Judgment : KARPAGAVINAYAGAM, PERMOD KOHLI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-appellant was an employee under the respondents. He was dismissed from : service after enquiry on the basis of charge of absence from duty and for assaulting his immediate superior Officer. Reference has been made in the year 1991 on the demand notice dated September 14, 1987. The Tribunal considered the question of the dispute being stale and rejected the claim of the petitioner-appellant stating that there is ten years unexplained delay. This verdict was challenged before the learned single Judge in the writ petition. While confirming the verdict of the tribunal the learned single judge held that there is long unexplained delay. This is the subject matter of this LPA. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant heavily relied on a decision of the Supreme Court Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-operative Marketing-cum-Processing service Society Ltd. and Another AIR 1999 SC 1351 : (1999) 6 SCC 82 : 1999-I-LLJ-1260. He submits that mere delay would not suffice to reject the claim for reinstatement. It is vehemently contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant that the act intended not only to make provision for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes but also to preserve Industrial peace so that it may result in more production and improvement of the national economy. It isalso pointed out by referring to Para 10 of the said decision that the provisions of Article 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not applicable to the proceedings under the industrial Disputes Act and the relief cannot be denied merely on the ground of delay. It is also contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant that the plea of delay is required to be proved by showing the real prejudice and not as a mere hypothetical defence. ( 3 ) WE have heard learned counsel appearing for the respondents. He cited the judgment in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K. P. Madhavankutty and others AIR 2000 SC 839 : (2000) 2 SCC 455 : 2000-I-LLJ-561, and haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank v. Neelam 2005-I-LLJ-1153 (SC), and Indian iron and Steel Co. ( 3 ) WE have heard learned counsel appearing for the respondents. He cited the judgment in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K. P. Madhavankutty and others AIR 2000 SC 839 : (2000) 2 SCC 455 : 2000-I-LLJ-561, and haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank v. Neelam 2005-I-LLJ-1153 (SC), and Indian iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Prahlad Singh AIR 2001 SC 69 : (2001) 1 SCC 424 : 2000-II-LLJ-1653 in order to substantiate his plea that the respondents raised the plea of delay in making a stale claim even before the Tribunal as the first issue. He also submitted that Ajaib singhs case (supra) referred to by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellants that it has been held in the facts situation and that would not apply to the present case. He also pointed out that in Ajaib Singhs case (supra), no plea had been raised by the employer with reference to delay but in this case, the point of delay has been specially raised before the tribunal as an important issue, which has been dealt with by the Tribunal which in turn held that the delay is enormous and the same has not been explained. As pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the case of Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways and another (2001) 1 SCC 133 : 2001-I-LLJ-476 it was observed that the decision in Ajaib Singhs case (supra) was rendered on the facts and circumstances, particularly in view of the fact that the plea of delay was not taken by the employer in the proceedings before the tribunal. As indicated above, in the case on hand, the plea of delay has been raised and the same was dealt with by the Tribunal and ultimately the Tribunal, on the basis of the materials placed by the employer as well as the employee before it, came to the conclusion that the claim has been made after ten years, which has not been explained. A similar observation has been made in Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K. P. Madhavankutty and Others 2000-I-LLJ-561 at p. 563: "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject matter of reference under section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an Industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. " ( 4 ) PARA 6 is also relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the case of Nedungadi Bank Ltd. (supra), in which it has been held that Law does not prescribe any time limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its power under Section 10 of the industrial Disputes Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject matter of the reference under section 10 of the Act, as to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each ease. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject matter of the reference under section 10 of the Act, as to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each ease. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. The Supreme Court in the above decision clearly held that after seven long years of the dismissal of the respondents, employee raised a dispute against the dismissal on the ground that two other employees dismissed in similar situation were reinstated. The Supreme Court held that the reference of the said dispute at that stage was to be held as bad both on the grounds of delay as well as non-existence of industrial dispute. Thus it is clear that the Supreme Court is emphatic in saying when the Industrial dispute was raised after seven long years, it must be considered that the dispute was not existing. ( 5 ) THEREFORE, it has to be held that not only delay of ten years has not been properly explained but also it can be safely held that the industrial dispute was raised when the said industrial dispute was not existing. However, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-appellant, by referring to the various documents filed before this Court, submits that delay, which occurred before raising dispute, was not only on his part rather it was on the part of the department, which gave assurance of re-employment through the various letters. He has also produced before this Court the various corresponding letters between the Management and the employees. We are afraid that we cannot go into those letters since these documents have not been produced either before the Tribunal or before the learned single judge. As indicated above, even at the initial stage, the main issue was raised by the management stating that the reference must be rejected on the ground of delay. We are afraid that we cannot go into those letters since these documents have not been produced either before the Tribunal or before the learned single judge. As indicated above, even at the initial stage, the main issue was raised by the management stating that the reference must be rejected on the ground of delay. As indicated above the ratio in the Ajaib Singhs case (supra), would not apply in this case because the plea of delay was not raised but in this case the plea of delay even at the initial stage was raised by the Management and inspite of the fact that sufficient opportunity was given to the employee to adduce the evidence, the employee has given a mere statement, stating that he has sent several letters requesting and he was assured of the reinstatement and that was how delay was caused. As correctly pointed out by the Tribunal, the statement made by the employee has not been substantiated by any material. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner appellant fairly says that even though the documents have been produced before this court to explain the delay, those documents have not been placed during the proceedings in the Tribunal for considering the delay as explained. So in such a situation, we cannot go into the aspects of the delay on the basis of the documents produced before this Court for the first time. Therefore, we find no merit in appeal, which is accordingly, dismissed. --- *** --- .