Judgment ( 1. ) WHILE admitting this appeal, the following substantial questions of law were framed and it was ordered that the case shall be heard finally in motion in the month of July, 2007 : "1. Whether first appellate Court was justified in confirming the decree passed by the trial Court under section 12 (1) (f) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act ? 2, Whether lower appellate Court was justified in rejecting the application made by the defendant (appellant herein) for amendment of the plaint under Order 6, Rule 17 of the C. P. Code when the said amendment was based upon the subsequent event and which had a material bearing over the issue about the availability of alternate suitable accommodation acquired by the plaintiff during pendency of the suit from another tenant ? 3. Whether the findings recorded by learned first appellate Court in rejecting the amendment application made by the defendant can be said to be legally justified ? " ( 2. ) THIS is defendants appeal against the concurrent judgments and decree of eviction passed against him by the Courts below under section 12 (1) (f) of the m. P. Accommodation Control Act (for short the Act ). ( 3. ) FACTS necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as under. Nathulal filed an eviction suit against the appellant on the allegation that he is a tenant in respect of the suit shop more particularly described in the plaint. The monthly rent of the premise was Rs. 722/ -. One of the grounds taken for eviction was that the suit shop was required for continuing business of Dilip, who was joined as plaintiff No. 2. According to the plaint allegation, Dilip was doing business of plastic toys and other articles made of plastic. It was alleged that suit shop was on the ground floor and on the first floor Plaintiff No. 1 had his office and second floor was used for residential purpose. It was alleged that Dilip was doing business as aforesaid in a place below the staircase which was not sufficient. The suit was contested by the appellant by denying each and every material fact pleaded in the plaint. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, trial Court framed issues and allowed parties to adduce evidence. It was alleged that Dilip was doing business as aforesaid in a place below the staircase which was not sufficient. The suit was contested by the appellant by denying each and every material fact pleaded in the plaint. On the basis of the pleading of the parties, trial Court framed issues and allowed parties to adduce evidence. Trial Court after appreciating the evidence found that the plaintiff had established the bona fide need of Dilip as a result a decree for eviction was passed against the appellant under section 12 (l) (f) of the Act. Appellant challenged the said judgment and decree in First Appeal. During the pendency of the F. A. the appellant moved applications, one under Order 6, Rule 17 and another under Order 41, Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code. By application under Order 6, Rule 17, the appellant sought amendment in the written statement to bring on record subsequent events. According to the appellant during the pendency of the lis, Plaintiff No. 1 expired, therefore, the accommodation on the first floor was available for continuing the business of Dilip and thus, the need of Dilip stood satisfied. By application under order 41, Rule 27, the appellant sought permission to adduce additional evidence. In another suit decree for eviction against the another tenant of non-residential accommodation was passed in favour of Dilip. Therefore, also the need set up in the suit out of which this appeal arises, stood satisfied. The First appellate Court allowed the application under Order 6, Rule 17 and remanded the case for adjudication by the trial Court. However, application under Order 41, rule 27 was rejected on the ground that the judgment passed in favour of Dilip had no bearing on the controversy and issue involved in the case because Dilip sought eviction on the ground of bona fide need of his son Rohit. It seems that the appellant did not challenge that part of judgment whereby his application under Order 41, Rule 27 was rejected by the lower appellate Court. After the remand, the trial Court after affording opportunity of leading further evidence to the parties, once again found that the need of Dilip was existing despite the death of Plaintiff No. 1 and notwithstanding the space available in the first floor which was being used by Plaintiff No. 1 for running his office as lawyer during his life time. After the remand, the trial Court after affording opportunity of leading further evidence to the parties, once again found that the need of Dilip was existing despite the death of Plaintiff No. 1 and notwithstanding the space available in the first floor which was being used by Plaintiff No. 1 for running his office as lawyer during his life time. Thus, suit was decreed. The matter was carried in appeal by the appellant and during the pendency of the First Appeal, the appellant moved an application under Order 6, Rule 17 seeking further amendment in the written statement. He sought amendment to the effect that the judgment passed in favour of Dilip in another application was affirmed by this Court as a result Dilip obtained possession from his tenant and he has started his own business in the name and style of Nisha Art Gallery in the said premises along with his son Ranjit. Thus, according to the appellant need of plaintiff Dilip stood satisfied and no decree for eviction could be passed against the present appellant. Learned First Appellate court by the impugned judgment and decree not only rejected the application under Order 6, Rule 17 but also affirmed the findings of fact recorded by the trial court. Hence this appeal on the substantial questions of law as mentioned herein above. ( 4. ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record of the Courts below in detail. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the First Appellate Court committed an illegality in rejecting the application for amendment. According to him the proposed amendment in written statement had a vital bearing on the question of bona fide need of the respondent Dilip and lower Appellate Court ignoring the law laid down by the Supreme Court in hashmat Rai vs. Raghunath, 1981 MPLJ (SC) 610 = AIR 1981 SC 1711 has wrongly relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court on another decision of the supreme Court in Shakuntala Bai and ors. vs. Narayan Das and ors. , (2004) 5 scc 772 . He, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment and decree are unsustainable in law as without recording the evidence the First Appellate Court has rightly brushed aside the application for amendment in written statement. vs. Narayan Das and ors. , (2004) 5 scc 772 . He, therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment and decree are unsustainable in law as without recording the evidence the First Appellate Court has rightly brushed aside the application for amendment in written statement. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondents has supported the impugned judgment and decree and submitted that there are concurrent findings of fact based upon proper appreciation of evidence and they are not open to challenge in this appeal. He further submitted that the questions of law framed while admitting the appeal are in fact not the questions of law in view of the test laid down by the Supreme Court in Santosh Hajari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, 2001 (1)JLJ 401 . He, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed and the lower appellate Court committed no illegality in rejecting the application for amendment. Learned counsel for the respondents in support of his contention has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 2005 SC 1274 , Pratap Rai Tanwani and another vs. Uttam Chand and another. ( 5. ) SO far as question relating to the bona fide need is concerned, both the courts below have found as fact that plaintiffs were able to establish the bona fide need of Dilip. This finding of fact is based upon proper appreciation of evidence. ( 6. ) AFTER going through the records of Courts below, this Court is of the view that there is hardly any scope of interference with the aforesaid finding of fact with regard to the bona fide need of Dilip, Plaintiff No. 2. In fact no serious attack was made by the learned counsel for appellant against said finding of fact. His emphasis was that the need stood satisfied in view of subsequent development inasmuch as Dilip had obtained vacant possession from his tenant of another non-residential accommodation and he has started his business in the name and style of Nisha Art Gallery. According to the learned counsel for appellant without adjudicating on this, lower Court by the impugned judgment has lightly dealt with the application for amendment and that too following the decision of the Supreme Court in Shakuntala Bais case (supra) which had no application to the facts of the present case. According to the learned counsel for appellant without adjudicating on this, lower Court by the impugned judgment has lightly dealt with the application for amendment and that too following the decision of the Supreme Court in Shakuntala Bais case (supra) which had no application to the facts of the present case. So far as later submission of the learned counsel for appellant is concerned, this Court agrees with the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the decision of the Supreme Court in shankuntala Bais case (supra) was wrongly applied by the lower appellate Court while deciding the application for amendment in the written statement. In shankuntala Bais case (supra) the question was whether personal bona fide need would come to the end upon death of a landlord during pendency of the lis. It was in that context the Supreme Court held that the bona fide need of landlord has to be examined as on the date of institution of the proceeding and subsequent death of the landlord during the pendency of the appeal would make no difference as his legal representatives are fully entitled to defend the estate. That was not the case here. However, that would not make much difference to the ultimate result in this appeal in view of the following discussion. ( 7. ) IN the application under Order 6, Rule 17 filed by the appellant before the lower appellate Court it was alleged that the eviction decree passed in favour of Dilip against his tenant Garibdas was affirmed by this Court as a result Dilip obtained possession and has started business in the name and style of Nisha Art