a specific bar in the contract to the raising of the particular claim then the award passed by the Arbitrator in respect thereof would be in excess of jurisdiction. (h) The award made by the Arbitrator disregarding the term of the reference or the arbitration agreement or the terms of the contract would be a jurisdictional error which requires ultimately to be decided by the Court. He cannot award an amount which is ruled out or prohibited by the terms of the agreement. Because of a specific bar stipulated by the parties in the agreement, that claim could not be raised. Even if it is raised and referred to arbitration because of a wider arbitration clause such claim amount cannot be awarded as the agreement is binding between the parties and the Arbitrator has to adjudicate as per the agreement." 15. In this behalf, this case considered the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd., reported in 2005 (6) SCC 462 . In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the legality and validity of the award of the Arbitrator. In Para 29 of the said judgment at page 474, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the case of Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. (supra) and observed as under : "Para 29. In Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. v. Eastern Engineering Enterprises, this Court after considering several decisions on the point, held that if an Arbitrator has acted arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or beyond the terms of the agreement, an award passed by him can be set aside. In Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. v. Eastern Engineering Enterprises, this Court after considering several decisions on the point, held that if an Arbitrator has acted arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or beyond the terms of the agreement, an award passed by him can be set aside. In such cases, the Arbitrator can be said to have acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred on him." 15.1 In the above said judgment of Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has also considered another judgment in the case of U.P.S.E.B. v. Searsole Chemicals Ltd., reported in 2001 (3) SCC 397 in Para 30 and observed that "In U.P.S.E.B. v. Searsole Chemicals Ltd., this Court held that where the Arbitrator had applied his mind to the pleadings, considered the evidence adduced before him and passed an award, the could not interfere by re-appraising the matter as if it were an appeal." 15.2 In Para 31 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority, reported in 2001 (5) SCC 691 and observed that "In Indu Engg. & Textiles Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority, it was observed that an Arbitrator is a Judge appointed by the parties and as such the award passed by him is not to be lightly interfered with." 15.3 In Para 32 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Annapurna Construction, reported in 2003 (8) SCC 154 and observed that "In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Annapurna Construction, this Court held that there is distinction between error within jurisdiction and error in excess of jurisdiction. The role of the Arbitrator is to arbitrate within the terms of the contract and if he acts in accordance with the terms of the agreement, his decision cannot be set aside. It is only when he travels beyond the contract, that he acts in excess of jurisdiction in which case, the award passed by him becomes vulnerable and can be questioned in an appropriate Court". It is only when he travels beyond the contract, that he acts in excess of jurisdiction in which case, the award passed by him becomes vulnerable and can be questioned in an appropriate Court". 15.4 After considering all these decisions, it may be noted that in that case, the award of the Arbitrator was considered by the learned single Judge and in that context, in Para 35 at page 475, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed, that "In our opinion, however, the learned Counsel for B.O.L. is justified in submitting that really it was in the realm of appreciation and re-appreciation of evidence. At the most, all those letters go to show that H.C.L. has some complaint against B.O.L. and it had also disclosed its intention to purchase oxygen gas from other sources but as observed by the Arbitrator, it was not proved that H.C.L. had in fact purchased oxygen from other sources under Clause 10A. If in the light of such evidence, the Arbitrator did not think it fit to allow counterclaim, it could not be said to be a case of misconduct covered by Sec. 30 of the Act. The learned single Judge as also the Division Bench were, therefore, not justified in setting aside the award passed by the Arbitrator dismissing the counter-claim and hence the order of the learned single Judge is confirmed by the Division Bench deserves to be set aside by resorting dismissal of counter-claim of H.C.L. by the Arbitrator. 16. This Court has also considered the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court (Coram: 1. N. Bhatt and K. M. Mehta, n.), in the case of Union of India v. H. K. Dhruv & Anr., reported in 2002 (1) G LH 617 : 2002 (4) GLR 3263 . In the said case, the Division Bench of this Court has considered the scope of interference in the award of the Arbitrator in Para 16 at page 635. In the said Para, the Division Bench of this Court has considered the judgment in the case of Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. (supra). Further the Division Bench of this Court in Para 17 at page 639 observed as under : "Para 17. In the said Para, the Division Bench of this Court has considered the judgment in the case of Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. (supra). Further the Division Bench of this Court in Para 17 at page 639 observed as under : "Para 17. In our view, in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. case the Court has very limited jurisdiction to interfere with the award of the Arbitrator, particularly where Arbitrator has not given any reasons in this behalf. We have considered the agreement between the parties containing arbitration clause. In our view, the Arbitrator has not committed any error while passing the award in this behalf. 