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2007 DIGILAW 656 (DEL)

EX. SEP/NA SUBHASH CHAND v. U. O. I.

2007-03-23

C.S.SISTANI, SWATANTER KUMAR

body2007
JUDGMENT G.S. Sistani, J.-The petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the Summary Court Martial (SCM) proceedings, findings and sentence awarded to him on 9.10.1998 by the said SCM held by Col. S.5. Prasad, VSM as Commanding Officer, Base Hospital, Barrackpur, West Bengal. 2. The Summary Court Martial sentenced the petitioner to nine months rigorous imprisonment in Civil Jail and dismissed the petitioner from service on 9.10.1998. 3. The case of the petitioner is that the entire proceedings of the trial by Summary Court Martial are without jurisdiction, suffers from many legal infirmities and are based on prejudicial and vindictive mind of the officers holding the Court. The respondents have not complied with the various provisions of the Military Law and, hence, the Order is bad. 4. The brief facts of the case are that petitioner was enrolled in the Army Medical Corps sometimes in the year 1987 and after completing his Basic Military Training and Technical Training, the petitioner was posted to various Units as Sepoy/Nursing Assistant. The petitioner performed his duties sincerely and with utmost dedication and devotion to the entire satisfaction of his superiors and he has had an 1mblemished record of service of ten years and eight months. 5. The petitioner was serving in the 14th Mech. Inf. Bn. MI. Room till June, 1998. As part of the career prospects, the petitioner was detailed to undergo Class-II training for Nursing Assistant for about six months at Base Hospital, Barrackpur, West Bengal where he reported for training on 30.6.1998. While the petitioner was undergoing training, he was detailed as a Duty Nursing Assistant in the Gynae OPD which duties are a part of the training and as such he was performing his duties on 4.9.1998. 6. As part of his duties, the petitioner was required to enter the names of the patients in the Register. The petitioner was also responsible to check the body weight and the blood pressure of the patients and endorse the same on the prescription chit before the patients were seen by the doctors. When the petitioner was checking the body weight of one lady patient in the presence of her husband, the petitioner asked the patient to roll up the sleeves of her Kameej/Shirt as the same was tight and the petitioner went out to attend the other patients in the meanwhile. When the petitioner was checking the body weight of one lady patient in the presence of her husband, the petitioner asked the patient to roll up the sleeves of her Kameej/Shirt as the same was tight and the petitioner went out to attend the other patients in the meanwhile. It is submitted that probably due to a communication gap, the lady who was a Nepali National misunderstood the instruction and instead of rolling up sleeves of Kameej 1 Shirt, she lifted her Kameej/Shirt from the abdomen and also loosened her Nara. On seeing this, when the petitioner came back for checking her blood pressure, the petitioner immediately told the husband of the lady who was standing on the door, to advise his wife to roll up the sleeves of her Kameej/Shirt as she has probably by mistake not understood what the petitioner has said and instead opened her clothes. It is stated at this point of time that not only the lady was present, but besides her husband other patients were also present over there. Thereafter, the petitioner checked her blood pressure and both the lady and her husband went off. The petitioner has stated that he narrated this incident to his reliever Mrs. Ranu Mukherjee, Lady Health Visitor before leaving the OPD. 7. It is pleaded that the aforesaid incident was blown out of proportion at the instance of Rifleman Kesar Bahadur Taman of 2/11, Gorkha Rifles, husband of the patient Smt. Khambha Maya Tamang. When the matter was reported to the Commanding Officer (CO), Base Hospital to the effect that the petitioner had committed a civil offence, Major Faruk Siraj of the Base Hospital was detailed to investigate the case and report the matter. The said officer along with Dr. (Mrs.) Sujata Chaudhary, a part time lady Medical Officer conducted the investigation, wherein, after examining the above said lady and her husband, the petitioner was examined. The petitioner had refused to have conducted any indecent act, however, he was physically manhandled and threatened with dire consequences, as a result of which, he had no alternative but to confess his guilt under the extended threat pressure, coercion and duress at the diktat of the officers. The petitioner was thereafter placed under close arrest on 4.9.1998 for facing disciplinary action. 8. The petitioner was thereafter placed under close arrest on 4.9.1998 for facing disciplinary action. 8. It is alleged that the CO of the base hospital, without conducting preliminary hearing, verbally ordered recording of summary of evidence, which was recorded from 8.9.1998 to 10.9.1998, while the petitioner was lodged in the quarter guard. The petitioner has been falsely implicated and he was continuously threatened and advised to confess his guilt. Respondent No.4, without appreciating the contents of the summary of evidence in the correct perspective and without applying his mind to the summary of evidence and there being a prima facie case against the petitioner, ordered trial of the petitioner by Summary Court Martial. 