Judgment : This civil revision petition is filed by the wife against the order dated 21.2.2006 passed by the Family Court, Coimbatore in I.A. No. 2266 of 2004 in H.M.O.P. No. 675 of 2004. The said petition was filed by the husband under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short, “C.P.C.”) for directing the revision petitioner/wife to deposit the articles (including jewellery and other items) and to pass suitable orders to preserve and protect the petition mentioned articles. A list of articles is also enclosed along with the petition. It was also stated that these articles were acknowledged to have been received by the petitioner/wife before an All Women Police Station (Control). 2. The main H.M.O.P. was filed by the respondent/husband under Section 13(1)(i-a) and 13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking for divorce. It was taken on file as H.M.O.P. No. 675 of 2004. The revision petitioner filed a counter statement and refuted the allegations made against her and opposed the grant of divorce. Even while these proceedings are pending, a criminal complaint was filed by the wife against the husband under Section 498-A, I.P.C. May be precisely for that reason, the respondent/husband filed this interim application along with the H.M.O.P. It is seen from the records that both the application and the main O.P. were heard together and the matter was adjourned from time-to-time and finally, on 21.2.2006, when there was no representation on the side of the revision petitioner, the Family Court Judge, allowed the application and it is found in the order, which is as follows: “The respondent did not file the counter. The respondent did not appear before this Court. It seems that the respondent has no objection to return the articles. Hence the respondent is liable to return the articles. Hence petition is allowed. The respondent is liable to return the articles. In the result, petition is allowed. The respondent is directed to return the articles to the petitioner within 3 months. No costs.” On the same day, the revision petitioner was set ex parte and the decree of divorce was also granted by the Family Court. Hence petition is allowed. The respondent is liable to return the articles. In the result, petition is allowed. The respondent is directed to return the articles to the petitioner within 3 months. No costs.” On the same day, the revision petitioner was set ex parte and the decree of divorce was also granted by the Family Court. However, it appears that while the revision petitioner has no objection against the ex parte decree for divorce and no challenge was made, it is only against the order dated 21.2.2006 passed in the interim application being I.A. No. 2266 of 2004, the present revision petition has been filed. 3. I have heard the arguments of Mr.V.C. Janardhanan, learned counsel appearing for Sarvabhauman Associates, for the revision petitioner and Mr.R. Karthikeyan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent and have perused the records. 4. On behalf of the petitioner, it is submitted that the order impugned in the revision petition can never be passed by the Family Court solely on the basis of some so-called acknowledgment given before the Police Station and since the revision petitioner had not appeared before the Family Court, it was wrong on the part of the Family Court to say that she has no objection for the return of the articles as if some concession was made and the order also was not in conformity with Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. It was further stated that the Court cannot pass a separate order and it should have formed part of the main O.P. 5. Per contra, Mr.R. Karthikeyan, learned counsel appearing for the respondent pointed out that as it is an ex parte order, it is not open to the revision petitioner to file the present revision petition without disclosing the defence before the trial Court and though counter was filed in the main O.P., no counter was filed in the application and that the acknowledgment signed before the Police Station was also valid and he is not seeking for return of all the jewellery and in particular, only asking for the jewellery, which was solely owned by the respondent and they were not given as stridhan properties for the petitioner/wife and it was stolen by her. Therefore, the order does not require any revision under the hands of this Court under Section 115, C.P.C. 6. Therefore, the order does not require any revision under the hands of this Court under Section 115, C.P.C. 6. In view of the above, it is necessary to see the legal provisions relating to the claim made in the interim application. Since the petition has been filed under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act read with Section 151 C.P.C., it is necessary to refer to Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which reads as follows: “ Disposal of property - In any proceeding under this Act, the Court may make such provisions in the decree as it deems just and proper with respect to the any property presented, at or about the time of marriage, which may belong jointly to both the husband and the wife.” By Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, only a limited jurisdiction has been given to the Courts exercising power under the Hindu Marriage Act and it also came to be considered by several High Courts. It is necessary to refer to them. 7. While dealing with Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Delhi High Court in its decision Subhash Lata v. V.N. Khanna Subhash Lata v. V.N. Khanna Subhash Lata v. V.N. Khanna AIR 1992 Del. 14 has held as follows: “ 4.