JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 18th August 2004 passed by Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal, Dhanbad, whereby the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 4,34,000/- by way of compensation for the injury sustained by the claimant. 2. The claimant-appellant is in the police service and at the relevant time he was posted as, A.S.I. of Bihar Police at Mahuda P.S. within the district of Dhanbad. In the night of 2.8.1995 while the claimant was on patrolling duty in a jeep, it collided with a truck bearing registration No. BHO-6847 causing serious injuries to the claimant, Because of the injuries, right leg above the knee and at the middle of the thigh has been amputated. The defendant-respondent No. 2 is the insurer of the truck. The claimant claimed compensation of Rs. 6,00,000/-. The defendant-respondent No. 2 Insurance Company appeared and filed written statement, wherein insurance of the vehicle was admitted. The owner of the truck produced valid driving license, road permit, tax token, fitness certificate etc. The tribunal after hearing the parties and after considering the evidence assessed the compensation at Rs. 6 lacks. However, out of the total compensation, the Tribunal deducted 1/3rd towards personal expenses of the claimant and awarded compensation of Rs. 4,34,000/ -. 3. The claimant-appellant preferred this appeal for enhancement of compensation. Mr. M.B. Lal, learned Counsel of the appellant, submitted that deduction of 1/3rd amount out of the total compensation amount by the Tribunal is wholly erroneous and against the principle of law settled by the Supreme Court and the High Courts. Learned Counsel submitted that 1/3rd amount out of the monthly earnings is to be deducted only in cases where compensation is claimed for the death and not for the injuries. Learned Counsel further submitted that compensation [of Rs. 6 lacs for imputation of right leg (above the knee) cannot and shall not be unreasonable and unjustified. 4. Mr. H.K. Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company on the other hand submitted that against the impugned judgment, the Insurance Company also preferred appeal being M.A. No. 274/2004. That appeal was dismissed by this Court and the respondent-Insurance Company of that appeal was directed to deposit the amount in Lok Adalaf to enable the claimant to receive the same. Mr. H.K. Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company on the other hand submitted that against the impugned judgment, the Insurance Company also preferred appeal being M.A. No. 274/2004. That appeal was dismissed by this Court and the respondent-Insurance Company of that appeal was directed to deposit the amount in Lok Adalaf to enable the claimant to receive the same. Mr. Singh, therefore, submitted that once appeal filed by the Insurance Company is dismissed, this appeal should also bee dismissed as because there cannot be two different orders in two different appeals arising out of the common judgment and award In reply to the said submission Mr. Lal learned Counsel for the claimant submitted that the in the appeal filed by the Insurance Company, the claimant was neither noticed nor has knowledge about the appeal and the same was dismissed at the admission stage. In that view of the matter, the appeal filed by the claimant for enhancement of compensation amount cannot be dismissed. 5. We gave our conscious consideration on the merit of the appeal and after realizing that the compensation of Rs. 4,34,000/- cannot be reasonable compensation to the claimant, Police Officer, whose leg has been amputated from middle of thigh (above knee), made endeavor to get the matter settled and ask Mr. Singh, learned Counsel for the Insurance Company at least to agree for settlement of case by paying lump sum or Rs. 5 lacs but he is not agreeable for settlement. Hence, we have no option but to decide the; appeal on merit. 6. As noticed above, against the impugned judgment and award the respondent-Insurance Company preferred appeal being M.A. No. 274/04, The said appeal was listed for hearing and at the admission stage, the appeal was dismissed on 4.8.2005. The said order reads as under Heard learned Counsel for the appellant. Here is a case where the insured was in Police service in the rank of A.S.I. who met with an accident and his right leg above the kneel was amputated. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 4,34,000/- by way of compensation. We are afraid such quantum of compensation should be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction that too in the appeal filed by the Insurance Company. We do not find any merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 4,34,000/- by way of compensation. We are afraid such quantum of compensation should be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction that too in the appeal filed by the Insurance Company. We do not find any merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. The amount shall be deposited on 21st of August 2005 before the Lok Adalat by tendering a cheque, which shall be received by the claimants. Needless to say that the appellant Insurance Company shall have all rights to recover the compensation amount from the owner of the vehicle if it is found that the vehicle was not being driven by the driver having] valid licence. The High Court Legal Services Committee is directed to issue notice to the claimant to appear before the Lok Adalat on 21st August, 200%.... Let a copy of this order be handed over to the counsel for the Insurance Company. 