A. K. SIKRI, J. ( 1 ) SHRI P. K. Banerjee, Income-Tax Officer (ITO), has filed a complaint under sections 277/278 of the Income-Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act') as well as under Sections 193/196 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, 'ipc') against as many as nine persons. Accused No. 1 is M/s. Radhey Sham Om prakash, which is a partnership firm (hereinafter referred to as 'the firm'), and accused Nos. 2 to 8 are the partners of accused No. 1. Accused No. 9 Shri r. K. Gupta is an Advocate who represented the firm. The gravamen of the charge is the false averment made by the accused persons to the effect that they had filed the income-tax return in respect of the assessment year 1981-82 on 6. 7. 1981, whereas no such return was allegedly filed and the return was filed only on 24. 3. 1983 in relation to the firm for the assessment year 1981-82. The factum of this alleged false statement surfaced in the following circumstances, as per the averments made in the complaint. ( 2 ) ON 24. 3. 1983, duly signed and verified income-tax return in respect of the firm was filed by the accused No. 5 Smt. Subhadhra Rajgaria showing taxable income at Rs. 2,14,900/ -. This return was filed without any indication as to whether it was a revised return or original return, though the accused was required to indicate this on the first Page of the return. Against the relevant column for this purpose a line was drawn, which indicates 'nil'. Assessment proceedings were conducted on the basis of this return on 24. 3. 1983 and taxable income was assessed at Rs. 2,33,086/ -. The firm was also directed to pay interest under Section 139 (8) and Section 217 of the Act. The interest under section 139 (8) of the Act was for filing of return belatedly. Against this order the firm preferred an appeal before the Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) and took the ground that the firm had already filed its return of income on 6. 7. 1981 vide receipt No. 6934. It is this return which was later revised on 24. 9. 1983 and, therefore, the return filed on 24. 9. 1983 was only a 'revised return' and was not a 'fresh return' filed for the first time for the assessment year 1981-82. 7. 1981 vide receipt No. 6934. It is this return which was later revised on 24. 9. 1983 and, therefore, the return filed on 24. 9. 1983 was only a 'revised return' and was not a 'fresh return' filed for the first time for the assessment year 1981-82. On this basis it was submitted that since the original return was filed on 6. 7. 1981, it was delayed only by six days and no interest was chargeable under Section 217 or under Section 139 (8) of the Act. On this plea of the firm, the CIT (Appeals) directed the ITO to hear the firm before charging interest under the aforesaid provisions and remanded the case back to the ITO vide his orders dated 4. 5. 1985. The ITO, in these circumstances, served notice upon the firm and asked the firm to produce a photocopy of the receipt regarding the filing of the original return on 6. 7. 1981. Inspite of several opportunities given to the firm and other accused persons, they failed to produce any evidence for filing the return on 6. 7. 1981. The ITO also examined the register of Range III-B for 6. 7. 1981, the date on which the purported return was filed vide receipt No. 6934. However, he found that no such receipt number was issued on that date for the return. It is on the basis of these facts that the ITO maintains that a false claim for omission from the payment of interest was preferred by alleging that the return was originally filed on 6. 7. 1981, whereas it could not be proved that any such return was filed. ( 3 ) THE complaint was entertained by the learned MM and taking cognizance, the summons were issued to the accused persons vide order dated 9. 4. 1984. On receiving these summons, accused No. 9 Mr. R. K. Gupta, before recording of the pre-charge evidence, filed an application for his discharge. Thereafter, the petitioner herein, namely accused No. 3, also filed an application for his discharge on 22. 5. 1987. It is not known as to why these applications kept pending for almost 15 years. In the meantime, pre-charge evidence commenced and statement of PW-1 Mr. P. K. Banerjee (ITO) was recorded on 24. 4. 1989, 8. 1. 1990 and 5. 8. 1991. 5. 1987. It is not known as to why these applications kept pending for almost 15 years. In the meantime, pre-charge evidence commenced and statement of PW-1 Mr. P. K. Banerjee (ITO) was recorded on 24. 4. 1989, 8. 1. 1990 and 5. 8. 1991. What happened between the period 1991 and 2001 is not known as no proceedings in that behalf are either filed or even stated in the petition. However, application for discharge preferred by the petitioner was considered and dismissed by the learned ACMM on 17. 3. 2001. Application of accused No. 9 was also dismissed on 17. 3. 2001. Accused No. 9 then preferred revision petition against dismissal of his application for discharge. This revision petition was allowed by the learned ASJ vide order dated 4. 3. 2002 discharging the accused no. 9 from the case. Thereafter, vide order dated 2. 6. 2003 charges were framed against other accused persons. However, it needs to be mentioned that the accused No. 8 was dropped in the year 1996 due to his demise. ( 4 ) INSOFAR as the petitioner herein is concerned, he filed Criminal Revision on 30. 8. 2003 against the order dated 17. 3. 2001 whereby his application for discharge was dismissed. This revision petition was dismissed by the learned asj vide impugned judgment dated 19. 5. 2006. Challenging this order, the instant petition was filed under Section 482 Cr. P. C. in September 2006. The case of the petitioner is that even if all the facts stated in the complaint are presumed to be correct and true, yet, no offence can be said to be made out under Section 277 of the Act. ( 5 ) IN the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that it is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and interfere with the matter at this stage. As mentioned above, the summoning order in this case was passed, after taking cognizance of the matter, way back in the year 1986. No doubt, the petitioner moved an application for his discharge in May 1987 and for some reason this application remained pending for more than 14 years. However, this application was dismissed by the learned ACMM on 17. 3. 2001. After the dismissal of this application, the petitioner did not challenge the said order at all. No doubt, the petitioner moved an application for his discharge in May 1987 and for some reason this application remained pending for more than 14 years. However, this application was dismissed by the learned ACMM on 17. 3. 2001. After the dismissal of this application, the petitioner did not challenge the said order at all. Thereafter, charge was framed on 2. 6. 2003. The petitioner challenged the order of framing of the charge by filing revision petition. Thus, when the application of the petitioner for discharge was dismissed, he did not challenge that order, thereby accepting the said order. Perusal of the application for discharge filed by the petitioner would indicate that the petitioner had argued that there was no averment that the petitioner was responsible for and control of the affairs of the accused partnership firm and, therefore, he could not be made accused in the said proceedings. This plea was turned down by the learned ACMM in his order dated 17. 3. 2001 observing that there were sufficient averments in the complaint which could be tested only at the time of trial. As mentioned above, the petitioner did not challenge this order. After the charge was framed, the order framing the charge was challenged again on the same grounds as would be apparent from the impugned order dated 19. 5. 2006 passed by the learned ASJ rejecting this plea in the following terms:- "7. Perusal of judicial pronouncements relied upon by Ld. Counsel for petitioners goes to show that none of these come to rescue of the petitioners. It had been specifically held in the judicial pronouncements relied upon by Ld. Counsel that the complaints filed in those cases nowhere mentioned that the concerned accused was incharge of and responsible to the firm for conduct of business of the firm. Facts of the present case are quite different. As already stated, para No. 2 of the complaint in this case specifically mentions that accused No. 2-8 (which includes the present petitioners) are responsible to and liable for the conduct of business of accused No. 1 being its partners. In view of specific allegations made in the complaint regarding the present petitioners, in humble opinion of this court, the pronouncements relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioners are not attracted to facts of the present case. 8. During course of arguments Ld. In view of specific allegations made in the complaint regarding the present petitioners, in humble opinion of this court, the pronouncements relied upon by ld. Counsel for petitioners are not attracted to facts of the present case. 8. During course of arguments Ld. Counsel for petitioners had placed specific reliance on Parameet Singh Sawney Vs. Dinesh Verma (1988 I-Tax Reports Page 5) and had submitted that mere reproduction of the expression used in section 278 B Income Tax Act in the complaint does not meet the requirement of law. A perusal of said judgment goes to show that said observation had been made by his Lordship Justice Malik Sharief-Ud-Din in peculiar facts and circumstances of the said case wherein a minor child aged about six years of age was mentioned to be incharge of and responsible for affairs or conduct of business of the firm. It was held in the said case that prosecution ought to be quashed for two reasons. Firstly because prior to section 278 B of the Income tax Act coming into force i. e. prior to 1. 