Judgment Barin Ghosh and Navaniti Pd.Singh JJ. 1. Four plaintiffs filed Title Suit No. 185 of 1995/235 of 1997. The plaintiff No. 1 was the erstwhile Advocate of the defendant, Bihar Sanskrit Siksha Board in the suit, and the appellant before us. The other plaintiffs are Junior Advocates, who then worked with the plaintiff No 1. The claim in the suit was for fees not paid for the work done. As it would be evident from the schedules to the plaint, such claim was mainly on account of consultancy fees not paid. In addition to that certain insignificant claims had been put forward on account of fees for appearance not paid and for costs incurred on behalf of the Board. The Board contested the suit by filing written statement and thereby denied the claims of the plaintiffs. The vakalatnama filed by the Board suggested that the Board had engaged Smt. Sheema Ali Khan, then an Advocate and now an Hon ble Judge of this Court, as the Advocate for the Board in connection with the said suit. The suit was decreed, when Smt. Sheema Ali Khan did not appear on behalf of the Board to defend the same, instead one Anwar Ali, an Advocate appeared on behalf of the Board to defend the suit. Anwar Ali, under his signature, applied to the Court for issuance of Dasti summons against the Secretary and the Law Officer of the Board for compelling them to appear and depose on behalf of the Board in defence to the suit. Anwar Ali, two days later, informed the Court that no one will appear on behalf of the defendants to defend the suit and, accordingly, the suit was decreed on the basis of evidence as was brought On record by the plaintiffs in the suit. 2. After the suit was decreed, plaintiffs put the same on execution and the Executing Court directed attachment of the bank account of the Board and in terms thereof, on 7th of December, 1997, the bank account of the Board was attached. According to the Board only upon attachment of its bank account, it came to learn about the decree and, accordingly, on 8th of December, 1997, applied for a certified copy thereof and obtained the same on 10th of December, 1997. According to the Board only upon attachment of its bank account, it came to learn about the decree and, accordingly, on 8th of December, 1997, applied for a certified copy thereof and obtained the same on 10th of December, 1997. On 18th December, 1997, the Board filed First Appeal No. 607 of-1997 before this Court assailing the judgment and decree in the said Title Suit. Subsequent thereto on 6th January, 1998, Board filed an application for condonation of delay. In opposition to the said application for condonation of delay, the plaintiffs in the suit, disclosed in their counter affidavit, that in fact the Board had applied for a certified copy of the judgment and decree passed in the said suit or 22nd September, 1997 and obtained the same on 10th of November, 1997 and, accordingly, it was contended that the Board, has, in the application for condonation of delay, suppressed material facts. This assertion was made on the basis of the certified copy of the application for certified copy of the decree, as was filed by Anwar Ali on 22nd September, 1997, obtained by the plaintiffs on 18th November, 1997. 3. A learned Single Judge of this Court by the judgment and decree passed in the said appeal, as impugned in this appeal, held that the Board is guilty of suppresio veri and suggestio falsi, inasmuch as it pretended unjustly that only on 7th of December, .1997, it came to know about the judgment and decree; whereas in fact it had applied for the certified copy of the same on 22nd September, 1997. The appellate Court found as a fact that the application for certified copy as was made on 22nd September, 1997 was made by Anwar Ali and that the same was also obtained by him on 10th of November, 1997. The appellate Court felt that the Board has accepted the fact that Anwar Ali was a Junior to Mrs. Sheema Ali Khan, when in fact the case, as made out by the Board before the appellate Court, was that Anwar Ali is not known to anyone, for he does not exist. 4. It is true that somebody has put in a signature purporting to be of Anwar Ali in the vakalatnama filed on behalf of the Board in the Title Suit granting power to Smt. Sheema Ali Khan. 4. It is true that somebody has put in a signature purporting to be of Anwar Ali in the vakalatnama filed on behalf of the Board in the Title Suit granting power to Smt. Sheema Ali Khan. That, therefore, suggests that the person so signed as Anwar Ali in the said vakalatnama had been engaged by the Board. At the same time, the self same person filed a petition for Dasti summon to summon the representatives of his own client including the Secretary to the Board, who according to the vakalatnama engaged him, for the purpose of giving evidence. This conduct is stupendous. Therefore, we wanted to see this