JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. This appeal by the claimants-appellants for enhancement of compensation is directed against the judgment and award dated 6.1.2006 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Giridih in Compensation Case No. 01 of 2003 whereby he has awarded a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/-by way of compensation for the death of one Shankar Yadav in a motor vehicle accident. Claimants-appellants are the widow, five minor daughters and mother of the deceased. 2. Claimants-appellants filed claim application under the provisions of Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act for grant of compensation. Claimants' case was that the deceased, aged about 35 years, was returning after finishing his work by a motorcycle. When the motorcycle reached near Dukhharan Baba more, a truck bearing registration No. BR-23-6004 being driven rashly and negligently dashed the motorcycle as a result of which, the deceased sustained grievous injuries and was taken into hospital where he died on the same day. Claimants' case was that the deceased was a contractor having labour licence No. 2359 dated 27.10.1998 and was employee in M/s. Ati Bir Hi Tech (Pvt.) Ltd., Giridih. His annual income of Rs. 71,280/-. Claimants, therefore, claimed compensation of Rs. 8,23,000/-. 3. The owner and the driver of the truck appeared and filed written statement stating, inter alia, that the vehicle was insured with New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Giridih (respondent No. 4) and the motorcycle was also insured with the said company. Hence, the insurer of the vehicle is liable to pay compensation. Respondent-Insurance Company also contested the claim by filing written statement taking usual defence that the drivers of the motorcycle and the truck in question have not proved their valid driving licence at the relevant time. Claimants examined witnesses and also proved certified copy of FIR (Ext. 1), Final Form (Ext. 2), Heirship Certificate (Ext. 3), copy of Provident Fund sheet (Exts. 4 and 5), P.M. Report (Ext. 6), Accident report (Ext. 7), Zimanama (Ext. 8), copy of Contract Labour Licence (Ext. 9), Income Tax returns (Ext. 10), Employee Provident Fund Scheme (Ext. 11) and Insurance Policy (Exts. 12 and 12/1). 4. The owner of the truck also examined witnesses and proved the national permit, driving licence of the driver of the truck (Ext. A), Registration Certificate of the truck (Ext. B), driving licence of the driver of the motorcycle (Ext. C). 5.
10), Employee Provident Fund Scheme (Ext. 11) and Insurance Policy (Exts. 12 and 12/1). 4. The owner of the truck also examined witnesses and proved the national permit, driving licence of the driver of the truck (Ext. A), Registration Certificate of the truck (Ext. B), driving licence of the driver of the motorcycle (Ext. C). 5. The tribunal after considering the entire evidence assessed the quantum of compensation. Taking into consideration Ext. 10 (Income Tax returns of the deceased), the tribunal held that annual income of the deceased was Rs. 72,000/-. However, the tribunal took the view that since the claim application was filed under Section 163A of the Act, the benefit available to the claimants shall be by restricting their claim on the basis of income of slab of Rs. 40.000/-which is the highest slab in second schedule. The tribunal, therefore, held that the annual income of the deceased shall be treated as Rs. 40,000/-. On the basis of that, the tribunal by taking 15 years of purchase, multiplied the same amount of Rs. 40,000/- and assessed compensation of Rs. six lacs. Thereafter, the tribunal deducted 1/3rd of the amount and assessed compensation at Rs. 4 lacs and awarded the same amount by passing the impugned judgment. 6. Mr. Arbind Kumar Lai, learned Counsel appearing for the claimants-appellants assailed the impugned judgment and award as being illegal and wholly without jurisdiction. Learned Counsel submitted that the tribunal has committed serious error of law in restricting the annual incomes of the deceased at Rs. 40,000/- and assessed compensation on that amount. Learned Counsel further submitted that the tribunal further committed serious error of law in deducting 1/3rd of the compensation amount which is without any basis and contravention of the provisions of law. Learned Counsel submitted that the tribunal has committed error of law in not allowing interest on the compensation amount. In this connection, learned Counsel relied upon the decisions of various Courts in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2004 ACJ 934, in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bimla Devi and Ors. (2007) 2 MAC 317 (HP), and in the case of K. Seshalatha and Ors. v. V. Nageshwara Rao and Anr. 2007 (2) TAC 218. 7. On the other hand, Mr.
