( 1 ) HEARD learned advocate Mrs. Sangita Pahwa for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr. Hardik C. Raval for respondents. ( 2 ) IN the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 8/12. 2. 2002 passed by respondent No. 2 and also further declaration to hold that the petitioner is entitled to work under the respondent authorities considering the date of birth as 2. 10. 1953 and further prayer for interim relief made in Prayer Clause 7 (B ). ( 3 ) BRIEF facts of the present petition are that the petitioner joined the service with respondent No. 1 Corporation as a Clerk in Stores Department. The father of the petitioner realizing the mistake filed an affidavit before the Court declaring that correct date of birth of the petitioner is 2. 10. 1953 . The said affidavit is filed on 11. 11. 1975. Accordingly, request was made to the school authority to correct the birth date of the petitioner recorded in school leaving certificate. The contention raised by learned advocate Mrs. Pahwa that without holding an inquiry and without giving any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, the respondent No. 1 Corporation has altered the date of birth recorded in service book. She also submitted that on the basis of the affidavit of the father of the petitioner, the date of birth is recorded as 2. 10. 1953 in service book but, subsequently, on the basis of school leaving certificate which has been altered, changed and recorded as 2. 10. 1949. Therefore, such alteration by the respondent No. 1 Corporation without any opportunity, is violative of principles of natural justice and accordingly, petitioner is to retire on 31. 10. 2007. Therefore, present petition is filed challenging the order dated 8/12. 2. 2002. ( 4 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. Raval appearing on behalf of respondents placed on record internal submissions, noting, the Circular of the Corporation as well as original application form of the petitioner and first page of the service book which has been taken on record. ( 5 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. Raval has contended that there is delay in challenging the order dated 8/12. 2. 2002 passed by the respondent No. 2. He submitted that the date of birth recorded in service book on 2. 10. ( 5 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. Raval has contended that there is delay in challenging the order dated 8/12. 2. 2002 passed by the respondent No. 2. He submitted that the date of birth recorded in service book on 2. 10. 1953 has been changed by the Corporation on the basis of date of birth recorded in school leaving certificate " 2. 10. 1949 and that has been communicated to the petitioner by the respondent No. 1 Corporation on 8/12. 2. 2002 and accordingly, it was informed to the petitioner that he will have to retire on 31. 10. 2007. He further submitted that this order is not challenged upto 5 years period by the petitioner before any authority in law. Therefore, there is a delay in challenging the action / decision of the respondents by the petitioner. Therefore, present petition is not maintainable or this Court should not entertain the petition because of delay and latches on the part of the petitioner. He relied upon the decision of this Court in case of Gujarat Water Resources Development Corporation Ltd. v. Baldevji Mohanji Solanki reported in 2006 (2) GLH 472 . He also relied upon the recent decision of Apex Court in case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Seshachalam reported in 2007 (11) Scale 239 . ( 6 ) LEARNED advocate Mrs. Pahwa appearing on behalf of petitioner submitted that after receiving the aforesaid order where communication is made to the petitioner that date of birth is changed in service record, thereafter the representation was made by the petitioner having oral assurance from the respondents that petitioner will not be retired on the basis of date of birth 2. 10. 1949 and, therefore, no proceeding is initiated by the petitioner. She placed reliance on the averments made in Para. 27 which is quoted as under : "the petitioner respectfully submits that when the petitioner was communicated the impugned order, the petitioner made oral representation and the petitioner was hopeful that the respondent must have accepted the date of birth of the petitioner as 2. 10. 1953. The petitioner states that the petitioner has come to know that the petitioner will be retired on 31. 10. 2007 considering the date of birth as 2. 10. 1949. " 6. 1 Learned advocate Mrs. 10. 1953. The petitioner states that the petitioner has come to know that the petitioner will be retired on 31. 10. 2007 considering the date of birth as 2. 10. 1949. " 6. 1 Learned advocate Mrs. Pahwa also submitted that as per the affidavit filed by the father, the date of birth of the petitioner is 2. 10. 1953 and accordingly, the school leaving certificate is also corrected by the Primary School at Melaj and that certificate has been issued by the school authority on 14. 8. 2001. Therefore, she submitted that the respondent No. 1 Corporation must have to accept the date of birth of the petitioner as 2. 10. 1953 as mentioned in the affidavit of the father of the petitioner. She also submitted that representation was made on 19/30. 3. 2005, 11. 9. 2006 and thereafter on 6. 12. 