7. From perusal of the aforesaid order, it is manifestly clear that at the time of hearing of appeal filed by Insurance Company the Court was very anxious for payment of compensation amount to the claimant and, therefore, direction was given to the Insurance Company to deposit the amount before the Lok Adalat, so that the claimant, if noticed, could be able to at least receive the compensation amount awarded by the Tribunal. It is also clear from the order that the Court while dismissing the appeal has not entered into the merit of the appeal and has not decided hat the amount of compensation is quite just and reasonable and it needs no enhancement. 8. It is well settled that besides the statutory right of appeal provided under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, any of the party, who was aggrieved by some of the findings of the judgment and award, may file cross objection as contemplated under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where the cross objections were filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation, it was held that even if the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22 CPC is not applicable, the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC will come to the rescue of the claimants. Where the cross objections were filed by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation, it was held that even if the provisions of Order 41, Rule 22 CPC is not applicable, the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 CPC will come to the rescue of the claimants. It is equally well settled that merely because the appeal is dismissed that will not result in dismissal of the cross objection also. There are catena of decisions where it has been held that cross objections are maintainable in an appeal against an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 9. In the case of "National Insurance Co. Ltd. Madras. v. R. Rani and Ors." (2000)1 T.A.C. 542 (Mad) in an appeal filed by the Insurance Company questioned the finding on the quantum and negligence recorded by the Claims Tribunal, In that appeal cross-objection Was filed by the claimant for enhancement of compensation. A Bench of Madras, High Court held that even if appeal filed by the Insurance Company is not maintainable on the ground of quantum, the cross-objection filed by the claimant is maintainable and can be heard. 10. Similar matter was taken up by a Bench of Karnataka High (Court in the case of "National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prema and Ors." (2002)AC 1889. In that case also appeal field by the Insurance Company challenging the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal, the cross examination was filed for enhancement of compensation. The Bench held that cross-examination is maintainable. The Court observed: 14. The aforesaid interpretation was placed x the context of the legal position as then existed to the effect that insurer cannot prefer an appeal challenging the quantum of compensation and the insurer's right was confined only to the liability to pay the compensation. However, in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of United India Insurer Co. Ltd. v. Bhushan Sachdeva [2002]1SCR352 , where it has been field that under Section 173 of the Act, the insurer can not file an appeal at all is based on an erroneous assumption. It has been held that so long as the insured has not challenged the award passed against him and so long as the liability would only fall on the insurance company it is inequitable to deny a remedy of appeal to the insurance company. It has been held that so long as the insured has not challenged the award passed against him and so long as the liability would only fall on the insurance company it is inequitable to deny a remedy of appeal to the insurance company. Further it has been held that any interpretation denying such aggrieved insurance companies the opportunity to seek the legal remedy of appeal should not be adopted unless there is a statutory compulsion. There is nothing in Section 173 or in the other relevant provisions of the Act, which debars the insurance company to resort to the remedy of appeal when it knows that the award is unjust Therefore, it was held when the insured does, not prefer an appeal against the quantum of compensation, in such an eventuality the Act enables the insurer to contest it on all grounds ava lable to the insured including preferring an appeal against the award. Therefore, in vies of this legal position any appeal preferred by insurance companies either challenging only the liability to compensate or the quantum of compensation, the respondent-claimant is entitled to prefer a cross-appeal seeking enhancement of compensation. 15. As discussed above, the appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and the entire subject-matter of the claim petition is before the appellate court and, therefore, even if the appellant has filed the appeal only against a part of decree the court can consider the entire matter and pass appropriate orders. Therefore, as stated in our view cross-objection is maintainable. 