9. It is stated by learned Counsel for the petitioner that even otherwise, the said CO had no jurisdiction to conduct any proceeding against the petitioner as he was not his CO, since the petitioner was on the strength of 14 Mech. Inf. Bn. and, if at all, the petitioner was required to be proceeded against, it was the CO of his previous Unit who had jurisdiction to proceed against the petitioner. On 30.9.1998, the petitioner was informed that he would be tried by Summary Court Martial on 8.10.1998. The copies of charge-sheet and summary of evidence were given to the petitioner. The petitioner was tried by Summary Court Martial for an offence under Section 69 of the Army Act read with Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was convicted on the "plea of guilty" which according to the petitioner is false and he never pleaded voluntarily and on his own accord, but the petitioner was forced to sign the "plea of guilty" under the threat of dire consequences to the extent of losing his life. It was the grievance of the petitioner that the petitioner was not supplied with complete set of documents, and according to him the entire proceedings have been conducted in gross violation of the statutory provisions in a highly vindictive manner. 10. The arguments of the petitioner can be summarised as, firstly, Col. It was the grievance of the petitioner that the petitioner was not supplied with complete set of documents, and according to him the entire proceedings have been conducted in gross violation of the statutory provisions in a highly vindictive manner. 10. The arguments of the petitioner can be summarised as, firstly, Col. S.S. Prasad, CO, Base Hospital had no jurisdiction to try the petitioner by Summary Court Martial as he was not his CO and the petitioner was only undergoing training of Class-II Nursing Assistant; secondly, even otherwise, the respondents did not follow the proper procedure and the petitioner was not given proper opportunity to either defend his case and he was forced and coerced to plead the guilt. The petitioner should have been given an opportunity to defend his case through the service of a qualified person. The summary of evidence which commenced on 8.9.1998 was recorded in a very slip-shod manner and the statement of various other witnesses were also not recorded. The CO did not apply his mind before passing the Summary Court Martial. The charge-sheet and summary of evidence in complete was not handed over to the petitioner. 11. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the judgments of the Delhi High Court in the cases of Lance Dafedar Laxman v. Union of India & Ors. reported at 1992 (24) DRJ 125 ; Ex Major Harpal Singh v. Union of India reported at 1996 (37) DRJ 390 ; and State (Delhi Admn.) v. Balroop Singh reported at 49 (1993) DLT 644=1993 JCC 174, to show that during the Summary Court Martial, proper procedure must be followed. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the present petition is a gross abuse of the process of Court inasmuch as the petitioner has not narrated the true facts. It has been pleaded that while the petitioner was at Gynae OPD of Base Hospital, Barrackpore on 4.9.1998 at about 0900 hours Smt. Khamba Maya Tamang wife of No. 9420878 RFN Keshar Bahadur Tamang of 2/11 Gorkha Rifles reported for ante natal checkup; the petitioner recorded her blood pressure; after that he opened the NARA of the patient and inserted his fingers into her vagina and carried out an examination which was not in his charter of duties, intending thereby to outrage her modesty. 13. 13. It is submitted that the petitioner had committed the offence under Section 69 of the Army Act, that is to say, using criminal force to a woman with intent to outrage her modesty. The petitioner had abused his rights as a Nursing Assistant in the Armed Forces. There is no violation of any provisions of law in the conduct of the proceedings under the Army Act against the petitioner. 14. It is further submitted that the punishment was awarded to the petitioner, keeping in mind the gravity of the offence and the nature of crime committed by the petitioner, which is against the medical ethics and against a pregnant lady who submitted herself to the medical professional for examination. The petitioner was not authorised to do any physical examination on any female patient without a female attendant. The petitioner went beyond his duties and violated all the norms of medical ethics. 15. The Counsel for the respondents has submitted that Col. 5.5. Prasad, VSM, Commanding Officer, Base Hospital, Barrackpur, West Bengal was duly authorised and was fully competent to conduct the Summary Court Martial of the petitioner, as the petitioner was posted at Base Hospital, Barrackpur for Nursing Assistant Class-II Course, and this posting is treated as a permanent posting, as per the records of the Army Medial Corps Letter No. 330028C/519 dated 22.4.1998, the copy of which has been filed by the respondents along with counter affidavit as Annexure R-l. In terms of the letter dated 22.4.1998, which was filed by the respondents as Annexure R-1, Clause 9 would be applicable. This letter has been relied upon by learned Counsel for the respondents to show that Col. 5.5. Prasad, VSM, Commanding Officer, Base Hospital, Barrackpur has the jurisdiction to try the petitioner by Summary Court Martial. Relevant Para 9 of the letter dated 22.4.1998 is reported below: "Individuals will be struck off the posted strength of the despatching units as the duration of the course is 26 weeks. Individuals serving in concessional area will be placed in X-7list and SCS vide SQ/11/S/70. Those on leave will be recalled and despatched to the trg. hospitals to attend. The above course on due date." 16. Since the petitioner was despatched from his parent Unit, the present Unit was the competent Unit for holding the Summary Court Martial. Individuals serving in concessional area will be placed in X-7list and SCS vide SQ/11/S/70. Those on leave will be recalled and despatched to the