2006 to the Corporation and therefore, no proceeding is initiated by the petitioner against the order of 2002. She also submitted that at the time of entering into service, the petitioner has not produced any school leaving certificate before the Corporation but affidavit of the father was produced on record and on that basis, the date of birth was recorded as 2. 10. 1953 . Therefore, she submitted that now to retire the petitioner on the basis of the changed date of birth by the Corporation " 2. 10. 1949 is illegal and contrary to law. ( 7 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. Raval submitted that there is a circular of the corporation that Corporation has to examine the service record of each employee and to see whether the date of birth recorded on the basis of school leaving certificate or not, whether it has been recorded on the basis of authentic documents or not and accordingly, the service book of the petitioner was also examined by the Corporation and it was brought to the notice of the authority that date of birth recorded in service book of the petitioner on the basis of the affidavit of his father as 2. 10. 1953 and no school leaving certificate is attached to service book. Therefore, just to verify the date of birth in light of the circular No. 729 dated 4. 8. 1978 and Circular No. 1738 dated 3. 5. 2001, the documents were called for from the petitioner. 10. 1953 and no school leaving certificate is attached to service book. Therefore, just to verify the date of birth in light of the circular No. 729 dated 4. 8. 1978 and Circular No. 1738 dated 3. 5. 2001, the documents were called for from the petitioner. Thereafter, the petitioner has produced the school leaving certificate before the Corporation where the date of birth was recorded as 2. 10. 1949 and not as 2. 10. 1953. This correspondence dated 8. 11. 2001 and 18. 6. 2001 is on recorded and accordingly, school leaving certificate from B. R. Patel Nutan Fellowship High School, Ashram Road, Navrangpura, Ahmedabad where the date of birth was recorded as 2. 10. 1949 . On that basis of that as well as on the basis of SSC certificate where date of birth was recorded as 2. 10. 1949 , the Corporation has corrected the date of birth and recorded the same in service book and accordingly, communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 8/12. 2. 2002. He further submitted that affidavit of the father of the petitioner cannot be considered to be irrefutable document in support of date of birth but, it requires some unimpeachable evidence to justify the date of birth. So in absence of genuine documents, merely affidavit of the father of the petitioner cannot be relied for recording the date of birth in service book. Therefore, the Corporation has rightly changed the date of birth on the basis of school leaving certificate / SSC certificate. For that, Corporation has not committed any wrong or illegality which requires interference by this Court. He relied upon the decision of Apex Court in case of State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Vali Mohd. Dosabhai Sindhi reported in 2007 (2) GLR 1064 wherein same question was considered by the Apex Court while reversing the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court. ( 8 ) I have considered the submissions made by both the learned advocates and have also perused the documents annexed to the petition. It is true that date of birth initially recorded by the Corporation on the basis of affidavit filed by the father of the petitioner as 2. 10. 1953 but, subsequently, when date of birth is recorded without support of genuine documents, the documents have been called for from the petitioner by the Corporation by letter dated 18. 1. It is true that date of birth initially recorded by the Corporation on the basis of affidavit filed by the father of the petitioner as 2. 10. 1953 but, subsequently, when date of birth is recorded without support of genuine documents, the documents have been called for from the petitioner by the Corporation by letter dated 18. 1. 2002 and thereafter, the petitioner has produced the school leaving certificate in response to the letter dated 20. 10. 2001 and in that school leaving certificate, date of birth is recorded as 2. 10. 1949 . Therefore, the contention of learned advocate Mrs. Pahwa that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner while altering the date of birth which has been recorded in service book, cannot be accepted because the documents called for from the petitioner by the Corporation by letter dated 20. 10. 2001 and in response to that, the petitioner has produced the relevant school leaving certificate where the date of birth was recorded as 2. 10. 1949 which has been accepted by the respondent No. 1 Corporation in light of aforesaid communication between the parties, therefore, the question of giving opportunity of hearing does not arise because such alteration is known to the petitioner which is based on documentary evidence produced by him. Therefore, that contention is also rejected. ( 9 ) IN response to the contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Raval about the delay in filing the present petition, I have considered the submissions of learned advocates for the respective parties and considering the fact that explanation which has been given for delay by the petitioner in Para. 2. 