Judgment 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has filed the revision application against the order dated 11.12.2006 passed in Misc. Appeal No. 3 of 1989/2 of 1989 by the Additional District Judge, 1st Gopalganj by which he has allowed the prayer of the defendant-opposite parties and set aside the order of injunction dated 9.1.1989 passed in Title Suit No. 114/1988 by Subordinate Judge-V, Gopalganj. 3. Title Suit No. 114/1988 was filed by plaintiff no. 1, Mahanth Ramchandra Das Jee (since deceased) and the present petitioner Mahanth Bhikhari Das is plaintiff no. 2 as Chela of said plaintiff no. 1 far a declaration that the properties mentioned in Schedule-II of the plaint are the personal properties of the plaintiffs and it was not the property of public trust and the act of the defendant Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board in constituting a committee with respect to the said properties is wholly void, illegal and without jurisdiction. 4. The case of the plaintiffs was that the original spiritual ancestor of the plaintiff Baba Nayak Ram Das Jee was the resident of Madhopur and after death of his wife he devoted his time in worshipping lord Vishnu and installed an Idol of Lord Vishnu in his house for private worship and thereafter he built a temple by the side of his house in which the Idol of Lord Shiva and other deities were installed out of the proceeds of his property and he also created the Institution of Chelaship and after his death his successor one after the other inherited the properties which was later on called as Math and the plaintiff No. 1 Ramchandra Das Jee was the last guru. The plaintiff no. 2 was described in the plaint as a Chela of plaintiff no. 1 who was looking after the properties of plaintiff no. 1. The said Title Suit was filed on 16.8.1988 and apart from the relief of declaration, relief of injunction was also claimed therein but two days after the filing of the Title Suit an amendment application was filed for deleting the relief of injunction and the same was also allowed. Subsequently, two days thereafter on 20.8.1988 an application under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs praying for temporary injunction in the matter. The admitted fact is that the plaintiff no. Subsequently, two days thereafter on 20.8.1988 an application under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC was filed on behalf of the plaintiffs praying for temporary injunction in the matter. The admitted fact is that the plaintiff no. 1 died on 5.10.1988 and thereafter an application was filed by plaintiff no. 2 on 17.12.1988 for expunging the name of plaintiff no. 1. However, the said application is still pending. 5. The application for injunction was heard. The defendant nos. 1 and 2 namely, the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board and its Chairman appeared on 17.12.1988 and filed an application for dismissing the suit as not maintainable in terms of the Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. By order dated 9.1.1989 the learned Subordinate Judge-5, Gopalganj passed a composite order rejecting the petition regarding maintainability filed on behalf of defendant nos. 1 and 2 and allowing the injunction petition filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. Against the same, the defendant-opposite parties filed Misc. Appeal No. 3 of 1989/2 of 1989 which was allowed by order dated 6.7.19.89 passed by the 3rd Additional District Judge, Gopalganj and the order dated 9.1.1989 passed by the court below was set aside. Against the same the petitioner filed Civil Revision No. 1340 of 1989 in which the principal issue raised was that the appeal had not been, as a matter of fact, filed by the Religious Trust Board but by other persons purporting to have filed it on its behalf and in this regard various allegations were made. By order dated 22.3.1994, a learned Single Judge Bench of this Court allowed the revision application and set aside the impugned order dated 6.7.1989 and remitted the matter to the appellate court to pass a fresh order in accordance with law holding that the question which was raised in the revision application as to whether the appeal has been filed by the defendant Religious Trust Board or not has not been considered in the said order and the appellate court was directed to hear the parties afresh, enquire into the matter and pass a fresh order in accordance with law. 6. Thereafter the matter has again been heard and by judgment dated 11.12.2006 the 1st, Additional District Judge, Gopalganj has again allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 9.1.1989 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge-5, holding that the plaintiff no. 6. Thereafter the matter has again been heard and by judgment dated 11.12.2006 the 1st, Additional District Judge, Gopalganj has again allowed the appeal and set aside the order dated 9.1.1989 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge-5, holding that the plaintiff no. 2-petitioner having failed to show the source of deriving interest in the property in the plaint cannot be said to have established prima facie case and thus no order could have been passed injuncting the defendant nos. 1 and 2 by the impugned order on the application of the plaintiff no. 2. Against the said order the present civil revision application has been preferred. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the learned appellate court has failed to pass order in accordance with the directions of this Court given by order dated 22.3.1994 in the earlier civil revision application and he has not enquired into the matter regarding the appeal having been filed by the Religious Trust Board and thus, the order ought to be set aside on that sole ground itself. It is submitted that the clear stand of the petitioner before the appellate court was that no Vakalatnama had been filed on behalf of the appellants when the appeal was filed and the subsequent Vakalatnama filed on 20.3.1989 was forged and fabricated which is obvious from the various documents submitted by them. It is submitted that the appellate court was required to go into all these matters and only then pass the order but the same has not been done. 8. Learned counsel further submits that even the main ground for setting aside the order of injunction appears to be contrary to law and the materials on the record. It is submitted that no objection regarding the death of plaintiff no. 1 had been raised before the trial court when the order was passed and only before the appellate forum the said issue has been raised and thus it was not permissible to the appellate court to have gone into the said matter. In any case it is submitted by the learned counsel that the petitioner was plaintiff no. 2 alongwith the deceased plaintiff no. 1 when the suit was filed clearly stating that he was a Chela who was looking after the property of plaintiff no. In any case it is submitted by the learned counsel that the petitioner was plaintiff no. 2 alongwith the deceased plaintiff no. 1 when the suit was filed clearly stating that he was a Chela who was looking after the property of plaintiff no. 1 and thus, even if the worst view is taken in the matter that he is not the sole successor of plaintiff no. 1, then at the very least he would be entitled to pursue the suit and take all steps in order to protect the estate of the deceased plaintiff no. 1 as an interrneddler, more so when he was already on the record as plaintiff no. 2 in the Title Suit. Thus, merely on the ground that the application for ex-punging the name of plaintiff no. 1 from the suit, although filed, had not yet been dealt with by the trial court, it could not be said that no injunction could be granted to protect the interest of the estate of the deceased plaintiff no. 1. In support of the said contention learned counsel relies upon the provisions of Sec.2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure which defines "legal representative" to mean a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased. In support of the said proposition, learned counsel relies upon a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Sudama Devi & Ors. V/s. Jogendra Choudhary and Ors. : AIR 1987 Patna 239 [: 1987 PLJR 793] and a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Custodian of Branches of BANCO National Ultramarino V/s. Nalini Bai Naique : AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1589. In the Patna decision, while discussing the applicability of Sec.2(11) of the Code of Civil Procedure, it has been held that the definition of "legal representative" is wide and inclusive one and conceives of two distinct categories. Firstly, the heirs or persons, who in law represent the estate of the deceased person and at par with them and in a class by itself is any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased. Such a person is equally a legal representative. The phrase intermeddler with the estate has come to be a term of art and has been construed as one of the widest amplitude. Such a person is equally a legal representative. The phrase intermeddler with the estate has come to be a term of art and has been construed as one of the widest amplitude. After referring to various authorities it was held that an intermeddler (who is on the same footing as an executor de son tort in English law) is one who in any way whatsoever dabbles with or comes in touch with the estate of the deceased. In AIR 1989 SC 1589 the Supreme Court in para 4 has laid down as follows: "After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of opinion that the learned Judicial Commissioner committed serious error of law in setting aside the order of the trial Judge. "Legal representative" as defined in Civil Procedure Code which was admittedly applicable to the proceedings in the suit, means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. The definition is inclusive in character and its scope is wide, it is not confined to legal heirs, only instead it stipulates a person who may or may not be heir competent to inherit the property of the deceased but he should represent the estate of the deceased person. It includes heirs as well as persons who represent the estate even without title either as executors or administrators in possession of the estate of the deceased. All such persons would be covered by the expression "legal representative". If there are many heirs, those in possession bona fide, without there being any fraud or collusion, are also entitled to represent the estate of the deceased." 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also sought to assail the finding of the court below that the Misc. Appeal had been filed on behalf of the Religious Trust Board on the ground that it had been filed by the Advocate who had conducted the case in the Title Suit. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also sought to assail the finding of the court below that the Misc. Appeal had been filed on behalf of the Religious Trust Board on the ground that it had been filed by the Advocate who had conducted the case in the Title Suit. It is submitted by the learned counsel that even if the same lawyer who was engaged in the trial court on behalf of the Board had filed the appeal, the appeal itself was not filed by the Religious Trust Board. In support of the same learned counsel relies upon certain notings made in the file of the Religious Trust Board which has been annexed as Annexure-10 of the application. Reference is specially made to the notings dated 18.2.1991 put up before the Special Officer in which it is stated that notices of that application and the application for injunction had been received in the Board and further that no show cause had been filed on behalf of the Board and moreover the counsel who had been authorised to file appeal had not filed the same and thus no appeal had been filed on behalf of the Board. The said facts, it is submitted are also supported by Annexures 1 and 2. 10. Learned counsel for the opposite party, however, vigorously supported the impugned order dated 11.12.2006. It was firstly submitted that the issue on remand regarding the appeal having been filed on behalf of the Religious Trust Board has been considered in detail in paras 6, 9 and 10 of the impugned judgment. It is submitted that the learned appellate court has considered the entire matter including the fact that on the same day as the earlier impugned order dated 6.7.1989 was passed by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge, Gopalganj, he had separately recorded an order regarding the objection that the present appellant has not been empowered to file the appeal. However, after hearing the parties on the point, it was held that the respondents had admitted that Mr. However, after hearing the parties on the point, it was held that the respondents had admitted that Mr. P.N.Mishra, Advocate was appearing for respondents in the lower court and naturally the respondent cannot dispute the authority of the present appellant who is entitled to continue the appeal also, moreover, the appellant had also filed a letter addressed to Shri P.N. Mishra, Advocate which indicated that the Board had recognised him as the Advocate to conduct the appeal and had enquired about the stage in the appeal which means that the Board had given authority and accordingly the objection of the respondents was rejected. Learned counsel submits that it is clearly mentioned in the impugned judgment dated 11.12.2006 that the said order was recorded separately on 6.7.1989 and further the respondents were unable to satisfy the Court that both the orders passed on 6.7.1989 by the learned 3rd Additional District Judge had been filed before the High Court and only the judgment portion which was on separate sheet has been annexed with the revision application. Learned counsel also refers to the fact that the court below has also taken into consideration the fact that the defendant nos. 1 and 2 had appeared in the suit on 17.12.1988 and filed Vakalatnama executed by defendant no. 2 appointing Sri RN. Mishra as counsel which is on the record and the genuineness of which has not been challenged. For the said reasons it has been held that he was authorised to file the appeal also on behalf of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board against the injunction order, relying upon Explanation C to sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. Learned counsel for the opposite party also submits that the issue of the petitioner being an intermeddler is not relevant for the purpose of consideration of the case of grant of temporary injunction. In this regard, learned counsel relies upon Sec. 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 in which it is laid down that any injunction cannot be granted when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the court below has rightly come to the finding that after the death of plaintiff no. 1, the present petitioner-plaintiff no. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the court below has rightly come to the finding that after the death of plaintiff no. 1, the present petitioner-plaintiff no. 2 has not filed any pleading to show as to how he is personally interested in the property since he had merely been shown earlier as looking after the property of plaintiff no. 1 and had no claim to the property in his individual right. It is sub-mitted that for the said reason the finding of the learned appellate court is in accord with the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and the order of injunction has rightly been set aside. 12. Learned counsel has also sought to bring to the notice of the Court various documents including the judgments of this Court in Civil Revision and Miscellaneous Case going back to the year 1954 on the basis of which it is stated that for a long period of time the property in dispute has been held to be a Public Religious Trust and had also been granted the registration no. 210 dated 16.11.1955 by the Religious Trust Board and the said fact had been admitted by plaintiff no.1 and his predecesor continuously for several decades. So far as the said facts are concerned they do not pertain to the pleadings of the party as were available till the stage of appeal since the said matter had not been considered in either the order dated 9.1.1989 of the trial court or in the impugned judgment dated 11.12.2006 of the appellate court. Thus, this Court would not like to enter into such issues in its revisional jurisdiction. 