Judgment : 1. The above Civil Revision Petition have been filed against the order of the learned District Munsif, Lalgudi dated 17.1.2005 made in E.P.No.96 of 1995 in O.S.No.616 of 1949 and in E.P.No.97 of 1995 in O.S.No.12 of 1950. 2. One L.A. Kandasamy Iyer filed the Suit in O.S. No.616 of 1949 on the tile of the District Munsif, Lalgudi for declaration of his title over the suit property and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants in the said suit from interfering with his right to possession and enjoyment of the suit property. The said L.A. Kandasamy Iyer filed another Suit before the District Munsif, Lalgudi in O.S. No.12 of 1950 for recovery of possession of the suit property after removal of the superstructure put up therein. Both the Suits were dismissed on 15.10.1951. Aggrieved over the same, the said L.A. Kandasamy filed two Appeals in A.S. Nos.49 and 50 of 1952 on the file of the Sul-ordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli. The learned Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli allowed both the Appeals and hence, the respondents in those Appeals preferred Second Appeals before this Court in S.A. Nos.2053 and 2054 of 1952. Both the Second Appeals were dismissed on 15.1.1956 thereby confirming the judgments and decrees passed in A.S. Nos.4 9 and 50 of 1952. 3. Subsequently, the sole plaintiff, namely, L.A. Kandasamy Iyer died and his legal heirs filed Execution Petitions in E.P.Nos.96 and 97 of 1995 to execute the decrees passed in O.S.No.616 of 1949 and O.S. No.12 of 1950. In the said Execution Petitions, the revision petitioners were impleaded as respondents 12 and 13 in E.P.No. 96 of 1995 and as respondents 20 and 21 in E.P.No.97 of 1995. They filed a detailed counter in the said execution petitions. 4. The main contention that has been raised by the revision petitioners in their counter is that after passing of the Tamil Nadu Inam Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (26 of 1963) (hereinafter referred to as "the Act), the entire ilium estates shall vest with the Government as per Section 34(3)(c) of the said Act. It is averred in the said counter that the said Act has been notified on 1.1.1964 and therefore, the decree made in both the Suits have become inexecutable after 1.1.1964 and therefore, the Execution Petitions have to be dismissed in limine. It is averred in the said counter that the said Act has been notified on 1.1.1964 and therefore, the decree made in both the Suits have become inexecutable after 1.1.1964 and therefore, the Execution Petitions have to be dismissed in limine. It has been further contended that as per Section 3-D of the said Act, the Government has classified the property, now sought to be delivered under the Execution Petitions, as a pathway taking into account the use and absolute necessity for the worshippers of the Hazarath Haj Rustum Ovli Darga Mosque and the house situated south of the suit property. The further case of the petitioners is that the alienation made by the legal heirs of the decree-holder in favour of the 8th petitioner on 11.2.1985 is void and unenforceable and therefore, he cannot claim any right in the suit property and therefore, the Execution Petitions are liable to be dismissed in limine. The learned District Munsif, Lalgudi, after considering the facts and circumstances of the entire case put forth by both the petitioners and the respondents in the Execution Petitions, allowed E.P.Nos.96 and 97 of 1995 by his order dated 17.1.2005 and the petitioners, who are the 12th and 13th respondents in E.P.No.96 of 1995 and the 20th and 21st respondents in E.P.No.97 of 1995, have filed C.R.P. (NPD) Nos.475 and 476 of 2005 respectively challenging the said order. 5. Mr. T.R.Mani, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, has raised the following points: (a) Though the decree has been passed declaring the title of the plaintiff-L.A. Kandasamy Iyer, subsequently it got extinguished after the passing of the Tamil Nadu Inam Estate (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963(26 of 1963). As per Section 3 of the said Act, the entire inam estate shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances and all rights and interests created in or over the roam estate before the notified date by the principal or any other land holder shall, as against the Government, cease and determine. Thus, after passing of the above said Act, the suit property being the inam property vested with the Government. Therefore, the decree passed in favour of the said decree-holder cannot be executed. (b) The respondents 1 to 5 herein. who are the legal heirs of the deceased-plaintiff, have sold the suit property to the 6th respondent herein. Thus, after passing of the above said Act, the suit property being the inam property vested with the Government. Therefore, the decree passed in favour of the said decree-holder cannot be executed. (b) The respondents 1 to 5 herein. who are the legal heirs of the deceased-plaintiff, have sold the suit property to the 6th respondent herein. The 6th respondent herein cannot claim any right on the basis of the property purchased by him on 11.2.1985, since even the right of the original plaintiff-L.A. Kandasamy Iyer and later by his legal heirs, namely, the respondents 1 to 5 herein has got extinguished after passing of the Act 26 of 1963. Thus, the sale by a person who is not having any right over the property is null and void. (c) No relief has been sought for against the petitioners herein, who have been arrayed as respondents 12 and 13 in E.P.No.96 of 1995 and respondents 20 and 21 in E.P.No. 97 of 1995. Since they are in possession and enjoyment of the property without claiming any relief against them, the execution petition is not at all maintainable. (d) Even assuming that the original plaintiff had no right in the property and later by the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff, they ought to have obtained ryotwari patta as per the provisions of the said Act. But, ryotwari pasta has not been obtained by them. Hence, the respondents 1 to 5 herein have lost their rights in view of the above referred Act. (e) After passing of the said Act, the properties vested with the Government and the Government has reclassified all Inam lands and classified the suit property as a pathway. 