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2007 DIGILAW 711 (GAU)

State of Tripura v. Bikash Sinha

2007-10-12

R.B.MISRA

body2007
JUDGMENT R.B. Misra, J. 1. Heard Mr. A. Ghosh, learned Addl. PP for the State. None appears for the opposite parties. 2. The present revision petition preferred under Section 397 read with Section 401 of CrPC is directed against the order dated 8.6.05 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala rejecting the application of learned Public Prosecutor (in short called PP) to withdraw from the prosecution in respect of two accused persons out of 27 accused persons chargesheeted in connection with ST 48 (WT/A)/2001. 3. It appears that a memorandum of tripartite settlement amongst the Government of India, Government of Tripura and one section of National Liberation Front of Tripura (in short "NLFT") (Kamini-Montu Koloi group) was signed on 15.4.04 according to which the Government of India and Government of Tripura have been making concerted efforts to bring about an effective settlement of the problems of the tribals and attempts have been made on a continuing basis to usher in peace and harmony in areas in which disturbed conditions had prevailed for long and, whereas, the NLFT (Kamini-Montu Koloi group) have given a clear indication that they would like to give up the path of armed struggle and would like to resume a normal life and they have decided to abandon the path of violence and sought solutions to their problems within the framework of the Constitution of India and therefore they have responded positively to the appeals made by the Government of India and the Government of Tripura to join the mainstream and to help in the cause of building a prosperous Tripura and whereas on a series of discussions between the parties hereto and based on such discussions it has been mutually agreed by and amongst the parties that the NLFT (Kamini-Montu Koloi group) shall deposit its arms and ammunition ending their underground activities and the Government of Tripura has agreed to provide some economic package, financial benefits and other facilities hereinafter consequent upon such Memorandum of Settlement, the NLFT (Kamini-Montu Koloi group) has undertaken to end all underground activities and to bring out all underground groups with their arms, ammunition and equipment within 15 days of the signing of the Memorandum of Settlement. They have further undertaken to ensure that they do not resort to violence and to help in restoration of amity between different sections of the population. They have further undertaken to ensure that they do not resort to violence and to help in restoration of amity between different sections of the population. They would also undertake not to extend any support to any other extremist groups by way of training, supply of arms or providing protection of shelter or in any other manner on ten points. 4. It appears that in view of such tripartite Memorandum of Settlement dated 15.4.04, the militants of this faction led by Montu-Koloi and Kamini Debbarma laid down their arms on 6th May, 2005. There is a specific clause in the agreement which providing that general amnesty would be given to all those who are willing to return to normal life including dismissal of all cases (both police and court) and accordingly assurance has been given that Government of Tripura would take all possible steps to generally withdraw all cases except those of crimes committed against women. 5. For the purpose of withdrawing the cases against Kamini Debbarma, the opposite party No. 2, a petition under Section. 321 CrPC was presented by Sri Pankaj Bhattacharjee, learned Public Prosecutor, West Tripura district, Agartala indicating that the said accused was involved in the indicated offences as provided below: Case No. Name of the accuse Sections S.T. 48 (WT/A)/2001, Salema PS case No. 5 of 1989 Kamini Debbarma alias D. Emang, S/O. Kshirod Debbarma Kainta Kobra, P.S. Ranirbazar. 148/149/307/ 302/120 (B) IPC/27 Arms Act/10/13 of UP (P) Act, 1967 It was also submitted that Mr. Kamini Debbarma, a noted accused/extremist has surrendered eschewing the path of violence and crime with intention to lead normal life in the mainstream of the society and since the Government has accepted the surrender, therefore, in the light of the policy of the State Government to encourage to all other extremists to come out from underground and may lead normal life with assurance that their past misdeeds shall not chase them and disturb their future. Therefore, to stop further violence and crime by the extremists and in order to bring peace and harmony in the society, an application was submitted praying that in furtherance of the object of public justice, to and for the greater good of the society, the consent may be given to withdraw from prosecution in respect of the accused/surrendered extremist e.g. Kamini Debbarma and necessary order may be passed for discharge/acquittal and for revocation of warrant of arrest. 