JUDGMENT A.K. Shrivastava, J. 1. The unsuccessful Plaintiffs having lost from both the Courts below have filed this second appeal. 2. The family tree of Plaintiffs and Respondents is as under: Tikaram (died 1940) -wife Ganeshi Bai (died on 24-5-1963) 3. The suit property and its location has been described in para-1 of the plaint. According to plaint averments, Tikaram who died in the year 1940, was the owner of the suit property and on the date of his death. The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 1937') already came into force and, therefore, on the death of Tikaram his widow Ganeshi Bai and sons Gopal and Gourishankar became the owner of the suit property and it became their joint Hindu family property having l/3rd share each. Gopal son of Tikaram died unmarried in the year 1942 and according to the Plaintiffs, his share devolved to another son of Tikaram namely Gourishankar by survivorship. The Plaintiffs are the daughters of Gourishankar. Gourishankar died in the year 1952 living Plaintiffs alone as his successors. According to the Plaintiffs, after the death of their father Gourishankar they succeeded to their father's share and each of them became owner of l/3rd share. 4. The case of Plaintiffs is that Ganeshi Bai who is the mother of Gourishankar could not succeed to the share of Gopal and Gourishankar who died during her life time. Ganeshi Bai died on 24-5-1963. Upon her death, her l/3rd share was inherited by the persons whose descriptions are given in para-6 of the plaint and can be seen at a glance on bare perusal of the family tree mentioned hereinabove. The contention of Plaintiffs is that the disputed property continued to be joint and whenever Plaintiffs used to come to Hoshangabad, they used to live in the suit house along with the other family members. 5. According to the Plaintiffs, Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu, all of a sudden, started saying that the entire suit property belongs to him and objected to their living in the suit property and as such they served a notice on him. In reply to the said notice it was disclosed by Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu that the suit property was alienated to him by way of registered gift deed executed by Mst. Ganeshi Bai on 26-4-1961. 6. In reply to the said notice it was disclosed by Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu that the suit property was alienated to him by way of registered gift deed executed by Mst. Ganeshi Bai on 26-4-1961. 6. The Plaintiffs, in the plaint, pleaded that the gift deed executed by Mst. Ganeshi Bai cannot be acted upon for the simple reason that she was 90 years old and was unable to see properly as her eye sight was weak. On account of her old age she was incapable of understanding the significance of ordinary things, she was unable to move easily and was totally dependent on Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu and under these back drops, if any gift deed was executed and thumb Impression was taken, the same is invalid and could not be acted upon. 7. The Plaintiffs, on the basis of their pleadings, claimed 7/9th share in the suit property and also sought relief of partition and separate possession. 8. Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu filed written statement and denied the plaint averments. According to the Defendants, Plaintiffs have no right, title and interest in the suit property. According to him, after the death of Tikaram, his sons Gopal, Gourishankar and widow Ganeshi Bai became the owner of the suit property having l/3rd share each and after the death of Gopal and Gourishankar, their shares devolved in Ganeshi Bai. Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu is the son of Punia Bai who is predeceased daughter of Ganeshi Bai. The suit was owned and possessed by Ganeshi Bai and Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu was taking care of her all the times. Ganeshi Bai vide registered gift deed dated 26-4-1961 gifted the property to Bhagnu (Defendant No. 1) and hence he became the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of the gift deed. The Plaintiffs are having no right, title and interest in the suit property and the suit is also barred by prescribed period of limitation. The Defendants prayed that the suit be dismissed. 9. The Plaintiffs are having no right, title and interest in the suit property and the suit is also barred by prescribed period of limitation. The Defendants prayed that the suit be dismissed. 9. Learned trial Court framed necessary issues and recorded the evidence of the parties and came to hold as under: (i) After the death of Tikaram the suit property vested in Ganeshi Bai, Gopal and Gourishankar equally and they were jointly possessing the same; (ii) After the death of Gopal, his share did not devolve on Gourishankar and he did not become owner of 2/3rd share in the suit property; (iii) After the death of Gourishankar, Plaintiffs who are his daughters did not become the owner of 2/3rd share; (iv) The gift deed executed by Ganeshi Bai in favour of Defendant No. 1- Bhagnu confers all rights over the suit property to him; and (v) The suit is barred by time. Learned trial Court dismissed the suit on merit as well as on the ground of limitation. 