Judgment ( 1. ) Sessions Judge, Sehore in Sessions Trial No. 142/90 vide impugned judgment dated 1-9-1992 recording conviction of appellant under S. 376 of I.P.C. sentenced him to undergo R.I. for a period of 7 years. Being aggrieved. appellant has preferred this appeal under S. 374(2) of Cr.P.C. ( 2. ) On 19-12-1989 prosecutrix (P.W. 8) lodged a report (Exhibit P-7) to the effect that about a month back while her mother- in-law was hospitalised at Icchawar hospital and her husband had gone to the school, in the afternoon when she was alone in the house, her father-in-law/appellant having entered into the house locked the back door and thrown her on the ground committed rape with her and threatened that if she will cry he will kill her. After satisfying his lust, he left the house. Proseeutrix narrated above incident to Rajkunwar Bai (P.W. 6), Harnath Chamar as well as to her husband in the evening. After 15 days, complainants-husband left proseeutrix to her paternal house. Proseeutrix intimated whole incident to her parents. Next day, they went to Police Station Icchawar to lodge the complaint against appellant. Meanwhile, appellant, maternal father-in-law, brother-in-law and some community members persuaded proseeutrix and her father to settle the matter in the caste panchayat. On their persuasion, they did not lodge the report. The community panchayat was held on 10-12-1989 in the village of appellant but no settlement could have been taken place in that panchayat, therefore, on 19-12-1989 F.I.R. (Exhibit P-7) was lodged. On the basis of this report Crime No. 215/ 89 under Ss. 376 and 506-B of I.P.C. was registered. Proseeutrix (P.W. 8) was sent for medical examination. As per medical examination report (Exhibit P-9) given by Dr. T. Khanna (P.W. 9), no marks of injury was seen on any part of her body. The alleged accident took place a month back, proseeutrix being married lady and consequently habitual to sexual intercourse, no opinion about rape was given by lady doctor. Completing the investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted. ( 3. ) Appellant abjured the guilt and contended that he is being falsely implicated in this case because prosecutrix wants to live with her lover Ravishankar and she has lodged the F.I.R. after many days of the incident. Completing the investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted. ( 3. ) Appellant abjured the guilt and contended that he is being falsely implicated in this case because prosecutrix wants to live with her lover Ravishankar and she has lodged the F.I.R. after many days of the incident. The Court below in S.T. No. 142/90 vide impugned judgment relying upon the testimony of prosecutrix (P.W. 8) held that appellant committed rape with the prosecutrix. As such, recording conviction under S. 376 of I.P.C. he has been sentenced to undergo R.I. for a period of 7 years. ( 4. ) The report (Exhibit P-7) was lodged on 19-12-1989. As per this, the incident occurred about a month back at 15.00 p.m. when her mother-in-law was hospitalised at Icchawar Hospital and her husband had gone to the school. When she was alone, appellant thrown her on the ground and committed rape with her and left the house. Prosecutrix intimated the incident to Rajkunwar Bai (P.W. 6), Harnath Chamar and to her husband when he came back from school. ( 5. ) Prosecutrix (P.W. 8), aged about 18 years has stated that when she was alone in the house, at about 15.00 p.m. her father-in-law/appellant came and locked the back door of the house and thrown her on the ground. Thereafter, forcibly committed sexual intercourse with her and left the house. In the evening, at about 17.00 p.m. when her husband came back from the school, this incident was narrated to him as well as to neighbours Rajkunwar Bai and Harnath Chamar. Her husband assured her that they will live separately from the appellant but after 15 days her husband left the prosecutrix to her paternal house. Prosecutrix intimated the whole incident to her parents when she met them. Next day along with her father she went to Icchawar police station to lodge the report. At Icchawar her brother-in-law, maternal father-in-law and appellant met them and convinced that the matter will be settled in community panchayat. Appellant and Gheesilal (P.W. 11) called the community panchayat on 10-12-1989. P.W. 5 Ramprasad has also attended that panchayat. Prosecutrix has narrated the whole incident to panchayat members but the matter could not be settled in panchayat, therefore, F.I.R. (Exhibit P-7) was lodged on 19-12-1989. P.W. 7 Pannalal is the main panch of their community. Appellant and Gheesilal (P.W. 11) called the community panchayat on 10-12-1989. P.W. 5 Ramprasad has also attended that panchayat. Prosecutrix has narrated the whole incident to panchayat members but the matter could not be settled in panchayat, therefore, F.I.R. (Exhibit P-7) was lodged on 19-12-1989. P.W. 7 Pannalal is the main panch of their community. He has also supported the prosecutrix version that her father and appellant have called the above panchayat on 10-12-1989 which