6. The said application was considered and dealt with by the learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala who has observed that the present accused was chargesheeted for the offence of murder of late Bimal Sinha, former Minister, Tripura and after completion of the investigation chargesheet against 27 accused persons was submitted. Out of 27 accused persons, trial in reference to 19 accused persons has been concluded and trial of one accused person is still going on and the trial of 7 accused persons could not be started as they were absconding. Learned Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala while rejecting the application of learned Public Prosecutor vide its impugned order dated 8.6.05 has made the following observations: Since it revealed that some of the accused persons who have been chargesheeted for murdering Bimal Sinha, had been tried by this Court and trial of one accused person is still going on, the case against the present accused persons who had been absconding years together cannot be allowed to be withdrawn as this is a heinous crime in which the accused persons alleged to have murdered a young Cabinet Minister. If the prosecution is allowed to withdraw such type of case against the present accused persons that will send a wrong signal in the society. Moreover, in my opinion, the Government cannot discriminate amongst the accused persons and cannot allow some of the accused persons to face trial and take steps for withdrawal of case against others. 7. In order to examine the correctness and legality of the impugned order it is necessary to refer Section 321 CrPC which deals withdrawal from prosecution. Moreover, in my opinion, the Government cannot discriminate amongst the accused persons and cannot allow some of the accused persons to face trial and take steps for withdrawal of case against others. 7. In order to examine the correctness and legality of the impugned order it is necessary to refer Section 321 CrPC which deals withdrawal from prosecution. For convenience, Section 321 CrPC is quoted as below: Withdrawal from prosecution--The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the Court, at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried; and, upon such withdrawal: (a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences; (b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences: Provided that where such offence-- (i) was against any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, or (ii) was investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (25 of 1946), or (iii) involved the misappropriation or destruction of, or damage to, any property belonging to the Central Government, or (iv) was committed by a person in the service of the Central Government while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty. and the Prosecutor in charge of the case has not been appointed by the Central Government, he shall not, unless he has been permitted by the Central Government to do so, move the Court for its consent to withdraw from the prosecution and the Court shall, before according consent, direct the Prosecutor to produce before it the permission granted by the Central Government to withdraw from the prosecution. 8. During the course of argument, learned Public Prosecutor has very fairly argued different ingredients and facts involved in reference to withdrawal from prosecution of any person. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in 1987 CriLJ 793 (Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar) has elaborately given the guideline for withdrawal from prosecution of any person. 8. During the course of argument, learned Public Prosecutor has very fairly argued different ingredients and facts involved in reference to withdrawal from prosecution of any person. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in 1987 CriLJ 793 (Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar) has elaborately given the guideline for withdrawal from prosecution of any person. It was observed in that case as below: Section 321 needs three requisites to make an order under it valid ; (1) The application should be filed by a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor who is competent to make an application for withdrawal, (2) he must be in charge of the case and (3) the application should get the consent of the court before which the case is pending. All the requisites had been satisfied in this case. In view of the earlier judgment in this case the competence of the public prosecutor who filed the withdrawal in the absence of cancellation of appointment of the previous prosecutor cannot be assailed. There is no appeal provided by the Act against an order giving consent under Section 321. But the order is revisable under Section 397, CrPC. The court in revision considers the materials only to satisfy itself about the correctness, legality and propriety of the findings, sentence or order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence. 9. In AIR 2001SC 116 (Abdul Karim v. State of Karnataka) guidelines have also been given by the Supreme Court as below: The law is that though the Government may have ordered, directed or asked a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from a prosecution, it is for the Public Prosecutor for apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied thereon that the public interest will be served by his withdrawal from the prosecution. In turn, the Court has to be satisfied, after considering all that material, that the Public Prosecutor has applied his mind independently thereto, that the Public Prosecutor acting in good faith, is of the opinion that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest, and that such withdrawal will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause manifest injustice. It must therefore follow that the application under Section 321 must aver that the Public Prosecutor is, in good faith, satisfied, on