TARUN AGARWALA, J. ( 1 ) BY means of this petition, the petitioner has challenged the validity and legality of the award, passed by the Labour Court directing reinstatement of the workman with stoppage of two yearly increments for two years and denial of back wages. The brief facts leading to the case is, that on account of an incident which took place on June 19, 1998, the petitioner was charge-sheeted for threatening a superior officer with dire consequences and for using abusive language on a superior officer. The workman, denied the charge and accordingly, the management conducted an oral inquiry, in which, the workman was given full opportunity to defend himself. The inquiry officer submitted his report and found that the charges levelled against the workman stood proved. Based on the aforesaid inquiry report, an explanation was called from the workman. The management considered his explanation and thereafter, vide an order dated October 21, 1998, terminated the services of the petitioner. This led to the initiation of a conciliation proceeding and upon its failure, the Deputy labour Commissioner referred the matter for adjudication to the Labour Court under Section 4-K of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). ( 2 ) BEFORE the Labour Court, a preliminary issue was framed with regard to the fairness of the domestic inquiry. The Labour Court, by its order dated April 10, 2002, found that the inquiry was conducted in a fair and proper manner and that full opportunity was given to the workman to defend himself and that the principles of natural justice was, fully complied with. The Labour Court also found that the charges against the workman stood proved and that he tried to threaten a superior officer with dire consequences and had also abused him. ( 3 ) THE Labour Court, however, in its award, held that the punishment of termination of the workman did not commensurate with the misconduct and that it was harsh and disproportionate to the misconduct. Consequently, the Labour Court directed reinstatement of the workman with stoppage of two yearly increments for two years and denial of back wages. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the aforesaid award, has filed the present writ petition. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri Anil Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Santosh kumar Srivastava, the learned counsel for the workman. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the aforesaid award, has filed the present writ petition. ( 4 ) HEARD Sri Anil Sharma, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Santosh kumar Srivastava, the learned counsel for the workman. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the powers of the Labour Court to interfere in the order of punishment by the management is limited under Section 6 (2-A) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and that once the charge of misconduct was affirmed by the labour Court, it was no longer open for the labour Court to substitute its own judgment with a lesser punishment. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the order of punishment was grossly disproportionate to the misconduct and therefore, the Labour Court, being vested with the discretion in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the management, validly exercised such discretion under Section 6 (2-A) of the Act, which is pari materia with the provisions of Section 11 -A of the Industrial disputes Act. ( 5 ) THE scope of Section 11-A has been explained by the Supreme Court in various judgments. In Mahindra and Mahindra v. N. B. Narawade etc. AIR 2005 SC 1993 : (2005) 3 scc 134 : 2005-I-LLJ-1129 the Supreme Court held at pp. 1133 and 1134 of LLJ: "20. It is no doubt true that after introduction of Section 11-A in the Industrial Disputes act, certain amount of discretion is vested with the Labour Court/industrial Tribunal in interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the management where the concerned workman is found guilty of misconduct. The said area of discretion has been very well defined by the various judgments of this Court referred to herein above and it is certainly not unlimited as has been observed by the Division Bench of the high Court. The discretion which can be exercised under Section 11-A is available only on the existence of certain factors like punishment being disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb the conscience of the Court, or the existence of any "mitigating circumstances which requires the reduction of the sentence, or the past misconduct of the workman which may persuade the Labour Court to reduce the punishment. In the absence of any such factor existing, the Labour Court cannot by way of sympathy alone exercise the power under Section 11-A of the Act and reduce the punishment. As noticed here above at least in two of the cases cited before us, i. e. , orissa Cement Ltd. (supra) and New shorrock Mills (supra), this Court held: "punishment of dismissal for using of abusive language cannot be held to be disproportionate. " In this case all the forums below have held that the language used by the workman was filthy. We too are of the opinion that the language used by the workman is such that it cannot be tolerated by any civilized society. Use of such abusive language against a superior officer, that too not once but twice; in the presence of his subordinates cannot be termed to be an indiscipline calling for lesser punishment in the absence of any extenuating factor to herein above. " ( 6 ) IN Employers, Management, Colliery, bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. etc. v. Bihar Colliery kamgar Union through Workmen, 2005-I-LLJ-1135 (SC) the Supreme Court held at p. 1138: "17. From the facts narrated herein above, the ratio laid down in two cases referred to herein above amply applies to the appeal in hand. The Courts below by condoning an act of physical violence have undermined the discipline in the organisation, hence, in the above factual backdrop, it can never be said that the Industrial