11. In another decision a Bench of Karnataka High Court in the case of "The Assistant Commissioner and land Acquisition Officer, Gulbarga v. Chandrashekar" further held that in an appeal filed by the Insurance Company against the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal, the cross-objection is maintainable and after hearing the appeal on merit, the cross objection shall also be heard. The Court observed: 6. The further question is as to whether the cross-objection can be entertained when the appeal is already dismissed. We have already held that the cross-objection must be deemed to have been filed on 3.2.1995 and accordingly, it has to be deemed to be pending on the date when the appeal was dismissed. The Court observed: 6. The further question is as to whether the cross-objection can be entertained when the appeal is already dismissed. We have already held that the cross-objection must be deemed to have been filed on 3.2.1995 and accordingly, it has to be deemed to be pending on the date when the appeal was dismissed. Order 41, Rule 22(4) is not a bar for en entertaining the cross-objection, for, it is only an enabling provision making provision in the case of withdrawal of an appeal or the same be dismissed for default of the appellant. That provision cannot debar the Court from considering the cross-objection even if the appeal is disposed of. There may be cases in which, some times, while disposing of the appeal, the Court may omit to consider and dispose of cross-objection either by inadvertence or for any other reason. The disposal of the appeal on merits does not preclude the Court from considering the cross-objections filed in Court independently though it may be desirable that the appeal and cross-objections are considered and disposed of together. 12. In the instant case, the claimant has not filed cross objection in the appeal filed by the Insurance Company, rather he has filed the instant regular appeal exercising his statutory right under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In that view of the matter, in our considered opinion, merely because dismissal of the appeal filed by the Insurance Company, the instant appeal filed by the claimant cannot be dismissed on that ground. 13. Now the question arises as to whether compensation awarded by the Tribunal needs any enhancement? 14. Mr. H.K. Singh, learned Counsel for the Insurance Company submitted that claimant has not sustained any pecuniary loss inasmuch he has been continuing in service and getting salary. 15. I would first like to discuss the ratio decided by the Supreme Court for assessing compensation in case of personal injury sustained by the claimant in motor vehicles accident. 16. In the case of Jai Bhagwan v. Laxman Singh (1994)5SCC5 the Supreme Court held: 9. In the matter of assessment of damages in personal-injury-actions, the approach of the Court, as indica. 16. In the case of Jai Bhagwan v. Laxman Singh (1994)5SCC5 the Supreme Court held: 9. In the matter of assessment of damages in personal-injury-actions, the approach of the Court, as indica. 2d by the House of Lords in H. West & Son, Ltd. v. Shephard is guided by these considerations: My Lords, the damages which are to be awarded for a tort are those which 'so far as money can compensate, will give the injured party reparation for the wrongful act and for all the natural and direct consequences of the wrongful act' [Admiralty Comrs. v. Susquehanna (Owners), The Susquehanna]. The words 'so far as money can compensate' point to the impossibility of equating money with human suffering or personal deprivations. A money award can be calculated so as to make good a financial loss, Money may be awarded so that something tangible may be procured to replace something else of like nature which has been destroyed or lost. But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that judges and courts can do is to award sums which must be regarded, as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common assent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards. When all this is said it still must be that amounts which are awarded are to a considerable extent conventional. 17. In the case of Ramesh Chandra v. Randhir (1966)IILLJ152SC , the Supreme Court held; 7. With regard to ground XIX covering the question that the sum awarded for pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life etc. termed as general damages should be taken to be covered by damages granted for loss of earnings is concerned that too is misplaced and without any basis. The pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life which is a resultant and permanent fact occasioned by the nature of injuries received by the claimant and the ordeal he had to undergo. If money be any solace, the grant of Rs 20,000 to the claimant represents that solace. Money solace is the answer discovered by the Law of Torts. No substitute has yet been found to replace the element of money. If money be any solace, the grant of Rs 20,000 to the claimant represents that solace. Money solace is the answer discovered by the Law of Torts. No substitute has yet been found to replace the element of money. This, on the face of it appeals to us as a distinct head, quite apart from the inability to earn livelihood on the basis of incapacity or disability which is quite different. The incapacity or disability to earn a livelihood would have to be viewed not only in praesenti but in fufuro on reasonable expectancies and taking into account deptival of earnings of a conceivable period. This head being totally different cannot in our view overlap the grant of compensation under the head of pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of life. One head relates to the impairment of person's capacity to earn, the other relates to the pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life by the person himself For these reasons, we are of the considered view that the contentions raised by the truck owner appellant, in that behalf must be negatived and we hereby negative them. 18. In the case of Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh AIR2003SC674 , the Supreme Court held: 7. Firstly, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, (hereinafter referred to as "the MV Act") there is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case, where from the evidence brought on record if the Tribunal/court considers that the claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. The only embargo is - it should be "just " compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the MV Act. The only embargo is - it should be "just " compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the MV Act. Section 166 provides that an application for compensation arising out of an accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both, could be made (a ) by the person who has sustained the injury; or ( b ) by the owner of the property; or ( c ) where death has resulted from, the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. Under the proviso to Sub-section (1), all the legal representatives of the deceased who have not joined as the claimants are to be impleaded as respondents to the application for compensation, the other important part of the said section is Sub-section (4) which provides that "the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act". Hence, the Claims Tribunal in an appropriate case can treat the report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed. 25. Further, compensation to a victim of a motor vehicle accident or in case of a fatal accident to the legal representatives is awarded under two heads, namely, special damages -which are suffered by the victim or the legal representatives and general damages - which include compensation for pain and sufferings, loss of amenities, earning capacity and prospective expenses including expenses for medical treatment. With regard to 'the first part of the damages, that is, special damages suffered by the victim or the legal representative, it can be easily proved on the basis of the evidence which is in possession of the claimant. However with regard to the second part - general damages/compensation, it would be a matter of conjectures depending on the number of imponderables. However with regard to the second part - general damages/compensation, it would be a matter of conjectures depending on the number of imponderables. In him Poh Choo case 6 Lord Denning observed as under: The practice is now established and cannot be gainsaid that, in personal injury cases, the award of damages is assessed under four main heads: first, special damages in the shape of money actually expended; second, cost of future nursing and attendance and medical expenses; third, pain and suffering and loss of amenities; fourth, loss of future earnings. 19. In the instant case, the claimant, at the relevant time, was pasted as Assistant Sub Inspector in the Bihar Police Service and in the said accident, his right leg above knee and at the middle of the thigh has been amputated. Because of the said injury, the appellant-claimant has not only suffered pain, sufferings and loss of enjoyment of life, but his entire future career has come to an end giving him further mental agony. He lost his future prospects of promotion as well as the entire promotional benefits during his remaining period of service. We are, therefore, of the view that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal is in a lower side. Besides the above, although the Tribunal assessed of Rs. 6 lacs payable to the claimants, but deducted 1/3rd of the amount towards his personal expenses, which is absolutely erroneous in law. There was no question of deduction of 1/3rd out of the total compensation towards his personal expenses for the reason that the claimant is injured and alive and he shall have more personal expenses because of the nature of the injury sustained by him. The deduction of 1/3rd of the compensation amount, therefore, is absolutely unjustified 20. Having regard {to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the compensation amount of Rs. 6 lacs as assessed by the Tribunal is just and reasonable compensation and there shall not; be any deduction out of the said compensation amount. 21. For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal is allowed and it is held that the appellant is entitled to Rs. 6 lacs by way of compensation for the injury sustained by him. D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 22. I agree. Appeal allowed.