consideration of all relevant material, that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause injustice. The material that the Public Prosecutor has considered must be set out, briefly but concisely, in the application or in an affidavit annexed to the application or in a given case, placed before the court, with its permission, in a sealed envelop. The court has to give an informed consent. It must be satisfied that this material can reasonably lead to the conclusion that the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor from the prosecution will serve the public interest; but it is not for the court to weigh the material. The court must be satisfied that the public prosecutor has considered the material and, in good faith, reached the conclusion that his withdrawal from the prosecution will serve the public interest. The court must also consider whether the grant of consent may thwart or stifle the course of law or result in manifest injustice. If, upon such consideration, the court accords consent, it must make such order on the application as will indicate to a higher court that it has done all that the law requires it to do before granting consent. 10. In 2005 CriLJ 963 Rahul Agarwal v. Rakesh Jain, the Supreme Court after considering its earlier decisions eg. State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey 1957 CriLJ 567; State of Orissa v. Chandrika Mohapatra 1977 CriLJ 773; Balwant Singh v. State of Bihar 1977 CriLJ 1935; Abdul Karim (supra) has observed as below: Every crime is an offence against the society and if the accused committed an offence, society demands that he should be punished. Punishing the person who perpetrated the crime is an essential requirement for the maintenance of law and order and peace in the society. Therefore, the withdrawal of the prosecution shall be permitted only when valid reasons are made out for the same. The law is very clear that the withdrawal of prosecution can be allowed only in the interest of justice. Therefore, the withdrawal of the prosecution shall be permitted only when valid reasons are made out for the same. The law is very clear that the withdrawal of prosecution can be allowed only in the interest of justice. Even if the Government directs the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution and an application is filed to that effect, the court must consider all relevant circumstances and find out whether the withdrawal of prosecution would advance the cause of justice. If the case is likely to end in an acquittal and the continuance of the case is only causing severe harassment to the accused, the court may permit withdrawal of the prosecution. Also, if the withdrawal of prosecution is likely to bury the dispute and bring about harmony between the parties and it would be in the best interest of justice, the court may allow the withdrawal of prosecution. The discretion under Section 321 is to be carefully exercised by the court having due regard to all the relevant facts and shall not be exercised to stifle the prosecution which is being done at the instance of the aggrieved parties or the State for redressing their grievance. Not many reasons are given in the impugned order as to why the court allowed the withdrawal of the prosecution under Section 321. It is only stated that looking at the facts and circumstances of the case, permission should have been granted for withdrawal as the petitioner therein had been harassed mentally and suffered continuously for seven years during the trial. The fact that the trial was not over and the case was posted for the examination of the accused was not noticed by the High Court. In the application filed by the Public Prosecutor, the only reason given for withdrawal of the prosecution was that the accused was not a habitual criminal and, therefore, the prosecution must be withdrawn. In these circumstances, the order passed by the High Court permitting the withdrawal of the prosecution is not legally sustainable. The reason given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order is not correct, and when the case was about to be over the same should not have been allowed to be withdrawn by holding that the trial had been pending for over seven years. 11. The reason given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order is not correct, and when the case was about to be over the same should not have been allowed to be withdrawn by holding that the trial had been pending for over seven years. 11. In Paragraph 32 S.K. Shukla v. State of U.R, it was observed by the Supreme Court that in respect of withdrawal of case public prosecutor cannot act like a postbox or act on dictates of the State Government but he has to act objectively as befits an officer of the court, Furthermore, the court is not bound by opinion of Public Prosecutor and is free to assess is made out or not and in the facts and circumstances. On facts, prima facie case having been made out against the accused, application of Public Prosecutor and order of State Government for withdrawal of cases could be quashed. 