JUDGMENT A.K. Sikri, I.-Respondent No.2 Mahesh Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the complainant), who lodged FIR No. 120/2003, married one Sarita on 16.4.2001. Sarita is the daughter of the petitioner No.2 herein. This marriage, however, could not succeed and went to rooks. On 20.3.2003, Sarita lodged a complaint on the basis of which FIR No. 228/2003 was registered against the complainant and his family members under Sections 498-A, 406/34, IPC. After investigation, challan has been filed in the said FIR and the matter is now pending before Ms. Barkha Gupta, Metropolitan Magistrate Rohini Courts, Delhi. 2. However, few days before the lodging of FIR No. 228/2003 by Sarita, the complainant lodged FIR No. 120/2003 under Sections 307/34, IPC against Shri Kalu Ram (father of Sarita) and other relatives alleging that there was an attempt on his life by the accused persons. Challan has been filed in this case also and the matter is pending before Sh. Yogesh Khanna, Addl. Sessions Judge, Rohini Courts, Delhi. In view of the nature of disputes, which are matrimonial disputes, the matter was referred to the Mediation Centre, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. The parties appeared before Shri Vinod Goel, ADJ-cum-Mediator. During the pendency of both the FIRs, the complainant, along with his family members, on the one hand and Sarita, along with her family members, on the other, settled/ compromised their disputes and settlement was recorded on 27.2.2006. Pursuant thereto, a joint petition for dissolution of marriage by mutual consent between the complainant and Sarita was filed and on 16.7.2006 decree of divorce was granted. Sarita, as a result of the said compromise, was paid a sum of Rs. 50,000/- and it was also agreed that balance amount of Rs. 50,000/- would be received at the time of quashing of the proceedings against each other and their family members. Pay order in this respect is deposited with the Delhi Legal Services Authority, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi. 3. In view of the aforesaid settlement, the petitioners, who are the accused persons in FIR No. 120/2003 under Sections 307/34, IPC have filed this petition for quashing of the proceedings in the said FIR. 4. Pay order in this respect is deposited with the Delhi Legal Services Authority, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi. 3. In view of the aforesaid settlement, the petitioners, who are the accused persons in FIR No. 120/2003 under Sections 307/34, IPC have filed this petition for quashing of the proceedings in the said FIR. 4. The petitioners have enclosed with this petition report of the Mediator recording the terms and conditions of the settlement as per which it was specifically agreed that the petitioners shall file petition for quashing of the FIR and the complainant shall fully cooperate in the said petition. Not only this, even in respect of FIR No. 228/2003 lodged by Sarita, there was an agreement that the same would be quashed. The terms contained in the said settlement are as under: “(1) That the first party shall give Rs. one Lac to second party towards dowry articles and maintenance etc. and after this payment no claim shall be remained towards each party. (2) That both the parties shall obtain divorce by filing a joint petition and a payment of Rs. one lac will be paid therein. (3) That on the complaint of the second party a FIR No. 228/03 under Sections 498A/406/34, IPC was registered in P.s. Nangloi, in which a charge-sheet has been filed against the first party and his family members which is pending in the Court of Ms. Barkha Gupta M.M., Rohini, Delhi and first party will file a writ petition in Delhi High Court to quash this case and second party will cooperate to quash the same. (4) That on complaint of first party a FIR No. 120/03 was registered under Sections 307/34, IPC in P.S. Sultanpuri, in which a Challan has been filed against father of second party namely Kalu Ram and her maternal uncles namely Joginder and Davinder and their relative Jaiveer. Same is pending in the Court of Sh. Yogesh Khanna, ASJ, Rohini, Delhi and fixed for 9.3.2006. That to quash this case, father of second party namely Kalu Ram and other person shall file a writ petition in Delhi High Court and second party will fully cooperate to quash the same. (5) That the second party shall withdraw the petition under Section 125, Cr.P.C. after receiving a said payment of Rs. one lac. That to quash this case, father of second party namely Kalu Ram and other person shall file a writ petition in Delhi High Court and second party will fully cooperate to quash the same. (5) That the second party shall withdraw the petition under Section 125, Cr.P.C. after receiving a said payment of Rs. one lac. (6) That no other case is pending between the parties and after fulfilling the conditions, both parties will not file any case or claim against each other. (7) That the above compromise is made without any pressure, without consent and we shall be bound by the same." 5. Learned Counsel for the complainant did not dispute that the aforesaid settlement was arrived at. However, his submission was that since the FIR was under Section 307, IPC, which was not compoundable, the proceedings could not be quashed. In the facts of this case, I am of the opinion that it is l10t open to the complainant now to raise such a plea and even when it is a non-compoundable matter, it would be appropriate to quash the proceedings. 