10. 75 only the firm could have been proceeded against and not the partners. The second reason mentioned was that there was non application of mind because even a six year old boy was, according to the complaint, incharge of and responsible for conduct of the firm's business. Facts of present case are clearly different. Present case relates to income Tax return of the year 1981-82 and there does not appear to be any non application of mind on behalf of the complainant as none of the petitioners or the other partners are claimed to be minor in this case. 9. It would be pertinent to mention that as per partnership deed of accused No. 1 wherein the present petitioners have been shown as partners, it has specifically been stated that each partner shall be just and faithful to the other partners in all transactions relating to the partnership and shall at all time be responsible to give to the other a just and faithful account of the partnership affairs. It is also mentioned in the partnership deed that the partners shall work honestly and diligently to the best interest of the partnership firm and shall keep appraise each other with day to day business development. It is also mentioned in the partnership deed that the partners shall work honestly and diligently to the best interest of the partnership firm and shall keep appraise each other with day to day business development. There is not a single word in the partnership deed to the effect that any particular partner shall be responsible for day to day affairs of the business of the firm or that some of the partners shall be sleeping partners. Copy of partnership deed which had been filed by Ld. Counsel for respondent alongwith application U/s 294 Cr. P. C. has been looked into by this Court as Ld. Counsel for petitioners had stated during course of arguments that he was not objecting to the same but without prejudice to his rights. ? thus, merely because charge was framed the petitioner wanted to take another chance by challenging the order of framing of the charge by seeking his discharge on the same ground on which he had earlier failed before the learned acmm in the year 2001 without making further challenge of that order. Significantly, impugned order is not challenged on the said ground. On the contrary, the ground taken is that the averment contained in the complaint do not constitute offence under Section 277 of the Act and, therefore, summoning order was not proper and the petitioner be discharged. It is too late in the day to challenge the summoning order (and the proceedings on this ground), which was passed in the year 1986. Twenty years after the passing of the summoning order, the petitioner now intends to contend that case under Section 277 of the act is not made out. That was not even the case set up by him in the earlier proceedings. The complaint was instituted in the year 1986. Even after 20 years, the case is still at the stage of post-charge evidence. Charge was framed in the year 2003. In a case like this, it would be appropriate that the trial concludes as early as possible and the case is ultimately decided on merits. It would be open for the petitioner to raise this plea as defence, which can be suitably considered by the learned trial court at the appropriate stage. The present petition is nothing but misuse and abuse of the process of law and a delaying tactic. It would be open for the petitioner to raise this plea as defence, which can be suitably considered by the learned trial court at the appropriate stage. The present petition is nothing but misuse and abuse of the process of law and a delaying tactic. ( 6 ) I may note that what is sought to be contended is that under Section 277 of the Act, false statement in any verification under the Act is punishable if on the basis of such a false statement, tax is evaded. Whereas in the present case, as per the allegations, the accused persons tried to evade levy of interest and interest is different from tax. What is, however, to be noted is that the complaint is not only under Section 277 but also under Section 278 of the Act as well as under Sections 193 and 196 of the IPC. Therefore, even if ultimately the petitioner succeeds in his argument that as no tax is evaded and provisions of Section 277 of the Act are not attracted, that would not be the end of the matter and complaint would still survive qua other provisions. ( 7 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, this petition is dismissed with cost quantified at rs. 5,000/ -.