12. In (2006) 10 SCC 473 Ghanashyam v. State of M.P., the Supreme Court has observed as below: 14. The discretion to withdraw from the prosecution is that of the Public Prosecutor and none else, and so. he cannot surrender that discretion to anyone. The Public Prosecutor may withdraw from the prosecution not merely on the ground of paucity of evidence but on other relevant factors as well in order to further the broad ends of justice, public order, peace and tranquility. The High Court while deciding the revision petition clearly observed that the material already available on record was insufficient to warrant conviction. The flow of facts and the possible result thereof as noticed by the Public Prosecutor and appreciated by the courts below, constituted the public interest in the withdrawal of the said prosecution. The High Court clearly came to the conclusion that the application for withdrawal of the prosecution and grant of consent were not based on extraneous considerations. 13. Only learned Public Prosecutor or learned Additional Public Prosecutor is authorized to withdraw from the prosecution with the consent of the court. The consent of the court as a condition for withdrawal is imposed as a check on the exercise of the learned PP's power. 13. Only learned Public Prosecutor or learned Additional Public Prosecutor is authorized to withdraw from the prosecution with the consent of the court. The consent of the court as a condition for withdrawal is imposed as a check on the exercise of the learned PP's power. Two enquiries are significant for determining the justifiability of the withdrawal: (1) whether the considerations are germane, and (2) whether the actual decision was made or only obeyed by the learned PP in view of the decision in 1980 CriLJ 324 Subhash Chander v. The State (Chandigarh Admn) wherein the Supreme Court has observed as below: When a case is pending in a criminal court its procedure and progress are governed by the Criminal Procedure Code or other relevant statute. To intercept and recall an enquiry or trial in a court, save in the manner and to the extent provided for in the law, is itself a violation of the law. Whatever needs to be done must be done in accordance with the law. The function of administering justice, under our constitutional order, belongs to those entrusted with judicial power. One of the few exceptions to the uninterrupted flow of the court's process is Section 321 CrPC. But even here it is the Public Prosecutor and not any executive authority, who is entrusted by the Code with the power to withdraw from a prosecution, and that also with the consent of the Court. The consent of the Court under Section 321 as a condition for withdrawal is imposed as a check on the exercise of that power. Consent will be given only if public justice in the larger sense is promoted rather than subverted by such withdrawal. That is the essence of the nolle prosequi jurisprudence. Invested by the statute with a discretion to withdraw or not to withdraw, it is for him to apply an independent mind and exercise his discretion. In doing so he acts as a limb of the judicative process, not as an extension of the executive. The decision to withdraw must be of the Public Prosecutor, not of other authorities, even of those where displeasure may affect his continuance in office. In doing so he acts as a limb of the judicative process, not as an extension of the executive. The decision to withdraw must be of the Public Prosecutor, not of other authorities, even of those where displeasure may affect his continuance in office. The even course of criminal justice cannot be thwarted by the Executive, however high the accused, however, sure Government feels a case is false, however, unpalatable the continuance of the prosecution to the powers-that-be who wish to scuttle court justice because of hubris, affection or other noble or ignoble consideration. May be, the executive, for plural concerns and diverse reasons, may rightfully desire a criminal case to be scotched. The fact that broader considerations of public peace, larger considerations of public justice and even deeper considerations of promotion of long-lasting security in a locality, of order in a disorderly situation or harmony in a factions milieu, or halting a false and vexatious prosecution in a court, persuades the Executive, pro bono publico sacrifice a pending case for a wider benefit, is not ruled out although the power must be sparingly exercised and the statutory agency to be satisfied is the public prosecutor, not the District Magistrate or Minister. The concurrence of the court is necessary. The subsequent discovery of a hoax behind the prosecution or false basis for the criminal proceeding may well be a relevant ground for withdrawal. For the court should not be misused to continue a case conclusively proved to be counterfeit. 1972 CriLJ 301 and 1976 CriLJ 328 and 1977 CriLJ 1935 relied on. 14. It is not necessary for the court to pass a reasoned order or to assess evidence to discover whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. However, it does not mean that consent of the court is a matter of course in view of Sheo Nandan Paswan (supra). The trial court's supervisory function of either granting or refusing to grant the permission is a judicial function in view of the decision in 1983 CriLJ 348 (Sheo Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar) wherein the Supreme Court has observed as below: Though withdrawal from prosecution is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor for which statutory discretion is bested in him, the discretion is neither absolute nor unreviewable but it is subject to the Court's supervisory function. In fact being an executive function it would be subject to a judicial review on certain limited grounds like any other executive action, the authority with whom the discretion