Judgment :- Aggrieved by order dated 012. 2000 of the Appellate Authority (VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai) in R.C.A.No.326 of 1999, reversing the order of eviction, Landlords have preferred this Revision Petition. For convenience, the parties are referred to as per their original rank in R.C.O.P.No.2419 of 1999. 1. Since it is a reversal order, brief facts and events are to be narrated. Landlords case in brief is as follows:- The premises bearing Door No.19 (Old No.22) Kachaleswarar Agraharam Street, Madras – 600 001 belong to Petitioners by a Will dated 22.06.1987 which was probated in High Court, Madras in O.P.No.577 of 1986. The Respondents were inducted as Tenants in respect of back entrance of ground floor portion of the premises for non-residential purpose. The First Petitioner is aged about 75 years and for sentimental reasons want to spend her last days with Daughters in the petition premises, who do not own any property of their own. Eviction Petition was filed under Section 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (for short "the Act") for Additional Accommodation and under Sec.10(2)(i) of the Act on the ground of Wilful Default. 2. 2. The Respondents/Tenants opposed Petition filing detailed Counter Statement, admitting the Tenancy and denying other averments. Main grounds raised by the Tenants are:- The First Petitioners Daughters are married and residing with their respective Husbands in posh residential localities and the alleged ground that the First Petitioner wants to occupy the Petition Premises to reside along with her married Daughters is unnatural and lacks bonafide. The very maintainability of Eviction Petition was challenged on the ground that Petition Premises being let out for non-residential purpose cannot be sought for residential purpose and that too for additional accommodation. The Respondents have also pleaded that if eviction is ordered, they would be put to greater hardship. 2. 3. Petitioners examined themselves as P.Ws.1 and 2 and Exs.P.1 to P.7 were marked on the side of the Petitioners. Haja Mohideen – Husband of the Second Respondent was examined onbehalf of the Tenants as R.W.1. To show that there was no wilful default, Tenants have produced Exs.R.1 to R.6. 4. 2. 3. Petitioners examined themselves as P.Ws.1 and 2 and Exs.P.1 to P.7 were marked on the side of the Petitioners. Haja Mohideen – Husband of the Second Respondent was examined onbehalf of the Tenants as R.W.1. To show that there was no wilful default, Tenants have produced Exs.R.1 to R.6. 4. Referring to the Will dated 29.07.1982 executed by Seetharama Rao – Husband of the First Petitioner and Father of Second Petitioner, learned Rent Controller in his elaborate order held that it was the wish of the Testator that Poojas are to be regularly performed in his house and the First Petitioners desire to live in the premises in her old age was bonafide. The Rent Controller further held that the First Petitioner being aged, cannot climb staircase to go to First Floor and found that requirement of ground floor is bonafide. Ground of Wilful Default was negatived. 5. Doubting bonafide of the Petitioners, the Appellate Authority reversed the findings of the Rent Controller and held that the First Petitioner residing along with Daughters and her desire to live in the house lacks bonafide. The Appellate Authority further held that for requirement of non-residential purpose, Petition ought to have been filed under Sec.10(3)(iii) of the Act and not under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act. The Appellate Authority observed that the findings of the Rent Controller regarding the wish of the Testator in performing Poojas in the house are not based on evidence, which is impugned in this Revision Petition. 3. Challenging the order of the Appellate Authority, learned counsel for the Revision Petitioners contended that when P.Ws.1 and 2 have consistently spoken about the requirement of the premises, the Appellate Authority without any rational basis reversed the findings of the Rent Controller. It was further submitted that Commissioner had noticed availability of Pooja Articles in the premises and performance of Poojas and Appellate Authority erred in not analysing the evidence in proper perspective. Learned counsel further submitted that the Petitioners being in occupation of part of the premises, Petition filed under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act for Additional Accommodation is well maintainable and prayed for restoration of order of Eviction passed by the Rent Controller. 4. Placing reliance upon number of decisions, learned counsel for the Respondents/Tenants submitted that there is no bonafide requirement. Learned counsel further submitted that the Petitioners being in occupation of part of the premises, Petition filed under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act for Additional Accommodation is well maintainable and prayed for restoration of order of Eviction passed by the Rent Controller. 4. Placing reliance upon number of decisions, learned counsel for the Respondents/Tenants submitted that there is no bonafide requirement. Arguing further, learned counsel further submitted that Landlords not being in physical possession of part of the building, Petition filed under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act for Additional Accommodation is not maintainable. It was further submitted that First Petitioner is living with her Son comfortably at Harrington Road, Chennai, which is a posh residential locality and her desire to reside in demised premises, which is highly commercial and congested locality in George Town, Chennai is unnatural. It was urged that relative hardship caused to the Tenants would be greater than the advantages of the Petitioners. 