Judgment :- Aggrieved by the concurrent findings and order of eviction, Tenant has preferred this Civil Revision Petition. For convenience, the parties are referred to as per their original rank in H.R.C.O.P.No.5 of 1998. 2. 1. Relevant facts for disposal of this Revision are as follows:- Petitioner / Landlord filed H.R.C.O.P.No.5 of 1998 under Section 10(2)(i) of Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1969 (for short "the Act") for eviction of Respondent / Tenant on the ground of Wilful Default in payment of rent. According to the Petitioner, the Respondent, who is Petitioners Sister had become Tenant on 01.02.1996 as per Lease Agreement dated 09.02.1996 agreeing to pay monthly rent of Rs.100/-. The lease was for eleven months from 01.02.1996 to 312. 1996. Right from inception of Tenancy, the Respondent has not paid the rent. Advocate Notice was issued calling upon the Tenant to pay arrears of rent. Alleging that the Tenant has to pay a sum of Rs.2,300/- towards arrears of rent for a period of 23 months from 01.02.1996 to 312. 1997, Eviction Petition was filed on the ground of Wilful Default. 2. 2. The Respondent / Tenant resisted the Eviction Petition on the ground that the Petitioner is not the sole owner of the building and that she is also one of the legal heirs of Deceased – Rajagopal Pillai, who is the Father of the Petitioner as well as the Respondent. According to Respondent, she has been continuously living in petition Schedule property for more than 53 years from her childhood and even after marriage, she continued to live in the property along with her Husband. The Respondent / Tenant claims share in the petition mentioned property. Further case of Respondent / Tenant is that she and her Two Sisters had executed a Release Deed in favour of their Brothers believing that properties of her Father will be sold and sale proceeds can be divided among them. The Respondent has contended that the Lease Deed was obtained from her under the pretext that it is required for sale of house property. It is the case of Respondent / Tenant that she is not a Tenant under the Petitioner / Landlord and as such eviction petition is not maintainable. 2. 3. Before the Courts below, the matter was hotly contested. It is the case of Respondent / Tenant that she is not a Tenant under the Petitioner / Landlord and as such eviction petition is not maintainable. 2. 3. Before the Courts below, the matter was hotly contested. Power Agent – Maternal Uncle of the Petitioner was examined as P.W.1 and Exs.A.1 to A.4 were marked. The Respondent / Tenant examined herself as R.W.1 and marked innumerable documents -Exs.B1 to B.32. 2. 4. Learned Rent Controller found that Respondent herself admitted that she did not pay the rent claiming to be the legal heir and non-payment of rent amounts to Wilful Default and ordered Eviction. It was further held that having already given the Release Deed, it is not open to the Tenant to deny Title of the Petitioner. Aggrieved by the order of Eviction, the Respondent / Tenant has preferred Appeal before the Appellate Authority. Pointing out execution of Release Deed and Lease Deed, the Appellate Authority confirmed the findings of the Rent Controller and observed that after executing Release Deed, the Tenant has no right in the property and without paying any rent, she cannot remain in the petition mentioned property. 3. Assailing the concurrent findings of Courts below, learned counsel for the Revision Petitioner has contended that she is entitled to a share and only for name sake, Lease Agreement was obtained from her. Laying emphasis upon Reply Notice sent by the Petitioner, learned counsel submitted that the Petitioner himself has admitted share of the Respondent and urging her not to rush to the Court. Placing reliance upon the decision reported in 2001 (2) M.L.J. 80 (S.C.) and other decisions, learned counsel further submitted that exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, to satisfy as to legality or propriety of findings, High Court can certainly re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings of Courts below, if the findings are perverse. 4. Laying emphasis upon Lease Agreement, learned counsel for the Petitioner / Landlord has submitted that the Courts below concurrently held on factual aspects that the Respondent is a Tenant and that she has committed Wilful Default in payment of rent. Placing reliance upon the decision reported in M/s. Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works ..Vs.. 4. Laying emphasis upon Lease Agreement, learned counsel for the Petitioner / Landlord has submitted that the Courts below concurrently held on factual aspects that the Respondent is a Tenant and that she has committed Wilful Default in payment of rent. Placing reliance upon the decision reported in M/s. Sri Rajalakshmi Dyeing Works ..Vs.. Rangaswamy Chettiar (A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1253), it was contended that under Section 25 of the Act, the High Court should not interfere on concurrent findings of facts decided by the Courts below based on evidence. 5. I have carefully examined the records and considered the submissions of both sides. The question falling for consideration is whether concurrent findings of courts below are illegal and improper warranting interference exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act. 6. Admittedly, petitioned property along with other properties belong to one Rajagopal Pillai – the Father of Petitioner and Respondent. Admittedly, Rajagopal Pillai died intestate, leaving behind four sons and three daughters, including Petitioner and Respondent. Mother – Gunamalai Ammal died on 212. 1993. 7. The demised property is a tiled house at No.16, Mariyamman Koil Street, Karaikkal. The Respondent is in occupation of the demised premises as a Tenant as per Ex.A.2 – Lease Agreement dated 09.02.2006. Lease is for a period of 11 months from 01.02.1996 to 312. 