v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2004 ACJ 934, in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Bimla Devi and Ors. (2007) 2 MAC 317 (HP), and in the case of K. Seshalatha and Ors. v. V. Nageshwara Rao and Anr. 2007 (2) TAC 218. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Manish Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Insurance Company submitted that amount of compensation awarded by the tribunal is perfect and in accordance with the provisions of Section 163A of the M.V. Act. Learned Counsel submitted that the tribunal has rightly held that under Section 163A read with Second Schedule of the Act, the maximum annual income shall be taken as Rs. 40,000/- and not beyond that. In this connection, learned Counsel relied upon the decision of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. 2004 ACJ 934. 8. Before appreciating the rival contentions of the parties, I would first like to refer Section 163A of the Act which reads as under: 163A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorized insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation as indicated in the second schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. (2) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or established that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. (3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. 9. Sections 163A and 163B of the M.V. Act were inserted by Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14th November, 1994.
(3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule. 9. Sections 163A and 163B of the M.V. Act were inserted by Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14th November, 1994. From bare reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is manifestly clear that in case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of use of motor vehicle, the owner or the insurer of the vehicle shall be liable to pay compensation as indicated in the second schedule. Sub-section (2) of Section 163A makes it clear that in the event of an application being filed under Section 163A for grant of compensation, the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made, was due to any wrongful act or negligence or default of the owner of the vehicle or the vehicle concerned. Sub-section (3) of Section 163A confers power on the Central Government to amend the second schedule time to time keeping in view the cost of living by issuing notification in the Official Gazette. Section 163B of the Act gives option to a person entitled to claim compensation, either to claim compensation under Section 140 or 163A of the Act, but not under the provisions of both the Sections. Section 164 empowers the Central Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the relevant provisions of the Act. Neither the Central Government nor the State Government has framed rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Section 163A of the Act. 10. Coming to second schedule which lays down the procedure for assessment of compensation in a case filed under Section 163A of the Act, the schedule prescribes the amount of compensation in respect of those cases where annual income is upto Rs. 40,000/-. 11. In the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala and Ors. [2001]2SCR999 , the Supreme Court discussed the provision of Section 163A besides other provisions of the Act relating to grant of compensation and after discussing the aim and object of the newly inserted provisions, their Lordships observed: 15.
40,000/-. 11. In the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala and Ors. [2001]2SCR999 , the Supreme Court discussed the provision of Section 163A besides other provisions of the Act relating to grant of compensation and after discussing the aim and object of the newly inserted provisions, their Lordships observed: 15. In this contest if we refer to the Review Committee's report, the reason for enacting Section 163A is to give earliest relief to the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Committee observed that determination of cases takes a long time and, therefore, under a system of structural compensation, the compensation that is payable for different classes of cases depending upon the age of the deceased, the monthly income at the time of death, the earning potential in the case of a minor, loss of income on account of loss of limb etc. can be notified and the affected party can then have option of their accepting lump-sum compensation under the Scheme of structural compensation or of pursuing his claim through the normal channels. The report of the Review Committee was considered by the State Government and comments were notified. Thereafter, the Transport Development Council made suggestions for providing adequate compensation to victims of road accidents without going into long-drawn procedure. As per the objects and reasons, it is a new predetermined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income, which is more liberal and rational. On the basis of the said recommendation after considering the report of the Transport Development Council, the Bill was introduced with "a new predetermined formula for payment of compensation to road accident victims on the basis of age/income, which is more liberal and rational" i.e. Section 163A. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163A is almost based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as annual income, age of the victim and multiplier to be applied. In addition to the figure which is arrived at on the basis of the said criteria, the schedule also provides that amount of compensation shall not be less than Rs. 50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as. (1) Rs. 2,000/- for funeral expenses, (2) Rs. 5,000/- for loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse, (3) Rs.