5. Placing reliance upon the decision reported in Sherwood Educational Society etc., ..Vs.. Abid Namazie and others ( 1997 (1) L.W. 323 ), learned counsel for the Landlords submitted that exercising revisional jurisdiction under Sec.25 of the Act, High Court can act only if it is shown that the Judgment of the Appellate Authority is in any way illegal, irregular or improper and High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence as a Court of Appeal. 6. In cases where order passed by the Appellate Authority is perverse, which had resulted in miscarriage of justice, High Court is empowered to exercise its power conferred under Sec.25 of the Act. Considering the scope of revisional jurisdiction of High Court under Sec.25 of the Act, in the decision reported in M/s.Shaw Wallace and Co.Ltd., ..Vs.. Govindas Purushothamdas and another (2001 (2) M.L.J. 80), the Supreme Court has held as follows:- "12. On a plain reading of Sec.25 of the Act, it is clear that the revisional jurisdiction vested in the High Court under that Section is wider than Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the regularity of the proceeding of the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, on examination, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass such orders accordingly. 13. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the regularity of the proceeding of the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if, on examination, it appears to the High Court that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass such orders accordingly. 13. In the case of M.S. Zahed Vs K.Raghavan ( 1999 (1) S.C.C. 439 ), the Supreme Court, interpreting Sec.50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 which is in pari material to Sec.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, held that it is within the scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact, illegally or incorrectly arrived at....." It is settled law that where the findings and reasons were not in appreciation of evidence and no proper application of correct principles, High Court can certainly reassess evidence to satisfy itself as to correctness or propriety of any decision. 7. The demised premises is bearing Door No.19 (Old No.22) Kachaleswarar Agraharam Street, George Town, Madras – 600 001. Admittedly, the premises is in commercial area. The Petitioners, who are Mother and Son have become entitled to the property under the Will executed by Seetharama Rao – Husband of First Petitioner and Father of Second Petitioner. As per the Will, the First Petitioner shall be entitled to live in the house and Second Petitioner is entitled to life estate and thereafter the property to devolve upon Sons of the Second Petitioner. In the Will, the Testator has stated about Pooja articles for services to his family deity worship in his house of the value of Rs.81,625/-. The Testator has expressed the desire that Pooja to be performed in his house from generation to generation as seen from the following:- "...I, as the Karta of Hindu Undivided Family (Bigger) am also in possession of Puja articles for services to my family deity worshipped in my house of the value of Rs.81,625/-. ....... The Puja articles are held by me in Trust for the family deity. All the articles utilised for worship of my family deity shall be taken by my son in Trust and utilised for the worship of the deity in my house from generation to generation. ....... The Puja articles are held by me in Trust for the family deity. All the articles utilised for worship of my family deity shall be taken by my son in Trust and utilised for the worship of the deity in my house from generation to generation. He shall not be entitled to alienate the same but he shall be entitled to substitute the same with new jewels and silver articles as and when necessary and utilise the same for Puja to be performed which I consider as of paramount importance and I hope my son will abide by this directive...." (Emphasis added) 8. There is no denial that Pooja articles are kept in the house and Poojas are regularly performed in the premises, in a portion, which is in occupation of Petitioners. P.W.2 has stated that as per the desire of his Father, Pooja should be performed every day in the premises and every day Pooja has been performed even after death of his Father as per the wish of his Father. Since Tenants denied occupation of the Landlords in a part of the Petition Premises, Commissioner was appointed, who has filed Report mentioning about the performance of Poojas and the location of the premises in the occupation of the Petitioners where Poojas are performed and other portion let out to Respondents. It is to be noted that no objection was filed to Commissioners Report, in which there is clear reporting about the regular performance of Poojas in the premises. On the basis of evidence of P.W.2 and Commissioners Report, Rent Controller has rightly held that as per the desire of Testator every day Poojas are performed in the premises. 9. The Appellate Authority has found that the alleged requirement of the Petitioner was not for Pooja purposes. Learned counsel for the Respondents contended that there is absolutely no pleadings with regard to existence of Pooja room or requirement of the premises for conducting of daily Pooja. There is no specific pleading nor evidence regarding performance of Pooja. In his evidence, P.W.2 has clearly stated about performance of Pooja and Landlords being in occupation of part of the premises, his evidence is substantiated by the Report of the Advocate Commissioner. 10. There is no specific pleading nor evidence regarding performance of Pooja. In his evidence, P.W.2 has clearly stated about performance of Pooja and Landlords being in occupation of part of the premises, his evidence is substantiated by the Report of the Advocate Commissioner. 10. Holding that the Rent Control proceeding is not to be compared with ordinary civil suits and no strict approach regarding pleadings could be adopted, in the decision reported in Dakshinamoorthy ..Vs.. Alphonsea Celestine Kamala Benjamine ( 2000 (3) L.W. 482 ) S.S.SUBRAMANI, J., has held as follows:- "...Rent Control proceeding is not to be compared with ordinary civil suits. Rent Control proceeding is only a summary procedure and when the parties are aware as to the point which they have to meet and if evidence is let in, decision will have to be taken following the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The only requirement under Rent Control Act is that the parties must be aware about the case which they have to meet and even if there is no pleading, if parties have let in evidence, the same could be considered by Rent Controller..." .11. Holding that lack of pleadings should not be a ground for dismissal of eviction petitioner, in the decision reported in S.V.M. Nagavairava Sundaram Vs S. Bageerathan and another ( 1999 (2) M.L.J. 28 ) learned Single Judge observed as follows:- ."...The purpose of pleading is only to satisfy the principles of natural justice i.e., the opposite party must be made known about the case which he has to meet. If the opposite party himself is aware of what he has to plead and prove, and joint in issue with the landlord, and he has no case of any prejudice even if there is lack of pleading in the Rent Control Petition, no Rent Control Petition should be dismissed on the ground of this technicality..." 12. From the above decisions, it is clear that even if there is any lack of pleadings, if the party understood the case and adduce evidence, Eviction Petition is not liable to be rejected merely on the ground of lack of pleadings or vague pleadings. The Appellate Authority erred in doubting the bonafide requirement on the ground of lack of pleadings and erred in brushing aside evidence of P.W.2 and Report of the Commissioner. .13. The Appellate Authority erred in doubting the bonafide requirement on the ground of lack of pleadings and erred in brushing aside evidence of P.W.2 and Report of the Commissioner. .13. The Respondents challenged the very maintainability of Eviction Petition on the ground that Petition premises being let out for non-residential purposes cannot be sought for residential purposes, that too by way of additional accommodation. Appellate Authority accepted the contention that the requirement of non-residential portion should be sought for under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and not under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act. Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act would apply only in case where the Landlord is occupying a building which is his own. Under Sec.10(3)(c) the expression "notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a)" is very significant. The intention of the Legislature is that a Landlord can claim possession of a building which is in the occupation of a Tenant, if he requires it for his own occupation either for his residential or non-residential purposes depending on the nature of the building. 14. It is well settled that if the Tenant is occupying a portion of the building for one purpose and if the Landlord, who is occupying another portion of the same building for another purpose, yet the Landlord can seek Additional Accommodation under Sec.10(3) (c) of the Act irrespective of the purpose for which the Tenant is occupying his portion of the building. Nature of the Building occupied by the Tenant is irrelevant. (vide Meenakshisundaram Vs Gothamraj Jain (1994 T.L.N.J. 223) and Sri Balaganesan Metals Vs M.N. Shanmugam Chetty (A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1668)). The contention raised regarding maintainability of Petition under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act is devoid of merits. .15. Additional Accommodation only if in occupation of part of building:- .Placing reliance upon the decision reported in S. Thangaraj Vs Balasubramaniam and others ( 1998 (II) M.L.J. 715 ) on behalf of the Respondents/Tenants it was contended that Sec.10(3) of the Act is not attracted when the Landlord is not in actual possession of any portion of the building. In the said case, Landlord was in possession of one vacant portion in building, but not in occupation of such portion and prayed for eviction of Tenant in other portion. The Landlord was doing Hotel business in another locality. In the said case, Landlord was in possession of one vacant portion in building, but not in occupation of such portion and prayed for eviction of Tenant in other portion. The Landlord was doing Hotel business in another locality. Under those factual circumstances, it was held that claim for shifting is not proved and provisions of Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act are not attracted. .16. Placing reliance on the above decision, it was contended that Petitioners/Landlords are not in physical possession of the premises and as such, the question of seeking eviction for additional accommodation does not arise at all. Learned counsel for the Respondents further submitted that the First Petitioner, who has chosen to stay with her Son and comfortably residing in Harrington Road, cannot be said to be in occupation of portion of the premises so as to invoke Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act. The contention that Petitioners/Landlords are not in occupation of any portion of the building is untenable. In his evidence, P.W.2 has stated that Poojas are regularly performed in the premises and all Pooja articles are kept in the premises as per desire of the Testator. P.W.2 has further stated that apart from Pooja Room, two bath room, two Toilets are in their occupation. Only the backside portion i.e., Car Shed, Kitchen was let out to Respondents. Upstairs portion let out to relatives on payment of nominal rent. Petitioners occupation of portion of building is proved by evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 and by the Commissioners Report. It is to be noted that the portion let out is integral part of the same building. The building having same Door Number and are not two different portions in the same building. There is a dividing wall between two portions which appears to have been constructed only for the purpose of letting out portion to the Respondents. The door dividing two parts and two windows have been closed to divide portion for the purpose of letting of a portion to the Respondents. From Ex.P.7 – Photographs, part of building is in occupation of Landlords and the demised premises being integral part is amply made clear. 17. In the decision reported in Kuthalingam Vs Jahir Hussain ( 1997 (2) L.W. 470 ) it was held that merely because two door numbers are separated by a Wall, where it is only one building it will not alter the situation. 17. In the decision reported in Kuthalingam Vs Jahir Hussain ( 1997 (2) L.W. 470 ) it was held that merely because two door numbers are separated by a Wall, where it is only one building it will not alter the situation. Identity of two portions not to be judged on the basis of the buildings being separated by a separate wall or two walls with intervening space. Plea of Tenants that it is two premises and Landlords are not in occupation of part of the building and cannot invoke Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act does not merit acceptance. (see also Karur Ghee Stores Vs N. Palaniappan and Another (2001 (3) C.T.C. 206)). .18. Whether Additional Accommodation should be required for the same purpose?:- .On behalf of Tenants, learned counsel for the Respondents has contended that the Landlords can ask for additional accommodation for residential purposes only if the Tenancy is residential. It was further submitted that the Tenants occupying portion of the building for non-residential purpose and the Landlords cannot seek additional accommodation under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act for residential purpose. This contention has no merits and is untenable in the light of the consistent view taken by the Courts. .19. "Additional Accommodation" means in addition to what exists. In the decision reported in Meenakshisundaram Vs Gothamraj Jain (1994 T.L.N.J. 223) it was held as follows:- ."...Under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act an exception is carved out in cases where the Landlord is occupying a portion of the building, which is also occupied by the Tenant in another portion. If the tenant is occupying a portion of the building for one purpose and if the Landlord who is occupying another portion of the same building for another purpose, yet the Landlord can seek additional accommodation under Sec.10(3)(c) irrespective of the purpose for which the Tenant is occupying his portion of the Tenant. The nature of the building occupied by the Tenant is irrelevant...." 20. Considering the scope of Sec.10 (3)(c) of the Act, the position is well settled in the decision reported in Sri Balaganesan Metals ..Vs.. The nature of the building occupied by the Tenant is irrelevant...." 20. Considering the scope of Sec.10 (3)(c) of the Act, the position is well settled in the decision reported in Sri Balaganesan Metals ..Vs.. M.N. Shanmugam Chetty (A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1668) that where a Landlord is in occupation of a portion of the building and is using that portion as his residence seek eviction of the Tenant, who is using the remaining portion for non-residential purposes, Landlord must establish that Additional Accommodation is required for the remaining portion or any portion of the building for residential purposes for its being used as a non-residential by the Tenant. The Petitioners being in occupation of part of the building for residential purposes like performing Pooja, petition filed under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act for Additional Accommodation is maintainable. The Appellate Authority erred in saying that Petition ought to have been filed only under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. 