JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ashok Bhushan, J.—Heard Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. By this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for quashing the order dated 12.2.2007 passed by the District Magistrate suspending the fire arm licence of the petitioner and directing him to deposit the same at the police station. Simultaneously, the petitioner was directed to show cause as to why his licence be not cancelled. The District Magistrate in his order dated 12.2.2007 on the basis of the report dated 7.2.2007 of the Superintendent of Police, the report dated 2.2.2007 of the Incharge Inspector, Kotwali and the Circle Officer dated 5.2.2007 felt satisfied that the action of the petitioner has endangered public safety on account of which it is not desirable to permit the licence to remain with the petitioner. The order refers to case crime No. 48 of 2007 Under Sections 43, 149, 436, 336, I.P.C. and Section 7 of Criminal Law Amendment Act, which was registered against the petitioner on 29.1.2007 in which it was alleged that a U.P.S.R.T.C. Bus was damaged and set to fire by putting kerosene oil and further the petitioner has fired from his licensed rifle terrorising the people. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner challenging the order made following submissions : 1. That the suspension of petitioner’s arm licence having not been made for any definite period, the said suspension is illegal. 2. Pending enquiry for cancellation of arm licence, there is no jurisdiction with the District Magistrate to suspend the arm licence. 3. Mere pendency of a criminal case is no ground to suspend the arm licence. 4. Refuting the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel contended that the suspension order passed by the District Magistrate is in accordance with Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act. He submits that the suspension has been ordered after recording satisfaction by the District Magistrate as contemplated under Section 17(3). He further submits that in the facts of the present case suspension cannot be said to be for indefinite period. Learned Counsel for both the parties have placed reliance on various judgments of this Court which -shall be referred to while considering the aforesaid submissions. 5. He further submits that in the facts of the present case suspension cannot be said to be for indefinite period. Learned Counsel for both the parties have placed reliance on various judgments of this Court which -shall be referred to while considering the aforesaid submissions. 5. The first submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the suspension order having not made for any definite period the same is illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act. 6. Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959 is as follows : "17 (3) The licensing authority may by order in writing suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit or revoke a licence— (a) if the licensing authority is satisfied that the holder of the licence is prohibited by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, from acquiring, having in his possession or carrying any arms or ammunition, or is of unsound mind, or is for any reason unfit for a licence under this Act; or (b) if the licensing authority deems it necessary for the security of the public peace or for public safety to suspend or revoke the licence; or (c) if the licence was obtained by the suppression of material information or on the basis of wrong information provided by the holder of the licence or any other person on his behalf at the time of applying for it; or (d) if any of the conditions of the licence has been contravened; or (e) if the holder of the licence has failed to comply with a notice under sub-section (1) requiring him to deliver-up the licence.” 7. The key words in sub-section (3) of Section 17 is “suspend a licence for such period as it thinks fit”. The issue to be considered is that what is the meaning and contents of the words “such period”. Whether the word “such period” connotes only a definite period expressed by days, months or year or it can also be for period denoted by some other expression. The word “period" has been defined in Webster Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedic Edition as follows : “Period.—1. A definite portion of time marked and defined by some recurring event or phenomenon. 2. A lapse of time, a series of years; an age; era; also, a stage of life. 3. The word “period" has been defined in Webster Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedic Edition as follows : “Period.—1. A definite portion of time marked and defined by some recurring event or phenomenon. 2. A lapse of time, a series of years; an age; era; also, a stage of life. 3. The concluding limit of any sequence of years, events, acts, or phenomena; termination.” 8. In Blacks Law Dictionary Sixth Edition the word “period” has been defined as under : “Period” Any point, space, or division of time.” 9. From the above definitions of the word “period” it is clear that the period is not always a fixed time denoted by days, months, or year. It can be period between two events, acts. Thus the period can be a fixed time denoted by months or year or it can also be something which is dependant on some happening or contingency. Most common illustration in this regard can be such period when a person lives in this world. A period during which a person lives is not a definite period but is an indefinite period of time which is contingent on the death of a person. Thus Section 17 (3) when mentions “such period”, the said period can be fixed by months or year by some other contingency. Thus for determining whether any period is provided for suspension of arm licence the contents of the order of suspension has to be looked into. It is not necessary that the District Magistrate should always intimate that the suspension is for some days, months or years. Even if month or year is not mentioned the period has to be found out, if any, in the order, Obviously suspension cannot be for infinity or for an uncontemplated period. 