gallery. In support of this, learned counsel for appellant relied upon the judgment of this Court passed in S. A. 334/03 and invitation card of his starting of Nisha art Gallery. In the application for amendment except for assertion, no other material was placed to show that Dilip had actually started his business in the shop possession whereof was obtained from Garibdas on the ground of bona fide need of his son-Rohit. In this connection, it would be useful to keep in mind the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Pratap Rai Tanwanis case (supra ). In this connection, it would be useful to keep in mind the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Pratap Rai Tanwanis case (supra ). The supreme Court after noticing previous judgments, dealing with the subsequent event in a suit for eviction, has laid the test to the effect that personal bona fide need of the plaintiff in suit for eviction under the Rent Control law must exist on the date of institution of the suit till final decree is passed. If the tenant raises the plea of subsequent event to defeat the claim of the plaintiff, the Court must examine, evaluate and adjudicate upon the subsequent events and their effect. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Pratap Rai Tanwanis case (supra) as under : "it is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. " ( 8. ) FROM the application for amendment it is clear that appellant had merely made an assertion but did not place any material to show even prima facie that dilip had started business in another non-residential accommodation obtained from Garibdas. From perusal of the invitation card it is clear that said invitation card was issued jointly by Rohit and Ranjit. Normally an invitation card is issued by the person who is starting the new venture and names of other family members and other relatives are mentioned who are eager to receive and welcome guests. From perusal of the invitation card it is clear that said invitation card was issued jointly by Rohit and Ranjit. Normally an invitation card is issued by the person who is starting the new venture and names of other family members and other relatives are mentioned who are eager to receive and welcome guests. If the appellant was serious he could have obtained other material like the license for starting the shop or permission under the Shop and establishments Act (Gumasta Kanun ). It would also be relevant to point out if what the appellant says in the application for amendment is correct, then definitely Garibdas the evicted tenant had a remedy under section 17 of the Act to obtain the possession of the shop but in the application for amendment neither there is a pleading nor any material was placed to show that actually Garibdas resorted to provision of section 17 of the Act which again goes to show that the proposed amendment was nothing but an attempt in disguise to prolong the litigation as long as possible. Thus, on evaluation of the plea in the application for amendment, it would not be wrong to come to the conclusion that the said plea was raised just to prolong traditional litigation between the landlord and tenant which has been deprecated by the Supreme Court in catena of decisions including Pratap Rai Tanwanis case (supra) and the reliance placed on the decision of Hashmat Rais would not come to the rescue of appellant. ( 9. ) THUS, the lower appellate although for wrong reasons, but rightly rejected the application for amendment submitted by the appellant upon subsequent events. At this point we may also recall that earlier also the application under Order 41, Rule 27, based upon eviction decree passed against garibdas, was rejected by the lower appellate Court. Thus, this Court, after examining and evaluating the subsequent events is of the opinion that they had no effect on a decree for eviction suffered by the appellant under section 12 (1) (f)of the Act. Thus, the impugned judgment passed by the lower appellate Court is hereby affirmed. As a result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with cost through out. Counsels fee Rs. 2000/- (two thousand ). ( 10. Thus, the impugned judgment passed by the lower appellate Court is hereby affirmed. As a result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with cost through out. Counsels fee Rs. 2000/- (two thousand ). ( 10. ) AT this stage, learned counsel for appellant submitted that appellant is carrying on business in the suit premises since 1985 and, therefore, some reasonable time may be given for vacating the premises. Learned counsel for respondents submitted that a period of six months from today would be sufficient for the appellant to vacate and hand over the suit premises. ( 11. ) IN view of this, it is directed that in case the appellant files an undertaking within three weeks from today in the trial Court and continues to pay monthly rent regularly before 15th of each succeeding month, the decree shall not be put in execution for six months. Upon expiry of six months, appellant shall peacefully hand over possession of suit shop to the respondent. In the event of breach of undertaking, respondent would be free to take appropriate action to obtain possession. Filing of the undertaking would be without prejudice to the rights of the parties to challenge the judgment and decree. Order accordingly. Order accordingly.