trg. hospitals to attend. The above course on due date." 16. Since the petitioner was despatched from his parent Unit, the present Unit was the competent Unit for holding the Summary Court Martial. Learned Counsel for the respondent has denied the allegation that the petitioner was not allowed to examine any outside witness. It is further submitted that as no patient or attendant is permitted inside the female examination room, there was no person or patient or any outsider who witnessed this incident. The only person who could have been in that area was the husband of the patient, who had gone to the toilet at the relevant time. In fact, the petitioner had voluntarily accepted his guilt and asked for pardon from all the investigating officers and since the hospital had no facilities of Quarter Guard, the petitioner was kept in a Unit under Guard, as there was no place available at the Quarter Guard of any nearby Unit. The entire disciplinary proceedings were based on the witnesses and the evidence. There was no variation in the statements of various witnesses during recording of the summary evidence. 17. The preliminary hearing of the charge was duly carried out on 8.9.1998 by the CO of the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of Army Rule 22. As many as 4 prosecution witnesses including the prosecutrix were examined. The petitioner duly cross-examined the prosecution witnesses and made his statement in his defence. It is only after hearing the witnesses, Commanding Officer of the petitioner, having satisfied himself of prima facie case against the petitioner, ordered recording of summary of evidence. The procedure with respect to the entire proceedings was duly complied with in accordance with the provisions of Army Order 24/94. The summary of evidence against the petitioner was recorded in accordance with the provisions of law and the petitioner cross-examined the witnesses at length. 18. Learned Counsel for the respondents further submits that the record of the proceedings, hearing of the charge and summary of evidence clearly show that the petitioner was given due opportunity as prescribed by law. The petitioner was handed over the charge-sheet on 30.9.1998. 18. Learned Counsel for the respondents further submits that the record of the proceedings, hearing of the charge and summary of evidence clearly show that the petitioner was given due opportunity as prescribed by law. The petitioner was handed over the charge-sheet on 30.9.1998. The copy of letter No. 1205/Est./PC/98 dated 30.9.1998, handing over the copy of summary of evidence and charge-sheet, and the receipt thereof by the petitioner have been filed by the respondents as Annexure R-2 with the counter affidavit. The trial of the petitioner was held on 8.10.1998 after a gap of one week, giving the petitioner sufficient time, i.e., 96 hours, as the mandatory period. 19. Learned Counsel for the respondents further submits that the petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in open Court in the presence of persons attending the trial, of which one person was of the rank of Lt. Col. and the other was of the rank of Subedar. The petitioner was duly represented by "Friend of the accused" a senior officer of the rank of Lt. Col. It is submitted that during the proceedings on a plea of guilty the petitioner had categorically stated in answer to the question: "I have nothing to say about the charge but about the mitigation of punishment, I have to say that a mistake has been done by me. I am a poor man and I have no place to stay. My parents are old and there is nobody to look after my family. I request for a lenient view." 20. At the stage of trial, the petitioner unequivocally pleaded guilty to the charge and the Army Rule 115(2) was duly complied with. The respondent along with counter affidavit has also filed a copy of the receipt dated 9.10.1998 to show that the petitioner was provided a complete set of Summary of Court Martial proceedings, as per Rules. 21. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied on Ex. Havaldar Mahipal Singh v. UOI & Ors., 55 (1994) DLT 176 as well as S.K. Sharma M. Havaldar AEC v. UOI & Ors., 2002 Vol. 2 AD Delhi 56, in support of his contention that if a Summary Court Martial is conducted by a CO of an outside Unit to which the petitioner did not belong, the proceeding would stand vitiated. 2 AD Delhi 56, in support of his contention that if a Summary Court Martial is conducted by a CO of an outside Unit to which the petitioner did not belong, the proceeding would stand vitiated. There is no quarrel to this proposition, however, these judgments are not applicable to the facts of the present case, in view of the Annexure 1, which has been filed by the respondent dated 2.4.1998, which shows that the petitioner was strucked off from the post of the despatching Unit as the duration of the course was 26 weeks. 22. In the case of Devi Dayal v. Union of India and Anr., WP (C) No. 1274/2005, this Court has considered the scope of judicial review. It would be useful to reproduce relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment: 6. The canons of natural justice and fair trial, albeit not codified, are firmly and indelibly imprinted on the rubric of judicial process throughout the legal systems of the world. Every Court of law Civil, Military or Constitutional, in its pursuit of justice, is vested with the onerous task of observing and preserving these lofty ideals. This school of thought becomes particularly relevant in the context of Military Courts in India which enjoy exclusivity in jurisdiction and finality in decision. Nevertheless, when a Military Court, in exercise of its judicial powers, betrays the precepts of natural justice and fair trial, it becomes incumbent upon Constitutional Courts to step in and set matters right. However, to what extent are Constitutional Courts permitted to review the decisions of Military Courts is the veritable question that calls for consideration before this Court. 