ORDER The petitioners in all these writ petitions are seeking a direction to the Bangalore Development Authority to comply with the orders dated 30th March, 2007, passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 7791 of 1997 and refund to the petitioners the property tax collected from them till 24-7-1992 i.e., till the date of amendment effected to the Bangalore Development Authority Act, by the Bangalore Development Authority (Amendment) Act, 1993, together with Bank rate of interest from the date of receipt of tax amount till the date of repayment. 2. Subsequently, in Writ Petition No. 712 of 2002, the petitioners filed an application for an amendment, to incorporate an additional prayer, to declare that the Bangalore Development Authority and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Karnataka Act No. 19 of 2002), published in the Karnataka Gazette, dated 9th September, 2002, as ultra vires the Constitution of India and to strike down the same. The said application is allowed. Therefore, the fate of all these writ petitions revolve round the constitutional validity of the aforesaid Amendment Act. Therefore, they are taken up for consideration together and disposed of by this common order. 3. Brief background: All these petitioners are rate payers and owners of sites which are situated in several layouts formed by the Bangalore Development Authority (for short, hereinafter referred to as "BDA"). After payment of such tax, they preferred writ petitions before this Court in W.P. Nos. 4394 to 4410 of 1988 contending that the BDA has no power to levy and collect property tax from these petitioners under the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (for short, hereinafter referred to as "the Act"). No valid notification under Section 29 of the Act has been issued by the Government making Sections 103 to 106 of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 applicable and conferring on the authority the powers under those provisions for levy, assessment and collection of property tax. Therefore, they contended as the authority has levied and recovered property tax without authority, it is violative of Article 265 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the same is liable to be returned to them. The said writ petitions were contested by the BDA. The learned Single Judge of this Court on consideration of the rival contentions allowed the writ petitions. The said writ petitions were contested by the BDA. The learned Single Judge of this Court on consideration of the rival contentions allowed the writ petitions. It was held that the Act does not confer upon the BDA the power to impose, assess and collect tax, cess and fee notwithstanding the notification issued by the State Government under the said provision without corresponding services compulsions. The notification issued by the Government under Section 29 is neither valid nor effective. It was further held that there is no material on record to assume that the BDA has been rendering services which correspond to the taxes, cesses and fee recoverable under the relevant provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 and if the Competent Authorities of the Corporation themselves were to embark on such levy and recovery. It ,vas also held that the contention raised on behalf of the BDA that the taxes, cesses and fee are levied for the purposes of defraying the maintenance cost does not stand legal scrutiny. A provision is made under the Corporations Act for levy and recovery of several taxes, cesses and fee with corresponding services being rendered by the Corporation to the rate payers, the money so collected being a part of the Corporation fund. In respect of BDA there are no provisions under the Act authorising or empowering the imposition and recovery of taxes, cesses and fee except betterment tax and there is no provision under the Act which provides for inclusion of taxes, cesses and fee in the Bangalore Development Authority Fund under the Act nor any statutory obligation is rendered by the BDA correspondingly. Insofar as taxes, cesses and fee in question are concerned, there is not even a mention of such taxes, cesses and fee in the entire Act leave alone the question of expounding the nexus between levy and the benefit conferred directly or indirectly. None of the taxes, cesses and fee are justified or authorised under the provisions of the Act and hence, such a levy and recovery is void ab initio. The BDA was directed to stop collecting taxes, cesses, fees, etc., relating to vacant lands and buildings from the concerned members of the public. The BDA was also directed to refund to the concerned members of the public the taxes (except betterment tax), cesses and fee collected from them. 4. The BDA was directed to stop collecting taxes, cesses, fees, etc., relating to vacant lands and buildings from the concerned members of the public. The BDA was also directed to refund to the concerned members of the public the taxes (except betterment tax), cesses and fee collected from them. 4. This judgment rendered on 10th January, 1991 was challenged by the BDA in Writ Appeal Nos. 223 to 239 of 1991. Along with the appeal, the BDA wanted to produce notification dated 6th March, 1979 by which certain areas, including the areas in the aforesaid petitions were said to have been included within the Corporation limit. The Division Bench refused permission to produce the said document. The Division Bench held the learned Single Judge as also the parties before the learned Single Judge proceeded on the assumption that the area in which the writ petitioners' premises are situate fell outside the Corporation limits. Whether a particular area is within the Corporation limits or not is a question of fact and when there is a dispute about the same, this Court, particularly, in an appeal from a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot investigate it. Further, it observed that if any area is within the Corporation limits, the question whether the BDA can exercise the power of taxation vested in the Corporation on the basis of a notification to that effect issued under Section 29 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, was left. open. It was conceded on behalf of the BDA that if an area is not within the Corporation limit, the BDA has no power to levy tax because of the infirmities pointed out by the learned Single Judge. Therefore, it was made clear that the order of the learned Single Judge under appeal has to be construed as an order pertaining to residents of an area outside the Corporation limits. Accordingly, they affirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge with a clarification that the order will apply only to persons who are residents in the areas outside the Corporation limits and with that modification, it was made clear that there cannot be a general direction to refund the tax to members of general public. Accordingly, they affirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge with a clarification that the order will apply only to persons who are residents in the areas outside the Corporation limits and with that modification, it was made clear that there cannot be a general direction to refund the tax to members of general public. However, it was observed that the writ petitioners and other members of public shall be entitled to take recourse to such proceedings as are open to them in accordance with law for refund of tax in terms of this order. The said judgment was delivered on 18th December, 1991. There was no challenge to the said judgment either by the BDA or the Government or the petitioners in the said proceedings. Thus, the said judgment became final. 