10. The expressions “such period” came for consideration on several occasions before several learned Single Judges of this Court in different cases. This Court in Abdul Aziz v. Commissioner, Faizabad Division and others, 1993 LCD 619 took the view that the suspension order should indicate the period for which it is suspended. The same view was taken by another Single Judge in a case of Vinod Kumar Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1994 LCD 30. This Court in Abdul Aziz v. Commissioner, Faizabad Division and others, 1993 LCD 619 took the view that the suspension order should indicate the period for which it is suspended. The same view was taken by another Single Judge in a case of Vinod Kumar Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1994 LCD 30. Again a learned Single Judge in Sadri Ram v. District Magistrate/Licensing Authority, District Azamgarh and others, 1998 (16) LCD 1064 : 1998 (37) A.C.C. 830 has taken the view that suspension has to be for a definite period to be specified in the order. Following was laid down in paragraph 12 of the judgement. “12. The propositions that emerge from the above discussion, may be summed up as under : (a) the licensing authority has no power to suspend the arms licence pending enquiry into its cancellation/suspension nor has it the power to suspend the licence for the definite period. (b) licensing authority has the power to suspend for specified period a fire arm licence on being satisfied as to existence of all or any of the conditions visualised by clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (3) of Section 17 of the Act sans any prior opportunity of hearing being given to the licence holder but such order of suspension shall not attain finality until the aggrieved party has been heard and his objections if any, adjudicated. In other words, suspension of arms licence for specified period or its revocation under Section 17(3) of the Act, if ordered without affording opportunity of hearing, would endure in suspended animation until the aggrieved party has been heard by the licensing authority and his objections if any, are adjudicated; (c) the licensing authority can also for the furtherance of the immediate remedial actions, exercise in facts and circumstances of a given case, an incidental power of directing the licence holder to surrender his licence until objections have been decided and, (d) suspension under Section 17(3) of the Act must be for definite period to be specified in the order by the licensing authority.” 11. Another learned Single Judge in 2002 (2) ACrR 1835, Bibhuti Narain Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, too the same view. Paragraph 8 of the said judgement is quoted below : “8. Another learned Single Judge in 2002 (2) ACrR 1835, Bibhuti Narain Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, too the same view. Paragraph 8 of the said judgement is quoted below : “8. From a reading of the aforesaid statutory provision, it is apparent that specification of the period for which the licence shall not remain operative, is necessary in the order of suspension of licence passed by the licensing authority. In Ram Murari Madhukar’s case (supra), it has been held by this Court that if the period is not specified, for which the suspension shall remain operative, the order is illegal and invalid. In the impugned order of suspension, no period has been specified. The impugned order simply says that the licences were suspended till final orders were passed from immediate effect. The petitioner was asked to surrender his guns at the police station. Thus, the order was wholly illegal. This Court rightly granted an interim order by which the operation of the impugned orders was stayed vide order dated 17.10.1990, which is still operative.” 12. Following Sadri Ram v. District Magistrate/Licensing Authority District Azamgarh and others (supra) again same view was taken by the learned Single Judge in Ravindra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2003 (53) ALR 484. 13. There are cases where the suspension was not found to have been vitiated on account of non-mention of definite period in the suspension period. In Tale Singh Yadav and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1998 All. C.J. 298, similar questions were considered. In the aforesaid case the writ petitions were filed challenging the order suspending the arm licence and simultaneously giving show cause notice as to why licence be not cancelled. The submission made before the learned Single Judge relying on Vinod Kumar Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others case (supra) and Abdul Aziz v. Commissioner. Faizabad Division and others case (supra) was that suspension order could be passed only for specified period and such orders cannot be passed for indefinite period pending enquiry or pendency of criminal case against a licence holder. Learned Single Judge in the aforesaid case considered the words “for such period as it thinks fit” as occurring in Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act. Learned Single Judge in the aforesaid case considered the words “for such period as it thinks fit” as occurring in Section 17 (3) of the Arms Act. It was held that Section 17 (3) does not provide that the licensing authority may suspend the licence for specific period only. Paragraphs 15 and 17 of the judgement is quoted below : “15. In view of Full Bench decisions of this Court the reference of which has been mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs which are binding upon this Court, this Court cannot delve into the question that no order suspending the Arms Licence can be passed for the period pending enquiry inasmuch as the Full Bench in Kailash Nath’s case (supra) and Rana Pratap Singh’s case (supra) has clearly laid down the law that the Arms Licence can be cancelled/revoked even without giving an opportunity to show cause but a post decisional hearing must be provided. The words "for such period as it thinks fit” do not mean that only for a specific period an Arms Licence can be suspended. Section 17(3) of the Arms Act does not provide that the licensing authority may suspend the licence for a specific period only, hence it cannot be said that for a non-specific period or indefinite period licence cannot be suspended or revoked. What is incumbent upon the District Magistrate is that after suspension/revocation of the Arms licence, the licensing authority must give an opportunity to the licensee to show cause against such suspension or revocation. It seems that the attention of the Hon’ble Single Judges who decided the case of Abdul Aziz v. Commissioner, Faizabad Division and others (supra) and Vinod Kumar Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra) were not drawn towards the earlier decisions of the Full Benches of this Court in Chhanga Prasad Sahu and Kailash Nath (supra). The Full Bench in Rana Pratap Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra) in paragraph 32 of the report clearly indicated that as regards suspension of an Arms Licence by the licensing authority during the enquiry, this, it may be clarified, may be done only in the manner as explained in the judgement in Chhanga Prasad Sahu’s case (supra) and not without application of mind and recording of reasons by the licensing authority with such reasons and circumstances being in consonance with the provisions of the Arms Act. In Chhanga Prasad Sahu”s case (supra) the Full Bench clearly laid down the law that in a case where it is proceeding to enquiry into the existence of the facts justifying making of an order for revocation/suspension of an Arms Licence, it is open to suspend the licence pending such enquiry and before it has formed an opinion with regard to existence of such facts. The Full Bench further in paragraph 21 of the report observed : “It is thus evident before a power can be implied as an incidental power the Court has to be satisfied that existence of such power is absolutely essential for the discharge of the power conferred and not merely that it is convenient for its exercise. In our opinion it can neither be said that the power to suspend an arms licence, pending an enquiry of the nature that licensing authority may like to make before ordering revocation/suspension of the arms licence, is absolutely necessary nor can it be said that the power to revoke/suspend a licence in the circumstances mentioned in Section 17 of the Act, cannot be exercised unless a power to suspend the licence pending enquiry is also conceded to the licensing authority”. “17. In view of the above the contention of the petitioner that the notices are vitiated for the reasons that no specific period for suspending the licence has been indicated is totally misconceived.” 14. Another learned Single Judge in Haidar Ali Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, 2004 (1) J.I.C. 563 (All) repelled the similar submission relying on the facts that in the order suspending the licence and issuing show cause notice specific date has been fixed by which the petitioner has to submit a reply and the argument that the suspension was for indefinite period was repelled. Following was held in paragraphs 3 and 4 : “3. The petitioner without submitting reply to the show cause notice aforesaid straight away rushed up to this Court with the arguments that this order of suspension amounts to suspension for indefinite period, which according to the Full Bench- of this Court is not permissible as asserted by learned Counsel for the petitioner.” “4. The argument is misconceived. The petitioner without submitting reply to the show cause notice aforesaid straight away rushed up to this Court with the arguments that this order of suspension amounts to suspension for indefinite period, which according to the Full Bench- of this Court is not permissible as asserted by learned Counsel for the petitioner.” “4. The argument is misconceived. The case which was being dealt with in Full Bench in Chhanqa Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1984 (10) ALR 223, it has not refer as to whether the show cause notice in that case directed the petitioner fixing a time limit to submit a reply, whereas in the present case a specific date has been fixed and when the action of the petitioner that in case he does not submit any reply by that date the petitioner’s licence shall be cancelled presuming that he has nothing to say in the matter. In this view of the matter, the decision relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention stands on different set of facts and are distinguishable.” 15. From the above noted decisions it is clear that the suspension can be ordered by the District Magistrate for a period which is to be spelled out from the order itself. The suspension cannot be ordered for eternity or for a indefinite period. As noted above, the word “period” can be denoted both from normal connotation of period by month, or year or it can be a period which is contingent on an event. One of the definitions of word “period” is also “the completion or end of a cycle, event or series of events.” When suspension is ordered after being satisfied about the existence of conditions as enumerated in Section 17 (3) and which is coupled with a notice giving a period to show cause as to why the arm licence be not cancelled, the suspension is upto the event or period till a decision is taken by the District Magistrate regarding cancellation of arm licence. The proceeding for cancellation may be either terminated or notice be confirmed cancelling the licence. Thus the suspension is contingent on the order to be passed on the notice given for cancellation. Thus in these circumstances it cannot be said that the suspension is for not any period which can be spelled out or which is not specified. 