1996 and monthly rent is Rs.100/- with advance of Rs.1000/-. According to P.W.1, even prior to 01.02.1996, the Respondent was in occupation of the premises and she was making payment of rent at Rs.100/- p.m and that P.W.1 had entered the same in pocket note book, which is stated to be with the Respondent. P.W.1 has clearly stated that from 01.02.1996 onwards till date of Petition, the Respondent / Tenant did not pay the rent. .8. Evidence of P.W.1 is substantiated from the recitals in Ex.A.2 – Lease Agreement. Ex.A.2 – Lease Agreement is in printed form containing details of Lease and Terms and Conditions thereon. Intention of parties to let out premises on lease to the Respondent and Respondent becoming Tenant under Petitioner is amply evident from recitals in Ex.A.2. 9. Denying jural relationship, Respondent has contended that the Petitioner got Ex.A.2 – Lease Deed executed from her stating that it was required for the purpose of selling the property. Intention of parties to let out premises on lease to the Respondent and Respondent becoming Tenant under Petitioner is amply evident from recitals in Ex.A.2. 9. Denying jural relationship, Respondent has contended that the Petitioner got Ex.A.2 – Lease Deed executed from her stating that it was required for the purpose of selling the property. The contention of the Respondent that she signed in blank papers believing the words of the Petitioner does not address to reason. Ex.A.2 – Lease Deed is a printed form containing Terms and Conditions, printed in Tamil. The Respondent has signed on two Revenue Stamps affixed thereon. It is quite unbelievable that the Respondent has signed in Ex.A.2 without knowing the contents thereon. Equally, unacceptable is the contention that she has signed in Ex.A.2 believing the words of her Brother that Lease Deed is required for the purpose of selling the property. 10. When considered in the light of Exs.B.29 and B.30 – Release Deeds, defence put forth by Respondent is improbablised. Ex.B.29 – Release Deed dated 28.07.1994 was executed by Respondent - Rajagantham and other Daughters of Rajagopal Pillai viz., Padmaveni and Chandrasekari releasing their right and interest in the landed properties in favour of the Petitioner and another Brother – Mohanasundaram for consideration of Rs.15,000/- paid to each of them. Under Ex.B.30 – Release Deed dated 03.08.1994, again Respondent - Rajagantham and her two Sisters viz., Padmaveni and Chandrasekari have relinquished their right and interest in favour of the Petitioner and another Brother - Mohanasundaram. In the petition mentioned house at No.16, Mariyamman Koil Street, Karaikkal, all of them received consideration of Rs.15,000/-each. Even before that, the Petitioner and his Brother - Mohanasundaram have partitioned the family properties under Ex.B.31 – Partition Deed (dated 07.02.1994). Having relinquished their right and interest in the landed properties and demised premises on receiving consideration, it is not open to the Respondent to deny the ownership of the Petitioner. .11. According to the Respondent, Release Deeds were obtained from her by her Brothers representing that she would be given her due share in the family properties. Respondent had issued Ex.B.14 – Legal Notice (dated 07.02.1997) denying partition effected between Brothers and also proposing to challenge Release Deeds before the Court. It may be noted that so far the Respondent had not taken any steps to cancel the Release Deeds. Respondent had issued Ex.B.14 – Legal Notice (dated 07.02.1997) denying partition effected between Brothers and also proposing to challenge Release Deeds before the Court. It may be noted that so far the Respondent had not taken any steps to cancel the Release Deeds. So long as Release Deeds are not challenged in a manner known to law, the Rent Control Courts are to be governed only by Ex.A.2 – Lease Agreement. In Eviction Petition filed under Rent Control Act, which is a summary proceedings, the Court cannot go into the nuances of the contentions raised by the Respondent. 12. It may be that the Respondent had issued Notice denying Tenancy and demanding Partition to divide the property into seven shares and allot 1/7th share to her. Having executed Release Deeds for consideration, it remains to be seen how far she can succeed in getting share in the properties. 13. Learned counsel for the Respondent has contended that Lease Agreement was not intended to be acted upon as claimed by the Petitioner. Placing reliance upon the decision reported in Kamireddi Sattiaraju and Another ..Vs.. Kandamuri Boolaeswari ( 2007 (1) M.L.J. 499 ) it was further submitted that under Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, Lease Agreement cannot have its face value. The above decision arising out of Suit for Specific Performance has no application to the case in hand as the facts are entirely different. 14. Learned counsel for the Respondent contended that Sister issued Notices under Exs.B.12 and B.14 to the Brothers demanding her 1/7th share. It was further submitted that the Petitioner had sent Reply Notice – Ex.B.16 (dated 11.02.1997) admitting the claim of the Sister and agreeing to give her 1/7th share and requesting her not to rush to the Court and again the Respondent had sent another Notice – Ex.B.19 (dated 010. 1997). Learned counsel further submitted that only with a view to defeat the Respondents claim, the Petitioner has come forward with the eviction petition as a ruse to cheat the Sister and sell the property. It was further submitted that because of admission of share of Respondent, there is bonafide dispute regarding Title to the petition mentioned premises and the Courts below ought to have dismissed the Eviction Petition. 15. As discussed earlier, evidence and surrounding circumstances clearly show that the Respondent was inducted as Tenant. It was further submitted that because of admission of share of Respondent, there is bonafide dispute regarding Title to the petition mentioned premises and the Courts below ought to have dismissed the Eviction Petition. 