JUDGMENT D.G.R. Patnaik, J. 1. This appeal filed by the defendant-appellant is directed against the judgment dated 12.01.1999 and its corresponding decree dated 18.01.1999, passed by the Subordinate Judge-1, Chaibasa in Money Suit No. 1 of 1995, whereby the suit filed for realization of a sum of Rs. 20.60 lakhs, was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant. 2 The plaintiffs case briefly stated is that the plaintiff is a registered partnership Firm, while the defendant is a body corporate dealing in storage and distribution of food grains. The defendant is required to stock its food grains in godowns. Being in need of a spacious premises for godown purposes for storage of food grains, the defendant had approached the plaintiff and had offered to take the plaintiffs premises on rent. Vide letter of offer (Annexure-1), the defendant had asked the plaintiffs to construct a godown within its premises according to specifications designed and mentioned in the said letter. The plaintiff had accepted the offer of the defendant to rent out its premises after constructing the godown besides other structures as required by the defendant and the monthly rent was fixed @ 0.22 Paise per square feet. The plaintiff had invested substantial amount of money for constructing the godown besides one double storied building with rooms and the entire premises bearing Municipal Holding No. 6/134 consisting of big rooms/halls open verandahs, open space, situated at Chakradharpur, was let out to the defendant in the year 1976. The monthly rent was enhanced two years later from 0.22 Paise to 0.32 Paise per square feet, The total built up area, which came into the occupation of the defendant was 9.415.71 square feet and the total rent for the premises payable per month according to English Calendar, was Rs. 3,013,32 Paise. A deed of lease was executed by and between the parties for a limited period up to 30.06.1981. However, the defendant became defaulter and failed to pay the monthly rents. The period of lease was not extended beyond 30.06.1981, the plaintiff had also needed the premises for its own use and] therefore, a legal notice was served upon the defendant, whereby the plaintiff had asked the defendant to vacate the tenanted premises. Upon failure to get the tenanted premises vacated, the plaintiff filed the Title (Eviction) Suit No. 2 of 1987 before the competent court, which was ultimately decreed. Upon failure to get the tenanted premises vacated, the plaintiff filed the Title (Eviction) Suit No. 2 of 1987 before the competent court, which was ultimately decreed. In spite of decree, the defendant did not deliver the vacant possession of the premises to the plaintiff. Rather, the defendant preferred an appeal before the High Court vide Second Appeal No. 13 of 1993 (R), which was ultimately dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 28.07.1993. When in spite of the dismissal of the Second appeal, the defendant did not vacate the tenanted premises, execution proceedings vide Execution Case No. 21 of 1992 was initiated by the plaintiff and in execution of :he writ of delivery of possession, the said tenanted premises was ultimately got vacated by the Nazir of the civil court and its possession was handed over to the plaintiff on 22.05.1994. On taking possession of the premises, the plaintiff found and detected that the defendant had extensively damaged the tenanted premises, rendering the constructed building into a dilapidated condition. The walls, the roofs and the floors of all the rooms were severely damaged and the plaintiff found that the defendant and its representatives caused such extensive damage intentionally and deliberately by manual operation since such extensive damages could not have resulted by usual wear and tear or by passage of time. A partner of the plaintiffs firm had specifically mentioned the extent of damage in the writ of Delivery of Possession at the time when the premises was delivered. The plaintiffs further pleading is that till the year 1986, plaintiff use to carry out the annual whitewashing and repairs and had kept the entire structures in good condition but later in between 1987 to. 1994, being annoyed with the filing of the eviction suit, the defendant and its Officers had refused access to the plaintiffs to the tenanted premises. In the eviction suit, the plaintiff had taken a plea of willful damage to the tenanted premises but since the plea was not substantiated by adequate evidence, the said plea was negated. The plaintiff thereafter obtained the services of a technical expert to assess the damages and cost of its repairs and the Engineer Expert vide his Report dated 15.08.1994 (Annexure-2), assessed the cost of carrying out the repairs at Rs. 14.65 lakhs as on 15.08.1994. The plaintiff thereafter obtained the services of a technical expert to assess the damages and cost of its repairs and the Engineer Expert vide his Report dated 15.08.1994 (Annexure-2), assessed the cost of carrying out the repairs at Rs. 14.65 lakhs as on 15.08.1994. The plaintiff has, therefore, claimed that he is entitled to a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs towards compensation for damages caused to the tenanted premises as the costs would increase day by day with the passage of time, besides the