JUDGMENT These two appeals can be disposed of together since they emanate from a common judgment and decrees dated 3rd January, 2003 passed by the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B. Nagar, Hyderabad. 2. A.S. No.873 of 2003 has been filed qua the judgment and decree passed in OS No.262 of 1995. AS No.874 of 2003 has been filed qua the judgment and decree in OS No.500 of 1993. The unsuccessful first defendant in both the suits is the appellant. 3. The facts leading to file the instant appeals may be stated thus : The first defendant in both the suits is the institution known as the Loyola Public School Society, situate at Father Balaiahnagar, old Alwal, Secunderabad. The second defendant was its former President. The first defendant filed a suit in OS No.291 of 1987 on the file of the Additional Sub-Judge, Rangareddy District at Saroomagar against the plaintiffs in both the suits and the second defendant, Father, Balaiahnagar Co-operative Housing Society, A1wal and another seeking the relief of declaration of title and for consequential perpetual injunction. The premises on which the said suit was filed was that Reverend Father Balaiah, the highly respected Father of Catholic Church and who was instrumental in the promotion and growth of several educational institutions in Madras, Vijayawada, Vinukonda, and other places, was instrumental in starting Loyola Academy at Alwal in or before the year 1979 established on an extent of Acs.147.00 of land. He further contemplated of starting a public school in the name and style of Loyola Public School. He formulated a scheme of owning an extent of Acs.27.00 of land to provide house sites to the various members who may be associated with the promotion of the said education activity and with that intention and objectivity he started the Father Ba1aiahnagar Co-operative Housing Society at Alwal in the year 1980. The society acquired the necessary land. It was the desire of Father Balaiah that the Loyola Public School should be established in the housing complex. For that purpose, he purchased the plots bearing Nos.142 to 147 benami in the names of the plaintiffs in both the suits and the second defendant. As aforesaid, a Society was formed and the same was registered with Anand Rao as its President and Father Balaiah himself as a senior executive member along with other members on 13.8.1984. For that purpose, he purchased the plots bearing Nos.142 to 147 benami in the names of the plaintiffs in both the suits and the second defendant. As aforesaid, a Society was formed and the same was registered with Anand Rao as its President and Father Balaiah himself as a senior executive member along with other members on 13.8.1984. After having obtained the necessary sanction from the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, got the school building constructed in the entire area inclusive of the plots purchased benami in the names of the plaintiffs and the second defendant. On account of subsequent developments, the plaintiffs started saying that they would seek to enforce the alleged right over the respective plots. Under those circumstances, the suit was filed. 4. All the defendants remained ex parte and the suit was decreed initially ex parte. While things stood thus the plaintiff in O.S. No.500 of 1993, who is the fourth defendant in OS No.291 of 1987, got a legal notice dated 1.10.1991 issued through her Counsel to the first defendant Society. It is claimed inter alia that she was the owner of the plot, described more fully in the schedule appended to the suit and that the Loyola Public School Society was her . tenant having agreed to pay the rent at Rs.l,500/- per month from 1.9.1985 for a period of eleven months and took possession of the premises got constructed by her on plot No.144, and that the society committed default in paying the rents and sought for eviction. The first defendant got a reply through its Counsel dated 8.10.1991 issued to the Counsel of the plaintiff. After having gone through the contents of the reply notice dated 8.10.1991 got issued by the first defendant, the plaintiff claimed to have come to know about the suit filed by the first defendant-Society in OS No.291 of 1987 and the ex parte decree obtained therein. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the instant suit in OS No.500 of 1993 for cancellation of the said decree in OS No.291 of 1987 and for vacant possession of the premises bearing Municipal No.5-98/1 constructed in plot No. 144 of Sy.No.593 of Father Balaiahnagar Co-operative House Building Society, Alwal. 5. The plaintiff, therefore, filed the instant suit in OS No.500 of 1993 for cancellation of the said decree in OS No.291 of 1987 and for vacant possession of the premises bearing Municipal No.5-98/1 constructed in plot No. 144 of Sy.No.593 of Father Balaiahnagar Co-operative House Building Society, Alwal. 5. The plaintiffs in as No.262 of 1995 on the premise that they are the nonresidents of Hyderabad and when they visited Secunderabad, to their surprise they noticed the structures on the plots purchased by them, and the presence of the first defendant-institution, they got a notice, dated 12.10.1991, issued to the first defendant through their Counsel. When the first defendant got a reply notice, dated 19.10.1991, issued which was received by their Counsel, they claimed to have come to know about the ex parte decree obtained by the first defendant society in as No.291 of 1987. Thus, the plaintiffs in as No.262 of 1995 filed the instant suit claiming themselves to be the owners of the plots for cancellation of the decree passed in as No.291 of 1987 and for vacant possession of the plot numbers 142, 143, 147, 146 in Sy.No.593 of Father Ba1aiahnagar Co-operative House Building Society, Alwal. The first defendant in both the suits resisted the suits by filing separate written statements. The second defendant, however, remained ex parte. The case of the first defendant is as aforesaid that the plots were purchased benami in the names of the plaintiffs for establishing a school and a huge complex was constructed for running the Loypla Public School and that the plaintiffs in both the suits were not the real owners of the plots as they claimed. 