6. Mr. S.V. Jayaraman, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents, has put forth the following reply: (a) The original plaintiff, namely, L.A. Kandasamy Iyer, got a decree for declaration and recovery of possession on 2.9.1952 which is a right existed on the date of enactment of the Act 26 of 1963 and therefore, the said right cannot be taken away by virtue of the enactment of the said Act. (b) As far as the contention of the revision petitioners stating that the 6th respondent herein has not made as a party in the Execution Petitions is absolutely incorrect. (b) As far as the contention of the revision petitioners stating that the 6th respondent herein has not made as a party in the Execution Petitions is absolutely incorrect. The 6th respondent has been impleaded as the 8th petitioner in the above referred execution petitions by virtue of the orders passed in E.A.No.402 of 1992 on 12.8.1993. The name of the 6th respondent is found place in the fair and decretal order in both the Execution Petitions as 8th petitioner. Furthermore, this objection was not raised either in the counter to the Execution Petitions or in the memorandum of grounds in these Revisions. (c) The contention of non-impleading the successor in interest in the Execution Petitions is liable to be rejected for the simple reason that the said contentions have not been raised either in the counter or in the memorandum of grounds in these Revisions. Further, the Dharga is represented by the office hearers and the Suit has been filed against the Dharga and therefore, the successors in office need not necessarily be impleaded and the Dharga has to hand over the property through its office bearers. 7. I have heard Mr. T.R. Mani, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. S.V. Jayaraman, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents. 8. Mr. T.R. Mani the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners, vehemently contended that after the enactment of the Act 26 of 1963, the original plaintiff himself has lost his title and hence, the legal heirs of the original plaintiff cannot have any right over the suit property. In view of the same reason, the sale by them in favour of the 6th respondent herein on 11.2.1985 is not valid and it is only a void sale. It is an admitted case that the original plaintiff, namely, L.A. Kandasamy Iyer has filed the Suit in O.S.No.616 of 1949 on the file of the District Munsif, Lalgudi for declaration of title in respect of the property marked as `ABCD in the plaint plan and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants therein from interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the suit property. He has also filed another Suit in O.S. No.12 of 1950 on the file of the District Munsif, Lalgudi for recovery of possession of the suit property marked as `ABCD in the plaint and for removable of the superstructure put up thereon. He has also filed another Suit in O.S. No.12 of 1950 on the file of the District Munsif, Lalgudi for recovery of possession of the suit property marked as `ABCD in the plaint and for removable of the superstructure put up thereon. Both the Suits were dismissed on 15.10.1951. Aggrieved by the same, the said L.A. Kandasamy Iyer has filed Appeals in A.S. Nos.49 and 50 of 1952 on the file of the Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli. Those Appeals were allowed on 2.9.1952 setting aside the judgments and decrees made in O.S.Nos.616 of 1949 and 12 of 1950. Aggrieved over the same, the defendants have filed Second Appeals in S.A.Nos.2053 and 2054 of 1952. Both the Second Appeals were dismissed on 25.6.1956 confirming the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli in A.S.Nos.49 and 50 of 1952. The Tamil Nadu Inam (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963(26 of 1963) was notified on 1.1.1964. As stated above, the said Act was notified on 1.1.1964 and before that, the competent Civil Court has upheld the right of the original plaintiff. The right existed on the date of enactment of the said Act and therefore, the said right cannot be taken away by virtue of the subsequent enactment. 9. In this connection, it is useful to refer to the Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in Srinivasan v. Sri Madhayarjuneswaraswami, Pattaviathalai, 1998 (1) CTC 630 , wherein it has been held as follows: "We have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel appearing on either side in the light of the catena of cases noticed supra the principles laid down therein. A comparison of the provisions contained in the abolition Act, the lnam Abolition Act as also the Minor Inams Act would go to show that the ultimate object of one or the other of these legislations is the introduction of ryotwari settlement in the areas covered and notified under the respective enactments, after abolishing existing land tenure and acquiring the rights of the landholders or inamdars concerned, who, under the system of land tenure which was in vogue in these areas, were considered to be intermediaries in between the actual tiller of the soil and the State and that the other provisions pertaining to the constitution of authorities, their powers, jurisdiction and the finality given to the orders passed, or incorporation of a provision in the nature of res judicata providing for the binding nature of the orders on the parties to the same and persons any suit or proceeding in a Civil Court insofar as such matters are in issue between the parties or persons in such Suit or proceeding, are almost identical and similar, except certain differences which, in our view, may not be that much relevant for the issue before us. Even while dealing with this aspect of the matter, the Supreme Court iii the decision reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ranlalinga Swamigal Madam, AIR 1986 SC 794 , observed that the powers of the statutory authority contituted under the Act are exercosed in a summary manner Madam, AIR 1986 1%b St N4, 1986 Sc 794, observation that the powers of the summary authority constituted under the Act ate exercised in a summary manner and the claims of occupants comes to be determined only incidentally and they cannot be equated with the Civil Courts in respect of what they could do or the nature of relief that they could grant. A careful analysis of derlying these Abolition laws would go to show that the vesting on abolition under everyone of these legsislations are subject to the preexisting rights of the occupants, except in respect of what are known as public or communal properties, meant for common use and the grant of patta has been always considered and held to be in recognition of their pre-existing rights. The provisions relating to abolition and vesting of the properties do not have the effect of obliterating or destroying such pre-existing rights, if any, except in respect of public or communal properties and the rights which inhere are the basis and fundamental rights which entitle a person to preferentially get patta under these legislations and be equated to the grant of patta by way of assignment under the Revenue Standing Orders or under rules of assignment outside the scope of the statutory enactments. Similarly, a meticulous analysis of the scheme underlying the provisions of the Act dealing with the nature of rights dealt with by the various authorities, the manner in which such authorities adjudicate such rights and the consequences of such adjudication, disclose that they do not mean and even intended to be a substitute or alternate mode of resolution of the ordinary civil right of a citizen or for that matter persons asserting competing claim, in their attempt to project a claim for patta. Consequently, in our view, the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court reported in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, AIR 1986 SC 794 ; R. Manicka Naicker v. E. Elurrralai Naicker, 1995 (4) SCC 156 and Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad 1998 (2) SCC 642 and that of a Division Bench of this Court in Ramanujam Kavirayar, T.K. v. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandora Sannathi Avargal, 1988 (2) LW 513 and of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Samsuddin Rowther and Another v. Awammal and 2 Others, 1992 (1) LW 207 , would squarely apply and govern the case and consequently, it has to be necessarily held that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts cannot be held to have been completely ousted or barred at any rate in respect of adjudication of claims of title and questions or issues which are not obliged or required to he adjudicated for the purposes of enforcement of these laws which has, as their objection and aim, to implement ryotwari settlement in the areas governed by them." 10. In R. Manicka Naicker v. E. Elumalai Naicker, 1995 (4) SCC 156 , Their Lordships of the Honourable Supreme Court have held as follows: "It is also not possible to accept the contention of the appellant that jurisdiction of the civil Court to determine title to the said land has been ousted by the said Act. Section 43 provides that the decision of a Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal in any proceeding under the said Act shall be binding on the parties insofar as such matter is in issue between the parties in a suit or proceeding. The decision of a Tribunal. or the Special Appellate Tribunal is in respect of the grant of ryotwari pattas. It is only in respect of matters which are covered by the said Act that the decision of the Tribunal or the Special Appellate Tribunal is binding on the parties. Obviously, matters which are not the subject-matter of decision before such a Tribunal, cannot be considered as final or binding between the parties. Sub-section (2) of Section 43 expressly provides that the decision of the Civil Court (not being the Court of a District Munsiff or a Court of Small Causes) on any matter falling within its jurisdiction shall be binding on the parties thereto in any proceedings before a Tribunal under the said Act. Therefore, there is no question of ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of matters falling within its jurisdiction and which are outside the purview of the said Act. Section 46 also provides for finality only in respect of decisions of the Tribunal in respect of matters which are required to be determined by it for the purposes of the said Act. The jurisdiction of the civil Court, therefore, to determine title to the lands in question or to determine whether the lessor has a right to evict the lessee from the lands in question is not ousted in any manner by the said Act." 11. Thus, the Honourable Supreme Court and this Court has categorically held that the enactment of the Act 26 of 1963 will not in any way affect the pre-existing right held by a person in the property. Thus, the Honourable Supreme Court and this Court has categorically held that the enactment of the Act 26 of 1963 will not in any way affect the pre-existing right held by a person in the property. Admittedly, in this case, the Suits filed by the plaintiff were dismissed on 15.10.1951 and the Appeal preferred by him in A.S.Nos.49 and 50 of 1952 were allowed by the Subordinate Court, Tiruchirappalli on 2.9.1952 thereby decreeing the Suits which have been confirmed by this Court in S.A. Nos.2053 and 2054 of 1952 on 25.6.1956. The Act was notified on 1.1.1964. Thus, the said Act will not in any way affect the pre-existing right held by the original plaintiff. 12. Furthermore, the 6th respondent has been granted patta whereas the petitioners have not been granted patta and therefore, the ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil, Court does not arise at all. Whether the Civil Court has, jurisdiction or not is not the subject matter of these Revisions and the point for consideration is whether the enactment of Act 26 of 1963 will take away the right of a person in the property. It has to be noted further that long after enactment of the Act, the revision petitioners have filed the Suit in O.S.No.288 of 1970 for declaration that the suit property belonged to the Dharga, the 7th defendant in the said Suit. On 20.2.1974, the said Suit has been dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli. The Appeal preferred in A.S. No. 122 of 1975 was also dismissed by this Court. Neither in the said Suit nor in the above referred Appeal, the revision petitioners have raised any objection for executing the decrees. Hence, now they are restrained from raising objection for executing the decree. Further, their claim that the suit property is a pathway has been negatived in the Suit that has been laid by the Dharga and also the Appeal as referred to above was dismissed. The same cannot be canvassed in the present Execution Petitions. 13. The judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners will not support the case of the petitioners. The same cannot be canvassed in the present Execution Petitions. 13. The judgments cited by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners will not support the case of the petitioners. As stated already, the judgment reported in R. Manicka Naicker v. E. Elumalai Naicker, 1995 (4) SCC 156 and the judgment reported in Srinivasan v. Sri Madhayarajuneswaraswami, Pattaviathalai, 1998 (1) CTC 630 , will be squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 14. As regards the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that no relief has been claimed against the respondents 12 and 13 in E.P.No. 96 of 1995 and respondents 20 and 21 in E.P.No. 97 of 1995 is concerned, they are parties in the Execution Petitions as could be seen from the fair and final orders in E.P.Nos.96 and 97 of 1995. Furthermore, it has to be seen that if they are not party in the Execution Petitions and if no relief has been claimed against them, how they could have filed counter in the said Execution Petitions. Further, the said plea has not been taken by them either in the counter to the Execution Petitions or in the memorandum of grounds in these revisions. Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the said contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has to be rejected. 15. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the 6th respondent herein has not been impleaded in the Execution Petitions cannot be accepted. The 6th respondent herein has been added as 8th petitioner in both the Execution Petitions pursuant to the purchase of the suit property by him. It could also be seen in the fair and final orders that even this plea has not been taken by the petitioners either in the counter to the Execution Petitions or in the memorandum of grounds in these Revisions. 16. The next contention of the revision petitioners that the successors in interest over the suit property has not been impleaded and hence the Execution Petitions are not maintainable also has to he rejected. The Dharga has been represented by the office bearers and the Suits have been filed against the Dharga and therefore the successors in office need not be impleaded. The Dharga has been represented by the office bearers and the Suits have been filed against the Dharga and therefore the successors in office need not be impleaded. Further, even this point has not been urged in the counter to the Execution Petitions or in the memorandum of grounds in these Revisions. Though the original decree-holder has obtained the decrees in pursuant to his success in A.S. Nos.49 and 50 of 1952 as early as 2.9.1952 and the same having been confirmed in S.A. Nos.2053 and 2054 of 1952 on 25.6.1956, the original decree-holder or their legal heirs or the subsequent purchaser are unable to execute the decrees in view of various proceedings initiated at the instance of the petitioners. Thus, the respondents are not able to execute the decrees for several years. The contentions raised by the petitioners have been dealt with by the learned District Munsif, Lalgudi and rejected their contentions and has ordered the Execution Petitions. The said orders of the learned District Munsif, Lalgudi are perfectly in order. I do not find any error of jurisdiction or illegality in the said orders. 17. Hence, the orders of the learned District Munsif, Lalgudi dated 17.1.2005 made in E.P.No.96 of 1995 in O.S.No.616 of 1949 and E.P.No.97 of 1995 in O.S.No.12 of 1950 are hereby confirmed and the Civil Revision Petitions stand dismissed. Consequently, the connected C.M.Ps. are closed. However, there is no order as to costs.