amount of one years rent for the year 1994-95 and also the sum of Rs. 20,000/-, paid to the expert for his services. The plaintiff has claimed a separate sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation for the malicious deeds of the defendants in causing the damages. The plaintiff had made a formal demand of the money by notice dated 02.11.1994 followed by a reminder dated 18.02.1995 but the defendant did not reply to the notice and hence the suit. 3. The defendant contested the suit by filing the written statements, denying and disputing the entire claim of the plaintiffs and countering that the suit is not maintainable in its present form for the reliefs claimed and that the plaintiff has got no cause of action and also, that the suit is barred by the law of limitation, waiver, acquiescence and estoppel, non-joinder and misjoinder of necessary parties. The defendant has admitted the fact that it had taken the premises of the plaintiff on rent for its godown purposes and the tenancy had commenced from 1976. The defendant has, however, pleaded that even at the inception of the tenancy, the house and godown was not worthy for storage of foodgrains as the same was not leak proof and was worn out in a very bad condition. Yet the defendant had to take the premises on rent since no other suitable accommodation was available to it at Chakradharpur. The defendant has also claimed that the construction of the premises was not in consonance with or in conformity with the specifications, size and shape suggested by the defendant. The defendant has denied the plaintiffs claim that the premises was renovated and made according to the specifications of the defendant before handing over the same to the defendant for use. The defendant has also claimed that the construction of the premises was not in consonance with or in conformity with the specifications, size and shape suggested by the defendant. The defendant has denied the plaintiffs claim that the premises was renovated and made according to the specifications of the defendant before handing over the same to the defendant for use. The defendant has farther claimed that since 1976, the plaintiff did not conduct the annual maintenance and whitewashing of the building. The further case of the defendant is that adjacent to the building let out to the defendant, the plaintiff had established its Biscuit factory and in the very first floor of the premises, the staffs employed in the factory used to reside and they used to cross through the tenanted premises along the Verandah. The defendants have denied to have caused any damage to the tenanted premises. The defendant has further denied the plaintiffs claim that the representatives pi the plaintiff were not allowed access to the tenanted premises for conducting the annual repairs and white- washing. The defendant claimed that the damage, if any, caused was on account of neglect made by the plaintiff himself in maintaining the building and also on account of the wear and tear and by passage of time. The defendant has denied and (disputed the experts Reports and the assessment of cost for repairing the purported damages. The plaintiffs claim of sum of Rs. 20.60 lakhs from the defendant has also been denied and disputed by the defendant on the ground that the same is without any basis and of no merit. 4. On the basis of the rival pleadings of the parties, the trial court has framed the following issues: (1) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (2) Whether plaintiff has got cause of action for the suit? (3) Whether the suit is barred by principle of resjudicata? (4) Whether plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 20.60 Lakhs together with interest pendentelite and future till realization at the rate of 18 % per annum from the defendant or not on the grounds mentioned in the plaint? 5. Whether plaintiff has neglected the suit premises in getting the same repaired and white washed? 6. Whether defendant has damaged the suit premises in the manner alleged by the plaintiff? 7. To what relief or reliefs plaintiff is entitled. 5. 5. Whether plaintiff has neglected the suit premises in getting the same repaired and white washed? 6. Whether defendant has damaged the suit premises in the manner alleged by the plaintiff? 7. To what relief or reliefs plaintiff is entitled. 5. On the issue No. 3, as to whether the suit was barred by the principles of resjudicata, the trial court had observed that the issue relating to damages was not framed for determination by the trial court in the Title (Eviction) Suit and no definite finding was recorded on the same, and, therefore, the present suit for damages is not barred by the principles of res judicata. On the issue nos. 2 and 4 to 6 as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 20.46 lakhs together with interest and as to whether the defendant has damaged the suit premises in the manner as alleged by the plaintiff or whether the damage has occurred on the part of the plaintiffs neglect, the learned trial court discussed the evidences adduced by the plaintiff and the defendant and had relied upon the Report of the Pleader Commissioner (D.W. 1) taking note of the extensive damage observed by the Pleader Commissioner including the damage to the floors, walls, roofs and even the electric wiring. The trial court had also observed that at the time when the tenanted premises was handed over to the defendant for occupation, the tenanted premises was in a good condition but the extent of damage to the premises, which could be detected only after the plaintiff got the vacant possession of the same from the eviction of the defendant was caused by the defendants misuse of the premises. The trial court recorded its finding in favour of the plaintiff by declaring that the plaintiff was entitled to realize cost for repairing the damages to its premises. The trial court while observing that the repairs did not call for dismantling the existing structures, therefore, disallowed the plaintiffs claim for the cost of dismantling the structures and working out the approximate cost for repairing the damages, on the basis of the Reports submitted by the expert, the trial court have awarded and allowed a sum of Rs. The trial court while observing that the repairs did not call for dismantling the existing structures, therefore, disallowed the plaintiffs claim for the cost of dismantling the structures and working out the approximate cost for repairing the damages, on the basis of the Reports submitted by the expert, the trial court have awarded and allowed a sum of Rs. 4,073, 81.92 Paise to the plaintiff together with interest pendentelite to the future @ 10 per cent per annum to the plaintiff and directed the defendant to pay the sum alongwith costs. 6. The appellant has challenged the impugned judgment of the trial court, mainly on the ground that the findings recorded by the trial court on the relevant issues are against the weight of evidence on record and is perverse. Mr. Satish Bakshi, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant-defendant argues that the learned trial court has seriously erred in failing to frame an issue as to what was the condition of the tenanted premises on the date of inception of the tenancy and on the date of eviction. Learned Counsel argues that the suit ought to have been dismissed by the learned court below on the ground that the claim for the money is arbitrary, vague and without specific details. Learned Counsel argues further that the learned court below has decided issue No. 3 regarding the defendants plea of resjudicata by an erroneous reasoning and without considering the fact that in the earlier Title (Eviction) Suit, the plaintiff had specifically claimed that the suit premises was damaged by the defendants use of the premises and a clear finding rejecting the claim was recorded by the trial court in the Title (Eviction) Suit on this issue. Learned Counsel further argues that the learned trial court has wrongly recorded a finding that the suit premises was evicted by the defendant on 22.5.1994 pursuant to the execution of the writ of delivery of possession, whereas, the fact was that the suit premises was vacated by the; defendant much earlier to that date. Learned Counsel argues further that the learned court below has erred in recording its finding that the defendant was liable to pay for the damages caused to the plaintiffs premises, without considering the fact that even according to the admission of the plaintiffs witness, the building can sustain damages on account of non-repairing and lack of annual white-washing. Learned Counsel argues further that the learned court below has erred in recording its finding that the defendant was liable to pay for the damages caused to the plaintiffs premises, without considering the fact that even according to the admission of the plaintiffs witness, the building can sustain damages on account of non-repairing and lack of annual white-washing. Learned Counsel adds further that the trial court has erred in not relying upon the testimony of the D.W.1, who being the Pleader Commissioner is an independent witness. The Report of the Pleader Commissioner (Exhibit 1) ought to have been considered by the trial court to arrive at the conclusion that it did not support the plaintiffs claim that the alleged damages was caused by manual operation. Learned Counsel adds further that the Exhibit-A series being the several notices issued by the defendant calling upon the plaintiff to undertake the annual repairs and white-washing of the premises, the learned trial court ought to have considered these documents, which could lead to the inference that it was the plaintiff who had failed to respond to the several requests for undertaking the annual white-washing and repairs to the premises and had himself allowed the premises to suffer the damage due to non-maintenance. 