16. The proceeding for cancellation may be either terminated or notice be confirmed cancelling the licence. Thus the suspension is contingent on the order to be passed on the notice given for cancellation. Thus in these circumstances it cannot be said that the suspension is for not any period which can be spelled out or which is not specified. 16. Coming to the facts of the present case the notice clearly mentions that the petitioner is to submit a reply by 19th February, 2007 and in case no reply is submitted ex parte order will be passed presuming that the petitioner has to say nothing. Thus in this case the suspension is for such period till an order is passed on the notice of cancellation given by the order dated 12.2.2007. The period of suspension although not denoted in months, or year but is specified by an event i.e. taking a final decision on the proceedings hence the suspension is only for the period till the decision is taken on the notice. If the notice is discharged, suspension will automatically come to an end, and if the notice is confirmed the order of cancellation shall bring to an end the suspension of arm licence. This does not mean that in no case the suspension can be interfered on the ground that it is not for a specified period. In case the order is passed by the District Magistrate suspending the arm licence without saying any further i.e. with regard to any proceeding for cancellation or mentioning about the period of suspension, the said suspension will be bad because no period can be spelled out or culled out from the said suspension. Thus the ratio which is deducible from the above case is that the suspension of arm licence can be ordered under Section 17 (3) only for such period which may be specified or culled out from the order. It is relevant to note that the legislature has not used the words “a definite period”. Use of the words “such period as it may thinks fit” gives flexibility to licensing authority to direct for suspension for such period which may either be specified by days, months or year or which may be specified by some event or contingency. Thus no infirmity is found in the impugned order on the above submission. 17. Use of the words “such period as it may thinks fit” gives flexibility to licensing authority to direct for suspension for such period which may either be specified by days, months or year or which may be specified by some event or contingency. Thus no infirmity is found in the impugned order on the above submission. 17. The second submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner has recently been considered by me in the case of Ramesh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2007(3) ADJ 606 . After considering the four Full Benches judgements of this Court dealing Section 17 of the Arms Act following was laid down : “In view of above discussions it is to be held that the suspension of arm licence during pendency of an enquiry for cancellation can be done only in accordance with the conditions as laid down in paragraph 18 of Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others case (supra) and as laid down in paragraph 32 of Rana Pratap Singh and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others’ case (supra). As noticed above the suspension is justified or not depends on the order of the licensing authority and on the scrutiny as to whether the conditions for suspension during the enquiry has been fulfilled or not. There is no such broad or general proposition deducible from the above noted three Full Bench judgments that the suspension of arms licence can never be ordered during pendency of enquiry." 18. Examining the order impugned in the writ petition in the light of ratio laid down in Ramesh Singh v. State of U.P. and others (supra) it is clear that the requisite satisfaction has been recorded by the District Magistrate within the meaning of Section 17(3) of the Arms Act for suspension of arm licence and the suspension is thus in accordance with law laid down in Chhanga Prasad Sahu v. State of U.P. and others case (supra), 1994 AWC 145 (FB) and Rana Pratap Singh and others v. State of U.P. Pradesh and others case (supra), 1995 All CJ 200 (FB). 19. Coming to the third submission that mere involvement in the criminal case is not sufficient to suspend the arm licence, there cannot be any dispute with the proposition. 19. Coming to the third submission that mere involvement in the criminal case is not sufficient to suspend the arm licence, there cannot be any dispute with the proposition. Following was laid down in the aforesaid case of Ramesh Singh v. State of U.P. and others (supra) : "There cannot be any dispute with the proposition laid down in the above case that the involvement in criminal case or pendency of criminal case cannot be ground for revocation of licence. The suspension or revocation can be ordered when the conditions as mentioned in Section 17(3) is fulfilled. Thus without recording a finding that the security of the public peace or public safety is endangered the suspension cannot be ordered only on the ground that a criminal case is pending against a person. Present is not a case of passing of suspension order merely on the ground of pendency of the criminal case. The incident which took place on 20.11.2006 has been taken into consideration and it is the happening on that particular day which has formed the basis of suspension of arm licence. Unless registration or pendency of criminal case can be said to have nexus with endangering the public peace or public safety, the mere pendency or registration of a criminal case cannot be a ground for suspension. Thus on the second submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner the order of suspension of arm licence cannot be held to be illegal. In view of foregoing discussions no grounds have been made out to interfere with the order suspending the arm licence of the petitioner. It is, however, observed that the final decision regarding proceedings for cancellation of arm licence may be taken expeditiously by the District Magistrate.” 20. There are other judgments of the learned Single Judges of this Court on above issue. In Ghan Shyam Singh v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra and another, 2003 (6) A.W.C. 5605 and Harprasad and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh through Secretary Home and others, 2005 (52) ACC 226, this Court laid down that mere pendency of criminal case is no ground for cancellation of arm licence. The proposition is well settled that suspension only on the ground that criminal case is pending against a person is unjustified. The proposition is well settled that suspension only on the ground that criminal case is pending against a person is unjustified. There has to be satisfaction recorded by the District Magistrate in the order within the meaning of Section 17 (3) for suspension of arm licence. Mere reference to a criminal case or pendency of a criminal case is not sufficient. It depends upon the gravity of the conduct of a person and nature of the criminal case which may have relevance. A Full Bench of Patna High Court has occasion to consider this aspect of the case in AIR 1987 Pat 122 , Kapildeo Singh v. State of Bihar and others. The Full Bench held that it is not the pendency of any or every criminal case which would inflexibly warrant the suspension. The use or employment of the licensed weapon in the alleged crime may be relevant factor. Following was laid down in paragraphs 11 and 12 : “11. A strong note of caution, however, must be sounded in this context. It is not the pendency of any and every criminal case which would inflexibly warrant the suspension or revocation of a licence validly granted. A criminal case may range from a paltry traffic offence to the most horrendous capital crime. Whilst the pendency of the former may hardly provide an adequate basis under Section 17(3), in the case of the latter after notice and hearing of the explanation such action may well become necessary. Equally, the use or employment of the licensed weapon in the alleged crime might well be a relevant and added factor for consideration in the exercise of the discretion by the licensing authority. There is no gainsaying that licensed weapons are not to be allowed to degenerate into crime weapons. It bears repetition that sub-section (3) puts the matter in the subjective satisfaction of the licensing authority and inevitably the issue cannot be put in the procrustean bed of a precise definition or an exhaustive enumeration of situations in which such discretion may be exercised. 12. Mr. Mishra had then sought to contend that the actual use or misuse of the licensed weapon in the alleged murder and even the petitioner’s participation therein is as yet subjudice before the Court of Session. 12. Mr. Mishra had then sought to contend that the actual use or misuse of the licensed weapon in the alleged murder and even the petitioner’s participation therein is as yet subjudice before the Court of Session. Therefore, the licensing authority could draw no sustenance from what as yet are only allegations in a pending case, for revoking the licence. This argument loses sight of the fact that under sub-section (3)(a) it is the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrate that for some reason the holder has become unfit for the licence. It is not the requirement of clause (a) aforesaid that there must be a formal conviction on a criminal charge only for holding a person as unfit. There is a wide gap betwixt the two, namely, a reasonable subjective satisfaction and an objective conviction on a criminal charge resting on the basis of acceptable evidence. One cannot go to the length of holding that because the matter is as yet pending trial the licensing authority could not be subjectively satisfied about the unfitness of the holder. If the argument of Mr. Mishra were to be accepted then in the context of even a most horrendous crime committed with licensed weapons, the licensing authority would be denuded of all powers of suspending or revoking the licence till the completion of the trial and a conviction therein.” 21. From the above quoted authorities it is clear that mere pendency of criminal case cannot be a ground for suspension. However, the nature and gravity of the criminal case coupled with conduct of accused therein, may be relevant factor for consideration under Section 17 (3) and it is too wide proposition to accept that pendency of criminal case against a person can in no event be looked into or considered for purpose of Section 17(3) of the Arms Act. 22. Coming to the facts of the present case the suspension has not been directed only on account of mere pendency of the criminal case. The conduct of the applicant and the report of the police officers were looked into and there is also allegation of use of fire arm in the incident. Thus the suspension order in the present case is not on account of mere pendency of the criminal case. Thus none of the submissions of the Counsel for the petitioner are potent enough to declare the suspension order invalid. Thus the suspension order in the present case is not on account of mere pendency of the criminal case. Thus none of the submissions of the Counsel for the petitioner are potent enough to declare the suspension order invalid. No ground is made out to interfere with the suspension order. However, it is provided that the proceedings for cancellation be expeditiously concluded by the District Magistrate preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. 23. Subject to above the writ petition is dismissed. ————