V. R. Raveendranath, Kerala v. State of Kerala, Represented by Revenue Secretary to Govt. , Revenue Department
2007-11-01
THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN
body2007
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- Petitioner seeks a declaration that Section 3 (1) (x) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, hereinafter referred to as the “KLR Act” is void and inoperative, being unconstitutional. 2. The petitioners claim that on the basis of occupation that resulted in suo-motu proceedings, S.M.7 of 1984 of the Land Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram, under Section 72C of the KLR Act, they are entitled to fixity, being cultivating tenants. Those statutory proceedings culminated in Ext.P5 order of this Court, in a revision under Section 103 of the KLR Act, confirming the finding that the land in dispute is liable to be exempted under Section 3 (1) (x) of the KLR Act, being a tenancy in respect of site or building attached to a temple. An application for review of that judgment was also dismissed. The conclusion arrived at in those proceedings is that the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of the proviso of Section 3 (1) (x) on the strength of Kerala Tenants and Kudikidappukars Protection Act, 1963, (Act 7 of 1963) hereinafter referred to as the “Kudikidappukars Act”. This Court did not therefore find it possible to apply the ratio of the decision in Gopalan Nair v. State of Kerala (1988 (1) KLJ 93), which was rightly noticed to be a case governed by the Malabar Tenancy Act. 3. This writ petition is filed, in the wake of the aforesaid view of this Court, essentially seeking a declaration that the proviso to Section 3 (1) (x) of the Act, as it now stands, results in hostile discrimination between tenants, who were entitled to fixity under certain prior statutes, and those who did not get any such benefit. It is in this context that the petitioners also seek a declaration that the tenants in Malabar and Travancore area are similarly situated and hence cannot be singled out. A further declaration that Section 3 (1)(x) of the KLR Act cannot be invoked or applied as against tenants, who were in possession for more than 75 years, is also sought for. 4. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that in the light of the decision in Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007 (1) KLT 623 (SC), the provision in Section 3 (1)(x) is not free from judicial review though included in the IXth Schedule of the Constitution.
4. It is argued on behalf of the petitioners that in the light of the decision in Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu (2007 (1) KLT 623 (SC), the provision in Section 3 (1)(x) is not free from judicial review though included in the IXth Schedule of the Constitution. In support of the argument that there cannot be any classification between the Travancore and the Malabar area, reference was made to Kumaran Nambudiri v. Cochin Devaswom Board and another (AIR 1954 T.C. 515). 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the private respondents submitted that, merely because an Act applies only to a part of the State, it cannot be held to be discriminatory. The decision in Lakshmi Venketesh Temple v. Commissioner H.R.C. Endowments (2005 (3) KLT 345) was cited. 6. Section 3 (1)(x) of the KLR ACT reads as follows: “3. Exemptions:- (1) Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to:- Xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (x) tenancies in respect of sites, tanks and premises of any temple, mosque or church [(including sites belonging to a temple, mosque or church on which religious ceremonies are conducted)] and sites of office buildings and other buildings attached to such temple, mosque or church, created by the owner, trustee or manager of such temple, mosque or church, Provided that nothing in this clause shall affect the right to which a tenant was entitled immediately before the commencement of this Act under the contract of tenancy or under any law then in force;” 7. We are concerned only with the effect of the proviso to Section 3 (1) (x) of the KLR Act. The question for determination is as to whether it results in any hostile discrimination resulting in arbitrariness, calling for any declaration, as sought for. 8. At the outset, I may notice that the contention of the petitioner is not that the benefit of the proviso shall not ensure to any particular person or category of citizens on account of domicile or otherwise. The plea is that, the benefit, which has been found to be available to the persons, who were earlier governed by the Malabar Tenancy Act, as enunciated and applied in Gopalan’s case (supra) is to be available to all citizens throughout the State of Kerala in view of the State wide application of the KLR Act. 9.
The plea is that, the benefit, which has been found to be available to the persons, who were earlier governed by the Malabar Tenancy Act, as enunciated and applied in Gopalan’s case (supra) is to be available to all citizens throughout the State of Kerala in view of the State wide application of the KLR Act. 9. The proviso in question only expresses the intention of the legislature that the exemption from the provisions of the Act in terms of Section 3(1) (x) shall not affect the right to which a tenant was entitled, immediately before the commencement of the KLR Act. The legislature clarifies itself that it does not intend to impinge any vested right accrued in favour of a tenant on the basis of the situation obtained before the commencement of the KLR Act. These may be rights referable to any contract of tenancy or under any law then in force. This means that the right of a tenant in terms of any contract of tenancy or under any law in force before the commencement of the KLR Act shall not, in any manner, be affected by the exemption granted to the tenancies falling under Section 3(1)(x). That is an exemption made applicable throughout the territory to which the KLR Act applies and the proviso to that exemption is also made uniformly applicable to the entire area of operation of the said statute. So much so, there is no classification between citizens in the matter of application of the exemption under Section 3 (1)(x) and the operation of the proviso under that clause. 10. To examine the argument, one needs only to visualize the situation that would have been available, had the KLR Act not been legislated and brought into force. The undisputed situation is that for lands which then fell within the area to which the Madras Tenancy Act applied, the tenants had such protection which was of a permanent character, while the Kudikidappukars Act was an Act for temporary protection of tenants and kudikidappukars which provided only a prohibition against institution of suits or other proceedings for the recognition or enforcement of certain rights, that too, only during the period of operation of that Act.
As held in Ext.P5 judgment rendered inter-parties in the revision under Section 103 of the KLR Act, to which proposition of law, I completely concur, section 132 of the KLR Act repeals the kudikidappukars Act and further provides that all proceedings stayed by that enactment may be disposed of by the courts in accordance with the provisions of the KLR Act. So much so, it can be easily seen that the protection granted by the Kudikidappukars Act was only a temporary measure of stay of proceedings and did not confer on a tenant, any right to property, by way of fixity or otherwise. Therefore, by the repeal of that Act, the situation would be that those who enjoyed the benefit of that legislation would seize to enjoy it. It can also be noticed, at once, that a person who is a tenant and entitled to any particular right under a contract of tenancy is also entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Section 3 (1)(X) provided, such benefit was available to him before the commencement of the KLR Act. Thus it can be seen that any right available before the commencement of the KLR Act, to any person falling under the proviso to Section 3 (1)(x), shall remain unaffected by the exemption being granted by virtue of Section 3(1)(X). This is all that is the run of the proviso under consideration. If a person did not have any such right before the commencement of the KLR Act, he cannot seek to enlarge it by recourse to the proviso to section 3 (1)(X) of the KLR Act. For the aforesaid reasons, no declaration, as sought for, is called for. Writ petition fails. It is hence dismissed. No costs.