Judgment :- Balakrishnan Nair, J. The petitioners are the respondents in O.A.No.854/2005 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench. The said O.A. was filed by the applicants, who are the respondents herein, challenging Annexure-A6 amendment, which is produced as Ext.P1 in this writ petition. By the said amendment, Clause 5(e) of the KVS (Recognition of Service Associations) Regulations, 1995 was amended by adding an explanation to it. After the amendment, the said clause reads as follows: “Employees who are in service shall be members or office bearers of the Service Associations. (Explanation: An employee under suspension shall not be eligible to be member or office bearer of the Service Association during the period of suspension).” The applicants felt aggrieved by the explanation added, which prohibits a suspended employee from being a member or office bearer of a Service Association. According to them, the said clause infringes their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India. The C.A.T upheld the challenge and allowed the O.A., by Ext.P5 order dated 20.3.2007. The respondents before the C.A.T have filed this writ petition, challenging the said order, mainly on the ground that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with the challenge to the aforementioned clause. 2. We heard the learned counsel on both sides. The right to form Unions or Associations is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(c) of the Constitution of India. A suspended employee continues to be a citizen of India and therefore, the fundamental right to form a Union or Association cannot be denied to him. Further, the services of the union are required by an employee when he is facing disciplinary proceedings and pursuant to the said proceedings he is suspended from service. So, it is irrational also to deny membership to such persons. The prohibition of a suspended employee against his continuance as office bearer of the Association is also arbitrary and unjust. The appointing authority, by virtue of the amended provision, can remove the office bearer of an association from office by suspending him from service. Normally, the activists of Trade Unions are confronted with several disciplinary proceedings. If the above clause is allowed to stand, the same will result in annihilation of their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(c). 3. Further, a suspended employee continues to be an employee of the organization. Normally, the activists of Trade Unions are confronted with several disciplinary proceedings. If the above clause is allowed to stand, the same will result in annihilation of their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(c). 3. Further, a suspended employee continues to be an employee of the organization. Denial of membership to him in the Association will amount to plain discrimination, which is prohibited by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. Therefore, we are of the view that the impugned explanation quoted above is ultra vires of the powers of the rule making authority. The framers of the parent statutory provision cannot be held to have intended to confer power to frame such arbitrary rules. Further, as held above, the said explanation violates the fundamental rights of the employees under Articles 14 and 19(1)(c). If that be so, even assuming the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to render Ext.P5, we need not interfere with the said order, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Mohd. Swalleh v. IIIrd Addl. Dist. Judge, Meerut [(1988) 1 SCC 40]. In the said decision, the Apex Court held as follows: “7. It was contended before the High Court that no appeal lay from the decision of the Prescribed Authority to the District Judge. The High Court accepted this contention. The High Court finally held that though the appeal laid (sic no appeal lay) before the District Judge, the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and was rightly set aside by the District Judge. On that ground the High Court declined to interfere with the order of the learned District Judge. It is true that there has been some technical breach because if there is no appeal maintainable before the learned District Judge, in the appeal before the learned District Judge, the same could not be set aside. But the High Court was exercising its jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. The High Court had come to the conclusion that the order of the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case justice has been done though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. The High Court itself could have set it aside. Therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case justice has been done though, as mentioned hereinbefore, technically the appellant had a point that the order of the District Judge was illegal and improper. If we reiterate the order of the High Court as it is setting aside the order of the Prescribed Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution then no exception can be taken. As mentioned hereinbefore, justice has been done and as the improper order of the Prescribed Authority has been set aside, no objection can be taken.” In view of the above decision, even assuming the order of the Tribunal is without jurisdiction, this Court need not interfere with the same as justice has been rendered by issuing Ext.P5 order, accordingly, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed.