JUDGMENT These writ petitions have been filed by the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation as well as employees of the said Corporation. The issue involved in these writ petitions is as under. Whether the employees of the Corporation are entitled to time scale of pay from the date they completed 180 days continuously including weekly offs and other holidays in accordance with Clause.49 of 1956 Settlement and whether the said Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement is superseded by Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement? 2. The full bench of this Court in the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Nagpur Vs. Premlal S/o. Khatri Gajbhiye, reported in 2003(3) Mh.L.J. 1025 answered inter alia the said question. In paragraph 15 of the said judgment, the full bench held as under; “15.....However, while deciding this issue, one cannot overlook the basic difference between the concept which was sought to be introduced by Clause 49 of 1956 settlement and the one which was introduced by way of Clause 19 of 1985 settlement. The former related to grant to time scale of pay and all the benefits available to the time scale workers to those who had completed 180 days continuously including weekly offs and other holidays, while the latter referred to the issue of absorption of daily rated workman on completion of 180 days of continuous service. Needless to say that these are totally two different concepts relating to the mode of employment. In the absence of a specific clause in the 1985 settlement disclosing a clear understanding on the part of the parties to settlement to replace Clause 49 of 1956 settlement by Clause 19 of 1985 settlement, there could be no justification to agree and accept the contention in• that regard sought to be advanced on behalf of the appellants.......Being so, the contention of the appellant that Clause 19 of 1985 settlement replaced the Clause 49 of 1956 settlement was rightly rejected by the learned Single Judges and we have no hesitation in agreeing with the said view taken by the learned Single judges in the matter.” 3. In paragraph 16 of the said judgment the full bench then held as under; “16. In paragraph 16 of the said judgment the full bench then held as under; “16. As regards the Resolution No.8856 of the Corporation and the one preceded by it that of Joint Committee in relation to cancellation of Clause 49 of 1956 settlement, it is to be noted that the Division Bench in Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan's case, as already observed above, had held that the settlement of 1968 disclose that the parties had agreed for division of Charter of demands into two parts, namely, monetary demands and non-monetary demands and while the monetary demands were discussed and referred in the settlement, the non-monetary demands were left for discussion and settlement by the Joint Committee. The said view has been clearly reiterated by learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment and has further explained that the preamble and the Clause 9 of the settlement clearly reveals that as there were altogether 64 demands, it was seen that it would take a longer time and as such there ought to be a package deal covering the four major demands which are relating to financial matters and remaining demands were referred to the Joint Committee which had jurisdiction to decide the issue pertaining to non-financial matters and that the issue pertaining to the demand relating to the time scale of pay being a demand pertaining to financial matters, it was not permissible for the Joint Committee to decide about the same. In fact the detail discussion on this aspect by the learned Single Judge coupled with the one by the Division Bench in Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan's case, does not warrant any further adjudication on the said issue. Suffice to say that we are in respectful agreement with the Division Bench as well as the learned Single Judge in that regard. In fact the detail discussion on this aspect by the learned Single Judge coupled with the one by the Division Bench in Mohammad Fasahatullah Khan's case, does not warrant any further adjudication on the said issue. Suffice to say that we are in respectful agreement with the Division Bench as well as the learned Single Judge in that regard. Indeed proper reading of Clause 9 and the preamble of the said settlement clearly reveals that out of 64 demands, four demands pertaining to the revision of pay scale, linking of Dearness Allowance with the costs of living index, increase in existing allowance and grant of new allowance and arbitration in dispute relating to bonus calculations were excluded from being left out for the decision by the Joint Committee and this apparently disclose that the Joint Committee was not authorized to deal with any financial matters as such and certainly not in relation to changes in the service condition which were stipulated under Clause 49 of 1956 settlement.” In paragraph 17 of the judgment, the full bench held as under; “17.....Every expression in the settlement has to be read in the context in which it has been used and not otherwise. Being so, the contention on behalf of the appellant that Clause 9 empowered the Joint Committee to deal with the issue in relation to the service conditions agreed upon under Clause 49 of 1956 settlement is to be rejected and in the regard no fault can be found in the finding arrived at by the learned Single Judge.” 