JUDGMENT J.M. Malik, J.-The sequence and genesis of this case are as follows. The respondent/defendant lodged a report with the police on 3.2.1992 to the effect that he had been receiving threats on his telephone installed at his residence for the last 20 days from 13.1.92 to 2.2.1992. The caller gave his name as Mohan Rai. The caller threatened to murder his son Amit if he did not deliver him Rs. 2,00,000/- in cash on 5.2.1992 at the main gate of St. Stephen Hospital, Tis Hazari, Delhi. He also cautioned him to keep it a where he was beaten by the respondent and his associates. The police arrested him subsequently. The appellant remained in judicial custody for about two months at the initial stage and he again remained in judicial custody, subsequently, after he had jumped the bail. It is alleged that the respondent lodged a false criminal complaint and actively prosecuted it. He further produced false witnesses to support his false criminal complaint. The appellant suffered financial loss in defending the criminal case in the sum of Rs. 60,000/-, remained out of employment, because the respondent had made publicity that the appellant was a bad character, the appellant suffered loss of wages on account of unemployment since February, 1992 to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/-. The plaintiff claimed Rs. 51,000/ - for mental agony which he suffered due to this case. The plaintiff . had sent a legal notice to the respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 51,000/-. 5. The following defences were set up by the respondent/ defendant in his written statement. It is explained that the appellant remained in employment of the respondent upto March, 1989. He was paid the dues and there was no dispute between the parties. The respondent never named the appellant in the FIR. He had, however, mentioned the name of Mr. Mohan , Rai. The respondent also moved an application to the Divisional Engineer requesting him to provide taping facility to the residential telephone of the defendant to trace the caller. The call was taped and Sri Ram, Supervisor recognised the voice of the appellant. The appellant himself confessed of having made the threatening calls and pointed out the places from where he made calls to the respondent. 6. The call was taped and Sri Ram, Supervisor recognised the voice of the appellant. The appellant himself confessed of having made the threatening calls and pointed out the places from where he made calls to the respondent. 6. The Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court found no favour with the prayer made by the appellant and dismissed the suit and first appeal respectively. In this appeal, I framed two substantial questions of law on 12th March, 2007, these run as follows: "1. Whether an indigent person who does not succeed in cases is liable to pay the Court-fees? 2. Whether the evidence was properly appreciated by the lower Court?" 7. Firstly, I will deal with question No.2. Learned Counsel for the appellant drew my attention towards the fact that, although, the respon1 dent did not name the appellant in the FIR, yet, in the dock when he appeared as PW 1, he clearly, specifically and unequivocally stated that the accused present in the Court had telephoned him to bring Rs. 2,00,000/-. He also pointed out that in his entire statement, he referred and addressed the appellant as an accused every now and then. In his cross-examination, he admitted that the accused/appellant was apprehended from Pili Kothi in his presence and in presence of Sri Ram, PW 3, Mr. Anil Kapoor, PW 4 and another whose name he could not call up. PW 1 deposed that the accused/ appellant was apprehended on 7.2.1992 at 10 a.m. and thereafter he was taken to the factory from where he led the police and pointed out the places from where he had extended the threats on telephones. He vehemently argued that it was the respondent and nobody else who had orchestrated the false involvement/ arrest of appellant in the above said false flagitious crime. 8. Second submission made by learned Counsel for the appellant was that Sri Rams flip-flopping demolished the prosecution case root and branch. He did not state that the cassette was played in his presence and he had identified the voice of the appellant. Again, he gave the wrong date. Learned Counsel for the appellant finally argued that the evidence clearly goes to show that the accused was beaten, taken into judicial custody and false witnesses were produced by the respondent. 9. This is a misplaced criticism. No amount of rhetoric can change the reality. Again, he gave the wrong date. Learned Counsel for the appellant finally argued that the evidence clearly goes to show that the accused was beaten, taken into judicial custody and false witnesses were produced by the respondent. 9. This is a misplaced criticism. No amount of rhetoric can change the reality. It must be borne in mind that the accused/appellant given the benefit of doubt. Learned MM at the foot of his judgment mentioned: "As a result of the above discussion, I feel that case of the prosecution is not free from doubt. The accused is not free from doubt. The accused is acquitted." There is no inkling in the judgment that the appellant/plaintiff was maliciously implicated in that case. The appellant was examined as PW 1 before the Trial Court. He clearly admitted that there was no enmity between him and Mr. Ved Prakash Gupta till his employment. He stated that he received the wages on 7.1.1992. He stated that he was in the employment of Mentor Cables till 6.2.1992. It must be borne in mind that it is the plaintiff/appellant who is to prove that the respondent has malicious intention to rope him in such a serious case. 10. Another noticeable point in this case is that had the intention of the respondent been mala fide, he would have immediately furnished the name of the appellant in the FIR. The fact that he gave the name of Mohan Rai establishes bona fides on his part. Respondent appears to be guileless. There is not even an iota of evidence which may go to prove that he had an axe to grind in falsely implicating the appellant in this case. He is deaner than a laundry. 