10. The Plaintiffs preferred first appeal and learned first Appellate Court also concurred with the view of learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment and decree. In this manner this second appeal has been preferred by the Plaintiffs. 11. On 6-10-1993 this Court admitted this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: (i) Whether on true construction of an application of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 and the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the Appellants are entitled to have a share in the suit properties to the extent of 7/9? (ii) Whether the suit as it is filed is barred by limitation? 12. The contention of Shri Umesh Trivedi learned Counsel for the Appellants-Plaintiffs is that the disputed property was owned by Tikaram who died in the year 1940 i.e. after the commencement of the Act of 1937 and, therefore, according to Section 3 of the said Act, Ganeshi Bai succeeded only l/3rd share of her husband and his two sons Gopal and Gourishankar succeeded l/3rd share each. Meaning thereby each person was having l/3rd share in the suit property and they formed a joint Hindu family and the suit property was joint Hindu family property. Meaning thereby each person was having l/3rd share in the suit property and they formed a joint Hindu family and the suit property was joint Hindu family property. After the death of Gopal in the year 1942, his share would devolved on Gourishankar as Gopal died issueless and as such Gourishankar became owner of 2/3rd share in the suit property. Gourishankar also died in the year 1952 and, therefore, Plaintiffs who are the daughters of Gourishankar succeeded his 2/3rd share by inheritance and after the death of Ganeshi Bai they also succeeded to their respective shares in l/3rd share of Ganeshi Bai. In support of his contention, learned Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of Supreme Court Thimmaiah and Ors. v. Ningamma and another, JT 2000(9) SC 516 and Article 255 of Mulla Hindu Law. Learned Counsel for the Appellants has also placed reliance on the two decisions of the Supreme Court, they are Pavitri Devi and Anr. v. Darbari Singh and Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 392 and Raghubar Singh and Ors. v. Gulab Singh and others, AIR 1998 SC 2401 . 13. The other contention of learned Counsel, for the Appellants is that according to amended Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, as amended on 9-9- 2005, since after the death of Tikaram in the year 1940 there was a joint family of his sons Gopal, Gourishankar and widow Ganeshi Bai and since there was a joint Hindu Family and the parties are governed by Mitakshara School of Hindu Law, Plaintiffs became coparceners by birth in their own right and in the same manner as that of a son and, therefore, they have the same rights in the coparcenary property as they would have had if they would have been sons. 14. On the other hand, Shri A. G. Dhande, learned senior counsel for Respondents/Defendants, argued in support of the impugned judgment and has submitted that after the death of both sons of Ganeshi Bai namely Gopal and Gourishankar in the year 1942 and 1952 respectively, their shares were succeeded by the mother Ganeshi Bai as Gopal died unmarried in the year 1942 and Gourishankar died without leaving any male issue in the year 1952 i.e. before commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (in short 'the Act of 1956'). According to learned Counsel for Respondents, Ganeshi Bai, since she was possessing the suit property, became absolute owner under Section 14 of the Act of 1956. 15. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this second appeal deserves to be allowed in part. REGARDING SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW No. 1: 16. According to learned Counsel for the parties, the suit property was of Tikaram. It is no more in dispute that Tikaram died in the year 1940 i.e. after the commencement of the Act of 1937. Thus, under Section 3 of the Act of 1937 the right in the husband's property would devolve on widow in the same manner and she would entitle to the same share as a son. True, under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act of 1937 the interest devolves on a Hindu widow shall be limited interest and it would known as "Hindu Woman's estate". But, after the commencement of the Act of 1956, by virtue of Section 14, she would become the absolute owner of the said share if she is in possession thereof. 17. In the present case sons of Tikaram namely Gopal and Gourishankar admittedly died in the year 1942 and 1952 respectively i.e. before coming into force of the Act of 1956. Admittedly, Gopal was unmarried and died issueless and Gourishankar was not having any male issue. 18. Tikaram died in the year 1940 and after his death, his family formed a joint Hindu family having two coparceners namely Gopal and Gourishankar being his sons. Before the commencement of amended Section 6 of the Act of 1956 which came into force from 9-9-2005, earlier under the Hindu Law females were not coparceners under the Mitakshara Law. Similarly, the mother cannot be a coparcener with her sons, therefore, Ganeshi Bai, being widow of Tikaram, at the most, was a member of joint Hindu family comprising of her two sons and herself, but, definitely, she cannot be a coparcener. Thus, the view of this Court is that Ganeshi Bai widow of Tikaram was only a member of HUF and was not a coparcener and the coparceners were her sons namely Gopal and Gourishankar. 19. Thus, the view of this Court is that Ganeshi Bai widow of Tikaram was only a member of HUF and was not a coparcener and the coparceners were her sons namely Gopal and Gourishankar. 19. The question would now arise that after the death of one of the coparcener Gopal in the year 1942, his share would devolve on whom and whether it would devolve on another coparcener Gourishankar whose daughters are the Plaintiffs. According to me, on the death of a coparcener, his interest in the coparcenary property will not pass by succession to his heirs, but, it will pass by survivorship to the other coparceners. Thus, I am of the firm view that after the death of coparcener Gopal, his right in the coparcenary property would not pass by succession but it would pass by survivorship to the other coparcener who is his brother Gourishankar and, therefore, after the death of Gopal, Gourishankar became owner of 2/3rd share in the suit property. The share of coparcener Gopal would not devolve on his mother Ganeshi Bai because she was not a coparcener though she was a member of joint Hindu family. Since Ganeshi Bai under the Act of 1937 was having l/3rd share in the property left by her husband by virtue of Section 3 of the said Act, she perfected and became absolute owner only to the extent of l/3rd share after the commencement of the Act of 1956. 20. The question now hinges is whether after the death of Gourishankar, the father of Plaintiffs as they are his daughters, his 2/3rd share in the coparcenary property would devolve on the Plaintiffs or the same would devolve on Ganeshi Bai, his mother. The law in regard to inheritance of males under the Mitakshara Law now may be seen. According to me, in determining the mode in which the property of a Hindu male governed by Mitakshara Law would devolve, being sole surviving member of coparcenary property, to his heirs by succession [see para 34(2)(ii) of Mulla Principles of Hindu Law]. Thus, after the death of Gourishankar in the year 1952, his 2/3rd share in the coparcenary property would be devolved on the Plaintiffs being his heirs as they are his daughters, by succession and in the order given in para 43 of Mulla Principles of Hindu Law. 21. Thus, after the death of Gourishankar in the year 1952, his 2/3rd share in the coparcenary property would be devolved on the Plaintiffs being his heirs as they are his daughters, by succession and in the order given in para 43 of Mulla Principles of Hindu Law. 21. Under Article 43 of Mulla Principles of Hindu Law, the order of succession has been given and the order of succession of the daughter is at item No. 5 of this para (see para 43 of Mulla Principles of Hindu Law, 17th Edition at page Nos. 118 and 127). The order of succession of mother is at Item No. 7 under this para and, therefore, I am of the firm view that Plaintiffs being the daughters of Gourishankar would become owner of 2/3rd share in the suit property after his death. The trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court erred in law by misconstruing the law and thereby holding that the share of coparceners Gopal and Gourishankar in the coparcenary property would only devolve on their mother Ganeshi Bai after their death. 22. I have already held hereinabove that Ganeshi Bai was having l/3rd share in the suit property under the Act of 1937 which was perfected by her on coming into force of Section 14 of the Act of 1956 and she became absolute owner thereof and, therefore, the gift deed Ex. D/15 dated 26-4-1961 executed by her in favour of Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu is valid upto the extent of l/3rd share in the suit property and he is entitled to l/3rd share only and the Plaintiffs are having and entitled to 2/3rd share in the suit property. 23. I am not at all impressed by the submission of Shri Trivedi, learned Counsel for the Appellants that Plaintiffs-Appellants are entitled to the share upto the extent of 7/9th in the suit property in view of amended Section 6 of the Act of 1956 which came into force w.e.f. 9-9-2005 and according to which, the daughter of coparcener by birth would become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as a son and would have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son. Section 6(1) is to be read conjointly with the proviso to this section which is having overriding effect. Section 6(1) is to be read conjointly with the proviso to this section which is having overriding effect. The proviso reads as under: Provided that nothing contained in this Sub-section shall affect or invalidated any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004. Since the two Courts below arrived at a concurrent finding of fact that Ganeshi Bai executed registered gift deed Ex.D/15 on 26-4-1961 in favour of Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu and this being a pure find of fact based on correct appreciation of the evidence, I am of the view that since Ganeshi Bai was having l/3rd share only in the suit property and, therefore, by virtue of gift deed Ex. D/15 dated 26-4-1961 Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu would become owner of l/3rd share and the alienation by Ganeshi Bai to Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu on 26-4-1961 would be protected by the proviso to Section 6 of the Act of 1956 which I have already quoted hereinabove. 