5. The Government after realising the infirmities pointed out in the aforesaid judgment by the learned Single Judge thought of amending the Act by conferring power on the BDA to levy tax and all other ancillary cesses. Therefore, the Bangalore Development Authority (Amendment) Act, 1993 by Karnataka Act No. 6 of 1993 was promulgated inserting new Sections 28-A, 28-B and 28-C. Section 29 of the Act was also amended. Sections 40 and 41 were amended. New Section 62-A was introduced. By Section 7 of the Amendment Act, they wanted to validate the levy and collection of property taxes and cesses. The purpose of the amendment was to introduce sections conferring power on the authority to levy, recover and collect taxes and by Section 7 to nullify the judgment rendered by this Court which is referred to supra. 6. The said amendment was challenged before this Court in Writ Petition No. 5173 of 1993 by way of a public interest litigation by one Sri B. Krishna Bhat. The grounds urged challenging the aforesaid amendment was that there is excessive delegation in the matter of levy of tax and the validation made by the Legislature is not competent. Under the entire framework of the Act, the authority is constituted for the development of Bangalore Metropolitan Area, the question of the authority rendering services as contemplated under Sections 57, 58 and 59 of the Corporations Act would not arise at all and therefore, the question of empowering the authority to levy tax would not arise. Under the entire framework of the Act, the authority is constituted for the development of Bangalore Metropolitan Area, the question of the authority rendering services as contemplated under Sections 57, 58 and 59 of the Corporations Act would not arise at all and therefore, the question of empowering the authority to levy tax would not arise. Further, it was contended that the authority is not a representative body or an elected body similar to Bangalore City Corporation and therefore, they cannot be entrusted with a power to levy tax, which is essentially a legislative function. It was also contended that the effect of Section 7 of the Validation Act is to nullify the lawful judgment of this Court. 7. This Court on consideration of the aforesaid contentions held that there is no invalidity as pointed in the Amendment Act. This enactment was passed to cure the defects pointed out earlier in the judgment of this Court and the Legislature has ample powers to enact a law curing the defects pointed out and thus, the writ petition was dismissed. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioners therein preferred a special leave petition before the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 7791 of 1997. The Supreme Court after hearing both the parties upheld the validity of Sections 28-B and 28-C of the BDA Act. However, it declared that Section 7 of the Amending Act, which invalidates the collection of property tax by the BDA before the introduction of Sections 28-B and 28-C as invalid. Further, it was ordered that the said collection is liable to be refunded as directed by this Court in the earlier proceedings. Accordingly, the said appeal was partly allowed to the extent indicated as aforesaid. 8. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment held that in the earlier case, the High Court had held that in the principal Act there was no specific provision to levy taxes similar to those leviable under the Corporations Act. It also came to the conclusion that any such tax, even if it were to be levied by the BDA with the sanction of the Legislature, could be levied only if the BDA performed certain functions mentioned in the said judgment. It also came to the conclusion that any such tax, even if it were to be levied by the BDA with the sanction of the Legislature, could be levied only if the BDA performed certain functions mentioned in the said judgment. The Court further came to the conclusion that such functions not being performed by the BDA, collection of tax, apart from being unauthorised for want of statutory sanction, is also bad because the BDA did not render any service in lieu of such collection. This finding not having been challenged by the BDA had become final. Therefore, so far as collections made prior to the coming into force of the Amending Act being a collection without any service rendered, the same cannot be validated even by the introduction of Section 7 of the Amending Act. The finding of the High Court in regard to want of services could not have been either ignored or reversed by the Legislature while validating the earlier collection because it has no such power to reverse the finding of a Court. When a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a Court to be illegally collected, it is not sufficient for the Legislature to merely declare that the decision of the Court shall not be binding because that would amount to reversing the decision rendered by a Court in exercise of judicial power which authority the Legislature does not possess. It is also a settled principle in law that when invalidity of collection of levy is pointed out by the Court based on non-existence of certain necessary facts, it is not open to the Legislature to merely controvert that finding of the Court and validate such collection by proceeding on the basis that such finding of the Court is incorrect. Therefore, it was made clear that in respect of tax collected for the period before the date of amendment there could have been no validation of such collection. Hence, the Amending Act so far as it validates the collection of property tax by the BDA, cannot be sustained for a period prior to the date of the Amending Act. 9. Therefore, it was made clear that in respect of tax collected for the period before the date of amendment there could have been no validation of such collection. Hence, the Amending Act so far as it validates the collection of property tax by the BDA, cannot be sustained for a