11. Thirdly it must be borne in mind that this is a State case. No fault can be attributed to the respondent. Fault, if any, must be laid at the door of Investigating Officer. It appears that Investigating Officer did not pursue the case property, Although, there was enough evidence against the accused/ appellant, yet, it was not properly put up before the Court. No . attempt was made by the Investigating Officer to get the voice of the culprit compared with the admitted voice of the accused/ appellant from a voice expert. No expert evidence was produced for the reasons best known to the Investigating Officer. No . attempt was made by the Investigating Officer to get the voice of the culprit compared with the admitted voice of the accused/ appellant from a voice expert. No expert evidence was produced for the reasons best known to the Investigating Officer. The investigation of this case was done hit or miss. The Investigating Officer is terribly remiss in discharge of his duties. The a Investigating Officer should have been made a party in this civil case and the compensation should have been claimed from him. 12. It is also surprising to note that cassette in question was produced before the Court. The Court did not ask it to be played before the star witness PW 3. The bizarre conduct of the Court and the concerned A.P.P. , is difficult to fathom. The PW 3 should have been confronted with the alleged taped voice. Can this Court punish the respondent for such like lapses. The Court should have itself compared the taped voice while hearing it in juxtaposition with the voice of the accused/appellant in addition to the experts evidence. 13. In all cases where benefit of doubt is given by the Court, it is difficult to hold that the complaint which is the basis of the prosecution is false and untenable. There are variety of reasons for which the accused is given benefit of doubt. This by itself cannot lead to a conclusion that the complaint was based on extraneous consideration leading to the entitlement of damages. 14. I have been able to locate the following case law. In W.B.S.E.B. v. Dilip Kumar Ray, II (2007) SLT 184=2006 X AD (SC) 683=2006 (12) Scale Page 559, Honble Mr. Justice Arijit Pasayat was pleased to hold: "This principle is thus stated to Light bodys case, 1882,9 Rettie 934. When it comes to the knowledge of anybody that a crime has been committed a duty is laid on that person as a citizen of the country to state to the authorities what he knows respecting the commission of the crime, and if he states, only what he knows and honestly believes he cannot be subjected to an action of damages merely because it turns out that the person as to whom he has given the information is after all not guilty of the crime. In such cases to establish liability the pursuer must show that the informant acted from malice, i.e.~ not in discharge of his public duty but from an illegitimate motive, and must also prove that the statements were made or the information given without any reasonable grounds of belief, or other information given without probable cause." It was further held- Malicious prosecution means that the proceedings which are complained of were initiated from a malicious spirit, i.e., from an indirect and improper motive, and not in furtherance of justice. [10 CWN 253 (FB)]." Again it was observed- "69. The word malice in common acceptation means and implies spite or ill will. One redeeming feature in the matter of attributing bias or malice is now well settled that mere general statements will not be sufficient for the purposes of indication of ill will. There a must be cogent evidence available on record. In the case of Jones Bros (Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens, (1955) 1 QB 275: (1954) 3 All ER 677 (CA), the Court of appeal has reliance on the decision of Lumley v. Gye, (1853) 2E&B216: 22 LJQB463, where Crompton, J. said that it was clear law that a person who wrongfully and maliciously, or, which is the same thing, with notice, interrupts the relation of master and servant by har bouring and keeping the servant after he has quitted his master during his period of service, commits a wrongful act for which he is responsible in law. Malice in law means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse: Bromage v. Prosser, (1825) 1 C&P 673 : 4 B&C 247. Intentionally refers to the doing of the act; it does not mean that the defendant meant be spiteful, though sometimes, as for instance to rebut a plea of privilege in defamation, malice in fact has to be proved [See State of Punjab v. J.K. Khann and Others, (2001) 2 SCC 330 ]." 15. Honble Mr. Justice P.K. Bahri of this Court in K.B. Mathur and Another v. Sheel Kumar Saxena and Another, 46 (1992) DLT 114=1992 APEXSOFT (Delhi) 208, observed: "50, at the time the FIR was lodged there was no ill will existing between the parties and, thus, it cannot be said that the FIR was lodged out of any malice nourished by the defendants against the plaintiffs. The lodging of the FIR also cannot be treated as a reckless hasty act on the part of the defendants under the circumstances. Hence, I hold that the plaintiffs were not prosecuted by the defendants because of any malice and without reasonable and probable cause. Issue is decided against the plaintiffs." 