is vested must genuinely address itself to the matter before it, must not act under the dictates of another body, must not do what it has been forbidden to do, must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit or the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Section 321 enables the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case to withdraw from the prosecution with the consent of the court. Before an application is made under Section 321, the Public Prosecutor has to apply his mind to the facts of the case independently without being subject to any outside influence. But it cannot be said that a Public Prosecutor's action will be illegal if he receives any communication or instruction from the Government. Unlike the Judge, the Public Prosecutor is not an absolutely independent officer. He is an appointee of the Government, Central or State appointed for conducting in court any prosecution or other proceedings on behalf of the Government concerned. So there is the relationship of counsel and client between the Public Prosecutor and the Government. A Public Prosecutor cannot act without instructions of the Government; a Public Prosecutor cannot conduct a case absolutely on his own, or contrary to the instruction of his client, namely, the Government. Section 321 does not lay any bar on the Public Prosecutor to receive any instruction from the Government before he files an application under that section. If the Public Prosecutor receives such instructions, he cannot be said to act under extraneous influence. On the contrary, the Public Prosecutor cannot file an application for withdrawal of a case on his own without instruction from the Government. 15. In Rajinder Kumar Jain v. State 1980 CriLJ 1084 through Spl. Police Establishment, the Supreme Court has observed that the withdrawal from the prosecution on political reasons, if otherwise proper is valid as the ultimate discretion is of the Public Prosecutor though Government may give its suggestions, advice or guidance to him. 15. In Rajinder Kumar Jain v. State 1980 CriLJ 1084 through Spl. Police Establishment, the Supreme Court has observed that the withdrawal from the prosecution on political reasons, if otherwise proper is valid as the ultimate discretion is of the Public Prosecutor though Government may give its suggestions, advice or guidance to him. The Court's jurisdiction under Section 321 CrPC, is supervisory and it has only to see if learned PP has applied his independent mind in the broader interest of public justice and for that purpose can ascertain the reasons for the withdrawal move but cannot reappreciate the grounds of the same. 16. The statutory responsibility for deciding upon withdrawal squarely vests in the PP. It is non-negotiable and cannot be bartered away in favour of those who may be above him on the administrative side in view of Balwant Singh v. State of Bihar 1977 CriLJ 1935. wherein, the Supreme Court has observed as below :- The statutory responsibility for deciding upon withdrawal squarely vests in the public prosecutor. It is non-negotiable and cannot be bartered away in favour of those who may be above him on the administrative side. The Criminal Procedure Code is the only master of the public prosecutor and he has to guide himself with reference to Criminal Procedure Code only. So guided, the consideration which must weigh with him is whether the broader cause of public justice will be advanced or retarded by the withdrawal or continuance of the prosecution. If some policy consideration bearing on the administration of justice justifies withdrawal, the court may accord permission. Of course the interests of public justice being the paramount consideration they may transcend and overflow the legal justice of the particular litigation. The District Magistrate or the Superintendent of Police cannot order the Public Prosecutor to move for the withdrawal, although it may be open to the District Magistrate to bring to the notice of the Public Prosecutor materials and suggest to him to consider whether the prosecution should be withdrawn or not. 17. The Government may have ordered, directed or asked a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from a prosecution, it is for the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied thereon that public interest will be served thereby. 17. The Government may have ordered, directed or asked a Public Prosecutor to withdraw from a prosecution, it is for the Public Prosecutor to apply his mind to all the relevant material and, in good faith, to be satisfied thereon that public interest will be served thereby. The Court has also to be satisfied in this regard and also that such withdrawal will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause manifest injustice in view of the decision in Abdul Karim v. State (2000) 8 SCC 710 . 18. Power to allow withdrawal is not confined only to court empowered to discharge or acquit the accused but also extends to the committing court also in view of Rajinder Kumar Jain (supra). 19. When the Sessions Judge allowed withdrawal from prosecution in the absence of materials on record, the order granting permission was set aside in view of the decisions in 1976 CriLJ 328 (Bansilal v. Chandan Lal and Anr.) 1976 CriLJ 328. 20. A Public Prosecutor must have full freedom so that he can function effectively, independently and fearlessly. He can even give up certain cases and request the court to discharge or acquit any accused. He cannot be fettered in conducting the proceedings in view of the decision in N. Natarajan v. B.K. Subba Rao 2003 CriLJ 820. 21. The application under Section 321 CrPC must aver that the Public Prosecutor is, in good faith, satisfied, on consideration of all the relevant materials that his withdrawal from the prosecution is in the public interest and it will not stifle or thwart the process of law or cause injustice. The material considered by him must be set out in the application in view of the decision in Abdul Karim (supra). 22. Withdrawal could be permitted only when there is consent of the court. As such the court must be satisfied that before filing an application for withdrawal, the Public Prosecutor applied his mind to the facts of the case without being subject to any outside influence. Of course, there is nothing illegal if the Public Prosecutor receives any communication or instruction from the Government regarding withdrawal. And if the Public Prosecutor acts on such instruction of the Government, it cannot be said that he has acted under extraneous influence. Of course, there is nothing illegal if the Public Prosecutor receives any communication or instruction from the Government regarding withdrawal. And if the Public Prosecutor acts on such instruction of the Government, it cannot be said that he has acted under extraneous influence. Even then he has to apply his mind independently in view of the decisions in V. Krishnamurthy v. S.K. Mondharan (Mad); State v. Chandrika Bansilal (supra); Balwant (supra); Subhash (supra); Sheo Nandan (supra). 23. The Court must be satisfied that learned Public Prosecutor has considered the materials on records and, in good faith, has reached to the conclusion that his withdrawal from the prosecution will serve the public interest. The Court must also consider whether the grant of consent may thwart of stifle the Course of law or result in manifest injustice in view of the decision in Abdul Karim (supra). 24. The trial court's supervisory function of either granting or refusing to grant the permission under Section 321 CrPC is a judicial function. Therefore, the same is liable to correction by the High Court under its revisional powers under Section 397 read with Section 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sheo Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar 1983CriLJ348 . 25. Undisputedly, learned Public Prosecutor/Asstt. Public Prosecutor is exclusively empowered to withdraw from the prosecution of any person. But, before submitting the application, it is expected that the learned Public Prosecutor/Asstt. Public Prosecutor has taken into consideration all the relevant materials on record, documents and has also applied his mind to the gravity and merits of the offence and has also assessed the possibility of conviction in a given case. Learned Public Prosecutor/Asstt. Public Prosecutor has to indicate that in good faith after examining materials on record he has arrived at the conclusion that in order to meet the ends of justice and in the great public interest and to restore peace and harmony in the State, it is necessary to withdraw from the prosecution of the person concerned. 26. In the present case, learned Public Prosecutor in the matter of such vital importance has very casually submitted the application, where, the essential ingredients as per requirement of Section 321CrPC are lacking in his application. 26. In the present case, learned Public Prosecutor in the matter of such vital importance has very casually submitted the application, where, the essential ingredients as per requirement of Section 321CrPC are lacking in his application. This court is unable to find out whether learned Public Prosecutor has considered all the materials relevant to the case and has also applied his mind bona fide, independently and in good faith? I am of the considered view that learned Public Prosecutor has miserably failed to submit the application in consonance to the requirement of Section 321 CrPC as well as settled legal position and guidelines provided by the Supreme Court from time to time. 27. Needless to say, though the necessary ingredients for withdrawal from the prosecution of the accused was missing in the application of the learned Public Prosecutor, but the appreciation of learned Sessions Judge in rejecting the petition of the learned Public Prosecutor under Section 321CrPC was also not happily worded, although the decision of the learned Sessions Court is legally correct. Learned Sessions Court ought to have analysed properly the contents and materials of the application submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor under Section 321 CrPC for withdrawal from prosecution of the accused Kamini Debbarma 28. The application itself was inherently lacking application of mind of learned Public Prosecutor. In absence of anything mentioned it cannot be said that learned Public Prosecutor in good faith and in great public interest and to meet the ends of justice has submitted the application in question, as such the rejection of application by learned Sessions Court cannot said to be incorrect. 29. In my respectful consideration, I do not find that there is any illegality, impropriety in the impugned order dated 8.6.05 of learned Sessions Court, therefore, the decision of learned Sessions Court is being approved. 30. Accordingly, this criminal revision petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed. Petition dismissed.