50,000/-. It provides for fixed amount of general damage in case of death such as. (1) Rs. 2,000/- for funeral expenses, (2) Rs. 5,000/- for loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse, (3) Rs. 2,400/- for loss of estate, (4) for medical expenses supported by the bills, voucher not exceeding Rs. 15,000/-. Similarly, for disability in a non-fatal accident para 5 of the Schedule provides for determination of compensation on the basis of permanent disability. Para 6 provides for notional income for those who had no income prior to an accident at Rs. 15,000/- per annum. There is also provision for reduction of 1 /3rd amount of compensation on the assumption that the victim would have incurred the amount towards maintaining himself had he been alive. The purpose of this section and the second schedule is to avoid long-drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victims or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If such affected claimant opts for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on structured formula, he would get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of non pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no-fault liability appears to have been introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social-security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be "no-fault liability" and as observed by this Court in Ramanbhai case 1 "in order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the deaths and injuries caused in road accidents". However, this benefit can be availed of by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- which is the highest slab in the second schedule which indicates that the legislature wanted to give benefit of no-fault liability to a certain limit. This would clearly indicate that the scheme is in alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act. The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long-drawn litigation on a predetermined formula, which is known as structured-formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away.
The object underlining the said amendment is to pay compensation without there being any long-drawn litigation on a predetermined formula, which is known as structured-formula basis which itself is based on relevant criteria for determining compensation and the procedure of paying compensation after determining the fault is done away. Compensation amount is paid without pleading or proof of fault, on the principle of social justice as a social security measure because of ever-increasing motor vehicle accidents in a fast-moving society. Further, the law before insertion of Section 163A was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no-fault liability and determination of compensation amount on fault liability was taking a long time. That mischief is sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163A and the disease of delay is sought to be cured to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured-formula basis. Further, if the question to the determining compensation on fault liability is kept alive it would result in additional litigation and complications in case claimants fail to establish liability of the owner of the defaulting vehicles. Their Lordships further observed: 26. In addition, the leaned Counsel also pointed out that in case of a fatal accident and disability in a non-fatal accident, it has been provided that notional income for the claimant who had no income prior to the accident shall be Rs. 15,000/- per annum and still, however, the second schedule provides table of income ranging from Rs. 3,000/- to Rs. 40,000/- and the break-up also does not provide any calculation for Rs. 15,000/-, as the columns in the schedule inter alia provide for compensation for a person having income of Rs. 12,000/-, and thereafter straight away at Rs. 18,000/-. The learned Counsel also submitted that despite the specific provision in Section 163A(3) that the Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living, by notification in the Official Gazette from time to time amend the schedule, nothing has been done so far. Further, by order dated 30.8.2000, this Court again noticed a number of anomalies in the second schedule and, therefore, thought it fit to have assistance of either the Attorney General of India or the Solicitor General of India. When the matter was called out on 15.12.2000, Mr.
Further, by order dated 30.8.2000, this Court again noticed a number of anomalies in the second schedule and, therefore, thought it fit to have assistance of either the Attorney General of India or the Solicitor General of India. When the matter was called out on 15.12.2000, Mr. Altaf Ahmed, ASG, stated before the Court that the order passed by this Court on 30.8.2000 has already engaged serious attention of the Ministry of Surface Transport Department and the Government was considering the matter for bringing necessary correction in the second schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act. Thereafter, we again sought assistance of the Additional Solicitor General on the interpretation of Section 163A and also to verify whether there are corrections in the second schedule. Learned Additional Solicitor General stated that amendment might take some time. In this view of the matter, we think it would be appropriate if the Central Government takes necessary action as early as possible under Section 163A(3). 12. In the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan and Ors. [2002]3SCR1176 , the Apex Court considered the provisions of Sections 163 and 166 of the Act. In that case the Supreme Court has taken a view that structured formula provided in the second schedule would be a safe guide to calculate the amount of compensation. However, deviation from the second schedule may be resorted to on some special reasons. Their Lordships further observed that the structured formula provided in the second schedule shall apply only in those cases where annual income is upto Rs. 40,000/-. Paragraphs 8, 11 and 12 of the said judgment are worth to be quoted herein below: 8. The noticeable features of this provision are that it provides for compensation in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of use of motor vehicle. The amount of compensation would be as indicated in the second schedule. The claimant is not required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement was due to any wrongful act or negligence or default of the owner of the vehicle or any other person. Award of compensation according to the schedule under this provision is also known as structured formula. 11.