6. One may find various cases of different High Courts as well as the Supreme Court where discretion is exercised by quashing the proceedings even in those cases which are non-compoundable. Some of these cases may be noted at this stage. In Gurcharan Singh v. State & Anr., 74 (1998) DLT 308, which was a case of identical nature as that of the one at hand, i.e. FIR registered under Sections 307/34, IPC, a Single Judge of this Court quashed the proceedings holding that jurisdiction could be exercised under Section 482, Cr.P.C. where there is no abuse of the process of the Court or the ends of justice so require. The Court noted the conflict of opinion, so far as the inherent powers of the High Court in the matter of exercise of its jurisdiction for compounding a non-compoundable offence is concerned, and opined that consistent view was taken by this Court that the Court had the inherent power to compound a non-compoundable offence. In fact, this issue now stands settled by the Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi (supra). In fact, this issue now stands settled by the Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi (supra). The Court, thus, concluded that to secure the ends of justice, proceedings required to be quashed in the said case, which arose in the following circumstances: "(2) The petitioner hired a farm house of one Arjun Sayal, the complainant for two days for holding a wedding reception of his son. It was agreed that the petitioner would pay a consolidated amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- for holding the reception. The amount was inclusive of the food provided at the wedding reception on the 25th and 26th November, 1997. The complainant who is respondent No. 2 in this petition admittedly received Rs. 1,10,000/- in advance. The balance amount of Rs. 1,40,000/- was to be paid after the wedding reception and according to their understanding. When the reception was about to finish, at that point of time around 2.00 a.m. the complainant demanded the balance amount from the petitioner. The petitioner did not like the complainants demanding the amount because at that time he was enjoying the wedding reception with his friends. The petitioner nodded his head and mentioned that the balance will be paid after the reception. The complainant again demanded the amount after an hour at 3.00 a.m., when practically the reception was over and only 4 to 5 persons were left. The petitioner got enraged and started abusing the complainant and said "1 will pay your amount just now and he asked one person who was standing nearby to pay the amount. Incidently (sic), at that time the petitioner was holding a 12 bore gun in his hand. On repeated demands of the remaining outstanding amount, the petitioner got infuriated and to frighten the complainant, the petitioner fired a shot in the air and again he gave the impression as if he was loading the second catridge to hit the complainant. The complainant felt that probably the petitioner was loading the same with a view to fire at the complainant. The complainant ran from the scene. However, the petitioner did not fire the second catridge. The complainant mentioned in the report to the S.H.O. later on that he became nervous and frightened and consequently he could not assess the correct position and as a matter of fact due to some misunderstanding. The complainant ran from the scene. However, the petitioner did not fire the second catridge. The complainant mentioned in the report to the S.H.O. later on that he became nervous and frightened and consequently he could not assess the correct position and as a matter of fact due to some misunderstanding. The complainant reported the matter to the police so that no harm could be caused to him thereafter. However, on the complaint of the complainant, a case was registered and investigation was carried out. During the pendency of the investigation, in view of the settlement before the parties the complainant Arjun Sayal moved an application before the S.H.O., Vas ant Kunj, New Delhi with the prayer that matter need not be investigated further and may be closed. The petitioner was granted anticipatory bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner has now moved this Court for quashing the FIR and other proceedings pending against him in view of the settlement and compromise between the parties." 7. In Daulat Zia v. Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors., 1998 (4) Crimes 516 , which was also a case of FIR under Section 307, IPC and parties had settled the matter, a Division Bench of this Court allowed compounding of the offence after the settlement and quashed the proceedings when it fond that the parties were Afghan nationals, who had amicably settled their differences and wanted to live in peace without any ill-will or bad blood. 8. Entire gamut of case law has been revisited by a Single Judge of this Court (Honble Mr. Justice Badal Durrez Ahmed) in the case entitled G. Udayan Dravid and Ors. v. State and Ors., (Crl. M.C. Nos. 227/2005 and 1926-29/2006, decided on 30.11.2006) and the law is summarized as under: "17. In this view of the matter, it is for the Court to examine each case as to whether the power should be exercised or not. There may be various reasons why the High Court may think it proper to exercise that power or to refuse the same. No strait-jacket formula can be laid down for it. In this view of the matter, it is for the Court to examine each case as to whether the power should be exercised or not. There may be various reasons why the High Court may think it proper to exercise that power or to refuse the same. No strait-jacket formula can be laid down for it. However, if the High Court is of the view that the continuance of criminal proceedings would be an exercise in futility and would be mere wastage of public money and public time and time of the Court, then it would be appropriate for the High Court to entertain a petition under Section 482 of the Code and quash the proceedings. The learned Counsel for the State referred to the Supreme Court decision in Union Carbide (supra), and Awadh Kishore Gupta (supra), to submit that offences which are not compoundable ought not to be quashed under Section 