person. Inasmuch as according to Board, this person does not exist, so we requested the learned lawyer for the plaintiffs in the suit to produce this person before us or to give us some information about him so that we could locate him. We thought that when a lawyer has defended a suit against the plaintiffs, for a number of days before the trial Court, it would be very easy for the plaintiffs, who are also lawyers, to locate this person quickly and bring him before us or supply some valuable information about him, but the learned counsel for the plaintiffs submitted before us that he is not in a position to produce that person before us or to supply any information about him. We, therefore, conclude that there is no existence of an Advocate by the name Anwar Ali, whose signature tallies with the signature as that of Anwar Ali appearing in the said vakalatnama. 5. The logical conclusion, therefore, would be that there was no suppression at all by the Board in their application for condonation of delay. If the suppression aspect is taken of, then the conclusion would be that the suit was decreed ex parte and the person who allegedly sought to defend the suit was not engaged by the Board and in such circumstances, the knowledge of the decree to the Board could only be shifted to 7th of December, 1997, that is the date when the bank account of the Board was attached; and as a consequence the application for condonation of delay ought to have been allowed for sufficient cause had been made out for condoning the delay. 6. 6. At one stage, we thought that after condoning the delay, the appeal should be remitted back to the first appellate Court for its decision but as the p laintiff No. 1 at first and the counsel for the plaintiffs latter argued the appeal on merits, we thought it appropriate to go into the merits of the first appeal. 7. Before the trial Court, documentary as well as oral evidence, was led by the plaintiffs. Exhibit-3 is the letter of engagement by which the Board had engaged the plaintiff No. 1 as its retainer. In terms of Clause 2(da), the plaintiff No. 1 was entitled to a consultation fee of Rs. 155/- in respect of matters in which he has been engaged by the Board and appearing in the list of this Court. From the schedule to the plaint, it appears that on the basis of fees of Rs. 155/- per consultancy, the plaintiff No. 1 became enti- tled to receive from the Board charges on consultancy for the month of July, 1993, a sum of Rs. 1,22,450/-, meaning thereby during the month of July, 1993, the plaintiff No. 1 had around seven thousand consultancies. These claims, as aforesaid, principally on account of consultancy, were sought to be proved by a register as was produced by the plaintiff No. 1 before the trial Court. In oral evidence, it was stated before the trial Court by the plaintiff No. 1 that the Law Officer of the Board has certified that this book contains the particulars of the work done by the plaintiff No. 1. A certificate to that effect has also been subscribed on this book. However, the certificate does not say that the entries made in the book are accepted on behalf of the Board as true and correct. Furthermore, this certificate was appended on 1st of January, 1992, when as aforesaid for the month of July 1993, the claim on account of consultancy was Rs. 1,22,450/-. Therefore, this certificate does not prove that anyone on behalf of the Board accepted the correctness of the entries made in the book. In terms of Section 34 of the Evidence Act, no one can be charged merely on the basis of entries made in the books of account kept and maintained in the regular course of business. 1,22,450/-. Therefore, this certificate does not prove that anyone on behalf of the Board accepted the correctness of the entries made in the book. In terms of Section 34 of the Evidence Act, no one can be charged merely on the basis of entries made in the books of account kept and maintained in the regular course of business. Therefore, the plaintiffs and in particular plaintiff No. 1 was required to produce evidence to corroborate the entries made in this book. No corroboration was brought on record of the trial Court. Not one single cause list of this Court was tendered in evidence and, accordingly, there was nothing on which the trial Court could come to the conclusion that the sum of money, as claimed in the suit, is due to the plaintiff No. 1 and payable by the Board. Before the trial Court, bills said to have been submitted by the plaintiffs, pertaining to their fees, were tendered in evidence. There was one exhibit which sug- gested that copies of the bills were resubmitted under cover of a letter and the then Chairman of the Board made an endorsement on the letter and thereby directed his office to look into the matter. It is well settled in law that bills/invoices are mode of lodging claims and nothing more. It may be possible that claims were lodged by the plaintiffs, but the same were ignored. That would not suggest the right to claim stood established. On the other hand, it was brought on the record of the trial Court that before the suit was filed, the plaintiff No. 1 had approached the writ Court, when the writ Court directed the Board to pay the lawful dues of plaintiff No. 1, but despite that the Board did not pay the claim lodged in the suit on the ground that the Board was disputing such claim. Despite such being the position, no attempt was made by the plaintiffs to establish that in fact on the basis of Exhibit-3, the plaintiff No. 1 did serve the Board by giving appropriate consultancies on the dates as were mentioned in the said register. 8. In so far as the other plaintiffs are concerned, admittedly, they were not engaged by the Board at any time. However, in terms of Exhibit-3, the Board agreed to pay consultancy fee to Junior Counsel at the rate of Rs. 8. In so far as the other plaintiffs are concerned, admittedly, they were not engaged by the Board at any time. However, in terms of Exhibit-3, the Board agreed to pay consultancy fee to Junior Counsel at the rate of Rs. 55/- with whosoever the plaintiff No. 1 will consult. If the plaintiff No. 1 has failed to prove the fact of giving consultancy, the conclusion would be that other plaintiffs too failed to establish the same. Despite such being the state of affairs on the evidence brought on record, the suit was decreed when specific issues were raised whether the plaintiffs are entitled to legal remunerations as claimed in the suit. 9. We would, therefore, allow the present appeal and, accordingly, would set aside the judgment and decree rendered by the first appellate Court dismissing the application for ocondonation of delay, allow the same and at the same time allow the First Appeal No. 607 of 1997 by setting aside the decree passed by the first Court and dismiss the Title Suit on the ground that there was no evidence on record on the basis whereof such decree could be passed. 10. As aforesaid after the suit was decreed, the same was put to execution and on the basis of an order passed by the Executing Court, the bank account of the Board was attached. Subsequent thereto on the basis of the stay orders passed by this Court, the Board was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- with the Civil Court. We declare that the Board is entitled to refund of the said deposit on the strength of this judgment and decree. The plaintiffs in the suit are directed to pay to the appellant 8% interest on the sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- from the date of deposit thereof with the Civil Court until today. In the event of non-payment of the said interest, this direction can be ex- ecuted as a decree. 11. In the event, the sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- has earned interest less than 8%, the same shall be paid to the plaintiffs in the suit after plaintiffs have discharged their obligation to pay in terms of the directions as above. In the event such deposit has earned more than 8% interest, the excess over 8% shall be paid to the Board. 12. 20,00,000/- has earned interest less than 8%, the same shall be paid to the plaintiffs in the suit after plaintiffs have discharged their obligation to pay in terms of the directions as above. In the event such deposit has earned more than 8% interest, the excess over 8% shall be paid to the Board. 12. We have concluded, in the facts and circumstances of this case, that a ghost appeared as an Advocate before Shri Samir Kumar Jha who was Xllth Sub- Judge at Patna on 31st July, 1997 and that ghost, though represented to be an Advocate of the Board, asked for Dasti summons against the officer of the Board, who signed the vakalatnama as well as written statement on behalf of the Board, to appear as witness to contest the suit. We feel that this is such a matter which we must bring to the notice of the Standing Committee and, accordingly, the Registry is directed to forthwith place a copy of this judgment and order before Hon ble the Chief Justice for the purpose of bringing the same to the notice of the Standing Committee of this Court. 