JUDGMENT Ajit J. Gunjal, J. This appeal is by the plaintiffs questioning the divergent findings recorded by the Courts below. To appreciate the controversy involved in this appeal, few facts are necessary to be stated. 2. Plaintiff No. 1 is the owner of property bearing CTS No.6163 shown as BCEF in the hand sketch. Plaintiff No.2 and his brother are the joint owners of property bearing CTS No.6126/ABC shown as AGHM. The defendant is the owner of house bearing CTS Nos.6124 and 6125 shown as ABCD in the hand sketch. At the place shown as BKNF there are residential houses. There is a primary school known as DETS within the vicinity of the premises in question. According to the plaintiffs the entire area is residential. The plaintiffs houses are ancient and built with mud bricks. The defendant’s house is also constructed of mud bricks long back. They are also not in a proper condition in as much as they are in dilapidated condition. The AB and BC walls are common walls constructed by mud bricks. Plaintiff No. 1 along with his family and children is residing in the house shown as BCEF. There are school going children in the family. Likewise plaintiff No.2 and his brother and family are residing in CTS No.6124+6125 shown as AGHM in the sketch. Suffice it to say, that the first defendant is making all efforts to set up a power loom in his house which according to the plaintiffs would cause nuisance. The anxiety of the plaintiffs is that by erection of such power loom there is every possibility that the structure would develop cracks and the noise emitted from the said power looms causes nuisance. 3. The plaintiffs would submit that the first defendant after putting up the necessary machinery, is making efforts to obtained license. Apprehension is that the second defendant-Municipality is likely to grant the license. Hence the suit was filed for mandatory injunction restraining the first defendant from setting up a power loom and the second defendant from granting license. 4. The first defendant has filed his written statement denying the existence of a primary school. He has also denied that the house of the plaintiffs are their own houses. It is his case that the AB wall in between the house of first defendant and plaintiff No.2 is a newly built wall with bricks and cement. 4. The first defendant has filed his written statement denying the existence of a primary school. He has also denied that the house of the plaintiffs are their own houses. It is his case that the AB wall in between the house of first defendant and plaintiff No.2 is a newly built wall with bricks and cement. It is his specific case that he is installing a power loom at a distance of about 21/2 feet from the common wall and about 15 to 20 feet from the place shown as DC in the sketch. According to him the necessary safe guards have been taken to see that the buildings of the plaintiffs is not damaged and running of power loom would not cause any nuisance. According to him the second defendant has not as yet granted any license. Hence the suit is premature. 5. The second defendant has filed written statement contending that the suit is not maintainable and without exhausting all the remedies available under the Karnataka Municipalities Act, the plaintiffs cannot file a suit. 6. On the basis of these pleadings the learned Trial Judge has framed as many as four issues. The learned trial Judge on the material issue has recorded a finding that the erection of a power loom would cause nuisance and further the setting up of a power loom in a residential area is impermissible. Hence decreed the suit. 7, The first defendant questioned the said judgment and decree before the learned appellate Judge. The learned appellate Judge having re-appreciated the evidence has found that the suit is premature in as much as cause of action has not arisen ‘for the plaintiff to seek declaration of mandatory injunction in as much as ‘the power loom has not as yet commenced, but however, he has allowed the appeal in part. Thus modifying the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge to the effect that the first defendant is restrained from starting the power loom without obtaining necessary license from the second defendant-Municipality. In so far as second defendant is concerned, the grant of injunction against him was set aside. As against the said finding, the plaintiffs are before this Court. 8. Mr. In so far as second defendant is concerned, the grant of injunction against him was set aside. As against the said finding, the plaintiffs are before this Court. 8. Mr. S.P. Kulkarni, learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs submits that the evidence on record clearly discloses that if at all the machinery is set up and the license is granted by the second defendant to run the power loom it will cause nuisance. He also submits that the fact that the power loom is being set up in a residential locality, the same is Impermissible. 9. Mr. N.P. Singri, learned Counsel appearing for the first defendant submits that unless the license is granted by the second defendant, the question of running power loom does not arise. 