JUDGMENT Hon’ble Amitava Lala, J.—According to the contesting parties, both the writ petitions are similarly placed and are connected with each other, therefore, both can be decided by a common judgement having binding effect upon both the matters. 2. In the first writ petition i.e. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 41886 of 2005 following prayers have been made : “(i) To issue an appropriate writ, order or direction commanding the respondents to reserve the cane area for the petitioner proportionate to its crushing capacity on a long term basis. (ii) any other writ, order or direction as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and just in the facts and circumstances of the case. (iii) to award cost of the petition to the petitioner.” 3. In the second writ petition i.e. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 76571 of 2005, the petitioner prayed for following reliefs : "A. That a direction may be given to the Central Government-respondent No. 1 to frame a policy and/or issue guidelines for fixation of drawl percentage at a uniform rate for same area, allotment of cane areas to sugar mills in a non-discriminatory manner so that the area closer to a particular unit are granted to that unit on permanent basis besides guidelines for regulating de-reservation of cane area and allotment to new sugar factories in the State; B. To issue a writ or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing of the order No. 26/C/Purchase/Reservation/05 dated 8.10.2005 in respect of the petitioner and the order No. 29/C/Purchase/Reservation/06 dated 8.10.2005 in respect of the respondent No. 4 passed by the Cane Commissioner, U.P., Lucknow, to the extent the reservation orders reserving an area of 3149 Hectares comprised in 14 cane purchase centres of the petitioner to the respondent No. 4, contained in Annexures 1 and 2 to the writ petition. C. To issue a writ or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to reserve the 14 cane centers in dispute in favour of the petitioner and/or to reserve the cane centers closer to its factory as detailed in paragraph 32 of the petition. D. To issue any other writ or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case. E. To award the cost of the writ petition.” 4. D. To issue any other writ or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case. E. To award the cost of the writ petition.” 4. When the prayer of the first writ petition is cryptic, the prayer of the second writ petition is exhaustive. But basically the dispute relates to reservation of cane area in proportionate to its crushing capacity on a long term or permanent basis. However, we make it clear that except the above issue available in the second writ petition, no other issue has been considered hereunder. 5. Mr. S.P. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners, has drawn our attention to the import of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 (hereinafter called as ‘Act, 1953’) read with the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954 (hereinafter called as ‘Rules, 1954’) and the U.P. Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 (hereinafter called as ‘Order, 1966’) in connection thereto. The plinth of argument of Mr. Gupta is Section 15 of the Act, 1953, which is as follows : "15. Declaration of reserved area and assigned area.—(1) Without prejudice to any order made under Clause (d) of sub-section (2) of Section 16 the Cane Commissioner may, after consulting the Factory and Cane-growers’ Co-operative Society in the matter to be prescribed— (a) reserve any area (hereinafter called the reserved area); and (b) assign any area (hereinafter called an assigned area), for the purposes of the supply of cane to a factory in accordance with the provisions of Section 16 during one or more crushing seasons as may be specified and may likewise at any time cancel such order or alter the boundaries of an area so reserved or assigned. (2) Where any area has been declared as reserved area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall, if so directed by the Cane Commissioner, purchase all the cane grown in that area, which is offered for sale to the factory. (3) Where any area has been declared as assigned area for a factory, the occupier of such factory shall purchase such quantity of cane grown in that area and offered for sale to the factory as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner. (4) An appeal shall lie to the State Government against the order of the Cane Commissioner passed under sub-section (1).” 6. (4) An appeal shall lie to the State Government against the order of the Cane Commissioner passed under sub-section (1).” 6. According to him, law cannot incorporate any word without its objectivity. Whenever there is a difference between reserve any area, called as reserved area, and assign any area, called as assigned area, definitely it has an import to spell out. 7. According to us, the scope and ambit of Section 15 of the Act, 1953 cannot be spelt out only on the basis of piecemeal reading of the Section. Chapter-III, in which Section 15 is embodied, as a whole along with the definition and other relevant parts of the Act will have to be taken into account. If we go by the preamble of the Act, it will be known that the Act is made to regulate the supply and purchase of sugarcane required for use in sugar factories and Gur, Rab and Khandsari sugar manufacturing units. The Act is promulgated to expedient the same and other connected matters. If we go by the preamble of the Act, it will be known that the Act is made to regulate the supply and purchase of sugarcane required for use in sugar factories and Gur, Rab and Khandsari sugar manufacturing units. The Act is promulgated to expedient the same and other connected matters. Section 2 (n), as amended under U.P. Act IV of 1964 with effect from 17th October, 1963, defines “reserved area”, as follows : "(n) “Reserved area” shall mean the area reserved for a factory under an Order for reservation of Sugarcane areas made under Rule 125-B of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, and when no such order is in force, the area specified in an order made under Section 15.” Clause (ee) of Rule 125-B (1) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962, as amended by third amendment Rules, 1964, gives following meaning of “reserved area”, as under : "(ee) ‘Reserved area means any area where sugarcane is grown, reserved for a factory under clause 4 (1)(a) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955.” Clause 4 (1)(a) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 gives meaning of the “reserved area”, as follows : "(a) reserve any area where sugarcane is grown (hereinafter in this clause referred to as ‘reserved area’) for a factory, having regard to the crushing capacity of the factory, the availability of sugarcane in the reserved area and the need for production of sugar, with a view to enabling the factory to purchase the quantity of sugarcane required by it;” In further the Order, 1966, as formed under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, gives meaning of the “reserved area” under Clause 2 (j) of the same as follows : "(j) ‘reserved area’ means any area where sugarcane is grown and reserved for a factory under sub-clause (1)(a) of Clause 6;” Sub-clause (1) (a) of the Clause (6) as referred above is as follows : "(a) reserve any area where sugarcane is grown (hereinafter in this clause referred to as ‘reserved area’) for a factory, having regard to the crushing capacity of the factory, the availability of sugarcane in the reserved area and the need for production of sugar, with a view to enabling the factory to purchase the quantity of sugarcane required by it;” 8. Therefore, from the aforesaid definitions it is crystal clear how the meaning of the “reserved area” is developed uniformly. Now the question is whether such “reserved area” will be determined on year to year basis or for a considerable period tentatively for more than a year i.e. 3-5 years or more. 9. According to Mr. Gupta, “reserved area” does not necessarily mean unfettered right of the factory in respect of an area but for the period conducive for growth of sugarcane. However, year to year determination by the Cane Commissioner, i.e. an executive, may lead to possibility of arbitrariness. There should be appropriate guidelines. Although the beneficial right is not the property right of the reserved area yet such right under no stretch of imagination can be the annual feature. The words ‘one or more crushing seasons’ under Section 15 of the Act, 1953 support the contention. The period should be exercised on the basis of object of the Act. The words “reserved area” give an indication of permanency on the basis of its object and rational approach. To establish the case, in reply, he relied upon a Government Order No. 2004 CD/46-3-2001-3(24)/2001 TC from the Special Secretary, U.P. Government addressing to the Cane Commissioner dated 21st May, 2001 on the subject regarding arrangement of permanent reservation order in view of smooth supply to sugar mills in the State and cane development. He relied upon one of its part and contended that reservation order for a period of five years shall be passed for the undisputed centres. From this point of view, the centre’s areas which are conventionally attached with a particular sugar mill, shall be reserved to such factories. The facility of permanent reservation shall not be extended to the sugar mills which are deliberately not getting their cash credit limit sanctioned. 10. Leaving aside all the other parts, if we go through Clause 6 (1)(b) of the Order, 1966, we get the following definition : "(b) determine the quantity of sugarcane which a factory will require for crushing during any year;” 11. 10. Leaving aside all the other parts, if we go through Clause 6 (1)(b) of the Order, 1966, we get the following definition : "(b) determine the quantity of sugarcane which a factory will require for crushing during any year;” 11. As per Rule-22 of the Rules, 1954, in reserving or assigning an area to a factory or determining the quantity of cane to be purchased from an area by a factory, under Section 15, the Cane Commissioner may take into consideration the quantity of cane supplied from the area to the factory in previous year amongst others. Appendix III Form-1 under Rule-12 made for the purpose of application for reservation and assignment of area having particulars of cane price during the last crushing season, expected duration of the season and availability of last year’s area. Except the above Government order dated 21st May, 2001 no impression carries from the plain reading of laws that year to year determination of “reserved area” is not a necessity. Hence, the Court was called upon to determine the question. 12. Upon coming back to the Chapter III of the Act, 1953, which deals with supply and purchase of cane, we find that eight sections are available there. 13. Section 12 deals with estimates of requirements. Section 13 deals with register of cane-growers and cane-growers’ co-operative society or societies. Section 14 deals with power of survey etc. Section 15 deals with declaration of reserved area and assigned area. Section 16 deals with regulation of purchase and supply of cane in the reserved and assigned areas. Section 17 deals with payment of cane price. Section 18 deals with commission on purchase of cane. Section 19 deals with power to declare varieties of cane to be unsuitable for use in factories. Since we are not dealing with register of cane-growers and cane-growers’ co-operative society or societies, issue of cane price, commission, declaration of varieties of cane to be unsuitable for use in factories, etc., we exclude necessity of discussion regarding Sections 13, 17, 18 and 19 in the present context. In fact, Section 12 plays an important role which is as follows : "12. In fact, Section 12 plays an important role which is as follows : "12. Estimates of requirements.—(1) The Cane Commissioner may, for purposes of Section 15, by order, require the occupier of any factory to furnish in the manner and by the date specified in the order to the Cane Commissioner an estimate of the quantity of cane which will be required by the factory during such crushing season or crushing seasons as may be specified in the order. (2) The Cane Commissioner shall examine every such estimate and shall publish the same with such modifications, if any, as he may make. (3) An estimate under sub-section (2) may be revised by an authority to be prescribed.” 14. The words “crushing seasons” appear to be incorporated by way of amendment as per U.P. Act XXI of 1956. 15. Section 14 of Chapter III is as follows : "14. Power of survey etc.—(1) The State Government may, for purposes of Section 15, by order provide for— (a) a survey to be made of the area proposed to be served or assigned for the supply of cane to a factory and the recovery of the cost of such survey from the occupier of the factory; (b) the appointment of an Officer for purposes of such survey, his duties and powers; (c) the procedure in accordance with which the survey shall be made; (d) the assistance and facilities to be provided to the officer appointed in pursuance of Clause (b) by the persons owning or occupying land in the area; and (e) such incidental and consequential matters as may appear to be necessary or desirable for this purpose. (2) Any amount due from the occupier of a factory in pursuance of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall be recoverable from such occupier as an arrear of land revenue.” 16. Section 16 gives an indication about purchase of cane in an area other than the reserved or assigned area amongst others which are not so important for discussion herein. 17. Chapter II of Act, 1953 deals with administrative machinery. Section 3 deals with sugarcane board. Out of the board members the Cane Commissioner or his representative, who shall be ex-officio member, is also a member of the board as per sub-section 2(c). Section 4 deals with functions of the board. 17. Chapter II of Act, 1953 deals with administrative machinery. Section 3 deals with sugarcane board. Out of the board members the Cane Commissioner or his representative, who shall be ex-officio member, is also a member of the board as per sub-section 2(c). Section 4 deals with functions of the board. Section 4 (c) speaks about maintenance of healthy relations between occupiers or managers of the factories, cane-growers, cane-growers’ co-operative societies, Cane Development Council. Formation of Development Council can be made as per Section 5 of Chapter II of the Act, 1953. Sub-section (3)(i) of Section 5 speaks that the Council shall consist of two representatives of the sugar factory concerned to be nominated by the occupier. Section 5 (4) speaks about terms of the Council for a period of three years. However, by virtue of the proviso the Cane Commissioner may dissolve the Council before expiry of the term or remove the Chairman or any other member for the reasons to be recorded therein. Section 6 deals with functions of the Council. Section 6 (1)(a) says that Council will consider and approve the programme of development for the zone. In any event as per Section 8-A provision of supersession of council is there. As per Rule 8 of the Rules, 1954, the Cane Commissioner shall establish a Council for the reserved area of a factory or for any area specified in the order. As per Rule 13-A, a factory agreeing to join or to undertake the cane development scheme approved by the State Government for the purposes of this rule shall contribute such sum to the fund of the council and in such manner, as may be determined by the Cane Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, from time to time. Rule 24 if read with Appendix III Form 2, it will be seen that occupier of a factory shall prepare a register to be called as Growers’ Register in respect of the area from which supplies of cane are drawn by the factory. Other rules of Chapter VII of Rules, 1954 deals with growers’ register. Therefore, from the totality of the aforesaid discussions one aspect is very clear that the “reserved area” can be reserved for one crushing season or for more than one crushing season. 18. According to Mr. Gupta, there is no policy of the Government in determining the reserved area. Other rules of Chapter VII of Rules, 1954 deals with growers’ register. Therefore, from the totality of the aforesaid discussions one aspect is very clear that the “reserved area” can be reserved for one crushing season or for more than one crushing season. 18. According to Mr. Gupta, there is no policy of the Government in determining the reserved area. It is variable state of affairs as apparent from the different provisions of law. As there is no appropriate policy and the Cane Commissioner has been given an unfettered right, it is likely to be violated. Hence, with the intervention of the Court, State can be directed to make an uniform policy. He relied upon 1989 (4) SCC 683 , A.N. Parasuraman and others v. State of Tamil Nadu and stated that determination of legislative policy and formulation of rule of conduct are essential legislative functions which can not be delegated. What is permissible is to leave to the delegated authority the task of implementing the object of the Act after the legislature lays down adequate guidelines for the exercise of power. When examined in this light, the impugned provisions miserably failed to come to the required standard. From 2000 (7) SCC 425 , Consumer Action Group and another v. State of T.N. and others, we find three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that in testing the validity of the provisions, the Courts have to discover, whether there is any legislative policy, purpose of the statute or indication of any clear will through its various provisions. If there be any, then this by itself would be a guiding factor to be exercised by the delegatee. In other words, then it cannot be held that such a power is unbridled or uncanalised. The exercise of power of such delegatee is controlled through such policy. In 2005 (12) SCC 77, State of Rajasthan and others v. Basant Nahata, it was also held that the necessity of legislature’s delegating its powers in favour of the executive is a part of legislative function. Such delegation of power, however, cannot be wide, uncanalised or unguided. The legislature while delegating such power is required to lay down the criteria or standard so as to enable the delegatee to act within the framework of the statute. It is also trite that essential legislative functions cannot be delegated. According to Mr. Such delegation of power, however, cannot be wide, uncanalised or unguided. The legislature while delegating such power is required to lay down the criteria or standard so as to enable the delegatee to act within the framework of the statute. It is also trite that essential legislative functions cannot be delegated. According to Mr. Gupta, there should not be any haziness in the law. From AIR 1962 SC 955 ; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar and AIR 1964 SC 1230 , R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, it appears to us that in both the cases five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that it is well settled that if certain provisions of law construed in one way would make them consistent with the Constitution, and another interpretation would render them unconstitutional, the Court would lean in favour of the former construction. 19. To establish the case far more concrete Mr. Gupta put an emphasis on the words “assigned area” differentiating the same from a reserved area not only as per Section 15 of the Act, 1953 but also from the other provisions of the law. It is true to say that the definition of “reserved area” is an introduction of U.P. Act IV of 1964 with effect from 17th October, 1963, whereas definition of “assigned area” was pre-existing. As per Section 2 (a), “assigned area” means an area assigned to a factory under Section 15. 20. From the three Judges Bench judgement of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1975 SC 43 , Shri Umed v. Raj Singh and others, we find that it is a well settled rule of interpretation that the Court should, as far as possible, construe a statute so as to avoid tautology and superfluity. The words of Viscount Simon in Hill v. William Hill (Park Lane), Ltd., 1949 AC 530 at p. 546 are quoted hereunder : "It is to be observed that though a Parliamentary enactment (like parliamentary eloquence) is capable of saying the same thing twice over without adding anything to what has already been said once, this repetition in an Act of Parliament is not to be assumed. When the legislature enacts a particular phrase in a statute the presumption is that it is saying something which has not been said immediately before. When the legislature enacts a particular phrase in a statute the presumption is that it is saying something which has not been said immediately before. The rule that a meaning should, if possible, be given to every word in the statute implies that, unless there is good reason to the contrary, the words add something which has not been said immediately before.” 21. As observed by Lord Watson in Salomon v. A. Salomon and Co. Ltd., 1897 AC 22, is quoted hereunder : "Intention of the Legislature’ is a common but very slippery phrase, which, popularly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the Legislature would probably have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it. In a Court of law or equity, what the legislature intended to be done or not to be done can only be legitimately ascertained from what it has chosen to enact, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication.” 22. According to us, the function of the Court is to gather the intention of the legislature from the words used by it and it would not be right for the Court to attribute an intention to the legislature. 23. Mr. C.B. Yadav, learned Chief Standing Counsel of the State, has firstly contended that the scope of the writ petitions are very much limited in nature. Such limit is only prescribing to reserve the cane area for the petitioners proportionate to the crushing capacity on a long term or permanent basis. Naturally the question will arise whether there is any refusal by the Cane Commissioner not to reserve an area or refusal to reserve the area for more than one crushing season. No such case is available as yet. In case of availability of such refusal, an aggrieved can prefer an appeal to the State Government against an order of the Cane Commissioner under Section 15 (4) of the Act, 1953. So far as appeal is concerned, specific rules are provided under the Rules, 1954. Rule 23 speaks as follows : "23. No such case is available as yet. In case of availability of such refusal, an aggrieved can prefer an appeal to the State Government against an order of the Cane Commissioner under Section 15 (4) of the Act, 1953. So far as appeal is concerned, specific rules are provided under the Rules, 1954. Rule 23 speaks as follows : "23. Appeal against an order of the Cane Commissioner under Section 15 shall be to the State Government within 14 days of the publication of the order at the office of the Collector : Provided that the State Government may, for any special reason, entertain an appeal made after the expiry of the above period. The appeal made under this rule shall be submitted to the State Government in triplicate.” 24. Apart from Rule 23, Rule 23-A was inserted by Notification No. 3096-S/XVIII-C—1725-53 dated 18th May, 1961. This rule specifically deals with estimates under Section 12 (3) of the Act. Section 12 (3) of the Act, 1953 is a process of revision of the estimate as made by the Cane Commissioner under Section 12 (2). Rule 23-A says that the State Government shall be the authority empowered to revise the estimates under Section 12 (3). An application for revision of estimates published by the Cane Commissioner under Section 12 (2) shall be made to the State Government within fourteen days from the publication of the estimates. Not only from the order, which has been provided under Section 15 (4), but the appeal lies to the State Government from the order of the Cane Commissioner in respect of the Chapter XI of Rules, 1954, which deals with various aspects with regard to cane-growers’ co-operative society. He further contended that membership of the Development Council cannot show any permanency of holding the reserved area. A factory, at best, becomes a contributory to the development being member of the Development Council. The law is very much exhaustive in respect of protection of all the parties including the factories. The intention of the petitioners to get reservation of an area for long term or permanent basis is for the future but not for the present. It is reflected at least from the paragraph 30 of one of the writ petitions made by M/s. D.C.M. Shriram Industries Limited. There they have categorically stated that in 1932 the crushing capacity was 500 TCD. It is reflected at least from the paragraph 30 of one of the writ petitions made by M/s. D.C.M. Shriram Industries Limited. There they have categorically stated that in 1932 the crushing capacity was 500 TCD. Presently the crushing capacity is 8000 TCD, which will reach to 12000 TCD in near future. Therefore, there is no loss of business of the petitioners. In respect of paragraph-19 of the first writ petition, he said that the petitioners relied upon a report of a committee known as ‘Mahajan Committee’, which has not yet seen the light of the day. The entire case of the petitioners is on the basis of the hypothesis not on the basis of any cause of action. The petitioners are not aggrieved by any order of the Cane Commissioner for which their fundamental right can be said to be violated. Economic policy of the Government cannot be challenged in this way. They cannot seek relief of mandamus to reserve their own cane area proportionate to its crushing capacity on a long term or permanent basis dehors the law or the policy. 25. Learned Chief Standing Counsel produced the policy of the year 2006-07 published on 26th April, 2006, from which it appears that total consumption of the raw materials i.e. cane by the factories is 45% of the entire production. Remaining cane is used for Gur, Rab, Khandsari and seeds etc. Therefore, if new industries are installed, no interference will be caused to the existing sugar factories but on the other hand the cane-growers will be benefited. Healthy competition will exist. Learned Chief Standing Counsel has taken two specific points amongst others i.e. (i) the petitioners are strangers to the cause; and (ii) petitioners have a remedy elsewhere. So far as the first point is concerned, he relied upon several judgments. 26. From AIR 1971 SC 246 , Nagar Rice and Flour Mills and others v. N. Teekappa Gowda and Bros. and others, we observe that the Supreme Court discouraged the objection of granting permission by the authority permitting new factory. Supreme Court held that one cannot prevent a party from exercising their right to carry on business. It is implicit that the authority sanctioning the licence for carrying out business consider about the installation of the mill. In AIR 1973 SC 2720 , Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha v. M/s. S. Lal & Co. Supreme Court held that one cannot prevent a party from exercising their right to carry on business. It is implicit that the authority sanctioning the licence for carrying out business consider about the installation of the mill. In AIR 1973 SC 2720 , Dr. Satyanarayana Sinha v. M/s. S. Lal & Co. (P) Ltd., the Court held when the application is made by a party or by a person aggrieved the Court will intervene ex debito justitiae, in justice to the applicant, and when it is made by a stranger the Court considers whether the public interest demands its intervention. In either case it is a matter which rests ultimately in the discretion of the Court. In that case since no right of the party had been affected, the Court held that such party had no locus standi. He is neither a party nor a person aggrieved or affected. Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. In AIR 1976 SC 578 , Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and others, it was held that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the certiorari jurisdiction the petitioner should be an aggrieved person and in a case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as a matter of course, but if he does not fulfil that character and is a stranger, the Court will, in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very special circumstances. In AIR 1992 SC 443 , Mithilesh Garg, etc. etc. v. Union of India and others etc. etc., in the case of transport operators it was held that there is no threat of any kind whatsoever from any authority to the enjoyment of their right to carry on the occupation of transport operators. There is no complaint of infringement of their statutory rights. Their only effort is to stop the new operators from coming in the field as competitors. Thus, the Supreme Court held that there is no justification in the petitioners’ stand. More operators mean healthy competition and efficient transport system. The apprehension of the petitioners therein that too many operators on a route are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession is without any basis. The transport business is bound to be ironed out, ultimately by the rationale of demand and supply. More operators mean healthy competition and efficient transport system. The apprehension of the petitioners therein that too many operators on a route are likely to affect adversely the interest of weaker section of the profession is without any basis. The transport business is bound to be ironed out, ultimately by the rationale of demand and supply. So far as the second point is concerned, he relied upon the judgement reported in AIR 1952 SC 179 , Parry and Co. Ltd., Dare House, Madras v. Commercial Employees Association, Madras and another. From such judgement we find when the power relates to Labour Commissioner, the interference of the superior Court in issuing a writ of certiorari by way of parallel proceeding cannot be accepted. Such Commissioner is bound to decide the question. At the worst he may have come to an erroneous conclusion, but the conclusion is in respect of a matter which lies entirely with the jurisdiction of the Labour Commissioner to decide. 27. In AIR 1964 SC 1260 , Basant Kumar Sarkar and others v. Eagle Rolling Mills. Ltd. and others, it was held that although the powers conferred on the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are very wide, they could not take in within their sweep industrial dispute of the kind which the contention of the workmen sought to raise. In 1993 (2) SCC 495 , State of U.P. and another v. Labh Chand, the Supreme Court refused to entertain a writ petition when the earlier refusal made for not availing the alternative remedy before the tribunal was a valid reason. In AIR 1997 SC 1125 , L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, a similar question arose in respect of Article 323A and 323B, in which the tribunal was declared as Court of first instance. In 1998 (8) SCC 1 , Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, the Supreme Court discouraged entertaining the writ petition having alternative remedy excepting the cases whereunder four important questions i.e. infringement of fundamental right, violation of principles of natural justice, passing order without any jurisdiction and ultra vires, are involved. In 2004 (100) FLR 849 , Samarendra Das, Advocate v. State of West Bengal and others, again hearing of the matters in spite of having jurisdiction of tribunal arose and the Supreme Court did not encourage the same. In 2004 (100) FLR 849 , Samarendra Das, Advocate v. State of West Bengal and others, again hearing of the matters in spite of having jurisdiction of tribunal arose and the Supreme Court did not encourage the same. In 2005 (8) SCC 264 , U.P. State Spinning Co. Ltd. v. R.S. Pandey and another, the Supreme Court held in view of the earlier judgments that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction. 28. On a further question of power to make judicial review by the writ Court we have gone through the judgement reported in 2002 (2) SCC 560 , Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v. Ashrafulla Khan and others, which is based on the Full Bench judgement, whereunder it was held that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is required to enforce the rule of law and not pass an order or direction which is contrary to what has been injected by law. In AIR 1956 SC 676 , Ch. Tika Ramji and others, etc. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, we find that even factually the matter relates to the right of the Cane Commissioner in deciding the issue. Two important relevant parts of the judgement are quoted hereunder : "(42) Re. (4); It is pointed out that the Cane Commissioner declares the reserved or assigned areas for the factories and also transfers particular areas from one factory to another. He is also in sole charge and management of Cane Growers Co-operative Societies. It is contended that the powers thus conferred upon him are so wide that they are capable of being exercised in a discriminatory manner and therefore the impugned Act infringes the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution.” 29. In answer of such question, the Supreme Court held as follows : "The power which is given to the Cane Commissioner under Section 15 of the Act for declaring reserved or assigned areas is well defined and guided by the considerations set out in Rule 22 of Chap. In answer of such question, the Supreme Court held as follows : "The power which is given to the Cane Commissioner under Section 15 of the Act for declaring reserved or assigned areas is well defined and guided by the considerations set out in Rule 22 of Chap. 6 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Rules, 1954 and is further conditioned that he has to consult the factory and the Canegrowers’ Co-operative Society, and his orders made thereunder are subject to an appeal to the State Government at the instance of the party aggrieved. This cannot by any means be treated as an uncontrolled or an unfettered power without recourse to any higher authority in the event of his going wrong. The power is not absolute nor is it unguided and, therefore, does not fall within the mischief of Art. 19 (1) (f) and.............” 30. In AIR 1996 All. 420 , M/s. Triveni Engineering Works Ltd. and another etc. v. Union of India and others, again the question of reserved area arose, which the Division Bench considered and ultimately held as follows : ".........................a reserved area is not anything in the nature of a permanent lease or permanent arrangement of any type for any sugar mill. The purpose of declaring a reserved area is only to see that the sugarcane produced by the cane growers is not wasted and a factory may be asked by the Cane Commissioner to purchase all the sugarcane that is offered for sale in the factory. The law is clear on the point that the Cane Commissioner retains the authority to change the boundaries of a reserved area or even to cancel the declaration of any area as a reserved area for a factory. The only purpose of this last mentioned power of the Cane Commissioner is, as appears to us, the proper consumption of the sugarcane produced in an area. The only purpose of this last mentioned power of the Cane Commissioner is, as appears to us, the proper consumption of the sugarcane produced in an area. In any view of the matter, if an area is once declared as a reserved area and, subsequently, is cancelled or modified, the order of the Cane Commissioner has been made appealable to the State Government and the mere apprehension that an establishment of a new factory may curtail the reserved area of a particular mill, may not give rise to any legal right to the existing sugar mills for moving a writ petition as it would always be open for the mill in case of any change in reserved area to file an appeal before the State Government. In this view also, the writ petitions are premature on the ground of apprehended change in the reserved area of the particular sugar mills.” 31. So far as the point of economical policy of the State is concerned, as contended by the learned Chief Standing Counsel, we have gone through the judgement reported in 1978 (3) SCC 459 , M/s. Prag Ice & Oil Mills and another v. Union of India and found that Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that it is not the function of the Courts to obstruct or defeat the beneficial measures devised by the Government of the day. The Courts cannot pass judgments on the wisdom of such actions, unless actions taken are so completely unreasonable that no law can be cited to sanction them. In AIR 1981 SC 2138 , R.K. Garg v. Union of India and others, Five Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that every legislation particularly in economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and therefore it can not provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible abuses. If any crudities, inequities or possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic issues. If any crudities, inequities or possibilities of abuse come to light, the legislature can always step in and enact suitable amendatory legislation. That is the essence of pragmatic approach which must guide and inspire the legislature in dealing with complex economic issues. In 1990 (4) SCC 516 , H.S.S.K. Niyami and another v. Union of India and another, it was held that fixation of price and zoning are integral scheme of the notification (as therein), without placing the factories in the appropriate zone based on agro-climatic and other economic considerations the proper price fixation cannot be made. So both the factors are part of the policy decision by the Government in exercise of the statutory powers. Once it is concluded that the zoning system is an integral part of the price fixation of the sugar produced by the factories in a particular zone, it is legislative in character and no individual sugar factory is entitled to a notice and hearing before placing the particular factory or factories in a particular zone. These orders are undoubtedly based on exhaustive study by the experts and the impugned orders though open to criticism would not be subject of judicial review. Zoning is a legislative act and policy. In 1996 (2) SCC 405 , Delhi Science Forum and others v. Union of India and another, it has been held what has been said in respect of legislation is applicable even in respect of policies which have been adopted by the Parliament. They cannot be tested in the Court of law. Of course, whether there is any legal or constitutional bar in adopting such policy can certainly be examined by the Court. In 2005 (4) SCC 456 , Karnataka State Industrial Investment & Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Cavalet India Ltd. and others, it was held on the basis of the previous judgement reported in 2004 (7) SCC 166 , S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, that High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not sit as an appellate authority over the acts and deeds of the financial corporation and seek to correct them. The doctrine of fairness does not convert the writ Courts into appellate authority over the administrative authorities. The doctrine of fairness does not convert the writ Courts into appellate authority over the administrative authorities. In 2005 (6) SCC 138 , Master Marine Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson (P) Ltd. and another, the Supreme Court held the modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. The Court does not sit as a Court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. In 2006 (2) SCC 373 , Government of A.P. and others v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan, it was held that by now it is a well established principle of law that the High Court exercising power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by depreciating the evidence as an appellate authority. 32. Mr. Ashok Nigam, learned Additional Solicitor General, appeared and contended that Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution (Department of Food and Public Distribution) passed an order on 10th November, 2006 in exercise of powers under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 amending the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 restricting setting up of two factories within the radius of 15 Kms. by way of Explanation (1). It is stated that an existing sugar factory shall mean a sugar factory in operation and shall also include a sugar factory that has taken all effective steps as specified in Explanation-4 to set up a sugar factory but excludes a sugar factory that has not carried out its crushing operations for last five sugar seasons. We find that system of implementation of Industrial Entrepreneur Memorandum (IEM) was introduced on condition of performance guarantee of Rs. 1 crore to the Chief Director (Sugar), Department of Food and Public Distribution, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution. 33. Mr. Ravindra Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the Cane-growers’ Co-operative Society, raised a basic question regarding right of the factories on reserved or assigned area as per the Act. He said that it is the product not the area which can be reserved or assigned. Section 15 is not independent of Section 16 of the Act. 33. Mr. Ravindra Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the Cane-growers’ Co-operative Society, raised a basic question regarding right of the factories on reserved or assigned area as per the Act. He said that it is the product not the area which can be reserved or assigned. Section 15 is not independent of Section 16 of the Act. Section 16 regulates the purchase and supply of the cane in the reserved and assigned areas as per the requirement of the cane-growers or Cane-growers’ Co-operative Society. It is to be regulated by the State under Section 16 of the Act. It speaks about distribution, sale and purchase of any cane in the reserved or assigned area and other than the reserved or assigned area. So far as the reserved area of the land, if any, is in question, that shall be restricted only in respect of the factory area. Factory area is independent of the reserved area or assigned area, where no question of crushing season or seasons are applicable. Crushing season or seasons are applicable in respect of the products’ purchase capacity of a factory. If the factory cannot consume the entire product of the reserved area, such area will be assigned to another factory so that the cane-growers or cane-growers’ co-operative society should not suffer in respect of the yearly production. Cane area, either reserved or assigned, belongs to the cane-growers or Cane-growers’ Co-operative Society. Cane Growers’ Co-operative Society makes the proposal to the Cane Commissioner for reservation/assignment of the cane area as per the resolution of the general body of the society. As such no sugar factory can have any legal right to get the cane area reserved on long term basis. Reservation/assignment is continuous process and can only be based on year to year basis. At the time of passing an order the Cane Commissioner is required to see the actual need of the factory, availability of the sugarcane in the cane area, previous year’s crushing and supply made to the factory, arrangement made by the factory, growers-wise actual availability of cane for fixing basic quota in the ensuing crushing season, views of the society, etc. Exigencies are attached with both the reserved as well as assigned area. Exigencies are attached with both the reserved as well as assigned area. If a factory is closed or requirement of factory is not fulfilled or if there is shortage of cane after starting of the season so on, are the issues for the purpose of assigning area from the reserved area of the factory. It can even happen even in the mid session. The purpose of declaring reserved area is only to see that the sugarcane produced by the cane-growers is not to be wasted. Sugarcane should be properly consumed. Reserved area is not in the nature of permanent lease or permanent arrangement of any type of arrangement for any sugar mill. The State authorities are taking all possible steps to fulfil the requirement of sugarcane. There is no arbitrariness in passing the reservation orders on year to year basis. Rationality of the State can be seen from its orders and bonding policies. The Cane Commissioner vide order dated 16th October, 2006 issued general directions to all the Cane-growers’ Co-operative Societies to ensure supply of sugarcane as required by the factory as per the reservation order. Establishment of new sugar factory is a tremendous achievement. Cane production will be increased. The cane-growers will be benefited. Sugar production will be increased. Capital investment will be increased. Revenue of the State will be increased. Thereby the development of the State as a whole will be increased. Survey policy of 2006-07 was enacted with a view to every year survey between May to June, in which the representatives of the factory will be participants for the purpose of determination of cane area. Prior to survey each cane-grower is required to make a declaration. 34. Development of cane area is dependable upon the Council. Not only the sugar factory but also all the necessary parties can be members of such Council. Sugar factories can also join and undertake the development scheme. Excepting the two writ petitioners out of 114 sugar factories, no one challenged the policy of reserved area or assigned area. Direction, if any, is baseless. Sugar factories are required to increase their drawal rate as per the bonding policy of the State. Scope of judicial review in policy/administrative matter is very limited. Learned Counsel appearing for the Cane-growers’ Co-operative Society cited various judgments. Direction, if any, is baseless. Sugar factories are required to increase their drawal rate as per the bonding policy of the State. Scope of judicial review in policy/administrative matter is very limited. Learned Counsel appearing for the Cane-growers’ Co-operative Society cited various judgments. In 2000 (3) AWC 1867 , Simbhaoli Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Appellate Authority and others, a Division Bench of this Court held that the underlying idea of the Act is to ensure the maintenance of reasonable supply of sugarcane to producers and to provide for other allied matters which include a fair return to the cane growers as well. The interests of cane growers and sugar manufacturers have to be protected. At the same time, balance is to be maintained amongst sugar producers inter se. By citing AIR 1982 SC 902 (M/s. Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar and another etc. etc. v. Union of India and another etc. etc.) he contended that if any restriction does not directly or proximately interfere with the exercise of freedom of trade, the freedom guaranteed by Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution is not violated. The State action for the protection of the weaker sections is not only justified but absolutely necessary unless the restriction imposed is excessive. By citing AIR 2003 SC 843 , M/s. Easland Combines, Coimbatore v. Collector of Central Excise, Coimbatore, he said that the Courts’ duty in interpreting a particular provision of law is to ascertain the meaning and intendment of the legislature and in doing so, it should presume that the provision was designed to effectuate a particular object or to meet a particular requirement. In 2005 (2) SCC 409 , Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat, it was held that the Court cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. Narrow and pedantic construction may not always be given effect to. Courts should avoid a construction which would reduce the legislation to futility. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the consequences of the alternative constructions. It is also well settled that every statute is to be interpreted without any violence to its language. It is also trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provision, having regard to the consequences of the alternative constructions. He further contended that even if we go by the submissions of Mr. Gupta that the petitioners legitimately expect with the consideration of their cause, the Supreme Court says in 2005 (1) SCC 625 , Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer and others, that the doctrine does not give scope to claim relief straightaway from the administrative authorities as no crystallised right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. The doctrine of legitimate expectation can be applied only where the decision taken by the authority is found arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest. 35. Reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint of interests of the general public and not from the standpoint of the interests of persons upon whom the restrictions have been imposed or upon abstract consideration. In 2006 (2) SCC 364 , Union of India and others v. Flight Cadet Ashish Rai, the Supreme Court has made a restriction upon the judicial review of the administrative action. Although it is in respect of the service law but by and large we apply the following parameters : ”The duty of the Court is (a) to confine itself to the question of legality; (b) to decide whether the decision-making authority exceeded its powers; (c) committed an error of law; (d) committed breach of the rules of natural justice; and (e) reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached; or (f) abused its powers. Administrative action is subject to control by judicial review in the following manner : (i) Illegality: this means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety.” 36. Administrative action is subject to control by judicial review in the following manner : (i) Illegality: this means the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. (ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness. (iii) Procedural impropriety.” 36. In AIR 2003 SC 1344 , Federation of Railway Officers Association and others v. Union of India, it was held that unless the policy or action is inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws or arbitrary or irrational or abuse of the power, the Court will not interfere with such matters. In a very short judgement reported in 2004 (13) SCC 780 , Sidi Pharmacy (P) Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others, the Supreme Court held that issues which are to be considered by the Government on the basis of advise of the body of the experts and taking policy decision in connection thereto, should not fall within the scope of judicial review. In 2000 (6) SCC 608 , Principal, Madhav Institute of Technology & Science v. Rajendra Singh Yadav and others, it was held in the context that grant-in-aid, either for the institution or for the school or for individuals is a matter of policy. Hence, if any direction is given by the Court to benefit individuals, it would amount to amendment of the existing Government policy by way of judicial order and amounts to extension of benefit to persons to whom the policy was not intended to apply. In 2003 (9) SCC 592 , Syed T.A. Naqshbandi and others v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and others, it was held that unless the exercise of power is shown to violate any other provision of the Constitution of India or any of the existing statutory rules, the same cannot be challenged by making it justiciable issue before Courts. In 2005 (5) SCC 181 , State of NCT of Delhi and another v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo, it was held that the Court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above, like illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. Whether action falls within any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion (if any) in that regard would not be sufficient. 37. Mr. Whether action falls within any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion (if any) in that regard would not be sufficient. 37. Mr. V.B. Upadhyaya, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the private respondent-M/s. Bajaj Hindustan Limited, contended before this Court that reservation cannot be held to be permanent or long term basis. Annual feature cannot be regarded as permanent or long term feature. No arbitrary action has been challenged by the petitioners. From 1953 till this date the Act follows the reservation policy. The word “seasons” cannot indicate any right of permanency. An estimate has to be made on year to year basis. If it is fulfilled, nothing can be said. If it is not fulfilled, then the question of assignment will arise. Land belongs to the cultivators. There is no scope of permanent right of the factory in respect of the land of others. Formation of Council for the purpose of development can not form any such right. 38. He relied upon the judgement reported in 2004 (9) SCC 686 , Prakash Nath Khanna and another v. Commissioner of Income Tax and another, and contended that it is a well settled principle in law that the Court cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the legislature. The language employed in the statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intent. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed and has been intended but what has been said. 2003 (1) SCC 730 , Jinia Keotin and others v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi and others, was cited to establish that the Court can not relegislate on the subject under the guise of the interpretation against the will expressed in the Act itself. Again 2001 (7) SCC 358 , District Mining Officer and others v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. and another, was cited before the Court to establish that the function of the Court is only to expound the law and not to legislate. From 1989 (3) SCC 709 , Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Again 2001 (7) SCC 358 , District Mining Officer and others v. Tata Iron and Steel Co. and another, was cited before the Court to establish that the function of the Court is only to expound the law and not to legislate. From 1989 (3) SCC 709 , Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam and others, it appears that the legislative declaration of nexus between the law and the principles of Article 39 of the Constitution of India is inconclusive and justiciable. From 1987 (1) SCC 191 , S.P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta and others, it appears that the law should take a pragmatic view of the matter and respond to the purpose for which it was made and also take cognizance of the current capabilities of technology and life-style of the community. It is well settled that the purpose of law provides a good guide to the interpretation of the meaning of the Act. In 2004 (11) SCC 641 , Swedish Match AB and another v. Securities & Exchange Board of India and another, it was held that it is now trite that when an expression is capable of more than one meaning, the Court would attempt to resolve the ambiguity in a manner consistent with the purpose of the provisions and with regard to the consequences of the alternative constructions. It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that effort should be made in construing its provisions by avoiding a conflict and adopting a harmonious construction. The statute or rules made thereunder should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference to the other provisions to make the provision consistent with the objects sought to be achieved. In 1984 (4) SCC 27 , Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education and another v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth and others, it was held that the Court cannot examine the wisdom, merits or efficacy of policy of the legislature or its delegatee if it effectuates the purpose of the Act. 39. The provisions contained under statutory enactment or under rules/regulations framed thereunder have to be so construed as to be in harmony with each other. The Court should, as far as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of a statutory provision, rule or bye-law which would bring about the result of rendering the system unworkable in practice. 39. The provisions contained under statutory enactment or under rules/regulations framed thereunder have to be so construed as to be in harmony with each other. The Court should, as far as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of a statutory provision, rule or bye-law which would bring about the result of rendering the system unworkable in practice. Where under a specific section or rule a particular subject has received special treatment, such special provision will exclude the applicability of any general provision which might otherwise cover the said topic. 40. According to us, the law is explicit in giving meanings of “reserved area” and “assigned area”. Definition of “reserved area” is a later introduction. From the Statement of Objects and reasons in support of the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) (Amendment) Bill, 1963, we find that to make the law explicit in respect of a factory including Gur, Rab and Khandsari manufacturing unit, the bill was prepared incorporating such units and giving definition of “reserved area”. It is to be remembered that Gur, Rab or Khandsari manufacturing unit was introduced by the amendment of the Act being U.P. Act III of 1960, whereunder such manufacture or production have been shown in a reserved area without the definition of the same. To avoid any conflict the amendment was made. The relevant parts of the Statement of Objects and Reasons are quoted hereunder : ”In the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 ‘cane’ has been defined as sugarcane intended for use in a factory. Since the supply of cane which is required for use in units is also intended to be regulated and further because the purchase tax is levied on sugarcane consumed by Gur and Khandsari units, it has been considered expedient and necessary that the scope of the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 is extended to all such cane used in factory or otherwise. For this, it is necessary to amend the law. 2. The definition of the ‘unit’ is being modified to include a unit set up in an assigned area to ensure that the laws made for regulating cane supplies to factories in reserved areas are equally made applicable to assigned areas, for this, it is necessary to amend the Principal Act.” 41. 2. The definition of the ‘unit’ is being modified to include a unit set up in an assigned area to ensure that the laws made for regulating cane supplies to factories in reserved areas are equally made applicable to assigned areas, for this, it is necessary to amend the Principal Act.” 41. In fact when ‘reserved area’ indicates about the nature of permanent assignment, the ‘assigned area’ indicates about the nature of temporary assignment. Such type of assignment is depending upon cane growing capacity of the farmers and crushing capacity of the factories. It has to be matched with each other. Previously radius of reserved area between the factories were much more, which have been reduced. Normally 15 Kms. radius around the factory is the reserved area. By the notification dated 10th February, 2006 the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 is already amended by putting restriction on setting up of two sugar factories within the radius of 15 Kms. According to us, if the cane growing capacity of the farmers of the reserved area is more but the consumption capacity of the factory is less, cane grown within the area will be assigned to other factory to avoid the wastage of the cane and to meet the need of the cane growers. Similarly if the cane growing capacity of the farmers of the reserved area is less than the crushing capacity of the factory, an area reserved for any other factory, in which the crushing capacity is not adequate, can be assigned to such factory to meet the requirement with the similar object. Therefore, neither the reserved area nor the assigned area is fixed. Interest of the weaker section of the people being cane growers will be protected at first particularly when the industry is agro-based industry and they are the owners of the land. A reserved area of 15 Kms. radius around a factory not necessarily be curtailed nor can be assigned to other if the cane growing capacity of the farmers and if crushing capacity of the factory match with each other for more than one season. Save and except the inference as drawn by this Court, no further inference can be drawn with regard to the meanings of “reserved area” and “assigned area” as well as the words “season” or “seasons”. Singular includes plural and vice versa unless different import is reflected. Save and except the inference as drawn by this Court, no further inference can be drawn with regard to the meanings of “reserved area” and “assigned area” as well as the words “season” or “seasons”. Singular includes plural and vice versa unless different import is reflected. Law is made both flexible and exhaustive in respect of area or season. Season or seasons mean either one season or longevity of the season from one period to other or more than one season. If any rigidity of permanency on long term basis is applied, many adverse effect can be available. Neither the factories will be benefited nor the farmers will be benefited. In other words, the farmers will not be able to sell their products outside the factory nor the factories will be able to purchase from outside because of their bonding policy for such period. It will not at all inure benefit of the agro-based industry as a whole. 42. We are definite that the petitioners’ grievance is not with regard to the present system because of its long standing acceptability. Moreover, the recent amendment of Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 will be safeguard. Even thereafter if any cause of action arises on the following, the same is yet to born. Necessary explanations under the Sugarcane (Control) (Amendment) Order, 2006 effective from 10th November, 2006 are given hereunder : ”Explanation 1.—An existing sugar factory shall mean a sugar factory in operation and shall also include a sugar factory that has taken all effective steps as specified in Explanation 4 to set up a sugar factory but excludes a sugar factory that has not carried out its crushing operations for last five sugar seasons. Explanation 2—...... ...... ...... ..... Explanation 3—...... ...... ....... ..... Explanation 4.—The effective steps shall mean the following steps taken by the concerned person to implement the Industrial Entrepreneur Memorandum for setting up of sugar factory : (a) purchase of required land in the name of the factory; (b) placement of firm order for purchase of plant and machinery for the factory and payment of requisite advance or opening of irrevocable letter of credit with suppliers; (c) commencement of civil work and construction of building for the factory; (d) sanction of requisite term loans from banks or financial institutions; (e) any other step prescribed by the Central Government, in this regard through a notification.” 43. However, we need little discussion. Everybody has a right to carry on the business anywhere in India subject to completion of necessary formalities required for the same. If one fulfils the requirement, his right cannot be opposed by the existing factory not only for the sake of fundamental right but also to avoid monopoly. The necessary requirement of the executives under the law is to explore the possibilities in various manners. It will not be obiter dicta to say that on a question as to why the cane growing area will not be expanded from the western part to the eastern part of the State of U.P. and why only the developed area will be given to new entrepreneurs instead of giving developing or underdeveloped areas, both the learned Additional Solicitor General of India and the learned Chief Standing Counsel of the State of U.P. stated casting responsibility to each other. According to us, both cannot avoid concurrent responsibility since economy of both the Central and the State is attached to it. The law itself gives power to survey. According to us, the main part of survey would be soil condition, transportation and mobilization of the farmers of the non-cane growing areas. Now a days transportation is not a far reaching problem. Therefore, problem is with regard to test of soil condition and expansion of radius of cane growing area gradually but not abruptly from one part to another and to mobilize the farmers about the growing of cane and its benefit. Even the State can form high powered Committee of experts to find out a solution. Taking cognizance of the current capabilities of technology and life-style of the community is a part and parcel of pragmatic view, which has been appreciated by the Supreme Court in 1987 (1) SCC 191 (supra). But the same is a separate chapter and the State is liable to do the needful independent of any proceeding. Mere apprehension cannot give rise to a cause of action particularly in the teeth of the judgments reported in AIR 1956 SC 676 (supra) and AIR 1996 All. 420 (supra), whereunder the self-same issue was vastly considered. Moreover from the recent policy we have come to know that consumption of the existing factories are 40% of the total products. The others are used in Gur, Rab, Khandsari and Seeds etc. 420 (supra), whereunder the self-same issue was vastly considered. Moreover from the recent policy we have come to know that consumption of the existing factories are 40% of the total products. The others are used in Gur, Rab, Khandsari and Seeds etc. Against this background, nobody can stop the State or Union from allowing new entrepreneurs to establish factory to get 100% of the existing production. Cent percent production has to be consumed for the sake of economical development of the State and the country which cannot be denied irrespective of exploring possibilities for further expansion as observed. 44. Hence, no relief can be granted to the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petitions. Thus, both the writ petitions are dismissed. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. 45. However, no order is passed as to costs. Honble V.C. Misra, J.—I agree. ————