15. As discussed earlier, evidence and surrounding circumstances clearly show that the Respondent was inducted as Tenant. Having executed Ex.A.2 – Lease Agreement it is preposterous to contend that the Respondent is not a Tenant. Mere contention that Respondent is entitled to a share will not oust the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. In the case reported in S. Sugumaran ..Vs.. Seenu alias Natarajan ( 2000 (1) L.W. 897 ) the Tenant claimed protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and did not pay the rent. In the said case, the Court has held as follows:- "...It is clear from the decisions that a mere denial will not oust the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. Court will have to scrutinise the evidence and conclusion will have to be arrived. While arriving at the conclusion, the Court will have to find out whether there are materials in support of the plea being upheld by the Civil Court...... It is clear from the decision reported in Mohan Lal ..Vs.. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996 I S.C.C. 639), that merely because he (the Tenant) happened to be in possession he cannot claim protection of Section 53-A unless he is also ready to take sale deed in his favour. Even for the purpose of defence, he has to prove the ingredients of Section 16 of Specific Releif Act. Once it is found that the Agreement is not proved to be prima facie genuine and also he is not entitled to the benefit of Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act, it can only be held that denial of title is not bonafide...." 16. Where concurrent findings are perverse and unreasonable resulting in miscarriage of justice, exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, the High Court can interfere with the concurrent findings. Contending that under Section 25 of the Act, High Court can reassess the evidence where the concurrent findings are perverse and unreasonable, learned counsel for the Respondent / Tenant placed reliance upon the decisions reported in V.D.Murugesan ..Vs.. V. Raj Mohammed ( 1995 (I) M.L.J. 84 ), T.Sivasubramaniam and others ..Vs.. Contending that under Section 25 of the Act, High Court can reassess the evidence where the concurrent findings are perverse and unreasonable, learned counsel for the Respondent / Tenant placed reliance upon the decisions reported in V.D.Murugesan ..Vs.. V. Raj Mohammed ( 1995 (I) M.L.J. 84 ), T.Sivasubramaniam and others ..Vs.. Kashinath Pujari and others (2000 I M.L.J 25) and M/s. Shaw Wallace and Company Limited ..Vs.. Govindas Purushothamdas and another (2001 (2) M.L.J. 80 (S.C.)). 17. Considering the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25 of the Act in the decision reported in T.Sivasubramaniam and others ..Vs.. Kashinath Pujari and others (2000 I M.L.J 25) the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "...Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act which confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court is very wide. Under Sec.25 of the Act, the High Court can call for and examine the record of the Appellate Authority in order to satisfy itself as to regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders passed therein. The words to satisfy itself employed in Sec.25 of the Act, no doubt, is a power of superintendence and the High Court is not required to interfere with the findings of fact merely because the High Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts below. It is also true that power exercisable by the High Court under Sec.25 of the Act is not an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts below. But where a finding arrived at by the Courts below is based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in interfering with such a finding recorded by the Courts below. In the present case, it is found that neither the landlord has set out his need or requirement for the premises for his occupation in his petition nor he led any evidence to show that his need is bonafide. In the absence of such evidence, the Rent Controller and the First Appellate Authority acted contrary to law in allowing the petition of the Landlord by directing the eviction of the Tenants. In such circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in interfering with the findings of the Courts below. In the absence of such evidence, the Rent Controller and the First Appellate Authority acted contrary to law in allowing the petition of the Landlord by directing the eviction of the Tenants. In such circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in interfering with the findings of the Courts below. ....." The same principle has been reiterated in other decisions holding that it is within the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact illegally or incorrectly arrived at. 18. This Court has carefully examined the records and findings of the Appellate Authority. In my considered view, the concurrent findings based upon evidence are neither perverse nor unreasonable warranting interference. Having executed Lease Agreement and Release Deed, the Respondent / Tenant cannot successfully deny her Tenancy. Denial of Title is not bonafide and it does not oust the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. This Revision is devoid of merits and is bound to fail. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the Impugned Order dated 21.02.2001 of the Additional District Judge, Karaikkal in R.C.A.No.10 of 2000 (arising out of H.R.C.O.P.No.5 of 1998 on the file of Rent Controller, Karaikkal) is confirmed and this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs. Three months time from the date of this order is granted to the Revision Petitioner / Tenant to vacate and hand over vacant possession to the Respondent / Landlord.