The claimant is not required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement was due to any wrongful act or negligence or default of the owner of the vehicle or any other person. Award of compensation according to the schedule under this provision is also known as structured formula. 11. From the provisions quoted above, it is clear that a claim under Section 166 covers cases of all kinds of bodily injuries or damages to the property of a third party or both. Under the explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 165 it has been indicated that the provision includes the claims for compensation under Section 140 and Section 163A but it is nowhere provided that the amount of compensation is to be assessed or calculated according to the second schedule. On the other hand, Section 168 provides the key leading to determination of amount of compensation under Section 166 of the Act. The relevant part of Section 168 reads as under: 168. Award of the Claims Tribunal.--(1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensations shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be: Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X. (2) The Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award.
(3) When an award is made under this section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct. 12. It thus makes it clear that it is for the tribunal to arrive at an amount of compensation, which it may consider to be just in the facts and circumstances of the case. This Court however has been of the view that structured formula as provided under the second schedule would be a safe guide to calculate the amount of just compensation. Deviation though permissible, may only be resorted to for some special reasons to do so. So far as structured formula is concerned, it provides for a maximum multiplier of 18. The application of the multiplier depends upon the age of the deceased, age of his dependants, number of his dependants, the amount of dependency etc. Again we find that the structured formula relates to a victim whose income is up to a sum of Rs. 40,000/- per annum. It may be clarified that in the present case, it is not in dispute that the multiplier method, which is the accepted and prevalent method, would be applicable and has been applied. The question of setting apart 1/3rd of the income on account of expenditure on self by the deceased is also not in dispute that is to say that the amount of multiplicand shall be 2/3rd of the annual income of the deceased. The annual income of the deceased, as found by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench, namely, 3,39,445 dollars is also not in dispute, nor the amount of dependency, 2,26,297 US dollars. The only dispute is about application of 13 as multiplier as applied by a Division Bench of the High Court following the second schedule to the Act. 13. Provisions of Section 163A have been elaborately discussed and law has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court observed that Section 163A is intended to provide for making of an award on the basis of pre-determined amount mentioned in the schedule and not on a long-drawn trial and without proof of negligence.
v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court observed that Section 163A is intended to provide for making of an award on the basis of pre-determined amount mentioned in the schedule and not on a long-drawn trial and without proof of negligence. The Apex Court further held that Section 163A has been enacted for grant of immediate relief to a section of people whose annual income is not more than Rs. 40,000/-. Their Lordships observed: 41. Section 140 of the Act dealt with interim compensation but by inserting Section 163A, Parliament intended to provide for the making of an award consisting of a predetermined sum without insisting on a long-drawn trial or without proof of negligence in causing the accident. The amendment was, thus, a deviation from the common law liability under the law of torts and was also in derogation of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act. The Act and the Rules framed by the State in no uncertain terms suggest that a new device was sought to be evolved so as to grant a quick and efficacious relief to the victims falling within the specified category. The heirs of the deceased or the victim in terms of the said provisions were assured of a speedy and effective remedy which was not available to the claimants under Section 166 of the Act. 42. Section 163A was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a section of the people whose annual income is not more than Rs. 40,000/- having regard to the fact that in terms of Section 163Aof the Act read with the second schedule appended thereto, compensation is to be paid on a structured formula not only having regard to the age of the victim and his income but also the other factors relevant therefor. An award made thereunder, therefore, shall be in full and final settlement of the claim as would appear from the different columns contained in the second schedule appended to the Act. The same is not interim in nature. The note appended to column 1 which deals with fatal accidents makes the position furthermore clear slating that from the total amount of compensation one-third thereof is to be reduced in consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself had he been alive.