13. In this appeal, on 3rd of February, 1999, Joint Registrar (Judicial) directed the appellant-Board to put in the cost for preparation of paper book and also to file appellants list. It appears from records called for and produced by the Registry, that the appellants deposited cost on 4th of May, 1999 and filed the appellants list on 5th of May, 1999. The same has also been endorsed on the office notes portion of the order-sheet on 7th of July, 1999. It appears I. A. No. 12675 of 1999 was filed by the plaintiff No. 3 for early hearing of the appeal. The office reported in the office notes portion of the order-sheet that the appeal is not ready for hearing as paper books are to be prepared. When the matter was, thus, brought to the notice of the Hon ble the Chief Justice, His Lordship on 4th of February, 2000 rejected the application for early hearing of the appeal after observing that neither of the parties has taken requisite steps to make the appeal ready. The office notes portion of the order-sheet then records that one copy of the paper book has been received by the learned counsel for the respondents. This endorsement is dated 29th May, 2000. The office notes portion of the order-sheet then records that one copy of the paper book has been received by the learned counsel for the respondents. This endorsement is dated 29th May, 2000. In the order-sheet, there is no mention of anything pertaining to the paper book apart from what we have observed above. The paper book, as has been brought to our notice, was allegedly filed on 24th of May, 2000. The High Court from 21 st May, 2000 to 20th June, 2000 remained closed on account of Annual Summer Vacation. The paper book, as has been produced before us and on the basis whereof the learned counsel for the plaintiffs were arguing, contains, amongst others, photostat copy of the certified copy of the judgment and decree dated 31st July, 1997 which certified copy was obtained on 10th November, 1997. This fact was brought to the notice of the appellant-Board by the plaintiffs by filing an affidavit affirmed on 15th June, 2000 and served upon the then Advocate on record of the appellant-Board on 15th. June, 2000. Before us, it was sought to be contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs that as a miracle of God, while preparing the paper book, the suppressed ertified copy, as was obtained on 10th of November, 1997 by the appellant-Board, has come on record. In addition to the said certified copy of the judgment and decree, the paper book contains almost all the exhibits as were exhibited before the trial Court by the plaintiffs. In addition, the paper book contains a letter dated 10th September, 1999 written by the then Vice-Chairman of the Board Shri Jai Narain Yadav addressed to this Court enclosing thereby five copies of the paper books of the appellants. The fact remains that this gentleman Jai Narain Yadav was associated with the appellant-Board for two terms, the first term started from 20.12.1996 and expired on 20.12.1999 and the later term was from 19th August, 2003 to 14th June, 2005. The question is if these paper books were to be filed on 15th of September, 1999 and, accordingly, were then lying ready why the same were to be filed on 24th of June, 2000 during the course of vacation? The question is if these paper books were to be filed on 15th of September, 1999 and, accordingly, were then lying ready why the same were to be filed on 24th of June, 2000 during the course of vacation? As aforesaid, the first appellate Court decided the appeal while considering the application for condonation of delay and had no occasion to call for the trial Court records, except the certified copy issue register. If that be so how these paper books could contain substantially all exhibits exhibited by the plaintiffs in the trial Court. We enquired from the concerned Assistant of the Letters Patent Appeal Section as to whether paper books could be filed during vacation. The answer to that was "no". If the paper books could not be filed during the vacation, question of receiving a copy thereof by the respondents in the appeal during Summer Vacation also did not arise. We called upon the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Board to produce his paper book before us. That paper book, as he has produced before us, has been prepared exactly in the same order as the same ought to have been prepared on the basis of appellants list. We are, therefore, certain that the paper books, as were placed before us, were not the paper books prepared by anyone on behalf of the appellant-Board, but the same, with the instrumentality of the members of our Department, was substituted by some person interested. This aspect of the matter too must be gone in for the purpose of upholding public confidence in us and, accordingly, at the first instance, we direct that the matter be investigated by the Registrar General of this Court and the inves- tigation report alongwith a copy of this order be placed before Hon ble the Chief iJustice for consideration and for taking appropriate steps. 14. Let our Court Master keep on seal the appellants list, the challan for deposit of money, the first Judges copy Of the brief, copies of the paper books as (well as a copy of the paper book supplied to us by the learned counsel for the appellant-Board and hand over the same to the Registrar General alongwith a copy of this judgment and order for making investigation as we have directed.