…..This Court held in the case of Smt. Shukla v. Brij Bhushan Makkar Smt. Shukla v. Brij Bhushan Makkar Smt. Shukla v. Brij Bhushan Makkar , AIR 1982 Del. 223 : “Section 27, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is a substantive provision empowering the Court in any proceeding under the said Act to make a just and proper order regarding property presented at or about the time of the marriage of the parties and belonging jointly to both of them. The Court exercising the jurisdiction under the Act is powerless to deal with properties exclusively belonging to one or the other spouse”. In the above case the wife who pleaded that the properties were presented to her and, therefore, belonged to her was held not entitled to the relief of their recovery under Section 27 of the Act. Her remedy lay before the Civil Courts. In the above case the wife who pleaded that the properties were presented to her and, therefore, belonged to her was held not entitled to the relief of their recovery under Section 27 of the Act. Her remedy lay before the Civil Courts. Neither could such an order be based on Order 7, Rule 7 read with Section 151, C.P.C.” The aforesaid view was followed by this Court in Ashok Kumar Kad v. Usha Rani Kad Ashok Kumar Kad v. Usha Rani Kad Ashok Kumar Kad v. Usha Rani Kad FAO No. 111 of 1983 reported in 1985 MLR 21. The Court said (at page 23): “It is no doubt true that the operation of the provision embodied in Section 27 of the Act is confined only to property presented to the parties at or about the time of the marriage which belong jointly to both of them.” Therefore, in matters which were contested by the parties before this Court, the consistent view is that Section 27 of the Act is attracted when the property presented at or about the time of the marriage is alleged to belong jointly to both the spouses. In the present case, the allegation is that all the aforesaid articles were presented to her at the time of marriage by her parents/other relations, meaning thereby that the same belonged to her.” 8. The Bombay High Court in its decision Sangeeta Balkrishna Kadam v. Balkrishna Ramachandra Kadam AIR 1994 Bom. 1 took the view that after the introduction of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, the jurisdiction has become wider and, therefore, even Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act should be interpreted widely so as to include all properties, which are in dispute by the husband and wife, should be dealt with by the Courts under the Hindu Marriage Act and should not drive them to other Civil Courts and for this purpose, Section 151, C.P.C. can be invoked and the relevant portion of the said judgment is extracted below: “ 11.…. We are of the view that the findings recorded by the City Civil Court and by the learned single Judge of this Court that the scope of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be expanded will have to be upheld. We are of the view that the findings recorded by the City Civil Court and by the learned single Judge of this Court that the scope of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be expanded will have to be upheld. Whichever way one construes the Section, it is not permissible to graft on to it anything other than what the Legislature has stated therein and, consequently, it would not be possible to uphold the first submission of Mr. Angal that the property in question would still come within the ambit and scope of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. By this, all that we are holding is that the claim of the appellant-wife in its entirety would be outside the scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Under these circumstances, even though, as indicated by us, it would not be possible to expand the scope of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act to cover all the property that has been claimed, at least some of it would certainly be covered by Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 12.……. We have heard learned counsel on both sides in great detail with regard to this aspect of the matter because we consider it an issue of paramount public interest that this particular vexed question be set at rest. As far as the city of Bombay and some of the metropolitan areas are concerned, it would, perhaps, not provide much of a difficulty to the course of the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act because of the wording of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, which empowers the Court to pass appropriate orders in respect of items of property that are the subject-matter of dispute. 13.….. We are faced with a situation, however, where the Legislature made specific provisions for the disposal of only one small restrictive class of property. Undoubtedly, there is no provision in the Hindu Marriage Act which imposes a bar on the Courts in relation to the disposal of other forms of property. Consequently, by virtue of the vacuum that is created, the Courts have been hitherto directing the parties to institute normal civil suits in relation to the remaining property. Undoubtedly, there is no provision in the Hindu Marriage Act which imposes a bar on the Courts in relation to the disposal of other forms of property. Consequently, by virtue of the vacuum that is created, the Courts have been hitherto directing the parties to institute normal civil suits in relation to the remaining property. We have already observed that this is hardly fair to the parties and, having regard to the volume of litigation that is pending, neither is it fair to the Courts when such a litigation would be unnecessary and to our mind, superfluous. As already observed, it is precisely in these circumstances that the Court must exercise the powers vested in it under Section 151, C.P.C., and pass orders in relation to the remaining items that are the subject-matter of the dispute.” 9. This reasoning given by the Bombay High Court, which was also more or less agreed by the Delhi High Court in its decision in Anju Bhargava v. Rajesh Bhargava 1986 (2) HLR 393, was expressly disagreed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in its decision Dr.Suraj Parkash v. Mohinder Pal Sharma Dr.Suraj Parkash v. Mohinder Pal Sharma Dr.Suraj Parkash v. Mohinder Pal Sharma AIR 1988 P & H 218 and the relevant passage is extracted below: “ 9.…… It is, therefore, evident that under Section 27 of the Act, no provision could be made in the decree for the return of jewellery which exclusively belongs to the wife as her stridhan. Contrary view was taken by the Delhi High Court in Anju Bhargava v. Rajesh Bhargava (1986) 2 Hindu LR 393 wherein the learned Judge tried to explain that under Section 27 of the Act, the property forming subject matter of the case may belong jointly or may not belong jointly and, therefore, it includes both types of properties including the stridhan of the wife. With due deference to the learned Judge, I do not subscribe to this reasoning. In any case, this case could not be used as a precedent because ultimately, the learned judge observed in para No. 20 of the Judgment that, “I would have made a reference to a larger Bench of this Court for resolving these judgments, had there not been an agreement between the parties before me regarding what is to be done in this matter. In my view, the scope of Section 27 of the Act is wide, it does not need to be whittled down and covering of all the three categories mentioned by the Supreme Court in Pratibha Ranis case would enable the intention of the Legislature in Section 21-B of the Act, that matrimonial matters should be disposed of expeditiously, to be implemented.”” 10. However, this Court vide its decision in V.B. Jaganathan v. A.R. Srividhya V.B. Jaganathan v. A.R. Srividhya V.B. Jaganathan v. A.R. Srividhya (1997) 2 MLJ 366 agreed with the judgments of the Bombay High Court and Madhya Pradesh High Court and in paragraphs 18, 19 and 23 held as follows: “ 18.….. Therefore, I am of opinion that Section 27 does not exclude the general power of the Court to pass an appropriate decree in regard to the property belonging exclusively to either the husband or the wife. The learned Judge, in the case cited, further held in paragraph 5 of the reports that the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 151, C.P.C., also applies to the proceedings. The learned Judge further took note of the fact that by a reading of Section 27, it should not be inferred that the Court has no power in regard to parties owned or possessed by the individual spouses. In that view of the matter, the power was recognised. 19. In Sangeeta Balakrishna Kadam v. Balakrishna Ramachandra Kadam Sangeeta Balakrishna Kadam v. Balakrishna Ramachandra Kadam Sangeeta Balakrishna Kadam v. Balakrishna Ramachandra Kadam , AIR 1994 Bom. 1 , a Division Bench of that Court invoked Section 151, C.P.C. and held that to direct the parties to a separate suit is hardly fair and having regard to the volume of litigation that is pending, to direct the parties to institute normal civil suits in relation to the remaining property would be inequitable. In such cases, under Section 151 C.P.C., orders could be passed in regard to those properties which do not come under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court was followed in Nirmala Gupta v. Ravendra Kumar Nirmala Gupta v. Ravendra Kumar Nirmala Gupta v. Ravendra Kumar , AIR 1996 M.P. 227 . The Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court was followed in Nirmala Gupta v. Ravendra Kumar Nirmala Gupta v. Ravendra Kumar Nirmala Gupta v. Ravendra Kumar , AIR 1996 M.P. 227 . In paragraph 13 of the judgment, Their Lordships, after considering the scope of Section 151 C.P.C., held that “the Court is not giving the appellant any substantive right in the garb of interpretation. It is only providing the additional procedure to a wife who could not claim her “ stridhan” under the provisions of Section 27 of the Act”. 23. On going by the various decisions, I agree with the conclusion arrived by the Allahabad, Bombay and Madhya Pradesh High Courts wherein Their Lordships have held that under Section 151 C.P.C., the Court can give necessary direction regarding the disposal of the property belonging to individual spouses and the same is within the jurisdiction of the Matrimonial Court. Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act is not a bar, nor does it restrict the power of the Matrimonial Court in regard to disposal of the individual properties of the spouses. Merely because a specific provision has been made under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act regarding joint properties of the spouses, it should not be construed that the Court has no power or the Courts power is excluded from giving necessary directions with regard to the individual properties.” 11. The aforesaid judgment of this Court came to be noted with approval by the Supreme Court vide its decision in B.P. Achala Anand v. S.Appi Reddy and Another B.P. Achala Anand v. S.Appi Reddy and Another B.P. Achala Anand v. S.Appi Reddy and Another AIR 2005 SC 986 : (2005) 3 SCC 313 : (2005) 2 MLJ 80 (SC). In paragraph 30, it was observed as follows: “ 30. In V.B.Jaganathan v. A.R.Srividhya the Madras High Court has held that a Court can pass an appropriate order under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act even when one of the parties to a marriage claims the property as belonging to him exclusively thereby indicating that it might have been possible to make a provision regarding the tenanted premises, in the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act. How far that order would be binding on a landlord who is not a party is another question, but it would certainly give her a right to defend the proceedings for eviction.” 12. Even while interpreting Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in its decision A.Mannan Khan v. Judge, Family Court, Hyderabad A.Mannan Khan v. Judge, Family Court, Hyderabad A.Mannan Khan v. Judge, Family Court, Hyderabad AIR 2001 AP 163 held as follows: “Indisputably, the suit schedule property, which was the matrimonial home of both the parties herein, is in dispute and merely because there is a severance of relationship of husband and wife between the parties it cannot be said that they were not parties to the marriage. The words “parties to a marriage” have to be construed as divorced spouses also and not, only the parties whose marriage is subsisting.” 13. As to which point of time, such a petition can be filed was also considered by the Courts and while construing Section 27 of the Act, the Delhi High Court in its decision Aruna Madan v. Subhash Madan 1994 DMC 59 held that such a proceeding can be instituted independent of the main original petition and even after the main case is decided, such petitions are maintainable and the Court need not pass a compendious order in the main O.P. as well as in the interim application and it should be considered as a separate proceeding. The relevant passage is extracted below: “ 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that a bare reading of Section 27 of the Act makes it incumbent on the trial Court that this application has to be disposed of while disposing of the petition for divorce and the learned trial Court has gravely erred in directing the same to be disposed of independently. It would, at this stage, be appropriate to quote Section 27 of the Act, which reads as follows: ….. “Omitted”….. 5. There is no doubt that Section 27 does provide that a provision can be made in the decree in any proceedings under the Act but that does not show that such a provision cannot be made after the main case is decided.” 14. “Omitted”….. 5. There is no doubt that Section 27 does provide that a provision can be made in the decree in any proceedings under the Act but that does not show that such a provision cannot be made after the main case is decided.” 14. Though in the present case, the matter was heard by the Family Court, it is not known as to why the petition was not filed in terms of Section 7(1)(c) of the Family Courts Act. Section 7(1) of the Family Courts Act reads as follows: “ 7. Jurisdiction.- (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a Family Court shall- (a) have and exercise all the jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or any Subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred to in the Explanation; and (b) be deemed, for the purposes of exercising such jurisdiction under such law, to be a District Court or, as the case may be, such Subordinate Civil Court for the area to which the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends. Explanation.- The suits and proceedings referred to in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the following nature, namely: ……..“Omitted”….. (c) asuit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage with respect to the property of the parties or of either of them.” 15. The width of the power of the Family Court also has been considered by this Court and various other High Courts and it has been held that the Family Court has got wider jurisdiction under Section 7(1)(c) of the Family Courts Act than under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. In the decision in N.R.Gopal v. K.G.Banumathi and Another N.R.Gopal v. K.G.Banumathi and Another N.R.Gopal v. K.G.Banumathi and Another AIR 2000 Mad. 300 : (2000) 2 MLJ 107 in paragraph 16, S.S. SUBRAMANI, J., observed as follows at p. 111 of MLJ: ” 16. … But, we must also take into consideration the provisions of the Family Courts Act. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act says that suits or proceedings between parties to a marriage with respect to property of the parties or either of them is to be decided by the Family Court only. In this case, the wife has alleged that it is by sale of her jewels, the mortgage right itself was acquired. Section 7 of the Family Courts Act says that suits or proceedings between parties to a marriage with respect to property of the parties or either of them is to be decided by the Family Court only. In this case, the wife has alleged that it is by sale of her jewels, the mortgage right itself was acquired. She claims a right over the property. The husband wants to surrender the property and get the entire mortgage amount. It is in the mortgaged property, the parties are residing. If the mortgage is redeemed, naturally, the wife and children, who are now deserted, will have no place to reside. It is in these circumstances, the lower Court passed an order of injunction as prayed for in I.A. No. 74 of 1999…….” 16. Even before the judgment of this Court, a Division Bench of Kerala High Court presided by the Hon’ble Justice K.G. BALAKRISHNAN (as he then was) in the decision in Abdul Jaleel v. Sahida 1997 (1) KLT 734 in construing Section 7 of the Family Courts Act held as follows: ”We are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that the parties to a marriage referred to therein shall only confine to the parties to the subsisting marriage. The object of the Family Courts Act is to settle the family disputes. The disputes relating to family may be there even after the dissolution of the marriage. In the instant case, the allegation of the respondent is that the property for which she seeks declaration and partition was purchased by the appellant using the money which belonged to her. Such a dispute arose between the parties consequent on the dissolution of the marriage. This dispute between them is closely connected with the family dispute. If the declaration and partition was sought in respect of an item of property independently acquired by one of the parties after the dissolution of the marriage, certainly the Family Court may not have the jurisdiction. If the dispute relating to the properties which were jointly acquired at the time when they were husband and wife, any dispute relating to such properties could be decided only in a forum like the Family Court. The expression, “parties to a marriage”, used under Section 7(1)(c) of the Family Courts Act is to be construed having due regard to the Objects and Reasons of the Family Courts Act. The expression, “parties to a marriage”, used under Section 7(1)(c) of the Family Courts Act is to be construed having due regard to the Objects and Reasons of the Family Courts Act. The Family Court Judge was perfectly right in holding that the dispute between the appellant and the respondent are to be decided by the Family Court and it has got jurisdiction under Section 7(1)(c) of the Family Courts Act, even though the appellant and the respondent are no longer parties to a subsisting marriage.” 17. The decision of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court was noted with approval by the Supreme Courtvide its decision K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A. Shahida AIR 2003 SC 2525 : (2003) 4 SCC 166 : (2003) 2 MLJ 202 (SC) and in paragraph 17 it was held as follows at p. 204 of MLJ: ” 17.… As indicated hereinabove, BALA- KRISHNAN, J., (as His Lordship then was) speaking for a Division Bench in a matter arising out of a preliminary issue on the question of jurisdiction held that the dispute over properties between parties to a marriage cannot be confined to the parties to a subsisting marriage. We agree with the said view…….” 18. Inthe above decision of the Supreme Court, the question of true scope of jurisdiction of the Family Court relating to properties of divorced parties was also considered and the relevant passages in paragraphs 11 to 14 are extracted below: ” 11.….. The wordings, “disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith,” in the view of this Court, must be given a broad construction. The Statement of Objects and Reasons, as referred to hereinbefore, would clearly go to show that the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends, inter alia, in relation to properties of spouses or of either of them which would clearly mean that the properties claimed by the parties thereto as a spouse of other, irrespective of the claim whether property is claimed during the subsistence of a marriage or otherwise. 12. The submission of the learned counsel to the effect that this Court should read the words “a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage as parties to a subsisting marriage”, in our considered view would lead to miscarriage of justice. 13. 12. The submission of the learned counsel to the effect that this Court should read the words “a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage as parties to a subsisting marriage”, in our considered view would lead to miscarriage of justice. 13. The Family Court was set up for settlement of family disputes. The reason for enactment of the said Act was to set up a Court which would deal with disputes concerning the family by adopting an approach radically different from that adopted in ordinary civil proceedings. The said Act was enacted despite the fact that Order 32-A C.P.C., was inserted by reason of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, l976, which could not bring about any desired result. 14. It is now a well settled principle of law that the jurisdiction of a Court created specifically for resolution of disputes of certain kinds should be construed liberally. The restricted meaning if ascribed to Explanation (c) appended to Section 7 of the Act, in our opinion, would frustrate the object wherefor the Family Courts were set up.” 19. The said decision came to be subsequently noted and followed by the Supreme Court in its decision in Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee and Another Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee and Another Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee and Another AIR 2005 SC 3557 : (2005) 8 SCC 140 . 20. In the present case, the respondent claimed the return of the jewellery solely on the basis that it exclusively belonged to him and the relevant passage stated by him in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, may be usefully extracted: ”Neither I have given my consent voluntarily nor they had any right to remove the valuables from my custody without aid of this Hon’ble Court. There is no basis to state that gifted articles belong to respondent. The list of articles annexed with the notice are incorrect and the list contains wrong details. The respondent is bound to return back the articles taken away by them with the assistance of their relatives and supporters on a compromise, under threat. When she has failed to keep up the agreed terms of compromise she is not entitled to retain the articles which belong to me. Some of them belong to me and certain articles are not delivered. When she has failed to keep up the agreed terms of compromise she is not entitled to retain the articles which belong to me. Some of them belong to me and certain articles are not delivered. Some of the articles were given exclusively for me and some are gifted jointly. The articles cannot be retained by the Respondent, if they are not willing to abide by the compromise. The articles listed by them were allowed only when the respondent had consented for a compromise. The respondent also had issued a receipt wherein she has omitted to mention all articles taken away by her along with her parents and relatives and the petitioner was forced to acknowledge the receipt in the Police Station believing that they will withdraw the criminal complaint besides returning back my valuables and agree for a consent divorce. The respondent cheated me and with dishonest intention had removed the valuables. I never voluntarily returned the articles and there was no scope to remove it, if not agreed for the compromise. They removed it, agreeing to perform the agreed obligations. I was made to accept the compromise proposal only under the promise of withdrawing criminal complaint and returning back my presents, which were also intended for joint usage. The respondent evaded to keep up the promise and they cheated me by false assurances. Though the Police allowed us to go free after removal of articles, refused to withdraw the case, since the respondent insisted to prosecute contrary to the compromise, I have preferred a Police complaint.” 21. The trial Court also in the absence of any counter, recorded a finding that the revision petitioner has taken away the articles from the petitioners house and when the respondent came to the house, the jewelleries were found missing. It was the revision petitioner who refused to return the valuables. Thereafter, curiously, the trial Court recorded as per Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the articles given as gift during marriage has to be treated as belonged to both husband and wife and no one can claim exclusive ownership over the same and since the respondent had stated that the articles were not given as stridhan properties, the revision petitioner is bound to return back the articles. In fact, this was not the case pleaded by the respondent before the trial Court. 22. In fact, this was not the case pleaded by the respondent before the trial Court. 22. As the petition was filed before the Family Court especially under the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and when the Court had the power to grant relief, mere non-quoting of relevant provisions will not disentitle the parties from getting justice from the Court under Section 7(1)(a) of the Family Courts Act. However, it must be stated that the nature of complaint made by the respondent before the Family Court is not a real property dispute between the parties to a marriage. As seen from the above extracted portion from the affidavit of the respondent, it is clear that there was a compromise proposal before the Police Station and the revision petitioner has not acted as per the compromise and the attempt to persuade the petitioner to withdraw the Police complaint also failed. It is only a case of theft that was alleged by the respondent-husband. It is also seen that he has also preferred a criminal complaint on this ground. Therefore, this can never be said to be a dispute with reference to a property of the parties or either of them as contemplated under Section 7 (1)(c) of the Family Courts Act. It is only when there is a dispute regarding title, ownership or entitlement or a share or interest in the property is in dispute, the Family Court has to decide the “ lis” between the parties. Therefore, the grievance projected by the respondent cannot be a dispute relating to any property and the nature of allegations made by him cannot be gone into by the Family Court. 23. The finding recorded by the trial Court that the revision petitioner has no objection to return the articles has been made in a mechanical fashion without reference to the proceedings pending before him. In fact, as early as 21.12.2005, the trial Court has recorded that the revision petitioner was called absent and set ex parte and, therefore, it is only an ex parte proceedings. When that is the fact, the question of the respondent ( sic not) having any objection to return the articles could not have arisen and it was a very serious irregularity on the part of the Family Court Judge to record such a finding. When that is the fact, the question of the respondent ( sic not) having any objection to return the articles could not have arisen and it was a very serious irregularity on the part of the Family Court Judge to record such a finding. In any event, the order passed by the trial Court suffers from material irregularity and calls for interference of this Court under Section 115 C.P.C. 24. In the light of the above, the civil revision petition shall stand allowed and the order of the trial Court dated 21.2.2006 passed in I.A. No. 2266 of 2004 in H.M.O.P. No. 675 of 2004 will stand set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected C.M.P. will stand dismissed.