7. Judicial review is perhaps the most delved upon area of Constitution Law. A catena of landmark judicial decisions have contributed in developing the jurisprudence underlying the scope and extent of the power of judicial review vested in High Courts with regard to the decisions of Military Courts. At this stage, it would be relevant to revisit some of these decisions. 8. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of NCT of Delhi and Anr. v. Sanjeev reported at (2005) 5 SCC 181 has held as under- The scope of judicial review of administrative orders is rather limited. The consideration is limited to the legality of decision making process and not legality of the order per se. 8. The Honble Supreme Court in the case of State of NCT of Delhi and Anr. v. Sanjeev reported at (2005) 5 SCC 181 has held as under- The scope of judicial review of administrative orders is rather limited. The consideration is limited to the legality of decision making process and not legality of the order per se. Mere possibility of another view cannot be ground for interference. One of the points that falls for determination is the scope for judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to be referable to broad area of governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive, quasi legislative and quasi-judicial nature. It is trite law that exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary (see State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co.). At one time, the traditional view in England was that the executive was not answerable where its action was attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor De Smith in his classical work Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn. at P.P. 285-87 states the legal position in his own terse language that the relevant principles formulated by the Courts may be broadly summarised as follows: The authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; must not act under the diktats of another body or disable itself from exercising discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant• considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant• considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. 9. In the case Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India and Ors., (1987) 4 SCC 611, the Honble Supreme Court has outlined the application of the doctrine of judicial review with regard to Military Courts as: "25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the" decision making process". The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdictio11 and discretion of the Court Martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court Martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. (Emphasis supplied) 8. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, Lord Diplock has formulated three grounds whereunder administrative action may be subject to judicial review-Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call illegality, the second irrationality and the third procedural impropriety. The first ground I would call illegality, the second irrationality and the third procedural impropriety. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of proportionality which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow membel"6 of the European Economic Community......" 23. Further in the case of Ex. Nb/Sub Veer Singh v. Union of India & Ors., WP(C) No. 5967/2003 this Court has considered the scope of intervention by the High Court. The relevant paras of the said judgment are reporduced below: 10. The scope of intervention by the High Court has been a subject matter of various decisions of the Supreme Court. In the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Himmat Singh Chahar, JT1999(3) SC 631, the Supreme Court has laid down certain guidelines, which are as under: "4. In view of the rival submissions at the Bar the shot question that arises for consideraion is what would be the extent of the jurisdiction in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution over the findings of the Authority in Court Martial proceeding? The Defence personnel serving in Army, Navy or Air Force when commit any offence are dealt with by the special provisions contained in the Army Act or the Navy Act or the Air Force Act and not by the normal Procedure Code. The said Navy Act is a complete code by itself and prescribes the procedure to be followed in case it is decided that an officer should be tried by Court Martial. The Act also provides sufficient safeguard by way of further appeal to the Chief of the Staff and then ultimately to the Union Government. 5. Since the entire procedure is provided in the Act itself and the Act also provides for a further consideration by the Union Government then ordinarily there should be a finality / to the findings arrived at by the Competent Authority in the Court Martial Proceeding. 5. Since the entire procedure is provided in the Act itself and the Act also provides for a further consideration by the Union Government then ordinarily there should be a finality / to the findings arrived at by the Competent Authority in the Court Martial Proceeding. It is of course true that notwithstanding the finality attached to the orders of the Competent Authority in the Court Martial Proceeding the High Court is entitled to exercise its power of judicial review by invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 but that would be for a limited purpose of finding out whether there has been infraction of any mandatory provisions of the Act prescribing the procedure which has caused gross miscarriage of justice or for finding out that whether there has been violation of the principles of natural justice which vitiates the entire proceeding or that the authority exercising the jurisdiction under the Act. The said power of judicial review cannot be a power of an Appellate Authority permitting the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and in coming to a conclusion that the evidence is insufficient for the conclusion arrived at by the Competent Authorities in Court Martial Proceedings." 11. In the case of Union of India & Ors. v. IC-14827,Major A. Hussain, AIR 1998 SC 577 , the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the powers of the Court with respect to conducting of a Court Martial. It has been held that what the Court must see is whether the Court Martial has been properly convened and the proceedings are in accordance with the procedure prescribed. The Court cannot minutely examine the records of the General Court Martial, as if it was sitting in appeal. Relevant portion of the same reads as under: "22. Though Court Martial proceedings are subject to judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court Martial is not subject to the superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. If a Court Martial has been properly convened and there is no change to its composition and the proceedings are in accordance with the procedure prescribed, the High Court or for that matter any Court must stay its hands. If a Court Martial has been properly convened and there is no change to its composition and the proceedings are in accordance with the procedure prescribed, the High Court or for that matter any Court must stay its hands. Proceedings of a Court Martial are not to be compared with the proceedings in a Criminal Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure where adjournments have become a matter of routine though that is also against the provisions of law. It has been rightly said that Court Martial remains to a singnificant degree, a specialised part of overall mechanism by which the military discipline is preserved. It is for the special need for the Armed Forces that a person subject to Army Act is tried by Court Martial for an act which is an offence under the Act. Court Martial discharges judicial function and to a great extent is a Court where provisions of Evidence Act are applicable. A Court Martial has also the same responsibility as any Court to protect the rights of the accused charged before it and to follow the procedural safeguards. If one looks at the provisions of law relating to Court Martial in the Army Act, the Army Rules, Defence Service Regulations and other Administrative Instructions of the Army, it is manifestly clear that the procedure prescribed is perhaps equally fair if not more than a criminal trial provides to the accused. When there is sufficient evidence to sustain conviction, it is unnecessary to examine if pre-trial investigation was adequate or not. Requirement of proper and adequate investigation is not jurisdictional and any violation thereof does not invalidate the Court Martial unless it is shown that accused has been prejudiced or a mandatory provision has been violated." 24. On perusal of the aforesaid judicial decisions, we can safely conclude that the extent of the jurisdiction of High Courts in exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution with regard to the decisions of Military Courts hinges on broadly three grounds. Firstly, whether there has been infraction of any mandatory provision of a military Act thereby causing gross miscarriage of justice. Secondly, whether there has been any violation of the priciples of natural justice which vitiates the entire proceedings of the Military Court. Thirdly, whether the Military Court exercising jurisdiction has not been vested with jurisdiction under• the concerned Act. 25. Firstly, whether there has been infraction of any mandatory provision of a military Act thereby causing gross miscarriage of justice. Secondly, whether there has been any violation of the priciples of natural justice which vitiates the entire proceedings of the Military Court. Thirdly, whether the Military Court exercising jurisdiction has not been vested with jurisdiction under• the concerned Act. 25. The copies of summary of evidence filed by the petitioner clearly shows five witnesses, namely, Smt. Khamba Maya Tamang wife of Rfm/ Lesjar Najadir Tamang; Keshar Bhadur Tamang; Major Faruk Siraj; CN Lady Medical Officer Dr. Mrs. Sujata Chaudhry, and Lt. Col. Mrs. Indu Bala Sukumar were examined on 8.9.1998. The petitioner has cross-examined each of the five witnesses. 26. In terms of communication dated 30.9.1998, the petitioner was informed that he would be tried by the Summary Court Martial on 8.10.1998. The petitioner was further informed that as per Army Rule 129, he was entitled to have a person to assist him during the trial. The petitioner was asked to give the name of a person whom he wishes to have as a "Friend of the accused". By means of another letter, the petitioner was called upon to give the names of the defence witnesses. It is clearly evident that the respondents have complied with the provisions of natural justice and this is no ground for judicial review. 27. Keeping the aforesaid proposition in mind as well as on perusal of the record and more particularly copies of summary of evidence filed by the petitioner as Annexure P-1 to the writ petition, which show that the petitioner had pleaded guilty, this Court has no hesitation to hold that there is no merit in the petition and the same is accordingly dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.