period prior to the date of the Amending Act. 9. It was also clarified in the said judgment that they have not decided the nature of levy under Section 28-B after it was introduced by the Amending Act as to whether it is a tax simpliciter requiring no service at all or whether it is a tax in the nature of a fee requiring services as held by the learned Single Judge in the earlier round of litigation. The examination of the validity of the Amending Act has been confined only to the arguments addressed before them. In regard to the validation of the past collection, the finding is based on the finding given by the High Court in the earlier judgment which has become final and as a consequence of such finding the validation of such collection is impermissible. Therefore, Section 7 of the Amending Act so far as it validates collection of property tax made by the BDA prior to the introduction of Section 28-B has to be declared as invalid and beyond the legislative power. Thus, the validity of Section 28-C was upheld and consequently, all the cesses collected by the BDA under the Acts referred to under Section 28-C was declared as validly collected. Consequently, validity of Sections 28-B and 28-C of the BDA Act was upheld. It was declared that, that part of Section 7 of the Amending Act which validates the collection of property tax by the BDA prior to the introduction of Sections 28-A and 28-B was held to be invalid and a direction was issued to refund the amount collected. as directed by the Court in the earlier proceedings. 10. Faced with the aforesaid situation of returning the amount which is collected as tax and after noticing the infirmities pointed out by the Supreme Court in the Amendment Act, with the intention of avoiding refund of tax, the State Legislature passed an ordinance called the Bangalore Development Authority and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001 (Karnataka Ordinance No. 9 of 2001), further amending the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976. By the said Ordinance an explanation was added to Section 20-B of the Act. Sections 20-A, 20-B and 20-C were added to the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 after Section 20. Then validation of levy and collection of property tax was made by Section 4 of the Ordinance. One Sri B. Krishna Bhat preferred a Public Interest Litigation challenging the aforesaid Ordinance in W.P. No. 21370 of 2002. What was challenged in the said writ petition was insertion of Section 4 in the Ordinance which is similar to Section 7 of Karnataka Act No.6 of 1993. The Court while issuing notice on 30-5-2002 stayed the operation of Ordinance for a period of twelve weeks. There was no further extension. In the meanwhile, the Ordinance was replaced by the Bangalore Development Authority and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Karnataka Act 19 of 2002). Thereafter the said writ petition came to be dismissed reserving liberty to challenge the Amendment Act. That is how the present batch of writ petitions are filed. Thereafter, the said B. Krishna Bhat has preferred a Public Interest Litigation challenging the validity of the said Act also. 11. As stated earlier, in these writ petitions the relief sought for is, for refund of the amount in tern1S of the Supreme Court order. However, by way of an amendment the validity of the Amendment Act is also challenged. Though the petitioners have challenged all the sections in the Amendment Act, as all the petitioners have paid tax subsequent to 1976, the question of going into the validity of the amendments to the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 at their instance would not arise. Therefore, in these writ petitions the challenge to the amendment is confined only to the explanation added to Section 28-B of the Act as well as Section 4, the validation, levy and collection of property tax. 12. Sri N.D. Ramachandra Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners assailing the validity of the amended impugned Act submitted as follows.- (i) From the undisputed facts in this case it is clear that the State Legislature has passed this impugned Act with the sole intention of nullifying the judgment of the Supreme Court. 12. Sri N.D. Ramachandra Rao, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners assailing the validity of the amended impugned Act submitted as follows.- (i) From the undisputed facts in this case it is clear that the State Legislature has passed this impugned Act with the sole intention of nullifying the judgment of the Supreme Court. As such, it is a fraud on the Legislature power; (ii) There must be sanction under law to levy and recover the type of tax claimed "tax simpliciter"; (iii) No tax could be levied without rendering any service and the only exception is if the tax is levied for public purpose i.e., to render innumerable public purpose without the element of quid pro quo; (iv) When the words "tax simpliciter" is not defined under the Act and the words "tax simpliciter" do not find a. place in any law or statute relating to levy of any type of tax and the term "tax simpliciter" being alien to any statute or levy or recovery of tax, the explanation given to Section 28-B is unconstitutional and void. In such circumstances, the judiciary is not permitted to enter the area of Legislature ... and discharge the function of Legislature by explaining the meaning of "tax simpliciter"; (v) If the tax is permitted to be imposed in those circumstances by the Court it amounts to the Court permitting imposition of tax thereby indirectly legislating on the subject; (vi) When this Court has held that the tax imposed on the petitioners is in the nature of quid pro quo for the services rendered and when it was further held that no such services was rendered, the authority is not empowered to impose any tax and it is not open to the Legislature to pass the validation Act so as to nullify the findings recorded by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court. 13. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for the State as well as the Bangalore Development Authority submitted that, the Legislature has no power to annul a judgment of this Court or the Supreme Court. However, it is within the legislative competence of a State Legislature to pass a law which wipes out the basis of the said judgment. Even retrospectively once such a law is passed the judgment rendered by the Courts would become unenforceable. However, it is within the legislative competence of a State Legislature to pass a law which wipes out the basis of the said judgment. Even retrospectively once such a law is passed the judgment rendered by the Courts would become unenforceable. That is precisely what the State Legislature has done by the impugned Act and, therefore, they submitted the impugned Act do not suffer from any such vices which warrant quashing of the same. Both the learned Counsels have relied on several judgments of the Apex Court on this point. 