482 of the Code. But, do these decisions say so ? In Union Carbide (supra), as would be apparent from contention D set out in paragraph 55 thereof, the orders terminating criminal proceedings were challenged on three grounds that; (i) if the orders were to be construed as permitting compounding of offences, they ran in the teeth of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 320(9) of the Code; (ii) if the orders were construed as permitting a withdrawal of the prosecution under Section 321 of the Code, they would, again, be bad as being violative of settled principles guiding withdrawal of the proceedings; and (iii) if the orders amounted to a quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code, grounds for such quashing did not obtain in the case. With regard to the first ground, there is no manner of doubt that, in view of the prohibition contained in Section 320(9) of the Code, no Court can compound an offence which is not compoundable. But, this is not what the petitioners are seeking. The second ground also does not arise in the present case. With regard to the first ground, there is no manner of doubt that, in view of the prohibition contained in Section 320(9) of the Code, no Court can compound an offence which is not compoundable. But, this is not what the petitioners are seeking. The second ground also does not arise in the present case. And, the third ground taken is not that the proceedings could not have been quashed under Section 482 of the Code but that "the grounds for such quashing did not obtain in the case." So, the Supreme Court decision in Union Carbide (supra), does not hold that offences which are not compoundable ought not to be quashed in exercise of the powers under Section 482 of the Code. 18. An examination of the Supreme Court decision in Awadh Kishore (supra); R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), also does not disclose any finding or conclusion that a criminal proceeding involving a non-compoundable offence cannot be quashed by the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers which have been saved by Section 482 of the Code. In R.P. Kapur (supra), as well as in Bhajan Lal (supra), the Supreme Court set out illustrative cases instances where the inherent power could and should be exercised. These were illustrative cases, instances and not exhaustive. In fact, the wide amplitude of the inherent powers of the High Court have been recognized in all these cases as well as in Awadh Kishore (supra), wherein, with reference to Section 482 of the Code, it was observed: "8. .....The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circum-stances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent, abuse of the process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction." It was also held: "11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction." It was also held: "11. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produce before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. On course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage......." 19. Thus, the powers exercised by the High Court are very wide. It is true that in exercising such powers the High Court has to be cautious and circumspect. There is no gainsaying that the degree of power varies proportionately with the degree of caution and care that is needed for its exercise. It is one thing to suggest that care must be taken in exercise of a power and it is quite another to say that the Court has no power. None of the decisions sought to be relied upon by the learned Counsel for the State lay down the proposition that a criminal proceeding involving a non-compoundable offence cannot, under any circumstance, be quashed by the High Court in exercise of the powers saved by Section 482 of the Code." 9. Reverting to the case at hand, it is clear from the settlement that the parties had agreed to bury all their differences. The complainant was also facing criminal proceedings under Sections 498A/406/34, IPC and also under Section 125, Cr.P.C. He has been the beneficiary of the settlement inasmuch as the proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.C. are withdrawn by Sarita and proceedings under Sections 498A/ 406/34, IPC are also quashed in view of the cooperation of Sarita. The complainant was also facing criminal proceedings under Sections 498A/406/34, IPC and also under Section 125, Cr.P.C. He has been the beneficiary of the settlement inasmuch as the proceedings under Section 125, Cr.P.C. are withdrawn by Sarita and proceedings under Sections 498A/ 406/34, IPC are also quashed in view of the cooperation of Sarita. This being a complete package, the complainant cannot turn around and oppose the petition after he agreed for quashing of these proceedings at the time of mediation proceedings. There is another aspect which needs to be emphasized. The settlement was arrived at during mediation proceedings. The Legislature has amended Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the year 2002. There is an all round attempt by the Legislature and Judiciary, as well as the Executive, to promote the settlement of disputes through the process of Mediation. Therefore, once disputes between the parties have been settled by the process of mediation, it would be in the public interest as well to attach importance to such a process and treat the settlement as a solemn settlement. Otherwise, the movement of mediation may itself suffer if the parties are given to understand that even after they agree for settlement, one of the parties can still back out. 10. For all the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the proceedings arising out of FIR No. 120/2003, which are under Sections 307/34, IPC, need to be quashed and are hereby quashed. The accompanying applications also stand disposed of. Applications disposed of.