Tribunal could have exercised its authority under Section 11-A of the Act to interfere with the punishment of dismissal. Substituting the order of dismissal in such a case withholding of one increment in our opinion is wholly disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct and is unsupportable. " In Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma, 2005-II-LLJ-156 (SC) the Supreme Court held at p. 161 :"9. In the case on hand, the employees has been found guilty of hitting and injuring his superior officer at the work place, obviously in the presence of other employees. This clearly amounted to breach of discipline in the organisation. Discipline at the work place in an organization like the employer herein, is the sine quo non for the efficient working of the organisation. This clearly amounted to breach of discipline in the organisation. Discipline at the work place in an organization like the employer herein, is the sine quo non for the efficient working of the organisation. When an employee breaches such discipline and the employer terminates his services, it is not open to a Labour Court or an Industrial tribunal to take the view that the punishment awarded ii shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. " In Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam manohar Nakate, AIR 2005 SC 947 : (2005) 2 scc 489 : 2005-I-LLJ-738 the Supreme Court held at p. 745 of LLJ:"29. Furthermore, it is trite, the Labour court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, in terms of the provisions of the Act, must act within the four-corner thereof. The industrial Courts would not sit in appeal over the decision of the employer unless there exists a statutory provision in this behalf. Although its jurisdiction is wide but the same must be applied in terms of the provisions of the statute and no other. 30. If the punishment is harsh, albeit a lesser punishment may be imposed, but such an order cannot be passed on an irrational or extraneous ground. " In New Shorrock Mills V. Maheshbhai T. Rao, AIR 1997 SC 252 : (1996) 6 SCC 590 : 1997-I-LLJ-1212 the Supreme Court held at p. 1214 of LLJ:"8. It appears to us that the Labour Court completely misdirected itself in ordering the respondents reinstatement with forty per cent back wages. The Labour Court was exercising jurisdiction under Section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. It has the jurisdiction, inter alia to decide the dispute regarding the propriety and legality of an order passed by an employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing Orders. The Labour Court, in the present case, having come to the conclusion that the finding of the departmental inquiry was legal and proper, respondents orders of discharge was not by way of victimisation and that the respondent-workman had seriously misbehaved and was thus guilty of misconduct, ought not to have interfered with the punishment which was awarded in the manner it did. This is not a case where the Court could come to the conclusion that the punishment which was awarded was shockingly disproportionate to the employees conduct and his past record. This is not a case where the Court could come to the conclusion that the punishment which was awarded was shockingly disproportionate to the employees conduct and his past record. The labour Court completely overlooked the fact that even prior to the incident in question the respondent had misconducted himself on several occasions and had been punished. According to the appellant there were atleast three other instances where the respondent had misconducted himself and that he had failed to improve his conduct despite his assurances from time to time. Another aspect which was overlooked by the Labour Court was that on the finding of the Inquiry Officer that the respondent had misbehaved with his superior officer and was guilty of misconduct, the appellant could have dismissed the respondent from service. The appellant chose not to do so. Instead it passed an order of discharging the respondents from service. Lesser punishment having been given by the management itself there was, in our opinion, no justifiable reason for the Labour Court to have set aside the punishment so awarded. We are unable to accept that the punishment imposed by the management was in any way disproportionate to warrant interference by the Labour Court. The direction of the labour Court ordering reinstatement of the respondent with forty per cent back wage was clearly unwarranted. " In Hombe Gowda Edn. Trust and Another v. State of Karnataka and Others 2006-I-LLJ-1004 (SC) the Supreme Court held at p. 1010:"28. Indiscipline in an educational institution should not be tolerated. Only because the Principal of the institution had not been proceeded against the same by itself cannot be a ground for not exercising the discretionary jurisdiction by us. It may or may not be that the Management was selectively vindictive but no Management can ignore a serious lapse on the part of a teacher whose conduct should be an example to the pupils. This Court has a long way from its earlier view points. The recent trend in the decisions of this Court seek to strike a balance between the earlier approach of the industrial relation wherein only the interest of the workmen was sought to be protected with the avowed object of fast industrial growth of the country. In several decisions of this Court it has been noticed that how discipline at the workplaces/industrial undertaking received a set back. In several decisions of this Court it has been noticed that how discipline at the workplaces/industrial undertaking received a set back. In view of the change in economic policy of the country, it may not now be proper to allow the employees to break the discipline with impunity. Our counter is governed by rule of law. All actions, therefore, must be taken in accordance with law. Law declared by this court in terms of Article 141 of the constitution of India, as noticed in the decisions noticed supra, categorically demonstrates that the Tribunal would not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the employers unless an appropriate case is made out therefore. The Tribunal being inferior to that of this Court was bound to fallow the decisions of this Court which are applicable to the fact of the present case in question. The Tribunal can neither ignore the ratio laid down by this Court nor refuse to follow the same. " ( 7 ) THE aforesaid view was reiterated by the supreme Court in the case of L. K. Verma v. H. M. T. Ltd. and Another 2006-I-LLJ-1074 (SC ). ( 8 ) FROM the aforesaid, it is clear that the labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal is vested with a limited jurisdiction under Section 6 (2-A) of the Act and can exercise such discretionary jurisdiction to substitute a punishment by another punishment. The jurisdiction to interfere with the quantum of punishment could only be exercised if it is round to be grossly disproportionate with the misconduct. The Supreme Court, in the aforesaid cases, has also found that the punishment of dismissal for using abusive language could not be held to be disproportionate but it should be borne in mind that if the punishment awarded by the management was required to be interfered, then the principle of proportionality between the gravity of the offence and the stringency of the punishment should be kept in mind. In the instant case, there is only a single instance of using an abusive word and a threat of dire consequence. There was no physical assault and the use of an abusive word was made in isolation shows lack of culture on the part of the workman. In the instant case, there is only a single instance of using an abusive word and a threat of dire consequence. There was no physical assault and the use of an abusive word was made in isolation shows lack of culture on the part of the workman. In the present case, the record suggests that this was the only isolated incident and that the past conduct of the workman was not such nor was the workman a habitual user of the abusive language against the superior officers. In Rama Kant Misra v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1982 SC 1552 : (1982) 3 SCC 346 : 1982-II-LLJ-472 the Supreme Court held: "what has happened here. The appellant was employed since 1957. The alleged misconduct consisting of use of indiscreet or abusive or threatening language occurred on november 18, 1971, meaning thereby that he had put in 14 years of service. Appellant was Secretary of the Workmens Union. The respondent-management has not shown that there was any blameworthy conduct of the appellant during the period of 14 years service he rendered prior to the date of misconduct and the misconduct consists of language indiscreet, improper or disclosing a threatening posture. When it is said that language discloses threatening posture it is the subjective conclusion of the person who hears the language because voice modulation of each person in the society differs and indiscreet, improper, abusive language may show lack of culture but merely the use of such language on one occasion unconnected with any subsequent positive action and not preceded by any blameworthy conduct cannot permit an extreme penalty of dismissal from service. Therefore, we are satisfied that the order of dismissal was not justified in the fact and the circumstances of the case and the Court must interfere. Unfortunately, the Labour Court has completely misdirected itself by looking at the dates contrary to record and has landed itself in an unsustainable order. Therefore, we are required to interfere. " In Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable india (P) Ltd. , AIR 1984 SC 914 : (1984) 2 SCC 569 : 1984-I-LLJ-546 the Supreme Court held at p. 5519 LLJ:"11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the punishment awarded to the appellant is shocking disproportionate regard being had to the charge framed against him. " In Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable india (P) Ltd. , AIR 1984 SC 914 : (1984) 2 SCC 569 : 1984-I-LLJ-546 the Supreme Court held at p. 5519 LLJ:"11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the punishment awarded to the appellant is shocking disproportionate regard being had to the charge framed against him. We are also of the opinion that no responsible employer would ever impose in like circumstances the punishment of dismissal on the employee and that victimisation or unfair labour practice could well be inferred from the conduct of the management in awarding the extreme punishment of dismissal for a flimsy charge of abuse of some worker or officer of the management by the appellant within the premises of the factory. We therefore hold that the termination of the appellants service is invalid and unsustainable in law, and that he is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits including continuity of service. " ( 9 ) DISCIPLINE is sine qua-non for the efficient working of an organization. Discipline in the organisation gets undermined, if a superior authority is subjected to humiliation by a workman but is it proper for the management to sack a workman for one lapse when a lesser punishment could be imposed which could have been proper and justifiable in the circumstances of the case instead of taking the extreme step of dismissal from the service. No doubt, the petitioner had committed a misconduct and was covered by Clause m (1) (w) of the Certified Standing Orders of the company, but in the facts and circumstances of the case that it was the only isolated incident and that there was no antecedent of the workman which could show that he was habitual in using abusive language against the superior officers, this Court is satisfied, that the extreme penalty of termination of the service of the workman was not justified and that the labour Court had rightly interfered in the quantum of punishment while exercising its discretionary powers under Section 6 (2-A) of the Act. The award of the Labour Court, therefore, does not suffer from any error of law. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. .