14. Before we look into the law on the point it is necessary to know what exactly the State Legislature intended to do. By Act 6 of 1993 under which Section 28-B was introduced reads as under: "28-B. Levy of tax on lands and buildings.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the authority may levy a tax on lands or buildings or on both, situated within its jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the "property tax") at the same rates at which such tax is levied by the Corporation within its jurisdiction. (2) The provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 14 of 1977) shall mutatis mutandis apply to the assessment and collection of property tax". 15. The constitutional validity of this section has been upheld by the Apex Court and thus it has become final. Therefore, the question of competence of the State Legislature to enact this section is beyond challenge. By the impugned Act what the Legislature has done was to introduce an explanation to this section which reads as under: "Explanation.-For the purpose of this section "property tax" means a tax simpliciter requiring no service at all and not in the nature of fee requiring service". 16. This explanation is deemed to have been inserted with effect from 20th day of December, 1975 from which date Section 28-B also is deemed to have been inserted. Sub-section (2) of Section 28-B provides the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 shall mutatis mutandis apply to the assessment and collection of property tax. The aforesaid explanation now intends to explain the meaning of the words "property tax" used in sub-section (2) of Section 28-B meaning a tax simpliciter requiring no service at all and not in the nature of fee requiring service. The aforesaid explanation now intends to explain the meaning of the words "property tax" used in sub-section (2) of Section 28-B meaning a tax simpliciter requiring no service at all and not in the nature of fee requiring service. It is no doubt true that the words "tax simpliciter" is not defined under the Act. The said word also is not used in taxing statutes. That by itself would not render an enactment invalid. If an enactment uses a particular word and defines the meaning of the said word, then the Courts have to extend the meaning of those words as given in the definition. It is only when those words are not defined, the role of the Court in interpreting those words would arise, if there is any ambiguity in understanding the meaning of the said word in the context in which it is used. If the Courts were to interpret those words in the statute they have no necessarily state the meaning of those words. It is called interpretation. Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is understood. It does not amount to legislation by the Courts or it is not a case where Courts are giving some meaning to a word which the Legislature never intended. 17. The law on the point is well-settled. The words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context, or in the object of the statute to suggest the contrary. "The true way" according to Lord Brougham is, "to take the words as the Legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words is, either by the preamble or by the context of the words in question, controlled or altered", in the words of Viscount Haldane L.C., if the language used "has a natural meaning we cannot depart from that meaning unless, reading the statute as a whole, the context directs us to do so". The Supreme Court in the case of Jugalkishore Saraf v Raw Cotton Company Limited, held that, the cardinal rule of construction of statutes is to read the statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words used by the Legislature their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. If, however, such a reading leads to absurdity and the words are susceptible of another meaning the Court may adopt the same. But if no such alternative construction is possible, the Court must adopt the ordinary rule of literal interpretation. Again the Supreme Court in the case of Kanai Lal Sur v Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, held that, the words used in the material provisions of the Statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. In Mahadeolal Kanodia v Administrator General of West Bengal3, it was held that, the intention of the Legislature has always to be gathered by words used by it, giving to the words their plain, normal, grammatical meaning. If the strict grammatical interpretation gives rise to an absurdity or inconsistency such interpretation should be discarded and an interpretation which will give effect to the purpose the Legislature may reasonably be considered to have had will be put on the words, if necessary, even by modification of the language used. 18. In the background of the aforesaid settled legal position, if we look into the explanation added to Section 28-B, in view of the words used therein all that it means is the property tax which the authority is empowered to impose is a tax do not require any service to be rendered at all. Further it clarifies the property tax is not in the nature of fee requiring service. If the background in which this amendment is brought is understood, it is clear, this Court had categorically held that the authority had no power to levy tax when it had not rendered any service to the petitioners. Therefore, it was held in the absence of a quid pro quo the authority could not have levied tax. The said lacuna in the legislation was overcome by introducing Section 28-B, the constitutional validity of which has now been upheld. Therefore, it was held in the absence of a quid pro quo the authority could not have levied tax. The said lacuna in the legislation was overcome by introducing Section 28-B, the constitutional validity of which has now been upheld. But, still the validation section was struck down on the ground that the Legislature has no power to pass a law to annul a judgment of this Court or the Apex Court though the Legislature is competent to pass a legislation taking away the basis of the said judgment. It is thereafter the impugned Act was passed and this explanation is added. What the Legislature intends by introducing this explanation is to hold that the property tax which the authority is competent to levy under Section 28-C of the Act could be imposed without rendering any service and it is not in the nature of fee requiring service thereby wiping out the basis on which the judgment of this Court was rendered holding that the authority is not competent to impose tax as no service was rendered in lieu of payment of tax. Therefore, when