13. The most important aspect however, sought to be highlighted by the learned counsel for the opposite party relates to the sequence of dates as recorded in the order-sheet of the trial court from the filing of the Title Suit and to the passing of the order dated 9.1.1989 granting temporary injunction. The said facts have also been dealt with in detail in para-4 of the impugned judgment. The complete order-sheet of the court below from the date of filing of the suit, i.e., 16.8.1988 till 9.1.1989 when the order of temporary injunction was passed has also been annexed in the counter affidavit. The said facts have also been dealt with in detail in para-4 of the impugned judgment. The complete order-sheet of the court below from the date of filing of the suit, i.e., 16.8.1988 till 9.1.1989 when the order of temporary injunction was passed has also been annexed in the counter affidavit. As pointed out earlier also within two days of filing of the amendment application for getting the prayer regarding injunction deleted, on 20.8.1988 the application under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC was filed and on the same day notices were issued to defendant nos. 1 and 2 to show cause why the said prayer be not allowed. Thereafter, it appears that requisites had been filed on 20.8.1988 itself. From 17.12.1988 the order-sheet acquires a peculiar form which has been commented upon by the learned appellate court also. On the said date under the heading Title Suit it is recorded that defendant no. 1 has appeared along-with Vakalatnama and an application for dismissing the plaint as not maintainable. Thereafter a separate heading of show cause is given in which the attendance of the plaintiff alone is recorded and it is mentioned that the plaintiff had filed receipt of registry of the letter. Again on 21.12.1988 order-sheet was recorded showing the attendance of the parties in the Title Suit and separate order immediately below is recorded under the heading show cause showing the attendence only of plaintiff no. 2 and it is further stated that more than one month has lapsed since the registered notice was issued to the defendants but the acknowledgment card has not yet been received and thus, the registered service of notice is treated as valid, fixing the date on 22.12.1988 for filing show cause. Again on 22.12.1988 the same procedure is followed showing attendance of the plaintiffs and defendants in the Title Suit whereas in the order regarding show cause recorded separately only attendance of the plaintiff is shown. In the main matter date was fixed on 2.1.1989 for hearing on the amendment petition and maintainability petition. Thereafter under the heading of show cause, 2.1.1989 was fixed as date for filing show cause and hearing. Again on 2.1.1989 the same procedure had been followed and in both the matters separately dates were fixed for hearing on 5.1.1989. The same procedure was followed on 5.1.1989 and date was fixed as 9.1.1989 for hearing of the matters separately. Thereafter under the heading of show cause, 2.1.1989 was fixed as date for filing show cause and hearing. Again on 2.1.1989 the same procedure had been followed and in both the matters separately dates were fixed for hearing on 5.1.1989. The same procedure was followed on 5.1.1989 and date was fixed as 9.1.1989 for hearing of the matters separately. Then on 9.1.1989 under the heading show cause only it is recorded that both sides have filed their Hazari separately, counsel for both the sides are present who are heard on injunction matter and on maintainability matter and thereafter the matter was kept for orders at 2.00 OClock on the same day. Subsequently, on the same day at 2.30 P.M. a common order was recorded in both the matters. 14. The appellate court has rightly observed that it is shocking to note that defendant nos. 1 and 2 appeared on 17.12.1988 but no copy of injunction petition was given to them and on 21.12.1988 in spite of appearance of the defendants earlier, instead of directing the plaintiff to provide copy of the injunction petition to the defendants the Court concluded in its order that more than one month time has been passed after issuance of show cause notice and since no acknowledgment has been received, it amounts to service of notice. Learned appellate court has also commented on the practice of filing of the receipt of registration of the notice by the plaintiffs stating that such practice is bad and in such cases the possibility of manipulation cannot be ruled out. It has also been noted in the appellate order that the record does not suggest that either the plaintiff or the court appraised the defendants that the plaintiff had filed an application for temporary injunction and thus, the questions were raised before the appellate court regarding the fairness of the court below in this regard. 15. Relying upon the aforesaid sequence of events learned counsel for O.P. submits that the order of temporary injunction passed by the learned trial court had been passed in violation of Order 39 Rule 3 of the CPC and also the principles of natural justice and thus, it is a nullity. Learned counsel further submits that the course adopted by the learned trial court from 17.12.1988, the moment the defendant opposite party nos. Learned counsel further submits that the course adopted by the learned trial court from 17.12.1988, the moment the defendant opposite party nos. 1 and 2 had appeared in the matter shows collusion of the Court in order to keep the defendants in the dark regarding the application for temporary injunction when the court ought to have directed the plaintiff no. 2 to serve a copy of the injunction petition on the defendants and given a chance to the defendants to take their stand in the Court. It is submitted that deliberately a composite order had been passed to show that the arguments had been addressed on behalf of the defendants with respect to the injunction matter also whereas it is evident from the course of the order-sheet that the defendants were only pressing their application for maintainability and had made their arguments with respect to the issue of maintainability only and the same is also clear from the order dated 9.1.1989 of the trial court from the arguments attributed to learned counsel for the defendants. It is submitted that on account of the said facts the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the order dated 9.1.1989 had been obtained by committing fraud and thus in view of the settled law in this regard that the order having been obtained by fraud, it is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. 16. Learned counsel has also sought to argue on the basis of Section 77 of the Bihar Religious Trust Board Act read with Section 9 of the CPC that the suit is not maintainable. However, since the present matter relates to the grant of injunction this Court does not consider it fit to go into the said matter although learned counsel for the petitioner insists that since there is no estoppel against the Statute at least for the purpose of refusal of injunction the said issue can be raised at any stage and considered by the court for that limited purpose. 17. 17. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that the proceedings with respect to the injunction being equitable in nature the person who seeks injunction should come to the Court with clean hands and it appears from the manner in which the order of injunction has been passed by the Court below that the plaintiff-petitioner has not approached the Court with clean hands and thus for the said reason he is not entitled to any equitable relief. 18. The further submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party is that there is no prayer for injunction in the plaint and the suit is for declaration simplicitor. In such a situation it is submitted that if there is no prayer of injunction at the initial stage then no relief for temporary injunction can be granted at the interim stage. 19. Learned counsel further submits that the final court of fact having vacated the injunction after application of mind, it is not open to the petitioner to seek relief in civil revisional jurisdiction of this Court. Lastly learned counsel relies upon the proposition that even if this Court finds that on technical grounds the reliefs sought is to be allowed then in the ends of justice which are higher than the ends of law, the Court must consider while setting aside the appellate order that it should not lead to revival of the illegal order passed by the learned trial Court. In the said circumstances, the Court should stay its hand and should not interfere with the appellate order. If at all the appellate order is to be set aside, then the original order should also be set aside at the same time. 20. In support of the aforesaid proposition learned counsel has relied upon various decisions. Learned counsel firstly relied upon a decision in the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer and Others V/s. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai & Ors. : (2006)5 SCC 282 , in Para-30 of which the well established principles regarding the grant of temporary injunction have been laid down, namely, existence of a prima facie case, the consideration of the balance of convenience and finally the clear possibility of irreparable injury caused to the plaintiff if the same is not granted. of Greater Mumbai & Ors. : (2006)5 SCC 282 , in Para-30 of which the well established principles regarding the grant of temporary injunction have been laid down, namely, existence of a prima facie case, the consideration of the balance of convenience and finally the clear possibility of irreparable injury caused to the plaintiff if the same is not granted. In addition it was held that temporary injunction being an equitable relief, the discretion to grant such relief shall be exercised only when the plaintiffs conduct is free from blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands. 21. With regard to the proposition that in a suit for declaration simplicitor no relief for temporary injunction can be granted, learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Raman Hosiery Factory, Delhi and Others V/s. J.K. Synthetics Ltd. and Others : AIR 1974 Delhi 207, a Division Bench judgment of the Patna High Court in the case of Bishun Prasad Pathak and Others V/s. Sashi Bhusan Misra and Ors. : AIR 1923 Patna 133, and upon the case of Amma Shah and Another V/s. Ismail Shah and Others : AIR 1972 Jammu & Kashmir 79. 22. For the proposition that mere error of law cannot be corrected under the revisional jurisdiction, learned counsel relies upon the decision of a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Pandurang Dhondi Chougule and Others V/s. Maruti Hari Jadhav and Ors., AIR 1966 Supreme Court 153 and the case of The Municipal Corporation of Delhi V/s. Suresh Chandra Jaipuria and Ann, AIR 1976 SC 2621 . He further relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kalpataru Vidya Samasthi (R) and Another V/s. S.B. Gupta and Another : (2005)7 SCC 524 in which it has been laid down that an interference can be made under the revisional jurisdiction only if the impugned judgment is perverse and shows non-application of mind. 23. Learned counsel also relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka V/s. L Muniswamy and Others : AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1489 in which it has been laid down that the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. Learned counsel also relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Venkateshwara Rao V/s. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. : AIR 1966 SC 828 , in para-17 of which it has been laid down that where a quashing of an order would restore an illegal order then the Courts must refuse to exercise their extraordinary discretionary power in those circumstances. The said proposition has also been followed by this Court in the Division Bench decisions of this Court in the case of Devendra Prasad Gupta V/s. The State of Bihar & Ors.: 1977 BBCJ 543 [:1977 PLJR 576] and Guru Orasad Nabdak & Ors. V/s. Additional Collector of Monghyr and Ors.: 1978 BBCJ 575 [:1978 PLJR 636]. 24. Regarding the proposition that a judgment which has been obtained by fraud is a nullity, learned counsel relies upon para 1553 Vol. 16 of Halsburys Laws of England (4th edition) in which that proposition has been laid down in the following terms: "1553. Judgment obtained by fraud. Fraud is an extrinsic, collateral act which vitiates the most solemn proceedings of Courts of justice. A judgment obtained by fraud or collusion, even, it seems, a judgment of the House of Lords, may be treated as a nullity. An exception to the generality of these propositions should probably be made where a purchaser has acquired title to property in good faith and for value upon the faith of a judgment in rem. Apart from this they may be accepted without qualification in favour of persons who were not party to the judgment, whether it was in rem or in personam. On this principle the recovery of penalties, which it is not intended to enforce, in a friendly action instituted in order to prevent hostile actions, is no bar. to a second action by another party for penalties for the same offence. In order to avoid being estopped by it, a party to a judgment obtained by fraud should generally apply to have it set aside." 25. In his reply, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even in the declaratory suit it is open to the Court to grant temporary injunction in an appropriate case. In order to avoid being estopped by it, a party to a judgment obtained by fraud should generally apply to have it set aside." 25. In his reply, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even in the declaratory suit it is open to the Court to grant temporary injunction in an appropriate case. In support of the same he relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajnibai (Smt.) alias Mannubai V/s. Kamla Devi (Smt.) and Others : (1996)2 Supreme Court Cases 225, in para-4 of which it has been laid down as follows: "Admittedly, the appellant is in possession of the property. In view of his apprehension that there is a threat to his possession, his only remedy would be whether he will be entitled to the declaration sought for. When he seeks to protect his possession, if he is otherwise entitled according to law, neces-sarily the Court has to consider whether protection is to be given to him pending the suit. Merely because there is no dispute as regards the corporeal right to the property, it does not necessarily follow that he is not entitled to avail of the remedy under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC. Even otherwise also, it is settled law that under Sec.151 CPC, the Court has got inherent power to protect the rights of the parties pending the suit. Under these circumstances, the view expressed by the High Court that application itself is not maintainable is clearly illegal and erroneous. The application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 is maintainable." 26. On a consideration of the rival submissions of the parties this Court is inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner so far as the issue regarding the competence of plaintiff no. 2-petitioner to carry on the suit is concerned. It has been clearly laid down in Sec.2(11) CPC that an intermeddler is also a legal representative and the said proposition has also been upheld by the Apex Court and the Full Bench of this Court in the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioner. Moreover, in the plaint itself the petitioner had been arrayed as plaintiff no. 2 and clear statement has been made that he is looking after the property of plaintiff no. 1. Moreover, in the plaint itself the petitioner had been arrayed as plaintiff no. 2 and clear statement has been made that he is looking after the property of plaintiff no. 1. In the said circumstances, it is immaterial that the petitioner has succeeded or not succeeded as Mahanth and Chela in succession of Mahanth Ram Chandra Das Jee. The only issue to be considered is whether having been made plaintiff no. 2 in the plaint and also described as looking after the property of plaintiff no. 1 he would have right to prosecute the suit as the plaintiff for the benefit of the estate of Mahanth Ram Chandra Das Jee or not; in my opinion, in view of the clear provisions of Sec.2(11) CPC, as interpreted by the Apex Court, and by this Court, he had right to continue the suit not on his own behalf but on behalf of the estate of Mahanth Ramchandra Das Jee. In this regard the reference of personal interest of the plaintiff under Sec. 41 (j) of the Specific Relief Act would not refer to the personal interest of the petitioner but the personal interest of plaintiff no. 1 which interest would now cover the estate of deceased plaintiff no. 1.Thus, the finding of the learned appellate court that the plaintiff no. 2 having failed to show sources deriving interest in the property in the plaint for establishing prima facie case, appears to be contrary to settled proposition of law and all that the plaintiff no. 2 would be required to show is the interest of the estate of deceased plaintiff no. 1 in the matter in order to obtain an injunction from the Court so far as protecting and preserving the property of the deceased plaintiff no. 1 is concerned. 27. However, on that issue alone the appeal cannot be allowed and the appellate order alone cannot be set aside in view of the shocking and disturbing facts which have been brought to the notice of both the appellate Court and of this Court by the opposite parties. It is evident from the manner in which the issue regarding grant of temporary injunction was undertaken in the court below, especially the manner in which the separate order-sheets were recorded under the heading Title Suit and the heading Show cause showing the plaintiffs as well as defendant nos. It is evident from the manner in which the issue regarding grant of temporary injunction was undertaken in the court below, especially the manner in which the separate order-sheets were recorded under the heading Title Suit and the heading Show cause showing the plaintiffs as well as defendant nos. 1 and 2 being present in the Title Suit and only the plaintiff no. 2 as appearing in the show cause matter, does not show the Court concerned in proper light. The only conclusion that one can draw from the same is that an attempt was made to keep the appearing defendant nos. 1 and 2 in the dark about the filing of the application for temporary injunction specially in view of the fact that the earlier prayer for injunction in the main plaint had been sought to be deleted by way of amendment and within two days of the same an application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rule 1 had been filed. It is clear from the manner in which the order-sheet has been recorded that attempt was made to hear the defendant nos. 1 and 2 on the issue of maintainability only and that no show cause was filed on their behalf although the same could easily have been elicited from them by informing them on 17.12.1988 when they had appeared in the court through the counsel. In the said circumstances, no proper opportunity was provided to the defendants to bring on record the large number of documents that were in their possession from the year 1954 onwards which could have warranted the decision of the Court against granting temporary injunction in the matter. 28. In this regard reliance by learned counsel for the petitioner upon Annexures 10.1 and 2 cannot help him since it is evident from Annexure-10 that in another set of notes that had been put up before the Law Department of the State Government, it had been clearly stated that appeal had been filed on behalf of the Board. The said factual submission before the Law Department and the contrary notes as contained in Annexure-10 go to show that there was a section of employees within the Religious Trust Board who were trying to assist the petitioner in the matter contrary to the interest of the Religious Trust Board. The said factual submission before the Law Department and the contrary notes as contained in Annexure-10 go to show that there was a section of employees within the Religious Trust Board who were trying to assist the petitioner in the matter contrary to the interest of the Religious Trust Board. Thus, no credibility can be given to any such notes that have been put up in favour of the petitioner and which have been made easily available to the petitioner for the purpose of prosecuting his revision application before this Court. 29. This Court also finds that the learned 1st. Additional District Judge in his impugned judgment dated 11.12.2006 has considered the aspect regarding filing of the appeal on behalf of the Board or not as has been raised earlier and has rightly considered all aspects of the matter and came to his conclusion. Under the revisional jurisdiction this Court does not deem it fit and proper to interfere in such factual matter and the finding of the learned appellate court in this regard must be taken as final. 30. Since the reasoning given in the impugned judgment dated 11.12.2006 do not find favour with this Court and the appeal should not have been allowed on the said reason this Court sets aside the impugned judgment dated 11.12.2006 on the said aspect of the matter. However, since a clear finding has been recorded not only by the Appellate Court in its judgment dated 11.12.2006 but also by this Court by holding that the order dated 9.1.1989 had been passed not in a fair and just manner by the learned trial court, the said order dated 9.1.1989 passed in Title Suit No. 114/1988 by the Subordinate Judge-5, Gopalganj is also set aside. 31. In the result the revision application is allowed to the extent indicated above but both the appellate judgment dated 11.12.2006 and the order dated 9.1.1989 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge-5, Gopalganj are set aside and the matter is remanded back to the learned trial court for re-hearing the matter after giving an opportunity to the defendants to file their show cause in the matter and present all their documents in opposition to the said application for temporary injunction. 32. 32. In view of the fact that the suit itself is of the year 1988, let the said matter be considered expeditiously as well as the main suit also be disposed of as quickly as possible.