4. The Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation took up the matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in several Special Leave Petitions. The Hon'ble Apex Court on 27-2-2007 finally decided the Appeal Civil No. 1046/2007 with several Special Leave Petitions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while examining the full bench judgment of this Court, in the said judgment has observed as under; “According to the impugned judgment Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement and Clause 19 of 1985. Settlement operated in different fields and consequently Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement did not supersede Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement. Broadly, we agree with the decision of the High Court. In our view, there is a difference between the status of an employee on one hand and the benefits accruing to the workman on the other hand. Settlement operated in different fields and consequently Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement did not supersede Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement. Broadly, we agree with the decision of the High Court. In our view, there is a difference between the status of an employee on one hand and the benefits accruing to the workman on the other hand. As stated above, in 1956 the Union presented to the Corporation various demands. One of the demands was abolition of the daily wage system. Under Clause 49 of 1956 the Corporation agreed to give to the workman all the benefits available to a time scale worker. On the other hand, under Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement, subject to a worker fulfilling the eligibility criteria, the Corporation agreed to absorb daily rated workmen who completed 180 days of service. Therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the above two Clauses operated in different fields and, therefore, there was no question of Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement superseding Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement. Under Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement, the Corporation agreed to provide benefits to employees working for 180 days continuously to be given all benefits available to time scale workers. The grievance of the workmen in the present case is that till today the Corporation has not given to them the benefits available to time scale workers. In the present case, they are not seeking absorption. In the present case, they are seeking wages payable to time scale workers. The topic of absorption is covered by Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement. It states that in all past cases all daily wagers who are eligible for absorption will be given absorption subject to their selection by the competent Select Committee and subject to existence of clear vacancies. This aspect was not there in Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement. Therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the two clause operated in different fields. We agree with this conclusion of the High court in the impugned judgment.” The Hon'ble Supreme Court in subsequent paragraph then observed as under; “However, as stated above, we are required also to consider the effect of Resolution no.8856 dated 31-8-78 passed by the Corporation under which Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement stood cancelled. It is true that the Union had agreed to the cancellation of Clause 49. It is true that the Union had agreed to the cancellation of Clause 49. However, the Union had also placed their demand for substitution of Clause 49 and the Corporation agreed to that substitution vide Resolution No.8856 passed by the Corporation under which persons in employment casually or on daily-wages as on the date of the Resolution as also those who were to be employed thereafter, were entitled to be appointed temporarily in ephemeral vacancies in the time scale of pay on completion of 180 days aggregate service in a financial year. Under the said Resolution they were entitled to the benefits admissible to regular employees on time scale to pay subject to their satisfying the conditions prescribed for the entitlement. As stated above, in the present case the workmen are not seeking absorption. They are seeking benefits admissible to regular employees on time scale of pay. In the present case, the workmen seek benefits admissible to those employees on time scale of pay. In the present case, the respondent-workman are in service after 31-8-78. In the circumstances notwithstanding cancellation of Clause 49 of 1956 Settlement the workmen herein would be entitled to all benefits admissible to regular employees working in the Corporation on time scale of pay provided they satisfy the eligibility criteria of having worked for aggregate service of 180 days and subject to their satisfying all the conditions prescribed for their entitlement in terms of the above Resolution No.8856 read with Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement.” 5. In view of the pronouncement of law by the full bench of this Court as well as the Hon'ble Apex Court as quoted herein before, it will have to be held that Clause No.49 of 1956 ( Settlement was not superseded by Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement and that both these clauses operated in different fields. Clause No.49 of 1956 Settlement is related to monetary demands i.e. grant of time scale of pay and all the benefits available to the time scale workers. While Clause No.19 of 1985 Settlement is related to issue of absorption of daily wages workmen on completion of 180 days of continuous service. 6. Clause No.49 of 1956 Settlement is related to monetary demands i.e. grant of time scale of pay and all the benefits available to the time scale workers. While Clause No.19 of 1985 Settlement is related to issue of absorption of daily wages workmen on completion of 180 days of continuous service. 6. In this view of the matter, the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation is directed to provide all the benefits admissible to regular employees working in the Corporation on time scale of pay provided they satisfy the eligibility criterion of having worked for aggregate service of 180 days and subject to their satisfying all the conditions prescribed for their entitlement in terms of resolution No.8856 read with Clause 19 of 1985 Settlement. 7. All the above writ petitions are accordingly disposed of Rule accordingly. No order as to costs. Order accordingly.