the language employed in the section is simple and a literal interpretation of the words used in the said section leads to the said conclusion, namely that the authority is competent to impose tax without rendering any service, it cannot be said that the said section is unconstitutional. Merely because the words "tax simpliciter" is not defined or is not used in any taxing statute that by itself would not render an enactment invalid. In fact by the explanation the Legislature is trying to explain the meaning of the words "tax simpliciter". Though the words tax simpliciter is not defined under Section 2 of the Act, the meaning of the words tax simpliciter is given in explanation to Section 28-B. In so construing the said word this Court is not legislating for the first time about the meaning of the words "tax simpliciter". It is not exceeding its jurisdiction conferred under the Constitution of India and making any legislation. Understanding the words tax simpliciter in the aforesaid manner, amounts to interpreting the said provision. It is the Court alone which is competent to do so. 19. It is not exceeding its jurisdiction conferred under the Constitution of India and making any legislation. Understanding the words tax simpliciter in the aforesaid manner, amounts to interpreting the said provision. It is the Court alone which is competent to do so. 19. Next it was contended that the State Legislature has no authority to impose a tax of the nature which they have imposed, i.e., tax simpliciter and such a power is not conferred on the State Legislature under Article 265 of the Constitution. 20. Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. Entry 49 of List II, Seventh Schedule to the Constitution empowers the State Legislatures to pass laws in respect of tax on lands and buildings. It is in pursuance of this power conferred, the Karnataka State Legislature has passed Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976, which provides for assessment and collection of property tax. The Karnataka State Legislature also has passed the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 and the Amendment Act, 1993, whereunder, the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 shall mutatis mutandis apply to the assessment and collection of property tax. This power is conferred on the authority under the Act for levy and collection of property tax. The words used in both these enactment is 'property tax'. Now by the proposed explanation, the words, 'property tax' used in the aforesaid statutes has been further explained to mean, 'tax simpliciter', requiring no service at all and not in the nature of fee requiring service. 21. It is contended that that explanation does not constitute a definition and also it does not constitute the law as contemplated under Article 265 and it has no authority of law or legal sanction. It is in this context, it is necessary to know the difference between 'tax' and 'fee'. 22. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Shri Shirur Mutt!, explaining the tax has held as under: "A tax is a compulsory extraction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable by law and is not payment for services rendered. This definition brings out the essential characteristics of a tax as distinguished from other forms of imposition which, in a general sense, are included within it. This definition brings out the essential characteristics of a tax as distinguished from other forms of imposition which, in a general sense, are included within it. The essence of taxation is compulsion, that is to say, it is imposed under statutory power without the tax-payer's consent and the payment is enforced by law. The second characteristic of tax is that it is an imposition made for public purpose without reference to any special benefit to be conferred on the payer of the tax. This is expressed by saying that the levy of ta.x is for the purposes of general revenue, which when collected forms part of the public revenues of the State. As the object of a tax is not to confer any special benefit upon any particular individual, there is no element of 'quid pro quo between the tax payer and the public authority. Another feature of taxation is that as it is a part of the common burden, the quantum of imposition upon the tax payer depends generally upon his capacity to pay. While explaining the meaning of 'fee', the Supreme Court held as under: "A fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals by some Governmental agency. The amount of fee levied is supposed to be based on the expenses incurred by the Government in rendering the service, though in many cases the costs are arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily, the fees are uniform and no account is taken of the varying abilities of different recipients to pay. These are undoubtedly some of the general characteristics, but as there may be various kinds of fees, it is not permissible to formulate a definition that would be applicable to all cases"". Thereafter, they laid down two distinctions between tax and fees: "A careful examination reveals that the element of compulsion or coerciveness is present in all kinds of imposition, though in different degrees and it is not totally absent in fees. This, therefore, cannot be made the sole or even a material criterion for distinguishing tax from fees. The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege. This, therefore, cannot be made the sole or even a material criterion for distinguishing tax from fees. The distinction between a tax and a fee lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied as a part of a common burden while a fee is a payment for a special benefit or privilege. Fees confer a capacity, although the special advantage, as for example in the case of registration fees for documents or marriage licences, is secondary to the primary motive of regulation in the public interest. Public interest seems to be at the basis of all impositions, but in a fee, it is some special benefit which the• individual receives. It is the special benefit accruing to the individual which is the reason for payment in the case of fees; in the case of a tax, the particular advantage if it exists at all is an incidental result of state action. As fee is a sort of return or consideration for services rendered, it is absolutely necessary that the levy of fees should, on the face of the legislative provision, be correlated to the expenses incurred by Government in rendering the services. If the money thus paid is set apart and appropriated specifically for the performance of such work and is not merged in the public revenues for the benefit of the general public, it could be counted as fees and not a tax. There is really no generic difference between the tax and fees and the taxing power of a State may manifest itself in three different forms known respectively as special assessments fees and taxes". 