16.1 Further in Para 17.2, the Division Bench of this Court has observed as under : "Para 17.2. We have also considered Sec. 30 and Sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act and the ground for challenging the award of Arbitrator. In this case, Arbitrator has not given any reasons and it was not open to the City Civil Court to speculate what has been awarded by the Arbitrator in absence of reasons. In our view, the Arbitrator has not committed any mistake apparent on the face of the record and when parties have selected Arbitrator to be a Judge in dispute between them thereafter parties cannot object to his decision that Arbitrator has given award incorrect. The Court cannot sit in appeal over the award of the Arbitrator, and therefore, in our view, the award of the Arbitrator has to be upheld and the order of the City Civil Court will have to be quashed and set aside as regards Claim Nos. 4 and 5 is concerned." 17. I have considered the facts and circumstances of the case. I have also considered Sec. 30 of the Arbitration Act which provides for grounds for setting aside the awards and Sec. 33 of the Arbitration Act which provides that the award to be decided by the application made by the concerned party. I have considered the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. (supra), Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. v. Hindustan' Copper Ltd., Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Union of India v. H. K. Dhruv & Ors., and other judgments cited by the learned Advocate for the appellant. 18. I have considered the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals Ltd. (supra), Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. v. Hindustan' Copper Ltd., Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Union of India v. H. K. Dhruv & Ors., and other judgments cited by the learned Advocate for the appellant. 18. Under Sec. 30, particularly clauses (a) (b) (c) of Sec. 30, the award can be set aside on the following grounds (a) Misconduct (b) A ward made after Court's order superseding arbitration. (c) A ward made after notice to Arbitrators of the institution of suit relating to the subject-matter of arbitration. (d) If the award IS improperly procured, and (e) If the award is otherwise invalid. 18.1 From the language of Secs.. 30 and 33, it is obvious that the Court would exercise this jurisdiction rarely and only where the award may be patently illegal and void. In other words, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, whenever the award is beyond terms of reference or award is in excess of jurisdiction. All these grounds are considered by this Court. The learned Counsel for the appellant has not urged any ground regarding the subject-matter of arbitration. The learned Advocate is not able to show that the Arbitrator has acted beyond his terms of reference or in excess of jurisdiction. Words, used in this Section that "an award shall not be set aside except on one or more of the following grounds : are imperative and take away the jurisdiction of the Court to set aside an award on any other ground. In other words, the grounds mentioned in this Section are exhaustive. The jurisdiction of the Court to examine correctness of arbitration award is limited by the provisions of the Arbitration Act, which are based on the general principle applicable to arbitration proceedings. An Arbitrator is a Tribunal selected by the parties, and his adjudication is binding on them. If it were permissible for the Court to re-examine the correctness of the award, the entire proceeding would amount to an exercise in futility. The grounds on which an award can be set aside are limited by statute and Sec. 30 of the Act in mandatory terms declares that an award shall not be set aside on other grounds. If it were permissible for the Court to re-examine the correctness of the award, the entire proceeding would amount to an exercise in futility. The grounds on which an award can be set aside are limited by statute and Sec. 30 of the Act in mandatory terms declares that an award shall not be set aside on other grounds. It is also not open to the Court to speculate, where no reasons are given by the Arbitrator, as to the reasons which led him to his conclusion. The Court cannot proceed to determine whether the conclusion is right or wrong, on an assumption that the Arbitrator must have proceeded by a certain process of reasoning. 19. In view of the same, this Court cannot accept the challenge of the appellant that the judgment of the trial Judge or award of the Arbitrator has been passed without jurisdiction. The learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to show as to which item which has not been referred has been decided by the Arbitrator. It is well settled that merely because of the error of law or error of fact, the trial Court or this Court will not interfere with the award of the Arbitrator in this behalf. In view of all these detailed reasons, this Court cannot accept the contentions that the award is beyond terms of reference or in excess of jurisdiction. 20. In the present case, Arbitrator has given his award and considered the factual and legal contentions which has also been considered by the learned trial Judge. There is no question of holding that the Arbitrator has acted beyond his terms or the Arbitrator has acted beyond his jurisdiction. Both these contentions of the learned Counsel for the appellant are misplaced and the Court has extremely limited jurisdiction in this behalf. In view of these decisions which I have referred earlier, the same shows that the Court has very limited jurisdiction in this behalf. It cannot be said that merely because of error of law, the Arbitrator has acted without jurisdiction and beyond his terms and reference. 21. As regards interest, I have considered Sec. 29 of the Arbitration Act which provides power of the Arbitrator to grant interest. The learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that the agreement does not bears (sic. 21. As regards interest, I have considered Sec. 29 of the Arbitration Act which provides power of the Arbitrator to grant interest. The learned Counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that the agreement does not bears (sic. bar) the right of the Arbitrator to grant interest. In view of the same, it will be perfectly legitimate for the Arbitrator to grant interest in this behalf. It may be noted that in this case the agreement took place in May, 1976 and somewhere in the year 1978 the work was completed, and thereafter, the bills were submitted and there was a dispute and ultimately on 8-4-1979, the suit was filed. Ultimately, the Arbitrator was appointed somewhere on 10-8-1979 and he has given the award on 13-4-1985. Thereafter the Misc. Civil Application Nos. 36 and 37 of 1985 were filed and ultimately the trial Court has passed a decree on 30-12-1985. Thereafter, the present appeal was filed in the year 1986 and the matter is heard today in this behalf. This Court is of the view that the respondent• being a business concerned has suffered a gross loss due to blockage of huge claim, and therefore, interest at the above rate from the date of termination of the contract dated 31-8-1978 should be allowed. 22. Mr. Bharda, learned Advocate has also submitted that 18 % interest should be allowed and for the same he has relied upon the cases referred in AIR 1972 SC 1507 - case of State of M.P. v. M/s. Saith and Skelton (P) Ltd. & Ors., and AIR 1982 Delhi 332 where the High Court of Delhi has allowed 18 % interest in this behalf. It may be noted that the Arbitrator has granted 18 % interest from 11-4-1979 till the date of decree. However, the trial Court has confirmed 18% of the interest only on amount awarded and till the date of decree, and thereafter, from the date of decree till realisation, the trial Court has reduced the interest by 9%. Thus, when the award passed by the Arbitrator on 13-41985, the F.C.I. has filed applications for quashing and setting aside the award of the Arbitrator. Thus, when the award passed by the Arbitrator on 13-41985, the F.C.I. has filed applications for quashing and setting aside the award of the Arbitrator. The learned trial Judge while considering the amount of interest, has observed that the plaintiff shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 18 % per annum on the amount awarded from 11-4-1979 till the passing of the decree and the Court has further observed that from the date of the decree till realisation, the plaintiff shall be entitled to 9% interest only on the amount awarded. In my view, the judgment and order of the learned trial Judge is proper and the trial Court has properly exercised its discretionary powers in this behalf. 23. It may be noted that Mr. Bharda, learned Advocate stated that the agreement executed between the parties does not debar the Arbitrator to grant the interest. 24. In view of the judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G. C. Roy, reported in 1992 (1) SCC 508 particularly in Para 43(iv) at page 533, it is observed that interest pendente-lite is not a matter of substantive law, like interest for the period anterior to reference (pre-reference period). For doing complete justice between the parties, such power has always been inferred. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that it is a matter keeping his end of justice. 25. Mr. Bharda, learned Advocate has relied upon the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd. (supra). In the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the legality ?'1d validity of the award of the Arbitrator as stated above and also in Paras 36 and 37 at page 475, the Hon'ble Court has considered the power of granting the interest. The Court has considered that the interest to be given in pre-reference period. As regards interest pendente lite, in Para 39 of the said judgment, the Hon'b1e Court has referred one judgment of the Hon'b1e Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Irrigation Department, Government of Orissa v. G. C. Roy, reported in 1992 (1) SCC 508 and in Para 40, the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, reported in 1992 (4) SCC 217 , where it is held that an Arbitrator is competent to award interest for the period from the date of the award to the date of decree or date of realisation, whichever is earlier. 26. In view of the aforesaid decision of Bhagawati Oxygen Ltd. (supra), the Arbitrator has power to grant interest through the arbitrarily right as well as pass an award in this behalf. 27. Mr. Bharda, learned Advocate has also relied upon the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of S. T7zakur v. Delhi Development Authority, reported in 2003 (1) Arbitration 1665 where the Arbitrator has granted 18 % interest. 28. Mr. Bharda, learned Advocate has also stated that the appeal is of year 1986 and after the appeal is admitted, this Court has directed the respondent to furnish the bank guarantee. He has stated that in view of the agreement, he has deposited Rs. 30,78,394-66 in the Bank. He has furnished the Bank statement in this behalf dated 14-3-2006 wherein it is stated that Bank guarantee commission paid at Bank of Baroda K.F.T.Z. Branch on the fixed deposit of Rs. 30,78,394-66 at different rate of Bank commission/period as per Bank norms detailed below : 28.(1) Amount of Fixed deposit - Rs. 30,78,394-66 No. Particular Amount Rs. 1. Bank Guarantee Commission 4,15.583-28 @ 0.75% of 18 years from 15-7-1986 to 14-7-2004 i.e., 23,087-95 x 18 2. For four and half months from 15-7-2004 8,658-98 to 30-11-2004 at the same rate 3. Bank Guarantee Commission @ 0.85 % 52,332-70 for two years from 1-12-2004 till date i.e.. 26,166-35 x 2 Total Guarantee Commission paid 4,76,574-96 29. The learned Advocate has also produced certificate from Bank of Baroda dated 14-3-2006 and the same is continue from time to time. 30. In view of this facts and circumstances of the case, when the Arbitrator has granted 18 % interest, the trial Court has reduced the same by 9 %. I am of the view that the matter pertains to the year 1979 to 1985, and at that time, the Arbitrator has power to grant interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Therefore, this Court do not interfere with the interest part also. 31. The learned Advocate Mr. I am of the view that the matter pertains to the year 1979 to 1985, and at that time, the Arbitrator has power to grant interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Therefore, this Court do not interfere with the interest part also. 31. The learned Advocate Mr. Kureshi, appearing for the appellant has relied upon one judgment in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Navbharat Construction, reported in 2002 (1) SCC 659 . In the said case, as the agreement was prohibiting to giving the interest, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered that the Arbitrator has no power to give interest. That effect is not relevant here in this case because in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reduced the interest by 6 %, but that is not binding here. 32. In view of the above facts and circumstances, this appeal is dismissed. Record and proceedings to be sent back to the trial Court concerned. Present First Appeal is disposed of accordingly. Appeal dismissed.