7. Mr. Manzul Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent-plaintiff while refuting the entire grounds advanced by the plaintiffs as misconceived and baseless, has relied entirely upon the findings recorded by the trial court on the main issues. Learned Counsel submits that the suit cannot be declared as non maintainable by the principles of resjudicata for the main reason that the issue involved in the present suit was never framed nor decided by the court in the earlier Eviction Suit. Furthermore, in the earlier eviction suit, there could be no scope for framing any specific issue relating to damages and cost of repairs of damages as because the plaintiff could not possibly assess the extent of damages to its premises until and unless it had access to enter into the premises and to inspect the same. It was only after the vacant possession of the premises was delivered to the plaintiff that an inspection could be made and the extent of damages could be observed and the cost for repairing the damages could be assessed by the services of the experts. It was only after the vacant possession of the premises was delivered to the plaintiff that an inspection could be made and the extent of damages could be observed and the cost for repairing the damages could be assessed by the services of the experts. Therefore, the present suit for compensation of the damages could not possibly be filed nor could any such issue be included in the earlier Title Eviction Suit. Learned Counsel adds further that as wrongly contended by the appellant, the provisions of order 2 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 8. The questions, which need to be addressed are: (1) "Whether the suit as filed by the plaintiff was barred by the principles of resjudicata? (2) Whether the defendant/appellant could be held liable for the damages caused to the premises of the plaintiff/respondent and if so what should be the quantum of damages? Question No. 1:- Admittedly, the plaintiff Had earlier filed the Title (Eviction) Suit No. 2 of 1987 before the court below against the defendants seeking eviction of the defendants front the suit premises, which has been referred to in the instant case. The prayer was made on the grounds of default by the defendant in payment of rent and also on the ground of personal necessity of the plaintiff. In the plaint of the aforesaid suit an averment was made by the plaintiff "that the defendant has been using the suit premises in a manner that is damaging the premises of the plaintiff." The defendant in the said suit had denied the above. However, neither did the plaintiff in the said suit plead the misuse of premises by the defendant as a ground for eviction nor was any such issue framed in the said suit by the trial court The grounds of the plaintiff, as mentioned above was confined to default in payment of rent and personal necessity. A separate issue was framed by the trial court on the basis of the plaintiffs averments as to whether the plaintiff violated the terms of tenancy. This issue was framed on the plaintiffs averment that the defendant had occupied more space than what was leased out to it under the agreement o lease. A separate issue was framed by the trial court on the basis of the plaintiffs averments as to whether the plaintiff violated the terms of tenancy. This issue was framed on the plaintiffs averment that the defendant had occupied more space than what was leased out to it under the agreement o lease. The earlier suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and the judgment and decree of the trial court was upheld even at the stage of second appeal by the High Court. 9. Learned Counsel for the appellant refers to the contents of para 30 of the judgment: passed by the trial court (Exhibit II) in the former Title (Eviction) Suit and tries to impress that the plaintiff in the former suit had pleaded that the defendants have been using the suit premises in such a manner that it is damaging the premises of the plaintiff and the trial court had considered this aspect but had rejected the plaintiffs claim on the ground that no evidence as to the nature of the use of the premises by the defendant was adduced by the plaintiff. Learned Counsel argues that the issue as to the alleged damages caused by the defendants in course of its use of the premises was, therefore, earlier decided in the former suit and, as such, the present suit on the same grounds and for the same cause of action, is not maintainable on the principles of res judicate. Learned Counsel argues further that for the same reasons, the suit is also not maintainable under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the C.P.C. 10. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "no court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly or substantially in issue directly and substantially an issue in a formal suit" in a former suit between the same parties or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title in a competent court to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court. Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to include the whole of its claim in the framing of the suit. Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires the plaintiff to include the whole of its claim in the framing of the suit. Sub Rule 1 of Rule 2, provides, inter alia, that every suit shall include the whole of the claim, which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; If he relinquishes any claim to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court, he will not be entitled to claim that relief in any subsequent suit. Sub Rule 3 of Rule 2 provides that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such relief, but if he omits, except with the leave of the Court to sue for all such reliefs he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. 