23. The aforesaid legal position has been reiterated by another Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratilal Panachand Gandhi and Others v State of Bombay and Others. Therefore, it is clear that what the Legislature intended by introducing this explanation is to make the position clear. When by Section 28-C(2), the power is conferred on the authorities to impose property tax, by explanation it was made clear that property tax before it could be imposed there need not be any service rendered for the said imposition of tax. Therefore, by adding an explanation, no tax is levied for the first time. The said explanation is only clarificatory in nature. Therefore, by adding an explanation, no tax is levied for the first time. The said explanation is only clarificatory in nature. That clarification is to be understood in the context of the earlier judgment of this Court where it has struck down the imposition of tax on the ground that no service is rendered by the authority before imposition of tax. What the Legislature intended to do by introduction of explanation was to state that for imposition of tax, no service need be rendered. In other words, that is how they wanted to wipe out the basis of the judgment of this Court, so that, their liability to refund the tax may be avoided. The legislative competency of the State Legislature to pass such legislation has already been up held by the Supreme Court. It is also held that legislative competency includes passing the law retrospectively, which also has been upheld. 24. Insofar as the next contention that it is a case of fraud on the legislative power and effect of this amendment is to nullify the judgment of the Apex Court as well as this Court is concerned, it is also without any substance. 25. Section 4 of the Impugned Act where the validation of levy and collection of property tax is saved reads as under: "4. 25. Section 4 of the Impugned Act where the validation of levy and collection of property tax is saved reads as under: "4. Validation of levy and collection of property tax.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or other authority to the contrary, levy, assessment or collection of any tax on land or building or on both made or purporting to have been made and any action or thing taken or done (including any notices or orders issued) or assessment made an all proceedings held and any levy and collection of tax or amount purported to have been collected by way of tax in relation to such levy, assessment or collection under the provisions of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (Karnataka Act 12 of 1976) and the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 (Mysore Act V of 1945), before the twenty-fourth day of July, 1992 shall be and shall be deemed to be valid and effective as if such levy, assessment or collection or action or thing had been made, taken or done under the said Acts, as amended by this Act and accordingly.- (a) all acts, proceedings or things done or any action taken by the authority or as the case may be, the Board or any of its officer in connection with the levy, assessment or collection of such tax for all purposes be deemed to be, and to have always been done or taken in accordance with law; (b) no suit or other proceedings shall be maintained or continued in any Court or Tribunal or before any authority for the refund of any such tax; and (c) no Court shall enforce any decree or order directing the refund of any such tax". 26. This provision was inserted to wipe out the effect of judgment of this Court as well as the Supreme Court where they had directed refund of the amount of tax collected on the ground that the authority had not rendered any service before imposition of the said tax. In fact, Section 7 in the earlier Amendment Act, 1993 was struck down on the ground that by such Act, the State Legislature cannot annul a valid and binding judgment of a Court. 27. In fact, Section 7 in the earlier Amendment Act, 1993 was struck down on the ground that by such Act, the State Legislature cannot annul a valid and binding judgment of a Court. 27. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Limited and Another v Broach Borough Municipality and Others!, dealing with validating statutes in general held as under: "When a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a Court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid law, the cause for ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed before validation can be said to take place effectively. The most important condition of course, is that the Legislature must possess the power to impose the tax for, if it does not, the action must ever remain ineffective and illegal. Granted legislative competence, it is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind for that is tantamount to reversing the decision in exercise of judicial power which the Legislature does not possess or exercise. A Court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. Ordinarily, a Court holds a tax to be invalidity imposed because the power to tax is wanting or the statute or the rules or both are invalid or do not sufficiently create the jurisdiction. Validation of a tax so declared illegal may be done only if the grounds of illegality or invalidity are capable of being removed and are in fact removed and the tax thus made legal. Sometimes this is done by providing for jurisdiction where jurisdiction had not been properly invested before. Sometimes this is done by re-enacting retrospectively a valid and legal taxing provision and then by fiction making the tax already collected to stand under the re-enacted law". 28. The Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh and Another v Hindustan Machine Tools Limited], dealing with the power of the State Legislature to pass legislations which would have the effect of annulling the judgment of the Court held that: "The power of the Legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively, the one no less than the other. Within the scope of its legislative competence and subject to other constitutional limitations the power of the Legislature to enact laws is plenary. The State Legislature, it is significant, has not overruled or set aside the judgment of the High Court. It has amended the definition of 'house' by the substitution of a new Section 2(15) of the Andhra Pradesh Gram Panchayat Act, 1964, for the old section and it has provided that the new definition shall have retrospective effect, notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any Court or other authority. In other words, it has removed the basis of the decision rendered by the High Court so that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. If the old Section 2(15) were to define 'house' in the manner that the amended Section 2(15) does, there is no doubt that the decision of the High Court would have been otherwise. In fact, it was not disputed before us that the buildings constructed by the respondent meet fully the requirements of Section 2(15) as amended by the Act of 1974". 29. In the case of M/s. Tirath Ram Rajindra Nath, Lucknow v State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, the Supreme Court has held that the Legislature has the power to amend the law retrospectively and thereby remove the basis of the decision rendered by the High Court of Allahabad. It was held that this was within the permissible limits and validation of the old Act by amending it retrospectively did not constitute an encroachment on the functions of the judiciary. 30. Similar amendment to the BDA Act was the subject-matter of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bakhtawar Trust and Others v M.D. Narayan and Others2. The petitioners in the said writ petition had challenged the construction of eight storied building on the ground that the maximum height of new constructions would be 55 ft. and therefore, the 6th, 7th and 8th floor of the building is illegal and to be demolished. The writ petition was allowed, writ appeal filed by the Builder was dismissed. Thereafter, the Commissioner passed an order for demolition of the 6th, 7th and 8th floor of the building. When the said order was not obeyed, a contempt petition came to be filed. The writ petition was allowed, writ appeal filed by the Builder was dismissed. Thereafter, the Commissioner passed an order for demolition of the 6th, 7th and 8th floor of the building. When the said order was not obeyed, a contempt petition came to be filed. When the matter was pending in contempt before this Court, the Bangalore City Planning Area Zonal Regulations (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1996, was passed by the Kamataka Legislature modifying the maximum height of the new building to above 165 ft. and validating the new construction raised in violation of the outline development plan and the Zonal Regulations. The same was challenged before this Court. This Court struck down the impugned Act holding it to be constitutionally invalid. The High Court held that the impugned Act instead of curing the basis of the decision rendered by the High Court, purported to set at naught the decision given by the High Court. The object of the impugned Act was to invalidate the pronouncement of the High Court and not to remove the fact of invalidity on the action taken by the appellant. Therefore, the question that arose before the Supreme Court was whether the Karnataka Legislature, by the impugned Act, has removed the basis of the judgment of the High Court or without amending the basis, has purported to nullify the judicial pronouncement per se and therefore, such an Act is ultra vires the competence of the State Legislature. 31. After reviewing the case-law on the point, the Supreme Court held that: "The intention of the Legislature in enacting a particular statute is immaterial in terms of the question relating to its validity. The intention of the Legislature in passing of a particular statute is beyond the pale of judicial review. In the present matter, the supposedly nebulous intention of the Legislature to defeat the judicial process, if therefore, outside the bounds of the Court's consideration. The test of judging the validity of the impugned Amending and Validating Act is, whether the Legislature enacting the Validating Act has competence over the subject-matter, whether by validation, the said Legislature has removed the defect which the Court had found in the previous laws; and whether the validating law is consistent with the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. The validity of any statute may be assailed on the ground that it is ultra vires the legislative competence of the Legislature which enacted it or it is violative of Part III or any other provision of the Constitution. It is well-settled that the Parliament and State Legislatures have plenary powers of legislation within the fields assigned to them and subject to some constitutional limitations can legislate prospectively as well as retrospectively. This power to make retrospective legislation enables the Legislature to validate prior executive and legislative Acts retrospectively after curing the defects that led to their invalidation and thus makes ineffective judgments of competent Courts declaring the invalidity. A validating Act may even make ineffective the judgments and orders of competent Courts provided it, by retrospective legislation, removes the cause of invalidity or the basis that had led to those decisions. Thus it is open to the Legislature to alter the law retrospectively, provided the alteration is made in such a manner that it would no more be possible for the Court to arrive at the same verdict. In other words, the very premise of the earlier judgment should be uprooted, thereby resulting in a fundamental change of the circumstances upon which it was founded. Where a Legislature validates an executive action repugnant to the statutory provisions declared by a Court of law, what the Legislature is required to do is first to remove the very basis of invalidity and then validate the executive action. In order to validate an executive action or any provision of a statute, it is not sufficient for the Legislature to declare that a judicial pronouncement given by a Court of law would not be binding, as the Legislature does not possess that power. A decision of a Court of law has a binding effect unless the very basis upon which it is given is so altered that the said decision would not have been given in the changed circumstances". 32. Therefore, it is well-settled that Parliament and State Legislature have plenary powers oflegislation within the fields assigned to them and subject to some constitutional limitations. They can also legislate prospectively and retrospectively. 