The same is not interim in nature. The note appended to column 1 which deals with fatal accidents makes the position furthermore clear slating that from the total amount of compensation one-third thereof is to be reduced in consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself had he been alive. This together with the other heads of compensation as contained in columns 2 to 6 thereof leaves no manner of doubt that Parliament intended to lay a comprehensive scheme for the purpose of grant of adequate compensation to a section of victims who would require the amount of compensation without fighting any protracted litigation for proving that the accident occurred owing to negligence on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle or any other fault arising out of use of a motor vehicle. 14. In the light of the ratio decided by the Supreme Court in the decisions quoted herein above, it can be safely concluded that the provisions of Section 163A read with second schedule appended thereto, shall apply in those cases where the annual income is not more than Rs. 40,000/-. In other words, such claim application for the grant of compensation under Section 163A of the Act alleging annual income more Rs. 40,000/- cannot be entertained and decided by the tribunal under the said section read with second schedule appended thereto. 15. Now the question arises as to whether tribunal in the event claim application is not entertainable for the reasons aforesaid, can treat such application under Section 166 of the Act and decide the same accordance with law. As noticed above, Section 163A of the Act has been enacted for the purpose of giving quick and efficacious relief to the victims falling within the specified category. On such application, the claimant is not required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement was due to any wrongful act or negligence on the part of the owner of the offending vehicle. On the contrary, on an application under Section 166 of the Act for grant of compensation, the claimant is required to plead and establish that the death or injury caused to the person is due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle.
On the contrary, on an application under Section 166 of the Act for grant of compensation, the claimant is required to plead and establish that the death or injury caused to the person is due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle. In our opinion, therefore, even on an application under Section 163A of the Act, if the tribunal follows the regular procedure and evidence is led by the parties that the tribunal may proceed to decide the claim under Section 166 of the Act if the tribunal finds that such application under Section 163A was not maintainable for the reasons that the annual income of the person concerned is more than Rs. 40,000/-. 16. In the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sheela Devi and Ors. (2007) 2 MAC 394 (P&H), a Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court considered a similar question and observed: 5. Learned Counsel for the Insurance Company submitted that the claim petition was filed under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, "the Act"), wherein, the income of the deceased was alleged to be more than Rs. 40,000/-, which could not be scaled down in view of judgment of this Court in Himachal Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Baldev Kumar Nayyer and Ors. (2006) 4 ACC 125 : 2006 (2) PLR 75 which also refers to a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court i.e. Deepal Girish Bhai Soni and Ors. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) I ACC 728 (SC) : 2004 (2) 137 PLR 271. 6. We are unable to accept the submission made. The tribunal has distinguished the judgment relief upon and instead relied upon the judgment in Sharabai and Anr. v. P. Shebkhan and Ors. 2006 ACJ 229 , by assuming that the said judgment was also a judgment of this Court. In fact, the said judgment has been rendered by Karnataka High Court. Even if we proceed on the basis that the judgment of this Court in Himachal Road Transport Corporation's case (supra) is applicable, the result remains the same. The judgment relied upon after holding that the petition under Section 163A of the Act was not maintainable, the matter was remanded for fresh decision by treating that application to be under Section 166 of the Act.
The judgment relied upon after holding that the petition under Section 163A of the Act was not maintainable, the matter was remanded for fresh decision by treating that application to be under Section 166 of the Act. In the present case, the tribunal has already followed the said procedure and recorded a finding that death took place on account of rash and negligent driving. A specific issue was framed and evidence was led. The tribunal has not proceeded on no fault basis. 17. In the case of K. Seshalatha and Ors. v. M.V. Nageshwara Rao and Anr. (supra) a Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court observed: 13. The Division Bench of Kerala High Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Muneer and Ors. 2003(1)KLT137 , while dealing with a similar question, while dealing with Section 163A read with second schedule, Sections 166, 168 and 163A along with second schedule and on the aspect of fixation of just compensation vis-a-vis structured formula, while answering the questions whether just compensation awarded in claim under Section 166 can fall below the amount prescribed in structured formula under Section 163A read with second schedule, the question was answered in the negative. In Akshit Kumar v. Balbir Singh, the learned Judge of Himachal Pradesh High Court while dealing with the principles of assessment in fixing the quantum of a fatal accident, it was held that the compensation payable under Section 166 of the Act should not be less than the minimum amount payable under structured formula under Section 163A of the Act and it would be a travesty of justice if a person who proves negligence and income of the deceased is awarded lesser compensation than a person who neither proves negligence nor the income. 14. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court referred to supra, it is needless to say that even in a case where the income exceeds Rs. 40,000/-as specified in the Table of the Second Schedule, the same can be taken as guidance for the purpose of assessing the quantum. The provisions relating to the compensation claims, being the claims thought of keeping in view the welfare of the dependants, the same may have to be construed with an element of liberality while adopting the guidelines.