was attended by them. She has specifically stated that prior to this, she could not lodge the F.I.R. because her husband has not taken her to police station. ( 6. ) Dealing with the sole testimony of the prosecutrix in a case of gang rape in Dilip vs State of M.P., AIR 2001 SC 3049 : (2001 Cri LJ 4721) it has been held (para 12) :- The law is well settled that prosecutrix in a sexual offence is not an accomplice and there is no rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted upon and made basis of conviction unless corroborated in material particulars. However, the rule about the admissibility of corroboration should be present to the mind of the Judge. In State of H.P. v. Gian Chand (2001) 6 SCC 71 : (2001 Cri LJ 2548), on a review of decisions of this Court, it was held that conviction for an offence of rape can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix corroborated by medical evidence and other circumstances such as the report of chemical examination etc., if the same is found to be natural, trustworthy and worth being relied on. This Court further held : "If evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon without seeking corroboration of her statement in material particulars. If for some reason the Court finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial Court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations........." ( 7. ) Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the testimony of prosecutrix is not supported by P.W. 6 Rajkunwar Bai. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial Court must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with cases involving sexual molestations........." ( 7. ) Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the testimony of prosecutrix is not supported by P.W. 6 Rajkunwar Bai. There is no rule of law that testimony of rape victim cannot be acted without corroboration in material particulars. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principle or probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject-matter being a criminal charge. However, if the Court on facts may find it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value it may search for evidence, direct or circumstantial, which would lend assurance to her testimony. Assurance short of corroboration, as under- stood in the context of an accomplice would do as has been held in State of Rajasthan v. Noore Khan, AIR 2000 SC 1812 : (2000 Cri LJ 2205). Prosecutrix (P.W. 8) gave vivid description of the entire episode as to how the appellant raped her In these circumstances, only on the ground that P.W. 6 Rajkunwar Bai has not corroborated her evidence, prosecutrix cannot be disbelieved. As soon as prosecutrix reached to her paternal house, she intimated whole incident to her father Gheesilal (P.W. 11) and next day with Gheesilal she went to lodge the report at Icchawar Police Station. P.W. 7 Pannalal is the Head Panch of the community. He also supported the prosecution version that her father Gheesilal and appellant have called above panchayat on 10-12-1989 which was attended by prosecutrix, her father and appellant along with community members. P.W. 5 Ramprasad has also attended the panchayat. ( 8. ) Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the delay in filing the F.I.R. (Exhibit P-7) is fatal for the prosecution. ( 9. ) It has been held in Sahebrao v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 AIR SCW 2490 : (2006 CriLJ 2881) that : "6. The settled principle of law of this Court is that delay in filing FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and discard it. ( 9. ) It has been held in Sahebrao v. State of Maharashtra, 2006 AIR SCW 2490 : (2006 CriLJ 2881) that : "6. The settled principle of law of this Court is that delay in filing FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case and discard it. The delay in lodging the FIR would put the Court on its guard to search if any plausible explanation has been offered and if offered whether it is satisfactory. 7. At this juncture, we would like to quote the following passage from State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gian Chand (2001) 6 SCC 71 : (2001 Cri LJ 2548, para 11), wherein this Court observed : "Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the First Information Report. Delay has the effect of putting the Court on its guard to search if any plausible explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactorily or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactory explain the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the Court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution case. "In Ravindra Kumar v. State of Punjab (2001) 7 SCC 690 : (2001 Cri LJ 4242, paras 14 and 15) this Court observed : "When there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed the Court has to look at the reason why there was such a delay. There can be a variety of genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to lack of adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. This kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They might not immediately think of going to the police station. Another possibility is due to lack of adequate transport facilities for the informers to reach the police station. The third, which is a quite common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquillity of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is, the persons who are supposed to give such information themselves could be so physically impaired that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous information about the incident. We are not providing an exhausting catalogue of instances which could cause delay in lodging the FIR. Our effort is to try to point out that the state demand made in the Criminal Courts to treat the FIR vitiated merely on the ground of delay in its lodgment cannot be approved as a legal corollary. In any case, where there is delay in making the FIR the Court is to look at the cause for it and if such causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version no consequence shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging the FIR. (Vide Zahoor v. State of U.P. (1991 Supp (1) SCC 372 : (1991 Cri LJ 56); Tara Singh v. State of Punjab (1991 Supp (1) SCC 536 :(1990 Cri LJ 2681); Jamna v. State of U.P. (1994 Supp (1) SCC 185) : ( AIR 1994 SC 79 ). In Tara Singh, the Court made the following observations (SCC p. 541, para 4) : "4. It is well settled that the delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be a ground to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are we cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should given a report. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude in giving the report to the police. At times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur to them that they should given a report. After all it is but natural in these circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station for giving the report. "In Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh (2003) 2 SCC 518 : (2003 Cri LJ 1282, para 10), this Court held that : "......There is no hard and fast rule that any delay in lodging the FIR would automatically render the prosecution case doubtful. It necessarily depends upon facts and circumstances of each case whether there has been any such delay in lodging the FIR which may cast doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case and for this a host of circumstances like the condition of the first informant, the nature of injuries sustained, the number of victims, the efforts made to provide medical aid to them, the distance of the hospital and police station, etc. have to be taken into consideration. There is no mathematical formula by which an interference may be drawn either way merely on account of delay in lodging of the FIR........." In these circumstances, it can be said that prosecution has explained the delay in lodging the FIR. ( 10. ) Dr. T. Khanna (P.W. 9) has stated that prosecutrix on being brought by the police was examined by her on 19-12-1989 (after a month of incident). No marks of external-internal injury on her body was found. She being a married lady was habitual of sexual intercourse. As such, no opinion could have been recorded. Report (Exhibit P-8) to this effect was written. Dr. M. M. Vyas (P.W. 3) has stated that prosecutrix was sent with him for ossification test and as per his report (Exhibit P-3) prosecutrix was above 18 years of age. R. K. Shrivastava (P.W. 1), I.O., Police Station Icchawar has done whole investigation of this case. ( 11. ) Prosecutrix (P.W. 8) has no reason to falsely implicate the appellant for the alleged act. The appellant has not explained any circumstances as to state that why his daughter-in-law/prosecutrix has falsely alleged that he had forcefully committed sexual intercourse with her. R. K. Shrivastava (P.W. 1), I.O., Police Station Icchawar has done whole investigation of this case. ( 11. ) Prosecutrix (P.W. 8) has no reason to falsely implicate the appellant for the alleged act. The appellant has not explained any circumstances as to state that why his daughter-in-law/prosecutrix has falsely alleged that he had forcefully committed sexual intercourse with her. On the contrary, prosecutrix is living in her parental house and her husband has remarried. ( 12. ) On facts and in the circumstances, the Court below rightly believing the statement of prosecutrix held that appellant committed rape with the prosecutrix and as such, recording conviction under S. 376 of I.P.C., sentencing him to undergo R.I. for a period of 7 years. Conviction of appellant is well founded. Sentence also does not call for any interference when father - in-law commits rape on his daughter-in-law, a deterrent sentence is called for. ( 13. ) Consequently, affirming the conviction sentence passed by Court below vide impugned judgment in S.T. No. 142/90, appeal fails and is dismissed. Appellant is on ball, he shall surrender before the C.J.M., Sehore to serve out the remaining period of sentence as described in para 1 of this judgment. Appeal dismissed.