32. Therefore, it is well-settled that Parliament and State Legislature have plenary powers oflegislation within the fields assigned to them and subject to some constitutional limitations. They can also legislate prospectively and retrospectively. The validity of any statute may be assailed on the ground that it is ultra vires the legislative competence of the Legislature which enacted it or it is violative of Part III of the Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution. The intention of the Legislature in passing a particular statute is beyond the pale of judicial review. In other words the validity of the statute cannot be challenged on the ground of its intention being not bona side. The intention of the Legislature would be of great assistance to the Courts in understanding the object of the legislation and in interpreting the provision in the Act, if there is any ambiguity. When a Legislature sets out to validate a tax declared by a Court to be illegally collected under an ineffective or an invalid law, the cause of ineffectiveness or invalidity must be removed before validation can be said to take place effectively. A decision of Court of law has a binding effect unless the very basis upon which it is given is so altered that the said decision would not have been given in the changed circumstances or altered legal position. Therefore, if the very premise of the earlier judgment is uprooted thereby resulting in fundamental change of the circumstances upon which it was founded by the Legislature altering the law retrospectively the same cannot be challenged on the ground that the intention of the Legislature was to set at knot a judicial pronouncement which they could not have done by expressly declaring the said judgment to be invalid. They can pass a legislation taking away the basis of a judicial pronouncement, thus rendering ineffective the judgments and orders of the Competent Courts. It is open to the Legislature to alter the law retrospectively. However, they cannot by legislation declare a particular judicial pronouncement as invalid. 33. It is in this background we have to see what is the basis on which the earlier judicial pronouncements were made holding that the authority had no power to levy tax and collect tax and that the same is to be refunded and what the Legislature intends by the impugned amendment. 34. 33. It is in this background we have to see what is the basis on which the earlier judicial pronouncements were made holding that the authority had no power to levy tax and collect tax and that the same is to be refunded and what the Legislature intends by the impugned amendment. 34. Prior to 1993, under the Act, the authority had no power to levy and collect tax from the owners of the property, i.e., they had no power to collect the property tax. Without such power, they had collected property tax. That is how the dispute arose between the parties. In W.P. Nos. 4394 to 4410 of 1988, the learned Single Judge of this Court held that in the absence of statutory provisions and in the absence of a notification issued under Section 29 of the Act, the authority had no power to levy tax. More so because, the BDA had not rendered any service which correspond to the tax assessed. Therefore, the main basis on which the said judgment was rendered was, the authority had not rendered any service for which it can levy and collect tax. The Division Bench kept open the question whether under Section 29 of the Act, the authority can exercise the power of taxation vested in the Corporation, on the basis of the notification. 35. After noticing the aforesaid infirmity, the State Legislature passed Karnataka Act 6 of 1993 introducing Sections 28-A, 28-B and 28-C in the Act. Now the constitutional validity of all these three sections has been upheld by the Supreme Court. Section 28-B expressly provides that the authority may levy tax on lands or building or on both situated within its jurisdiction, the property tax on the same rates on which the said tax is levied by the Corporation within its jurisdiction. Sub-section (2) makes it clear that the provisions of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 shall mutatis mutandis apply to the assessment and collection of the property tax. However, Section 7 which dealt with the validation of levy and collection of property tax, annulled all the judgments rendered on the aforesaid basis. It is in that context the said sections were struck down by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Legislature has no competency to pass law and annul the judgments of the Court without wiping out the basis for the said judgment. It is in that context the said sections were struck down by the Supreme Court on the ground that the Legislature has no competency to pass law and annul the judgments of the Court without wiping out the basis for the said judgment. Therefore, the impugned Act is passed adding an explanation to Section 28-C clarifying that the property tax referred to in Section 28 is a "tax simpliciter" requiring no service at all and not in the nature of fee which required service. Thus, the basis of the Courts' judgments that the authority is not entitled to tax as they have not rendered any service is taken away. If the authority has the power to impose tax without rendering any service and if the law is made retrospective, notwithstanding the judgment of this Court or the Supreme Court, the authority is entitled to collect tax without rendering service and the tax so collected need not be refunded. Therefore, the judgments rendered by these Courts in view of the impugned enactment has become ineffective. 36. The State Legislature though has no power to pass the legislation retrospectively to annul a judicial pronouncement, has the power to pass a law retrospectively altering the basis upon which the said judicial pronouncement is made. If the judicial pronouncement is to be made on the basis of this amended provisions, the judgment of the Court would have been different. This is the whole object of this amendment. 37. Therefore, it cannot be said that the validation section is invalid or unconstitutional or it amounts to fraud on the Constitution as contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. 38. It was next contended that no law could be passed preventing the litigant from knocking at the Courts for the relief. 39. The said attack is on the basis of clauses (b) and (c) of Section 4, which reads as under: "4. (b) no suit or other proceedings shall be maintained or continued in any Court or Tribunal or before any authority for the refund of any such tax; and (c) no Court shall enforce any decree or order directing the refund of any such tax". As is clear from the wordings used, the words used is, 'any such tax', i.e., tax which is collected without rendering any service. As is clear from the wordings used, the words used is, 'any such tax', i.e., tax which is collected without rendering any service. Therefore, it cannot be construed as, a litigant is prevented from going to a Court for refund of any amount which is legitimately due to him. All that it means is, if tax is collected by the authority without rendering any service, on that ground he cannot approach the Court for refund of the tax. That is the whole object of this amendment. Therefore, I do not find any merit in this contention as well. 40. In view of what is stated above, I do not find any merit in these writ petitions. Accordingly, all these writ petitions are dismissed.

V. SUDARSHAN v. BANGALORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, BANGALORE