Judgment :- Bilal Nazki, J. The petitioner was accused in C.C.No. 143 of 1997 on the file of I Additional Munsif Magistrate, Tenali. On 15.9.1996 at 11.30 A.M. R. Ramachandra Naidu, D.E. Operation, A.P.S.E. Board, Tenali along with his staff inspected the service connection of the accused and he observed that the accused had pilferaged the electricity energy bypassing the meter and thus the accused had committed theft of electrical energy. The inspection report was prepared and later a complaint was lodged. After the evidence was led by the prosecution, the trial Court found the accused guilty of the offences under Sections 39 and 44 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, convicted and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- i/d. to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 44 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 and rigorous imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- i/d. to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910. An appeal was taken, which was dismissed and the conviction and sentence were confirmed. Then this revision was filed. When the revision came up for hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioner prayed that a direction be given to the complainant to compound the offences in terms of Section 49-B of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (for short “the Act”). He submitted that such a direction could be given in view of the judgment of this Court being Tamalampudi Satyanarayana Reddy Vs. State of A.P. 2003 (1) ALD (Crl.) 401 (AP). A single Judge of this Court referred the matter to Division Bench. The direction given in the above judgment in Tamalampudi Satyanarayana Reddy Vs. State of A.P. was, “Consequently, the petitioner shall be entitled for compounding of the offences against him, subject to payment of the amount as stipulated in the Table and sub-section (4) of Section 49-B of the Act.” We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and learned senior counsel Mr. C. Padmanabha Reddy as amicus curiae. There is no dispute with the legal position as far as the meaning of ‘compounding of offence’ is concerned. C. Padmanabha Reddy as amicus curiae. There is no dispute with the legal position as far as the meaning of ‘compounding of offence’ is concerned. Compounding means the compromise between the aggrieved person and the accused and according to judgments of the Calcutta High Court and Allahabad High Court respectively in Murray, (1893) 21 Calcutta 103, 112 and J. John, (1922) 45 Allahabad 145, the compounding of an offence signifies that the person against whom the offence has been committed has received some gratification, not necessarily of a pecuniary character, to act as an inducement for his desiring to abstain from a prosecution. Similarly in Rev. Father Godfrey Meeus Vs. Siman Dular, (1950) Nagpur 434, Nagpur High Court held that compromise of a compoundable case deprives the Magistrate of his jurisdiction to try it. As a matter of fact, there cannot be a compromise, which can be forced either by the Court or by any one of the parties. Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “the code”), which has been referred to for the purpose of analogy, lays down that offences punishable under the sections of Indian Penal Code specified in the columns under the section may be compounded by the persons mentioned in another column. So in terms of the Code only those offences can be compounded which are mentioned in the table given under Section 320 of the Code and it is consistently held that the offences, which are not mentioned in Section 320 of the Code, cannot be compounded as far as Indian Penal Code is concerned. Under the offences, which are mentioned to be compoundable, it is the aggrieved person by whom the offence could be compounded with the accused. It is well settled that an FIR could be filed for taking cognizance of any offence by anybody, but only only those persons to whom the hurt was caused could compound offences under Section 323 and 334 of the IPC. Similarly for offences under Sections 341 and 342 of IPC, which pertain to wrongful restraint or illegal confinement, person restrained or confined can make compounding. These illustrations, which are by no means exhaustive, were only given to stress on the point that it is the aggrieved person and the accused who have to enter into a compromise which can be ordered. These illustrations, which are by no means exhaustive, were only given to stress on the point that it is the aggrieved person and the accused who have to enter into a compromise which can be ordered. Coming to the present reference, Section 49-B of the Act lays down, “49-B. Compounding of offences:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974), any Officer of an Electricity Utility specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government may accept from any consumer or person who committed or who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence of theft of energy punishable under this Act, a sum of money by way of compounding for the offence as specified in the Table below and as may be modified by notification by Government from time to time…….” On bare perusal of the section it becomes clear that an officer of Electricity Utility who was specially empowered by the Government can accept, from any consumer or a person who committed or who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence of theft of energy, a sum of money by way of compounding for the offence. There are two restrictions (1) the specially empowered officer can compound the offence; and (2) he can compound the offence on payment of money as enunciated in the table given under Section 49-B of the Act and this payment of money for compounding has to be agreed to by the consumer or the person who committed or who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence of theft of energy. So the compromise cannot be a one-sided affair. The officer, on his own, cannot thrust of a compromise on payment of money as give in the table on the consumer or the person who committed or who is reasonably suspected of having committed the offence. Similarly the person who committed or who was reasonably suspected of having committed the offence upon making the payment cannot insist for an order of compounding. This exercise was two-way traffic. If the offender or the suspect makes such an offer, it is for the officer concerned to accept or not to accept. In some cases the officer concerned may reject it as there can be reasons for rejecting it. This exercise was two-way traffic. If the offender or the suspect makes such an offer, it is for the officer concerned to accept or not to accept. In some cases the officer concerned may reject it as there can be reasons for rejecting it. For instance, while dealing with a habitual offender in whose favour the cases have been compounded on many occasions in the past, the officer may use his discretion and may not agree this time around to compound the offence. Similarly a suspect may believe that he has not committed any offence and why he should pay huge amount, rather face the trial and get an acquittal. The learned single Judge who considered the matter was right in coming to the conclusion that the compounding of offence can be done either during the trial or even after punishment at an appellate stage because the section itself stated that the officer may accept from any consumer or person who “committed” or who was reasonably “suspected” of having committed the offence of theft of energy. Therefore, it would follow that the reference to a person who has committed the offence is a reference to a person who has already been convicted and reference to the person who is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence is a reference to a person who has not yet been convicted. But the learned single Judge, in our view, was not right in giving a direction to the respondents to compound the offence. The learned single Judge at the end of the order, held, “Consequently, the petitioner shall be entitled for compounding of the offences against him, subject to payment of the amount as stipulated in the Table and sub-section (4) of Section 49-B of the Act.” This direction, in our view, is not in accordance with law. The learned single Judge at the end of the order, held, “Consequently, the petitioner shall be entitled for compounding of the offences against him, subject to payment of the amount as stipulated in the Table and sub-section (4) of Section 49-B of the Act.” This direction, in our view, is not in accordance with law. Similarly the learned Single Judge, while interpreting section 49-B of the Act, in para-13 of the order was of the view that once the payment of amount as stipulated in the Table is paid by a consumer, several consequences would follow, such as, (a) the person in custody with the offence shall be set at liberty; (b) no proceedings shall be instituted or continued against such consumer or person in any Criminal Court; (c) the custody referred to above can be during the trial or subsequent thereto; (d) the proceedings referred to sub-section (2) cannot be confined to those in the trial court alone; and (e) the reference to the proceeding are those “in any Criminal Courts.” That would, in other words, mean that it is for the accused to decide whether to compound the offence or not to compound the offence. It is not the import of the law that no sooner the offender pays the fine, consequences of acquittal would follow automatically. In our view, after making an offer of compounding, the said offer is to be considered and accepted by the specially empowered officer and then the amounts as calculated by him in accordance with the table are to be paid, then the consequences of compounding will follow, but not on mere payment of amounts by the accused or the suspect. The reference is accordingly answered holding that compounding under Section 49-B of the Act can only be done by mutual consent of specially empowered officer and accused or suspect on payment of amounts as calculated by the specially empowered officer in terms of the table given under Section 49-B of the Act and no direction can be given by the Courts to the specially empowered officer to compound an offence. We place on record the valuable assistance rendered by Mr. C. Padmanabha Reddy, learned senior advocate as amicus curiae. The matter is now listed before the learned single Judge.