11. The doctrine of res judicata differs from the rules stated in Order 2 Rule 2 of tike C.P.C. in as much as, the former places emphasis on the plaintiffs duty to exhaust all available grounds in support of his claim while the later requires the plaintiff to claim all reliefs emanating from the same cause of action. Neither of the two provisions preclude a second suit based on a distinct cause of action. 12. Referring to the facts of the present case, the former suit was for eviction of the defendants from the suit premises on two specifically pleaded grounds, namely, default in payment of rent by the defendant and personal necessity of the premises by the plaintiff. The cause of action-for the suit was default in payment of rent and personal necessity. The trial court had confined the issues to these two grounds only. Though the trial court in its judgment in the former suit had entered into recording some extraneous pleadings of the plaintiff relating to the manner of the use of the premises by the defendant but neither was any issue framed on the said pleading nor was any finding recorded on the same specifically. In the present suit, the relief claimed is totally different from the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in the former suit and the cause of action is also entirely different. The plaintiff has prayed for compensation for the damages purportedly caused to the premised by the defendant during its occupation of the premises. In the present suit, the relief claimed is totally different from the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff in the former suit and the cause of action is also entirely different. The plaintiff has prayed for compensation for the damages purportedly caused to the premised by the defendant during its occupation of the premises. The Suit is for payment of compensation in terms of money and the amount is claimed to have been calculated after assessing the actual damage and the cost for repairs of the damage. It is not disputed that the premises was in the occupation of the defendant as tenants from 1976 onwards and according to the plaintiffs, the vacant possession of the premises could be obtained only after execution of a writ of delivery of possession passed by the executing court for executing the decree of eviction passed in the title (Eviction) Suit in favour of the plaintiff. Apparently, the plaintiff could not have access to the premises or any opportunity to assess the extent of damages, which the premises had suffered during the period when the premises was in exclusive occupation of the defendant. Thus, the cause of action in the former suit is entirely different from the cause of action in the present suit, which is based entirely on a different context. It cannot be said, therefore, that the present suit of the plaintiff was barred either on the principles of res judicata or under the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 of the; Code of Civil Procedure. 13. As regards the second question, whether the premises of the plaintiff did suffer any damage during the course of its occupation by the defendant and whether the defendant could be held liable for such damages, reference is made once again to the pleadings of the parties. The contention of the plaintiff is that under the terms of agreement of tenancy, the plaintiffs used to carry out the annual white-washing and repairs of these premises and used to keep the entire structures in good condition but later on being annoyed with the eviction suit filed by the plaintiff, the defendant and its officers had refused access to the plaintiff into the tenanted premises and from the year 1987 till the date of eviction. The plaintiffs have further claimed that the agents of the defendants had misused the premises with a deliberate intent to cause damage and had even used manual operation for causing willful damage to the premises. The defendant on the other hand have refuted this allegation and have counter asserted that it was the plaintiff who had neglected to conduct the annual white washing and repairs in spite the several correspondences and requests made by the respondents through letters. The defendants have also denied the allegation that any damage to the premises was caused willfully or by any manual operation by any agents of the defendants. It is claimed that the damage, if any, was on account of normal wear and tear due to absence of periodical whitewashing and repairs and that this fact is also supported by the evidence of the Pleader Commissioner (D.W. 1), who has categorically stated that the damage to the premises was not on account of any deliberate manual operation. The defendants claimed that under such circumstances, since the damage was occasioned due to the neglect of the plaintiffs themselves, the defendants cannot be held liable for compensating the plaintiffs for repairing the damages. It is also contended by the defendants that the amount claimed by the plaintiffs towards the cost of repairs is highly inflated, imaginary and without any basis and the amount as assessed by the trial court is equally without any reasonable basis and the assessment made by the trial court is based entirely on conjectures and surmises. 