21. In any event, misquoting of provision of law ought not to have been a ground for reversing order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. It is well settled that on account of misquoting of provision of law, a party is not disentitled to the relief sought for. Admittedly, the Petition was filed for eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. The Appellate Authority erred in saying that Petition ought to have been filed under Sec.10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. .22. Bonafide Requirement:- .Placing reliance upon the decision reported in T.S. Sethuraman Vs J. Nagalakshmi ( 1997 (3) C.T.C. 339 ), learned counsel for the Respondents/Tenants has submitted that the Landlords stating one reason in Petition and giving another reason in evidence, requirement is not bonafide. It was further submitted that desire must be decided objectively and burden of proving, genuine requirement is on the Landlord. Learned counsel further urged that Daughters of First Petitioner are married and living with their respective families and such being the position, the alleged requirement to occupy a non-residential small portion that too in a commercial and congested locality in George Town, Chennai lacks bonafide. It was further submitted that if really Landlady had intention to carry out the wishes of the Testator to continue the Pooja and other ceremonies, they would not have let out the properties to the Respondents that too two years after grant of Probate of the Will. 23. It was further submitted that if really Landlady had intention to carry out the wishes of the Testator to continue the Pooja and other ceremonies, they would not have let out the properties to the Respondents that too two years after grant of Probate of the Will. 23. No doubt, the premises was let out after the Will was probated. But, First Petitioner is aged about 75 years. At her old age, quite naturally, the First Petitioner likes to be in the place where she lived with her Husband. Her evidence is to be considered only in the context of wishes of Testator in the Will. Evidence of bonafide requirement cannot be mechanically considered ignoring human sentiments. Taking into consideration old age of the First Petitioner, Rent Controller has rightly observed that in her old age, the First Petitioner desires to be in the house where Poojas are performed as per wishes of her Husband. In my considered view, there is no lack of bonafide. In the First Floor, the Petitioners relatives are residing. Being aged about 75 years, the First Petitioner would not be in a position to climb the staircase and requirement of ground floor is a bonafide. 24. Relative Hardship:- Under Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act, the Court is to satisfy itself regarding bonafide claim of the Landlord before ordering eviction. The Court should also consider hardship to the Tenants by granting eviction in case of requirement for additional accommodation. On the basis of facts and evidence, the Rent Controller recorded a finding that relative hardship could be more on the part of the Petitioners than on the part of the Tenants. The Rent Controllers finding that relative hardship to the Tenants would be lesser is fortified by evidence on record. P.W.2 has stated that the Tenants are having another Shop – Hameeda Hardwares and Tenant is residing in the First floor of that premises. Running business in another shop by the Tenant is the relevant factor to be reckoned with in considering relative hardship. (vide P.A. Sundaram ..Vs.. Mrs. S. Amaravathy ( 1998 (2) L.W. 341 )). When the Rent Controller has recorded a specific finding about relative hardship, the Appellate Authority erred in reversing the same finding that relative hardship caused to the Tenants would be more. 25. The findings of the Appellate Authority are not in proper appreciation of evidence. (vide P.A. Sundaram ..Vs.. Mrs. S. Amaravathy ( 1998 (2) L.W. 341 )). When the Rent Controller has recorded a specific finding about relative hardship, the Appellate Authority erred in reversing the same finding that relative hardship caused to the Tenants would be more. 25. The findings of the Appellate Authority are not in proper appreciation of evidence. On erroneous application of principles, the Appellate Authority reversed the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. In the decision reported in P.S. Pareed Kaka and others Vs Shafee Ahmed Saheb ( 2004 (5) S.C.C. 241 ) the Supreme Court has held that the High Court has jurisdiction to go into the legality or correctness of the decision, which includes the power to appreciate evidence and that the High Court can interfere with the finding of fact also. The examination as to the correctness involves appreciation of evidence and that the High Court can interfere with the finding of the Rent Controller if the findings are improbable. In the present case, the order of Appellate Authority suffers from wrong approach and perversity calling for interference. 26. For the foregoing reasons, the Impugned Order dated 012. 2000 of the Appellate Authority (VII Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai) in R.C.A.No.326 of 1999 is set aside and this Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The order of Rent Controller (XI Judge, Small Causes Court, Chennai) dated 02.03.1999 in R.C.O.P.No.2419 of 1999 is confirmed. Two months from the date of this order is granted to the Respondents/Tenants for vacating and handing over vacant possession to the Petitioners/Landlords.