7 as referred above, is not satisfactory and also not sufficient cause to challenge the order in question after a period of 5 years. The delay and latches affects the legal right of the concerned employee if it is not challenged within reasonable time. Under the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, the suit is to filed within a period of 3 years and beyond that, it considered to be unreasonable. No doubt, there is no provision made in Article 226 of the Constitution of India that petition is to be filed within prescribed time limit. But, at least, reasonable time of 3 years can be considered as provided under provisions of Code of Civil Procedure for filing the suit. No doubt, there is no provision made in Article 226 of the Constitution of India that petition is to be filed within prescribed time limit. But, at least, reasonable time of 3 years can be considered as provided under provisions of Code of Civil Procedure for filing the suit. In this case, from the date of order, more than 5 years have passed and there is no challenge in between by the petitioner except the representation and at the verge of retirement, now to file the petition to obtain the interim relief, so that the petitioner can remain continued in service on the basis of a document which cannot be considered to be irrefutable document in support of date of birth. The repeated representation cannot condone the delay and latches and even the principle of legitimate expectation is also a part of principle of natural justice, cannot be invoked in such circumstances. This aspect has been examined by this Court in case of Gujarat Water Resources Development Corporation Ltd. v. Baldevji Mohanji Solanki reported in 2006 (2) GLH 472 . Relevant observations made in Para. 6/1 to 6/7 are quoted as under : "6. 1 In case of Bishnu Charan Mohantry Vs. State of Orrisa, reported in AIR 1973 Orissa 1999, the following general principles relating to delay and laches has been laid down: (i) The Limitation Act has no application to writ petitions. Where, however, a suit for identical relief would be barred by the law of limitation, the court would ordinarily refuse to exercise discretion to grant relief under Article 226. (ii) Even if a suit for the same relief is not barred by limitation under the Limitation Act, yet the High Court may refuse to issue a writ, if otherwise the delay is not explainable by satisfactory reasons. (iii) Two important circumstances to be borne in mind in all such cases are : the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other so far as relates to the remedy. (iv) Where by the conduct of the party, the delay might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of the remedy, the relief under Article 226 would be refused. (iv) Where by the conduct of the party, the delay might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of the remedy, the relief under Article 226 would be refused. (v) Even if the conduct or act is not equivalent to a waiver, if the neglect of the petitioner put to opposite party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy is afterwards granted, the relief under Article 226 should be refused on account of delay and laches. (vi) Utmost expedition is the essence for a claim under article 226; and (vii) no hard and fast rule can be laid down. Each case is to be determined on its own facts and circumstances. 6. 2 The further view has laid down by the Supreme Court in case of P. S. Sadasivaswamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 152 . Relevant observations of the said decision is quoted as under : "it is not that there is any period of limitation for the courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters," (emphasis supplied ). 6. 3 In the case of Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, reported in 2000 III LLJ 3, the Calcutta High has held in Para, 6, 7 and 8 as under : "6. 6. 3 In the case of Eastern Coal Fields Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal, reported in 2000 III LLJ 3, the Calcutta High has held in Para, 6, 7 and 8 as under : "6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties we are of the opinion that it is not a fit case where this Court should interfere with the impugned judgment and order as apart from the fact that the learned trial Judge has refused to exercise its power of judicial review it had also recorded a finding as regards the question of delay in the following terms : "before parting with this case it should be noted that though the learned Tribunal passed the award as far back as March 28, 1984 th writ application was not filed before February 8, 1990 on the plea that delay was due to the fact that Government permission could not be obtained before February 7, 1989. The explanation is not satisfactory. The plea of delay on the ground of office formalities is absolutely untenable especially in case of Industrial Disputes where there was illegal termination of service about 20 years ago. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent union that this long delay on the part of the management of all the workmen not only the wasting of their valuable years of lives but have also caused death to some of them. It is true, that there is no limitation in filing the writ application but that shall not automatically entitle the petitioner to make limitless delay in filing the writ application, especially, in case of the present nature, where such delay brought untold miseries to the workmen. There being unreasonable delay in filing the application on frivolous ground the writ Court would have refused to grant any relief to the petitioner, even if it had been otherwise entitled to it. Th writ petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of delay also" 7. Mr. Ginwala submits that delay cannot be considered to be a ground for refusing to exercise its jurisdiction by the High Court in a case where the writ of prohibition is to be issued. The submission of the learned counsel cannot be accepted for more than one reasons. Mr. Ginwala submits that delay cannot be considered to be a ground for refusing to exercise its jurisdiction by the High Court in a case where the writ of prohibition is to be issued. The submission of the learned counsel cannot be accepted for more than one reasons. The appellant primarily has prayed for issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing of the aforementioned award dated March 28, 1994 passed by the Industrial Tribunal. Prayer for issuance of a writ of prohibition had been sought for and the same could be issued only in the event the primary prayer of the appellant viz. A writ of certiorari would be issued. It is now a well settled principle of law that the delay defeats equity. It is further well settled that a person who sleeps over its right cannot claim any equity in enforcing its right before a writ Court. 8. Writ of certiorari as is well known is a discretionary remedy. A writ Court does not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India merely because it is lawful to do so. While exercising its Jurisdiction under Article 226 a writ Court may take into account several factors, delay being one of them. As noticed by the learned trial Judge the concerned workmen were refused employment as far back as in the year 1975 and reference was made by the Central Government only on August 1, 1978. The learned Tribunal below made its awards on March 28, 1984. The writ application had been filed only on February 8, 1990. The only explanation which the appellant gave before the learned Trial Judge was that it was required to obtain permission of the Central Government for filing a writ application which could not be obtained before February 7, 1989. the said explanation, having been offered without any particulars, did not find favour with the learned trial Judge. He, therefore, refused to exercise its discretion. " 6. 4 In case of M. C. D. Vs. Rajkumar and Othrs, reported in 2004 Lab IC 2334, the Delhi High Court has held in Para 3 and 4 as under : "3. This writ petition challenges the Award dated 10th July,2000. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the award was published on 4th January,2001 and the information relating thereto was received in the office of the petitioner Corporation on 14th February,2001. This writ petition challenges the Award dated 10th July,2000. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the award was published on 4th January,2001 and the information relating thereto was received in the office of the petitioner Corporation on 14th February,2001. However, the writ petition was filed in this Court only on 18th February,2002. There is no other explanation for the delay and laches in filing the writ petition. Mr. Monga has submitted that in matters relating to the movement of files in Government Department, files move at their own pace and such delay in the movement of the official files occur because they are required to go through several channels. Consequently the delay in filing the writ petition is not such which should dis-entitle the petitioner to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. In my view, institutionalized lethargy cannot be any ground to explain the laches of more than one year. Merely because the bureaucratic machinery in MCD moves slowly cannot be a ground for condoning laches. " 6. 5 In case of Bhoop Singh Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1992 SC 1414 , the Apex Court has held in Para. 8 as under : "8. There is another aspect of the matter. Inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse relief to the petitioner, irrespective of the merit of his claim. If a person entitled to a relief chooses to remain silent for long, he thereby gives rise to a reasonable belief in the mind of others that he is not interested in claiming that relief. Others are then justified in acting on that behalf. This is more so in service matters where vacancies are required to be filled promptly. A person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty-two years, without any cogent explanation for the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed. Accepting the petitioner s contention would upset the entire service jurisprudence and we are unable to construe Dharampal in the manner suggested by the petitioner. Art. 14 or the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be founded on equity and not. be alien to that concept. Accepting the petitioner s contention would upset the entire service jurisprudence and we are unable to construe Dharampal in the manner suggested by the petitioner. Art. 14 or the principle of non-discrimination is an equitable principle and, therefore, any relief claimed on that basis must itself be founded on equity and not. be alien to that concept. In our opinion, grant of the relief to the petitioner, in the present case, would be inequitable instead of its refusal being discriminatory as asserted by learned counsel for the petitioner. We are further of the view that these circumstances also justify refusal of the relief claimed under Art. 136 of the Constitution. " 6. 