14. Undisputedly, the premises, till the date of eviction in the year 1994 was in continuous occupation of the defendants from the year 1976. Undisputedly, the plaintiffs did carry out annual white-washing and repairs of the premises till the year 1986. Admittedly, no white-washing or repairs was conducted since after 1986 and till the date when the defendants had vacated tine premises. 15. The defendants had claimed that even at the time of inception of tenancy when the defendants had come into occupation of the premises, the condition of the premises was not good and was not congenial for the purposes of use of the defendant. 15. The defendants had claimed that even at the time of inception of tenancy when the defendants had come into occupation of the premises, the condition of the premises was not good and was not congenial for the purposes of use of the defendant. The plaintiff on the other hand have claimed that under the terms and conditions stipulated in the agreement of tenancy, the plaintiffs had renovated the existing structures by designing the structures according to the specifications desired by the defendants, where after the premises was let out to the defendants, who had used the premises continuously without any complaint in respect of the condition of the premises. The plea advanced by the defendant does not appear to be convincing. If the premises was not in good condition and was not congenial for the purposes of the use made by the defendants, then the defendants could certainly have compelled the plaintiff, in exercise of their right under the agreement itself, to get the necessary repairs done so as to enable the defendants to make use of the premises as originally intended by them. In fact, even as admitted by the defendants, the plaintiffs used to carry out the annual white-washing and repairs of the premises ensuring the proper maintenance of the structures every year till 1986. The obvious inference from the above facts is that the building structures within the premises had severely become damaged during the period since after 1986 till the date of eviction. The question is whether the damage suffered by the building structures was on account of the normal wear and tear due to lack of regular white-washing and repairs and maintenance or whether it was deliberately and intentionally caused, as alleged by the plaintiff, by manual operation by the agents of the defendants. The evidence on the actual extent of damage appears to have been brought on record by the defendants through evidence of the Pleader Commissioner appointed by the trial court on the prayer of the defendants. The Pleader Commissioner, both in his Report as also in his evidence, has given a detailed description of the extent of damage, which he had found on his inspection of the premises. In the opinion of the Pleader Commissioner, the damage was not on account of any manual operation. The Pleader Commissioner, both in his Report as also in his evidence, has given a detailed description of the extent of damage, which he had found on his inspection of the premises. In the opinion of the Pleader Commissioner, the damage was not on account of any manual operation. The damage to the floors and walls of the building structures was caused in course of use by the defendants agents while the damage of the walls and the damage to the roof could have been caused on account of absence of regular annual maintenance. The Pleader Commissioner has also found that the electrical wirings and fittings were found dismantled. It is apparent from the evidence of this witness that while a part of the damage was occasioned in course of the use of the premises by the defendants agents, some of the damage was occasioned due to lack of regular maintenance. The damage to the electric wirings however, suggests willful act, which has to be attributed to the defendants and its agents who were in actual possession and use of the premises. 16. The plaintiffs have claimed that they have always wanted to conduct the annual white-washing and repairs, which they had been doing for ten years since 1976 but the defendants had refused access to the premises to the plaintiffs after 1986. This claim appears also in the evidence of the plaintiffs. The defendants on the other hand have preferred to rely upon a few letters, which they had purportedly written to the plaintiffs requesting the plaintiffs to conduct the annual whitewashing and repairs, but the defendants witnesses admit that the letters were never received by the plaintiff. If the defendants had detected any damage needing urgent repairs and if the plaintiff had failed to conduct the repairs, then; the defendants could have taken recourse to legal remedies provided under the law either for compelling the plaintiff to carry out the repairs or to get the damage repaired and realize the cost from the amount of rent payable for the premises. The defendants have apparently not taken any such initiative of their own. Apparently the defendants had also remained indifferent allowing the continuous damage to the premises. The defendants cannot, therefore, disown its liability to pay the costs for repairs of their damages. 17. The defendants have apparently not taken any such initiative of their own. Apparently the defendants had also remained indifferent allowing the continuous damage to the premises. The defendants cannot, therefore, disown its liability to pay the costs for repairs of their damages. 17. Learned Counsel for the appellant had stressed that the trial court ought to have framed specific issue to record a finding as to what was the condition of the premises including the structures on the date when it was let out to the defendants and the condition of the premises on the date when the same was vacated by the defendants and in absence of any finding on any such issue, no assessment of the actual damage could have been made. This argument of the learned Counsel appears to be misconceived. The fact that the defendants had occupied the suit premises under the agreement: of tenancy without any grievance or complaint regarding the condition of structures and had not raised any such complaint even during the period of ten years of their occupation from 1976 to 1986 prior :o the date of institution of the suit, or at any time prior to vacating the premises, does confirm that the premises and its structures was always in goad repairs and in good condition till 1936; when the plaintiffs used to undertake the annual repairs and white-washing. The damage to the condition of the structures within the premises began deteriorating since after 1986 resulting in the extensive damage as pointed out by the Pleader Commissioner (D.W. 1) while the same was in the use and in the occupation of the defendants. It has to be held, therefore, that the defendants are liable to pay the cost for repairs of the damages to the premises of the plaintiff, which had occurred during the period of the defendants use and occupation of the premises. 18. The question, which now arises is what is the extent of repairs needed to be undertaken and what should be the amount of compensation to be paid by the defendants for repairing the damage? As to the extent of damages, the plaintiffs have adduced the evidence of an expert Engineer, who has submitted his Report containing details of the damage, which he had found on his inspection and the estimate of cost for repairs. As to the extent of damages, the plaintiffs have adduced the evidence of an expert Engineer, who has submitted his Report containing details of the damage, which he had found on his inspection and the estimate of cost for repairs. The defendant has challenged the Report of the expert on the ground that the expert was engaged unilaterally by the plaintiff and no reliance, therefore, can be placed on his; evidence. It appears from the impugned judgment that the learned trial court has also not accepted the report of the expert in its entirety. The trial court has depended more on the Report of the Pleader commissioner; (D.W. 1) and on the details of the damage mentioned, therein. The trial court has contended that on considering the Report of the Pleader Commissioner, the existing structure of the building did not require complete dismantling and raising a new structure altogether on the site. The trial court had found from the Report of the Pleader Commissioner that the foundation of the building structures was intact although the Cement flooring was extensively damaged and at several portions of the Walls, the bricks was also found damaged. The roof of the structures was comprised of corrugated sheets and a couple of sheets were found missing The trial court, therefore, while assessing the estimated cost for repair 3, had confined only to the cost for repairing the visible damages both on the floors as well as on the walls and the roof. The trial court did not accept the estimate of the expert examined by :he plaintiff on the ground that the estimate appeared to be inflated. The trial court thereafter proceeded to categorize each item of repair and made a modest estimate of a sum of Rs. 4,073,81.92 Paise as the cost of repairs, against the plaintiffs claim of Rs. 20.60 lakhs. The plaintiffs do not appear to have expressed any grievance on the amount assessed and awarded by the trial court. The defendants claim on the other hand is that the assessment as made by the trial court is not reliable since it has no technical basis and is based more on conjectures and surmises. 20.60 lakhs. The plaintiffs do not appear to have expressed any grievance on the amount assessed and awarded by the trial court. The defendants claim on the other hand is that the assessment as made by the trial court is not reliable since it has no technical basis and is based more on conjectures and surmises. It appears from the impugned judgment that the trial court after considering the estimate; submitted by the plaintiffs expert witness (P.W.5) has reduced the rate of charges indicated by the expert towards the estimated cost, by 50 per cent in respect of each of the items of work. The trial court has also calculated the extent of work in terms of area of the flooring as also of the walls and has assessed the total cost at the rate, which the trial court has deemed just and proper. It cannot, therefore, be said that the assessment of the cost of repairs as made by the learned trial court was entirely on the basis of conjectures and surmises or that the estimate was without any basis. In the ultimate analysis, I do not find any impropriety in the findings of the learned trial court on this issue. In the light of the discussions made above, I do not find any merit in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs.