( 1 ) THIS Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is filed as against an order of remand made in A. S. No. 152/2006 on the file of IV Additional Senior Civil Judge, warangal. ( 2 ) SRI Ghanshyamdas Mandhani, Counsel representing the appellant would maintain that no doubt a final decree to be passed in accordance with the preliminary decree, but however even on a cursory glance of the allotments made, there is total non-application of mind and the same had been allotted in a disorderly fashion. The learned Counsel also pointed out that no doubt the appellate Court observed that the Court of first instance did not make a speaking order, but however, in stead of making an open order of remand, observed as though for allotment already made, reasons to be recorded. The counsel also would maintain that these observations made by the appellate Court would be taken by the Court of first instance that the allotments already made in a way to be confirmed, but by recording reasons. By such an order of remand, serious prejudice is caused to the appellant. ( 3 ) PER contra Sri Tarakam, the learned Senior Counsel had explained the meaning of preliminary decree and final decree in a partition action and would submit that the final decree to be passed in accordance with the preliminary decree. The learned Senior Counsel placed strong reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Venkat Reddy and others Vs. Pethi Reddy. The learned Senior Counsel in all fairness would submit that in the light of the facts and circumstances, if any modified order to be passed while making the final decree, the appellate Court could have done the same and to say that reasons had not been recorded by the Court of first instance, may not be the correct view. The learned Counsel had taken this Court through the relevant portions of the order made in A. S. No. 152/2006 by IV Additional District Judge, warangal and also the order made in. A. No. 947/2003 in O. S. No. 157/96 by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Warangal. ( 4 ) HEARD the Counsel on record. ( 5 ) THE respondent in the said Appeal A. S. No. 152/2006, as decree holder who obtained the preliminary decree filed. A. No. 947/2003 in O. S. No. 157/96 by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Warangal. ( 4 ) HEARD the Counsel on record. ( 5 ) THE respondent in the said Appeal A. S. No. 152/2006, as decree holder who obtained the preliminary decree filed. A. No. 947/2003 in O. S. No. 157/96 on the file of II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Warangal and the learned Judge made the following order : "perused the record. The final decree is passed in accordance with the preliminary decree dt. 18. 8. 2000 by dividing the property into two equal shares and allotting one such share to the petitioner herein. The petitioner is allotted the light blue colour portion which is denoted as A1, A2, A3 and A4 in the rough sketch map annexed herewith. The J. Dr. /respondent is allotted the portion shown in red colour denoted as B1, B2 and B3. The petition is allowed accordingly. Both parties shall bear their own costs. " Aggrieved by the same, the respondent/judgment debtor carried the matter by way of Appeal A. S. No. 152/2006 on the file of IV Additional District Judge, Warangal and the appellate Court at para-4 framed the following Points for consideration : 1. Whether the final decree proceedings passed by the learned trial Judge in. A. No. 947/2003 is not in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil procedure ? 2. To what relief ? the learned Judge recorded certain reasons at paras 5, 6, 7 and 8 and ultimately allowed the Appeal making an order of remand to the trial Judge for passing a speaking order in the final decree proceedings. Aggrieved by the same, the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal had been preferred. ( 6 ) THE main grievance ventilated by the Counsel for the appellant is that even while making an order of remand, in stead of making an open order of remand, a restricted order of remand was made in a way which is suggestive to the Court of first instance to confirm the same allotments, but no doubt recording certain reasons. A preliminary decree was passed on 18-8-2000 declaring that the plaintiff and defendant are entitled to claim shares and it was also declared that the defendant shall be allotted the South Western corner of the plaint schedule property while partitioning the property since the defendant invested considerable amount in construction of the building. The respondent in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal as petitioner filed. A. No. 947/2003 for passing of final decree in O. S. No. 157/96. The Court of first instance appointed a Commissioner who submitted his report and objections were filed to the said report. Both the parties proposed partition by showing the respective portions by filing the respective maps. The Court of first instance, without considering the report of the Commissioner or the proposal by the parties, made an order and the said order already had been specified supra. The learned senior Counsel Sri Tarakam placed strong reliance on the decision referred (1) supra wherein the Apex Court at para-6 observed : "the new provision makes it clear that the law is and has always been that upon the fathers insolvency his disposing power over the interest of his undivided sons in the joint family property vests in the Official Receiver and that consequently the latter has a right to sell that interest. The provision is thus declaratory of the law and was intended to apply to all cases except those covered by the two provisos. We are concerned here only with the first proviso. This proviso excepts from the operation of the Act a transaction such as a sale by an Official Receiver which has been the subject of a final decision by a competent Court. The short question, therefore, is whether the preliminary decree for partition passed in this case which was affirmed finally in second appeal by the High Court of Madras can be regarded as a final decision. The competence of the Court is not in question here. What is, however, contended is that in a partition suit the only decision which can be said to be a final decision is the final decree passed in the case and that since final decree proceedings were still going on when the Amending Act came into fore the first proviso was not available to the appellants. What is, however, contended is that in a partition suit the only decision which can be said to be a final decision is the final decree passed in the case and that since final decree proceedings were still going on when the Amending Act came into fore the first proviso was not available to the appellants. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that since the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by the court before a preliminary decree is passed that decree must, in so far as rights adjudicated upon are concerned, be deemed to be a final decision. The word decision even in its popular sense means a concluded opinion (see strouds Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Ed. Vol. I, p. 743 ). Where, therefore, the decision is embodied in the judgment which is followed by a decree finality must naturally attach itself to it in the sense that it is no longer open to question by either party except in an appeal, review or revision petition as provided for by law. The High Court has, however, observed : "the mere declaration of the rights of the plaintiff by the preliminary decree, would, in our opinion not amount to a final decision for it is well known that even if a preliminary decree is passed either in a mortgage suit or in a partition suit, there are certain contingencies in which such a preliminary decree can be modified or amended and therefore would not become final". It is not clear from the judgment what the contingencies referred to by the High court are in which a preliminary decree can be modified or amended unless what the learned Judges meant was modified or amended in appeal or in review or in revision or in exceptional circumstances by resorting to the powers conferred by sections 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If that is what the High court meant then every decree passed by a Court including decrees passed in cases which do not contemplate making of a preliminary decree are liable to be "modified and amended". Therefore, if the reason given by the High Court is accepted it would mean that no finality attaches to decree at all. That is not the law. Therefore, if the reason given by the High Court is accepted it would mean that no finality attaches to decree at all. That is not the law. A decision is said to be final when, so far as the Court rendering it is concerned, it is unalterable except by resort to such provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as permit its reversal, modification or amendment. Similarly, a final decision would mean a decision which would operate as res judicata between the parties if it is not sought to be modified or reversed by preferring an appeal or a revision or a review application as is permitted by the Code. A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate the making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree - the decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The legislature in its wisdom has thought that suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree is made the decision of the court arrived at the earlier stage also has a finality attached to it. It would be relevant to refer to Section 97 of the Code of civil Procedure which provides that where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. This provision thus clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree. This provision thus clearly indicates that as to the matters covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree. " ( 7 ) ON a careful reading of the reasons which had been recorded by the court of first instance, it may be that the Court of first instance could have recorded further reasons, but however it is pertinent to note that it is a final decree proceeding and the shares of the respective parties already had been declared by the preliminary decree and while working out the modalities in relation to the allotments or otherwise, the same can be adjusted at any stage and for that purpose in the light of the limited scope and ambit of the nature of controversy between the parties in the present litigation, making an order of remand in the considered opinion of this Court may not be necessary. In other words, the objections, if any of the respective parties and the respective contentions of the parties relating to the relevant portions which they point out to be allotted to the respective shares, these aspects could have been considered by the appellate Court in stead of making an order of remand. In a way, this Court is of the view that this order of remand is a futile exercise. In stead, it would be just and proper on the part of the appellate Court to consider the respective contentions of the parties and also consider the material available on record and pass appropriate orders in accordance with Law. ( 8 ) ACCORDINGLY, in the light of the above observations, the impugned order is hereby set-aside and the matter is remanded to the appellate Court to pass appropriate orders in accordance with Law at the earliest point of time. The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated. No order as to costs. ( 9 ) IT is brought to the notice of the Court that the Cross Objections also had been filed. No separate orders need be passed in the Cross Objections in the light of the observations made above. Accordingly the Cross Objections also are disposed of. No order as to costs. .