16. In Radhey Mohan Singh v. Kaushala Devi, 105 (2003) DLT 678=AIR 2003 Delhi 413, the complaint filed by respondent on investigation was found to be correct. However because of lapse on part of the prosecution and non-corroboration of story by prosecution, appellant was given benefit of doubt. Claim for damages by appellant for malicious prosecution was rejected. 17. Now I turn to the statement of Sri Ram, who is the star witness of this case. Although, he took refuge in equivocation, yet his statement is very material and significant. The following points emerge from his testimony. He testified that on 6.2.1992, accused came to his residence and he conveyed to him that somebod y was demanding Rs. 2,00,000/ - from Mr. Gupta, owner of the factory. It is surprising to note as to how the accused/ appellant came to know about this fact. How did he come to know that somebody was demanding Rs. 2/00/000/- from Mr. Gupta. He also deposed I that one cassette was taken into possession vide memo Ex. PW 1 B. It was the duty of the Court and A.P.P. to question him about the said cassette. Most importantly, he stated that the accused had made the disclosure statement before the police in his presence. In his cross-examination, appellant made the following statement. Sri Ram was the Supervisor in the Mentor Cables and was working with him. He used to live absolutely near his house. It is surprising to note that this witness could not call up whether Sri Ram was also a witness in the Trial Court against him. He clearly, specifically and unequivocally stated that Sri Ram was his good friend. With this backdrop, I see no reason as to why Sri Ram should not be taken at his words that appellant had blurted out the above said offence in his presence before the police. The appellant has no explanation to make. Even if the confession made before the police is inadmissible, still explanation must come as to why the appellant confessed it before the police. The appellant has no explanation to make. Even if the confession made before the police is inadmissible, still explanation must come as to why the appellant confessed it before the police. If a confession is made even before the police, others including the complainant are bound to take it as true or there should be reasons apparent for the same, which in this case were kept under the wraps. 18. In view of this discussion, it cannot be said that the evidence was not properly appreciated by both the Courts below. Consequently, this substantial question of law is answered in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. 19. Now I turn to the first question. Recovery of amount of Court fees is provided under Order 33 Rule 14. Rule 11 provides the procedure when indigent person fails. Rule 11 clearly, specifically and unequivocally provides that indigent person has to pay the Court-fees if the suit filed by him is dismissed. In Shila Devi v. Mohan Lal, (1963) 65 Pun. LR 618/ a Division Bench of the Punjab High Court has observed as follows: The provisions of Rule 11 of Order 33 are quite clear. Where the plaintiff fails in the suit, the Court shall order the plaintiff to pay the Court-fee which would have been paid by the plaintiff if he had not been permitted to sue as a pauper. Mr. Raj Kumar has pointed out that this rule further provides for certain eventualities/ namely, where the suit is withdrawn or dismissed, and he contends that it is only in those eventualities that the plaintiff can be obliged to pay the Court-fee and not if the suit is dismissed on the merits. This contention is clearly untenable and is not supported by any authority. This contention is clearly untenable and is not supported by any authority. The first part of the rule i.e. where the plaintiff fails in the suit is without any qualifications and apparently applies to dismissal on the merits and the other eventualities which are given in Clauses (a) and (b) of this rule appear to have been added merely as a matter of abundant caution so that it may not be argued that if the suit fails on account of default of the plaintiff such as not paying the postal charges or not appearing when the suit was called for hearing, then the plaintiff shall not be liable to pay the Court-fee which would have been paid by him if he had not been permitted to sue as a pauper. In the circumstances the application is allowed and we order that the plaintiff-appellant shall be liable to pay the Court-fee on the amount of Rs. 10,73,217/- for which she had filed an appeal in this Court." 20. Same view was taken in a latest authority reported in R. V. Dev alias R. Vasudevan Nair v. Chief Secretary, Government of Kerala and Others, AIR 2004 Kerala 11. In this case it was held that indigent person has to pay the entire Court fee if he fails in the suit under Rule 11 of Order 33. There are divergent views as well, as Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Sinha v. State Bank of India, 2000 AIHC 3441, carne to the conclusion that in such eventuality that plaintiff is not liable to pay the Court fees. I regret that these views are not palatable. In view of the discussion above, I answer this question in favour of the respondent and against the appellant. CM Nos. 12211-12112/2005 stand dismissed. 21. The appeal has no force and the same is, therefore, dismissed. 22. Copy of this order be sent to Lower Court forthwith along with the LCR. Appeal dismissed.