40,000/-as specified in the Table of the Second Schedule, the same can be taken as guidance for the purpose of assessing the quantum. The provisions relating to the compensation claims, being the claims thought of keeping in view the welfare of the dependants, the same may have to be construed with an element of liberality while adopting the guidelines. In the light of the same, this Court has no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that even in cases where the income exceeds Rs. 40,000/-, as specified by the Table in the Second Schedule, the same can be taken as a guidance for the purpose of applying the multiplier. In view of the same, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned tribunal had not correctly applied that the multiplier and instead of applying multiplier 15', the learned tribunal applied multiplier 12', and if multiplier 15' to be applied, then instead of Rs. 4,80,000/- awarded by the tribunal as loss of dependency, the quantum of compensation towards loss of dependency would come to Rs. 6,00,000/-. Accordingly, the quantum of loss of dependency granted at Rs. 4,80,000/- is modified to an amount of Rs. 6,00,000/- applying multiplier 15' and in all other respects, the findings are hereby confirmed. Accordingly, the award of the tribunal is modified granting the total compensation of Rs. 6,30,000/-. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances, the appellants-claimants are entitled to interest only 7.5% per annum on the enhanced compensation awarded by this Court. 18. In another case in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jabbar and Ors. (2007) 2 TAC 562, a Bench of Kerala High Court considered similar question and observed: 8. In this case, there is one more aspect which requires attention. The claimant pleaded that his monthly income is Rs. 5,000/-. The tribunal reduced it to Rs. 2,000/- and thus proceeded to make the award. It was held in Deepal Girishbhai (supra) that the annual income of Rs. 40,000/-cannot be treated as a cap as found in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai 2001 (2) KLT 235 : 2001 (2) TAC 312 (SC) and that the proceedings under Section 163A are confined to be invoked by persons whose annual income is only up to Rs. 40,000/-. Therefore, a person who alieges that his annual income is above Rs. 40,000/-cannot invoke Section 163A.
Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai 2001 (2) KLT 235 : 2001 (2) TAC 312 (SC) and that the proceedings under Section 163A are confined to be invoked by persons whose annual income is only up to Rs. 40,000/-. Therefore, a person who alieges that his annual income is above Rs. 40,000/-cannot invoke Section 163A. prosecute proceedings and thereafter, get the benefit of the finding of the tribunal that his proved income is only below the bench mark of Rs. 40,000/-. the statutory limit for invoking Section 163A. So much so, the tribunal erred in adjudicating the application under Section 163A as long as it continued with the pleading that the monthly income of the claimant is Rs. 5,000/-. 12. Sections 163A and 163B, which form a Code by themselves, were inserted by Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14th November, 1994. However, no provision similar to Section 176 has been made enabling the State Government to make rules for the purpose of prescribing the form of application for compensation under Section 163A. Section 176 provides power to the State Government to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 165 and 174. The Central Government is empowered by Section 164 to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter XI. Since it relates to Courts and tribunals, the procedure can be, to be insisted upon, one provided by rules framed under Section 176 by the State Government. Chapter X of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ("the rules", for short) relates to tribunals. Rule 371 prescribing the form of application is part of the rules made in 1989 before the insertion of Sections 163Aand 163B into the Act. So much so, there is no separated and specific form to apply for compensation under Section 163A while there is one for application under Section 166. 15.
Rule 371 prescribing the form of application is part of the rules made in 1989 before the insertion of Sections 163Aand 163B into the Act. So much so, there is no separated and specific form to apply for compensation under Section 163A while there is one for application under Section 166. 15. Having regard to the social welfare concept behind constituting the tribunals and the fact that litigations of such nature relating to claim for compensation on account of death or bodily injury, would have already been filed invoking both the provisions and may be pending, the point of time for the claimant to exercise option to confine under Section 163A or 166 could be during the pendency of the matter before the tribunal, without affecting the rights of parties to a fair trial and within the framework or the law, as laid in Deepal Girishbhai (supra). Propriety would require that the election by the claimant as between the two different proceedings under Sections 163A and 166 is to be made at or before the settlement of issues. If option is exercised at least at that stage, the opposite party could be granted, if necessary, a further opportunity to place further pleadings on record before the parties go to trial, after the settlement of issues. Such trial will not deflect the course of justice, but will lead to an end of the lis, on a complete adjudication of the issues that would arise on the rival contentions. No injustice would be caused by such an approach. On the one hand would be the claimant, a victim of a motor accident or his dependants, while on the other, would be the entitlement of the driver, owner or insurer to a just and fair trial to contest, either in an adjudication under Section 166 or for an immediate relief under Section 163A. Viewed in his angle, it is just and proper to extend to the claimant an opportunity, at or before the framing of the issues, to opt among the two proceedings. Upon such choice being exercised, the respondents would be entitled to place such further pleadings that may be necessary on the facts and circumstances of the case.
Viewed in his angle, it is just and proper to extend to the claimant an opportunity, at or before the framing of the issues, to opt among the two proceedings. Upon such choice being exercised, the respondents would be entitled to place such further pleadings that may be necessary on the facts and circumstances of the case. If a choice is not so made, it would entail disposal of the claim petition, unless the tribunal gives an opportunity to exercise option, may be on such terms as to costs, as it may deem fit. 19. In the instant case, the deceased was a contractor and according to the claimants, his annual income was Rs. 71,280/- as per the Income Tax assessment of the year 2001-02. The tribunal also recorded a finding that the annual income of the deceased was Rs. 72,000/-. However, the tribunal proceeded on an erroneous approach of law that the annual income of the deceased shall be restricted to Rs. 40,000/-for the reasons that the claim application was filed under Section 163A of the Act. As a result, the tribunal taking Rs. 40,000/- as annual income of the deceased, multiplied it by 15 and out of the total compensation so assessed, 1 /3rd has been deducted towards personal expenses and thereafter, a compensation of Rs. 4 lacs has been determined as compensation payable to the claimants. As noticed above, the claimants have adduced sufficient evidence, both oral and documentary, in support of their case and the tribunal has considered the evidence with regard to rash and negligent driving of the offending truck. In that view of the matter, the tribunal ought to have determined compensation by citing the provisions of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 20. In the claim application, the claimants, who are widow, five minor daughters and mother of the deceased have claim a sum of Rs. 8,20,000/- by way of compensation. As per the finding recorded by the tribunal the annual income of the deceased was Rs. 72,000/-. If 1/3rd of the said amount is deducted, then the annual dependency comes to Rs. 48,000/-. Since the deceased was a young man of 35 years, if a multiplier of 15 is taken, then the amount comes to Rs. 7,20,000/-. 21.
As per the finding recorded by the tribunal the annual income of the deceased was Rs. 72,000/-. If 1/3rd of the said amount is deducted, then the annual dependency comes to Rs. 48,000/-. Since the deceased was a young man of 35 years, if a multiplier of 15 is taken, then the amount comes to Rs. 7,20,000/-. 21. However, taking the entire facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence adduced by the parties, in our considered opinion, a sum of Rs. 6,50,000/-shall be just and reasonable compensation which the claimants are entitled. 22. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed and the claim amount awarded to the claimants is enhanced from Rs. 4 lacs to Rs. 6,50,000/-. D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 23. I agree. Appeal allowed.