24. Even otherwise provisions of amended Section 6 of the Act of 1956 demonstrating the devolution of interest in the coparcenary property by the female or a daughter of coparcener, would not be applicable to the succession which was already opened and has been given effect to and if it is permitted to be reopened, would divest from the persons to whom estate has already vested prior to coming into force of this provisions. Thus, amended Section 6(1) of the Act of 1956 cannot be interpreted and construed in the manner argued by learned Counsel for Appellants looking to the proviso to this section. 25. The substantial question of law No. 1 is, thus, answered that on true construction of the application of Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 as well as various other provisions of Hindu Law which I have mentioned hereinabove, the Plaintiffs-Appellants are entitled to have share in the suit property to the extent of 2/3rd and not to the extent of 7/9th. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW No. 2: 26. The present suit has been filed for partition by the Plaintiffs on 6-11- 1979. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW No. 2: 26. The present suit has been filed for partition by the Plaintiffs on 6-11- 1979. There is specific pleading of the Plaintiffs that after the death of Ganeshi Bai in the year 1963, they were visiting frequently and staying in the suit property and they were having joint possession till June, 1979 when suddenly Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu objected to their living in the suit house and did not permit the Plaintiffs to stay. On sending notice to Defendant No. 1-Bhagnu on 24- 8-1979 by registered AD post through their pleader, the reply was sent on 3-9- 1979 in which Defendant No. 1- Bhagnu for the first time disclosed that Ganeshi Bai executed registered gift deed dated 26-4-1961 in his favour. The evidence of Plaintiff No. 1-Smt. Malti Bai is that after the death of Ganeshi Bai and even after her marriage, she was frequently visiting to the suit property and used to reside there. 27. The Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Rukhma Bai v. Lala Laxminarayan and others, AIR I960 SC 335, has held that there can be no "right to sue" until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least, a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the Defendant against whom the suit is instituted. The Supreme Court further came to hold that when the Defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the Plaintiff in the suit, every such threat by a party to such a right, however, ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel Plaintiff to file suit. Whether a particular threat gives rise to a compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether that threat effectively invades or jeopardizes the said right. 28. Since it was in the year 1979, when Defendant No, 1-Bhagnu did not permit Plaintiffs to stay in the suit property, the suit for partition and separate possession was filed on 6-11-1979 and, therefore, I am of the view that the suit is within limitation. The Privy Council in the case of Annamalai Chethiar and Ors. v. A.M.K.CT. 28. Since it was in the year 1979, when Defendant No, 1-Bhagnu did not permit Plaintiffs to stay in the suit property, the suit for partition and separate possession was filed on 6-11-1979 and, therefore, I am of the view that the suit is within limitation. The Privy Council in the case of Annamalai Chethiar and Ors. v. A.M.K.CT. Muthukaruppan Chethiar and another, AIR 1931 PC 9, has held that there can be no "right to sue" until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the Defendant against whom suit is instituted. The same principle has been reiterated by the Privy Council in its earlier decision Mt, Bolo v. Mt. Koklan and others, AIR 1930 PC 270. Both these decisions have been placed reliance by the Supreme Court in Mst Rukhma Bai (supra) 29. Even otherwise the suit is for partition and when Defendant No. 1- Bhagnu on 3-9-1979 by sending reply to the notice sent by Plaintiffs dated 24-8- 1979 declared that they are not having any right, the suit which was filed on 6- 11-1979, cannot be said to be barred by prescribed period of limitation. The finding of learned trial Court which has been affirmed by learned first appellate Court is that since Ganeshi Bai became the absolute owner of the suit property on coming into force of the Act of 1956, therefore, the Plaintiffs ought to have brought their suit within a prescribed period after the date when Ganeshi Bai became absolute owner, is based on misconstruction of law. 30. Substantial question of law No. 2 is, thus, answered that suit of Plaintiffs, as filed by them, is not barred by limitation. 31. Resultantly, this appeal succeeds and is allowed in part and it is hereby held that the Plaintiffs/Appellants are entitled for partition of the suit property up to the extent of 2/3rd share and are also entitled for separate 2/3rd portion in the suit property. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.