10. Mr. Harsh Desai, learned Counsel appearing for defendant No.2 submits that the Municipality is yet to consider the application of the first defendant for grant of license. He submits that the suit itself is premature. 11. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. 12. Apparently the nuisance is of two kinds, public nuisance and private nuisance. The test of private nuisance is: (1) Constant noise, if abnormal .or unusual can be actionable nuisance if it interferes with one’s physical comforts. (2) The test of a nuisance causing personal discomfort is the actual local standard of comfort, and not an ideal or absolute standard. (3) Generally, unusual or abnormal noise on defendants’ premise which disturbs sleep of the occupants of the plaintiff’s house during night or which is so loud during day time that due to it one cannot hear ordinary conversation in the plaintiff’s house or which cannot allow the occupants of the plaintiff’s house to carry on their ordinary work is deemed to be a noise which interferes with one’s physical comforts. (4) Even in a noisy locality, if there is substantial addition to the noise by introduction of some machine, instrument or performance at defendants’s physical comforts of the occupants of the plaintiff’s house, then also the noise will amount to actionable nuisance. (5) If the noise amounts to an actionable nuisance, the defence that the defendant is making a reasonable use of his own property will .be ineffectual. No use of one’s property is reasonable if it causes substantial discomfort to other persons. (5) If the noise amounts to an actionable nuisance, the defence that the defendant is making a reasonable use of his own property will .be ineffectual. No use of one’s property is reasonable if it causes substantial discomfort to other persons. “If a man creates a nuisance” said Kekewish J. in Attorney General V s. Cole and Sons (1901) 1 Ch. 205 at p.207. “He cannot say that he is acting reasonably. The two things are self contradictory”. (6) If the defendant is found to be carrying on his business so as to cause a nuisance to his neighbours, he is not acting reasonably as regards them, and may be restrained by injunction, although he may be conducting his business in a proper manner according to rules framed in this behalf either by the Municipality or by the Government. The latter defence can be effective in a case of public nuisance, but not in that of a private nuisance. (7) If an operation on the defendant’s premises cannot by any case and skill be prevented from causing a private nuisance to he neighbours, it cannot be undertaken at all, except with the consent of those injured by it. (8) The right to commit a private nuisance can in certain circumstances, be acquired either by prescription or by the authority of a statute”. These are the primary varieties of nuisance. 13. Apparently in the case on hand, the second defendant-Municipality is yet to grant a license in favour of defendant No. 1. The application filed by the first defendant for grant of license is pending consideration. Consequently, I am of the view that the learned appellate Judge was justified in modifying the judgment and decree and removing the embargo granted by the learned trial Judge on the second defendant in issuing the license. Obviously the power of the Municipality or a local body cannot be whittled by the Civil Court and a decree of injunction cannot be granted against a statutory body. Obviously any action of a statutory body is liable for judicial intervention. It is also to be noticed that an injunction is operating against defendant No.1 to the effect that he shall not operate the power loom without obtaining the necessary permission from the local authority i.e., the second defendant-Municipality. Obviously any action of a statutory body is liable for judicial intervention. It is also to be noticed that an injunction is operating against defendant No.1 to the effect that he shall not operate the power loom without obtaining the necessary permission from the local authority i.e., the second defendant-Municipality. Incidentally it is also to be noticed that the second defendant-Municipality is required to take note of whether any power loom of the present nature can be permitted in a residential locality. Having regard to the Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Hebbal Gangenahalli Layout Residents Association Vs. Corporation of the City of Bangalore, ILR 1992 Kar 1344, the second defendant-Municipality is also required to take note of the observations made during the course of the judgment before issuing a license in favour of first defendant. Needless to say that the plaintiffs who will be affected by the running of a power loom are required to be heard before the application of the first defendant for grant of license is processed. Having regard to the findings recorded by the learned appellate Judge, I am of the view that the said findings cannot be faulted. Consequently, I am of the view that no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. The appeal stands dismissed. Registry to send back the records forthwith.