6 In case of State of M. P. and Others Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and Others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 251 , the Apex Court has held in Para. 23 as under : "23. Now, it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of latches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. When the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. We do not think it necessary to burden this judgment with reference to various decisions of this Court where it has been emphasised time and again that where there is inordinate and unexplained delay and third party rights are created in the intervening period, the High Court would decline to interfere, even if the State action complained of is unconstitutional or illegal. We may only mention in the passing two decisions of this Court one in Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCR 1014 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) and the other in Ashok Kumar v. Collector, Raipur, (1980) 1 SCR 491 : ( AIR 1980 SC 112 ). We may point out that in R. D. Shetty s case (supra), even though the State action was held to be unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court refused to grant relief to the petitioner on the ground that the writ petition had been filed by the petitioner more than five months after the acceptance of the tender of the fourth respondent and during that period, the fourth respondent had incurred considerable expenditure, aggregating to about Rs. 1. 25 lakhs, in making arrangements for putting up the restaurant and the snack bar. Of course, this rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a straitjacket formula, for there may be cases where despite delay and creation of third party rights the High Court may still in the exercise of its discretion interfere and grant relief to the petitioner. But such cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay or creation of third party rights would by their very nature be few and far between. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. " 6. 7 In case of Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Ultimately it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court; ex hypothesi every discretion must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. " 6. 7 In case of Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Jai Bhagwan, reported in 2003-I LLJ 1029, the Delhi High Court has held in Para. 4 and 5 as under: "4. My attention has been drawn by Ms. Bajaj to the judgment of the Constitution Bench in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bhailal, AIR 1964 SC 1006 . The Apex Court observed that : "it is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may, however, be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay, the Court ought not to ordinarily lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus. . . . It appears to us, however, that the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be measured. This Court may consider the delay unreasonable, even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable". It will be relevant to bear in mind that the Constitution Bench was concerned with a situation where the petitioner has voiced the grievance that he had been assessed to tax under a void statute. Even in those extraordinary circumstances, the Supreme Court has declined to over look the laches. Ms. Kittoo Bajaj also relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Maharasthra Road State Corporation Vs. Balvant Regular Motor Service, Amravati, AIR 1969 SC 329 . In that case, the Apex Court again articulated that; "it is well established that the writ of certiorari will not be granted in a case where there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. In that case, the Apex Court again articulated that; "it is well established that the writ of certiorari will not be granted in a case where there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. " The Court relied on Lindsey Petroleum Company Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Arbran Farewell and John Kemp (1874) 5 PC 221 and also specifically noticed in its earlier decision in Moon Mills Ltd. Vs. M. R. Neher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay, AIR 1967 SC 1450 : 1967 -II LLJ 34, Ms. Kittoo Bajaj relies on the observations of the Apex Court in Naik Subedar Lachhman Dass Vs. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 1979 , there the Court found that the writ petition has been filed after gross delay for which there was no specific explanation and, therefore, endorsed the High Court s decision for a summary dismissal of the action. It may be observed that the laches have not even been attempted to be answered or explained by the DTC. 5. On the issue of delay and laches, Mr. Vibhu Shankar, learned Consel for the petitioners, has relied heavily on Para. 6 of the judgment in Moon Mills Ltd. Vs. M. R. Meher, President, Industrial Court, Bombay (Supra) which reads as under at p. 38 of 1967-II " LLJ 34. "on behalf of the respondents Mr. B. Sen, however, pointed out that the conduct of the appellant does not entitle it to the grant of a writ, because it has been guilty of acquiescence or delay. It was pointed out that the award of Mr. Bhat was given on April 25, 1958 but an application to the High Court for grant of a writ was made long after on November 16, 1959. We do not think there is any substance in this argument, because the second respondents had made an application, dated August 19, 1958 to the Labour Court for enforcement of the award and the appellant had contested that application by a Written Statement, dated September 15, 1958. The Labour Court allowed the application on August 4, 1959 and the appellant had preferred an appeal to the Industrial Court on August 31, 1959. The Labour Court allowed the application on August 4, 1959 and the appellant had preferred an appeal to the Industrial Court on August 31, 1959. The decision of the Industrial Court was given on October 24, 1959 and after the appeal was dismissed the appellant moved the High Court for grant of a writ on November 16, 1959. Mr. B. Sen then put forward the argument that the appellant itself had acted on the bonus agreement and on October 14, 1957 had issued a notice informing its workers that "pursuant to the award of the Industrial Court in terms of the agreement, dated March l, 1956 reached between the Millowners Association, Bombay, and the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, regarding payment of bonus would be paid to them at 4. 8 per cent of the total basic earning during 1956". On October 27, 1956 the appellant and the Secretary of the second respondents signed a joint statement in which it was stated as follows : since it has not yet been possible to complete bonus calculations for all these years, it is hereby agreed between the Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, Bombay, and the Moon Mills Ltd, Bombay, that under the Bonus Agreement the Moon Mills should pay a bonus at the rate of 4. 8 per cent for each of the years 1953, 1954 and 1955 as a tentative payment. It was, therefore, contended that the appellant itself had agreed with the second respondents to pay bonus for 1953, 1954, 1955 and 1956 according to the terms of the bonus agreement. It was also pointed out that the appellant had not pressed its objection with regard to jurisdiction before the Labour Court or the Industrial Court. But it appears that the decision of this Court in Prakash Cotton Mills case, (1962) 2 SCR 105: ( AIR 1961 SC 977 ), was given on February 16, 1961 after the decision of K. K. Desai, J. on July 1, 1960 and before the decision of the Letters Patent Bench on February 6, 1962. In the circumstances of this case, we do not consider that there is such acquiescence on the part of the appellant as to disentitle it to a grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the issue of a writ of certiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion. In the circumstances of this case, we do not consider that there is such acquiescence on the part of the appellant as to disentitle it to a grant of a writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the issue of a writ of certiorari is largely a matter of sound discretion. It is also true that the writ will not be granted if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. The principle is to a great extent, though not identical with, similar to the exercise of discretion in the Court of Chancery. The principle has been clearly stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewell, and John Kemp, (1874) 5 PC 221 at p. 239, as follows:- "now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as related to the remedy. in the present case, we are of opinion that there is no such negligence or laches or acquiescence on the part of the appellant as may disentitle it to the grant of a writ. in the present case, we are of opinion that there is no such negligence or laches or acquiescence on the part of the appellant as may disentitle it to the grant of a writ. " ( 10 ) SAME aspect is also recently examined by the Apex Court in case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Seshachalam reported in 2007 (11) Scale 239 . Relevant observations made by Apex Court in Para. 11 and 12 which are quoted as under : ( 11 ) SOME of the respondents might have filed representations but filing of representations alone would not save the period of limitation. Delay or latches is a relevant factor for a court of law to determine the question as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves consideration. Delay and/or latches on the part of a Government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant. Opinion of the High Court that GOMs No. 126 dated 29. 5. 1998 gave a fresh lease of life having regard to the legitimate expectation, in our opinion, is based on a wrong premise. Legitimate expectation is a part of the principles of natural justice. No fresh right can be created by invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation. By reason thereof only the existing right is saved subject, of course, to the provisions of the statute. {see State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors. [1992 Supp. (2) SCC 351]}. ( 12 ) WE may notice that in Government of West Bengal v. Tarun K. Roy and Ors. [ (2004) 1 SCC 347 ], this Court held : "the respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief on the ground of gross delay and laches on their part in filing the writ petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar (supra ). The plea of delay, which Mr. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976 wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992. In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ petitions had been decided but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered by this Court in Debdas Kumar (supra ). The plea of delay, which Mr. Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to the other persons similarly situated would operate against the respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate courts of law no order should be passed which would prejudice their cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others therefrom who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law. " See also Chairman, U. P. Jal Nigam and Anr. v. Jaswant Singh and Anr. [ 2006 (12) SCALE 347 ] and New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Ors. [2007 (4) SCALE 204]. Only because a cut off date has been fixed, the same per se cannot be said to be arbitrary as some date is required to be fixed for that purpose. Recently, this Court in K. S. Krishnaswamy etc. v. Union of India and Anr. [ 2006 (12) SCALE 307 ] held :"nakara s case (supra) was a case of revision of pensionary benefits and classification of pensioners into two groups by drawing a cut off line and granting the revised pensionary benefits to employees retiring on or after the cut- off date. The criterion made applicable was "being in service and retiring subsequent to the specified date". This Court held that for being eligible for liberalised pension scheme, application of such a criterion is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it was both arbitrary and discriminatory in nature. It was further held that the employees who retired prior to a specified date, and those who retired thereafter formed one class of pensioners. The attempt to classify them into separate classes/groups for the purpose of pensionary benefits was not founded on any intelligible differentia, which had a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It was further held that the employees who retired prior to a specified date, and those who retired thereafter formed one class of pensioners. The attempt to classify them into separate classes/groups for the purpose of pensionary benefits was not founded on any intelligible differentia, which had a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The facts of Nakara s case (supra) are not available in the facts of the present case. In other words, the facts in Nakara s case are clearly distinguishable. " 12. Therefore, according to my opinion, the explanation which has been given by the petitioner in Para. 2. 7 cannot be considered to be sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the present petition. Merely having the oral assurance from the Corporation, without disclosing the name of concerned officer, cannot be considered to be a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Therefore, the contention raised by learned advocate Mr. Raval that petition cannot be entertained because of delay is accepted. ( 13 ) APART from that, even on merits also, the date of birth if it is not supported by genuine documents being irrefutable evidence which can be considered by the authority while correcting the date of birth recorded in service. The Apex Court has observed in Vali Mohd. Dosabhai Sindhi (Supra) that "applicant has to produce the evidence in support of such claim which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. Whenever any such question arises, the onus is on the applicant to prove about the wrong recording of his date of birth in his service book. " ( 14 ) LOOKING to the facts of this case, the date of birth recorded in service book on the basis of the affidavit filed by the father of the petitioner which is contrary to the school leaving certificate produced by the petitioner himself before the Corporation on being demand made by Corporation. So affidavit of the father cannot be considered to be irrefutable proof in support of date of birth recorded in service. So affidavit of the father cannot be considered to be irrefutable proof in support of date of birth recorded in service. On the basis of the affidavit of father, the petitioner has approached to the school authority and corrected the date of birth in school leaving certificate in the year of 2001 and affidavit of the father is of 1975 without following the procedure under the provisions of Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act,1886 where it requires that first necessary application has to be made before the Registrar by the concerned employee with the proof of date of birth and that has to be examined by the Registrar and thereafter, after satisfying with the genuineness of the documents, the Registrar shall have to pass appropriate orders. The Apex Court has considered that public servant concerned had claimed correction of his date of birth with reference to the births and deaths register maintained under the Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act,1886. In facts of this case, merely affidavit of the father of the petitioner is on record and on that basis, the date of birth is recorded in service book of the petitioner. Therefore, according to my opinion, the petitioner has not followed any procedure before correcting the date of birth in school leaving certificate as prescribed under the provisions of Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act,1886 and, therefore, corrected date of birth in school leaving certificate in the year of 2001 cannot be accepted. The view taken by the Apex Court in case of State of Gujarat v. Vali Mohd. Dosabhai Sindhi reported in 2007 (2) GLR 1064. Relevant observations are in Para. 12 to 15 which are quoted as under : "12. An application for correction of the date of birth should not be dealt with by the Courts, Tribunal or the High Court keeping in view only the public servant concerned. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury, inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some cases for years, within which time many officers who are below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may loose the promotion for ever. Cases are not unknown when a person accepts appointment keeping in view the date of retirement of his immediate senior. This is certainly an important and relevant aspect, which cannot be lost sight of by the Court or the Tribunal while examining the grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case on the basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in nature, is made out by the respondent and that too within a reasonable time as provided in the rules governing the service, the Court or the Tribunal should not issue a direction or make a declaration on the basis of materials which make such claim only plausible. Before any such direction is issued or declaration made, the Court or the Tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order. If no rule or order has been framed or made, prescribing the period within which such application has to be filed, then such application must be within at least a reasonable time. The applicant has to produce the evidence in support of such claim, which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. Whenever any such question arises, the onus is on the applicant, to prove about the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book. The applicant has to produce the evidence in support of such claim, which may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of birth. Whenever any such question arises, the onus is on the applicant, to prove about the wrong recording of his date of birth, in his service book. In many cases it is a part of the strategy on the part of such public servants to approach the Court or the Tribunal on the eve of their retirement, questioning the correctness of the entries in respect of their date of birth in the service books. By this process, it has come to the notice of this Court that in many cases, even if ultimately their applications are dismissed, by virtue of interim orders, they continue for months, after the date of superannuation. The Court or the Tribunal must, therefore, be slow in granting an interim relief or continuation in service, unless prima facie evidence of unimpeachable character is produced because if the public servant succeeds, he can always be compensated, but if he fails, he would have enjoyed undeserved benefit of extended service and thereby caused injustice to his immediate junior. 13. The position was succinctly stated by this Court in the above terms in The Secretary and Commissioner Home Department and Ors. v. R. Kirubakaran (JT 1993 (5) SC 404 ). 14. As observed by this Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. T. V. Venugopalan ( 1994 (6) SCC 302 ) and State of Orissa and Ors. v. Ramanath Patnaik ( 1997 (5) SCC 181 ) when the entry was made in the service record and when the employee was in service he did not make any attempt to have the service record corrected, any amount of evidence produced subsequently is of no consequence. The view expressed in R. Kirubakaran s case (supra) was adopted. ( 15 ) THE above position was also noticed in State of U. P. and Others v. Gulaichi (Smt.) ( 2003 (6) SCC 483 ). " 15. Therefore, considering the observations made by the Apex Court as well as this Court, according to my opinion, the petition filed by the petitioner cannot be entertained on the ground of delay and latches and even on merits. " 15. Therefore, considering the observations made by the Apex Court as well as this Court, according to my opinion, the petition filed by the petitioner cannot be entertained on the ground of delay and latches and even on merits. The affidavit of the father of the petitioner produced before the Corporation cannot be considered to be irrefutable evidence or genuine document and, therefore, same cannot be accepted. The date of birth which is not recorded in as per the Act, as referred above, cannot be accepted by the public body. The respondent No. 1 Corporation has rightly not accepted and has accepted the date of birth which was recorded in school leaving certificate produced by the petitioner before the Corporation. For that, according to my opinion, the Corporation has not committed any error which requires interference by this Court. So on both the grounds, there is no substance in the present petition. Accordingly, present petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged.