Judgment :- I have heard Mr. K. Premkumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Mr. V.R.Thangavelu, GA, learned Government Advocate representing the respondent and have perused the records. .2. The petitioner, who was working as a Manager in the respondent Society, was suspended from the Society vide order dated 110. 2003 and also certain charges were framed on the same day. However, by an order dated 110. 2004, the disciplinary action initiated against him was closed and he was reverted to the post of Clerk with effect from 110. 2004 as a punishment and he also joined in the reverted post on the same day. During the period of suspension of service from 110. 2003 to 38. 2004, the petitioner was paid subsistence allowance of a sum of Rs.62,731/- and no allowance was paid for the period from 09. 2004 to 110. 2004. However, when the Special Officer was appointed to the respondent Society, he ordered recovery of the entire subsistence allowance paid by an order dated 011. 2004. This was on the ground that the petitioner being a Manager, is not covered by the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act [for short, PSA Act]. The petitioner sent a letter stating that he is entitled to get subsistence allowance and there is already a short fall of Rs.49,377/- to be paid to him for the aforesaid period. Therefore, in the present writ petition, he challenges the order passed by the Special Officer of the respondent Society dated 011. 2004 ordering for a recovery of the sum of Rs.62,731/-to be refunded to the Society on the ground that the PSA Act will not apply to him. 3. This Court, by an order dated 38. 2005, admitted the writ petition and also granted interim stay in W.P.M.P.No.30351 of 2005. The respondent has taken out a vacate stay application being W.V.M.P.no.2708 of 2005. 4. In the vacate stay application, it is alleged that the provisions of the PSA Act will not apply to the respondent Society since the petitioner is not a workman within the definition of the said Act, as he was engaged in a Managerial capacity and was admittedly drawing the salary of Rs.11,830/-per month. 4. In the vacate stay application, it is alleged that the provisions of the PSA Act will not apply to the respondent Society since the petitioner is not a workman within the definition of the said Act, as he was engaged in a Managerial capacity and was admittedly drawing the salary of Rs.11,830/-per month. It is also stated that in any event, the petitioner is not eligible for any subsistence allowance as he was holding the Managerial post and that the writ petition itself is not maintainable as the writ would not lie in terms of a Co-operative Society in the light of the decision of the Larger Bench of this court reported in 2006 (4) C.T.C. 689 [K.Marappan v. Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Society, Namakkal]. .5. With reference to the maintainability of the writ petition, even the Larger Bench of this Court has laid down certain propositions in the aforesaid decision and paragraph 21(7) reads as follows: ."(vii) In the absence of special circumstances, the Court will not ordinarily exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India when the Act provides for an alternative remedy." 6. This is a case involving recovery of the subsistence allowance already paid to the petitioner and time and again, Courts have held that without subsistence allowance, it will be difficult for the employees to make a sustenance and denial of subsistence allowance even infringes Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the light of the above, the objection raised by the respondent is overruled. 7. With reference to the application of the PSA Act to the case of the petitioner, it will be safely said that the person like the petitioner may not be covered by the PSA Act. Though the PSA Act may apply to the respondent Society, the petitioner cannot be held to be a workman within the definition of the Act. 8. In 2002 (4) CTC 339 [The Management, T.P.Spl. 67 Goundanpalayam Primary Agricultural Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Labour], a learned Judge has held that the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act is a special law and, therefore, a person designated as a Secretary, who is in overall control of the Society, is not entitled to claim subsistence allowance as per the Act. 9. 67 Goundanpalayam Primary Agricultural Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Labour], a learned Judge has held that the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act is a special law and, therefore, a person designated as a Secretary, who is in overall control of the Society, is not entitled to claim subsistence allowance as per the Act. 9. Very recently, another learned single Judge of this Court in his decision reported in Manupatra Law Reports (Madras) in MANU / TN / 2655 / 2006 [S. Poongavanam vs. The Special Officer, HH 565 Kadaladi Primary Agricultural Co-operative Bank Ltd., Thiruvannamalai District and another] held that in respect of common cadre employees, their service conditions are governed by G.O.Ms.No.55 Cooperation, Food and Consumer Protection Department dated 23. 2000 and, hence eligible to claim subsistence allowance in terms of the Tamilnadu Primary Agricultural Co-operative Bank Common Cadre Regulations 2000. 10. But, in the present case, the petitioner is neither a workman within the definition of the PSA Act nor his cadre is brought under the common cadre service under the provisions of Section 73 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. Therefore, while the claim made in terms of the PSA Act may not be permissible in the case of the petitioner, but it is not as if the Society can escape its liability simply because the petitioner has drawn the subsistence allowance in terms of the PSA Act. So long as the petitioner was kept under suspension pending enquiry and when the bye-laws of the Society was either silent on the question of suspension pending enquiry or did not provide any payment of subsistence allowance, the decisions in this regard are very clear. 11. It is well settled that if an employee, who is not governed by any Rules or terms of contract of employment but kept under suspension by the employer and if the terms of contract do not provide for temporary suspension, then the employer is bound to pay full wages to the workman. The Supreme Court vide its decision reported in AIR 1968 SC 800 (Balvantrai Ratilal Patel Vs. State of Maharashtra) has held as follows: "The general principle therefore is that an employer can suspend an employee pending an inquiry into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such suspension will relate to payment during the period of such suspension. State of Maharashtra) has held as follows: "The general principle therefore is that an employer can suspend an employee pending an inquiry into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such suspension will relate to payment during the period of such suspension. If there is no express term relating to payment during such suspension or if there is no statutory provision in any enactment or rule the employee is entitled to his full remuneration for the period of his interim suspension. On the other hand, if there is a term in this respect in the contract of employment or if there is a provision in the statute or the rules framed thereunder providing for the scale of payment during suspension the payment will be made in accordance therewith. This principle applies with equal force in a case where the Government is an employer and a public servant is an employee with this qualification that in view of the peculiar structural hierarchy of Government administration, the employer in the case of employment by Government must be held to be the authority which has the power to appoint the public servant concerned. It follows therefore that the authority entitled to appoint the public servant is entitled to suspend him pending a departmental enquiry into his conduct or pending a criminal proceeding, which may eventually result in a departmental enquiry against him. But what amount should be paid to the public servant during such suspension will depend upon the provisions of the statute or statutory rule in that connection. If there is such a provision the payment during suspension will be in accordance therewith. But if there is no such provision, the public servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during the period of suspension." Further, the same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court vide its decision reported in 1970 (1) SCC 362 (V.P. Gidroniya Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another). But if there is no such provision, the public servant will be entitled to his full emoluments during the period of suspension." Further, the same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court vide its decision reported in 1970 (1) SCC 362 (V.P. Gidroniya Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another). The relevant passage occurring in paragraph 8 (page 366) is usefully extracted: "It is equally well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which, it could be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words, the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey." 12. A Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us is a party (K. Chandru, J.) in W.A.No.882 of 2006 [The District Planning Officer, Dharmapuri and another v. Ponnammal], disposed of on 18. 2006, after referring to the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, in paragraph 10 observed as follows: "10. Therefore, in the light of the above principles, the appellants cannot shirk the responsibility of paying the subsistence allowance to the respondent as directed by the learned Judge...." 13. In the light of the clear legal pronouncements, this Court is inclined to quash the said order. Though the impugned order correctly makes out the legal proposition that the petitioner was not entitled to get subsistence allowance in terms of the PSA Act and, therefore, any claim made on the basis of the said Act was not permissible, yet the Court cannot approve the decision of the respondent Society in recovering the subsistence allowance. Though the impugned order correctly makes out the legal proposition that the petitioner was not entitled to get subsistence allowance in terms of the PSA Act and, therefore, any claim made on the basis of the said Act was not permissible, yet the Court cannot approve the decision of the respondent Society in recovering the subsistence allowance. If it is the stand of the respondent that the PSA Act will not apply and that the bye-laws of the Society are silent in this regard, in the light of the pronouncements cited supra, the respondent Society cannot shirk its responsibilities from paying the subsistence allowance to the petitioner. The petitioner is entitled to seek payment of subsistence allowance in the light of the pronouncements referred to above. 14. In view of the above, the writ petition shall stand allowed and the impugned order of recovery dated 011. 2004 made by the respondent is hereby set aside. Since the petitioner had suffered the punishment of reduction in rank and he has also not challenged the same before any forum, no further direction is given in terms of any balance amount to be paid to the petitioner. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, W.P.M.P.No.30351 of 2005 and W.V.M.P.No.2708 of 2005 will stand closed.