6. It appears that on the applications filed by the plaintiffs in O.S. No.291 of 1987 the ex parte decree was set aside. Later, that suit was tried and eventually at the culmination of the trial by the judgment dated 22.2.1988 it ended in dismissal. The appeal filed qua the said judgment in A.S. No.2614 of 1996 before this Court also ended in dismissal. Thus, the first defendant-Society lost its claim over the plots in dispute. Thereupon, both the suits were tried together. Three witnesses were examined on the side of the plaintiffs and Exs.A1 to A29 were got marked. Four witnesses were examined on the side of the first defendant-Society and Exs.B1 to B25 were got marked. Thus, the first defendant-Society lost its claim over the plots in dispute. Thereupon, both the suits were tried together. Three witnesses were examined on the side of the plaintiffs and Exs.A1 to A29 were got marked. Four witnesses were examined on the side of the first defendant-Society and Exs.B1 to B25 were got marked. As aforestated, after hearing either side, the learned Judge decreed both the suits with costs directing the first defendant to vacate the plots in question, after demolishing the structures existing thereon. Having been aggrieved by the common judgment and decrees, the two instant appeals have been preferred. 7. During the pendency of A.S. No.873 of 2003, the second respondent therein since died, his legal representatives respondents 6 to 10 have been brought on record. Respondent Nos.4 and 5 remained ex parte. The appellant filed A.S.M.P. No.1150 of 2005 to receive the registered gift deeds dated 17.7.2003 and 11.7.2003 said to have been executed by the second and fourth respondents. Since the fourth respondent remained ex parte, there has been no gainsaying about the due execution of registered gift deed. However, respondents 6 to 10, who are the legal representatives of the second respondent Balaraju, filed a counter resisting that petition on the premise that late Balaraju executed a revocation deed cancelling the gift deed executed by him in favour of the appellant-Society and that after such cancellation, he issued a notice dated 24.12.2003 to the Secretary of the appellant's Society informing the same and the appellant issued a notice dated 21.1.2004 and that later late Balaraju executed an agreement of sale-cum-general power of attorney in favour of the tenth respondent agreeing to sell his rights over the disputed plot No.143. Both are the registered gift deeds and have been obviously executed after the impugned judgment dated 3.1.2002. The applicant, in that view of the matter, could not have filed those gift deeds despite due diligence during the course of the trial in the suits. The documents, inasmuch as touch upon the merits, shall have to be received as additional evidence. 8. Sri K. Raja Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 6 to 10 seeks to contend that the gift deed, executed by the deceased-second respondent during his lifetime having been cancelled under a revocation deed, cannot be received. The documents, inasmuch as touch upon the merits, shall have to be received as additional evidence. 8. Sri K. Raja Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 6 to 10 seeks to contend that the gift deed, executed by the deceased-second respondent during his lifetime having been cancelled under a revocation deed, cannot be received. By executing the cancellation deed, the due execution of the gift deed by late Balaraju, the second respondent, has been proved. A gift once executed unless it is a conditional one cannot be revoked in view of Section 129 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel that the gift deed cannot be received as additional evidence merits no consideration. These two documents shall be marked as Exs.A30 and A31 on the side of the appellant. 9. Both the suits, O.S. No.500 of 1993 and O.S. No.262 of 1995, have been filed for cancellation of the decree dated 22.2.1988 passed in O.S No.291 of 1987 by the Additional Subordinate Judge, Rangareddy District and for possession of the schedule mentioned properties after demolishing constructions made thereon by the first defendant. As stated hereinabove, the suit, O.S. No.291 of 1987, was decreed initially ex parte, later restored to file by setting aside the ex parte decree and after full-fledged trial eventually ended in dismissal which attained finality when A.S. No.2614 of 1996 filed qua the said judgment and decree in O.S. No.291 of 1987 ended in dismissal by this Court. EX.A28 is the certified copy of the judgment passed by this Court. Inasmuch as the judgment in O.S. No.291 of 1987 was rendered after a full-fledged trial far subsequent to the institution of the suits in O.S. No.500 of 1993 and as No.262 of 1995, neither the plea of res judicata nor the plea of estoppel could be taken by the plaintiffs in the above suits. Nonetheless, EX.A28 judgment being inter parties binds the appellant. Obviously, therefore, the appellant-Society, which filed the suit, O.S. No.291 of 1987, for declaration of its title, lost the title vis-a-vis the respondents herein. Admittedly, the sale deeds in respect of the disputed plots stand in the name of the plaintiffs. Nonetheless, EX.A28 judgment being inter parties binds the appellant. Obviously, therefore, the appellant-Society, which filed the suit, O.S. No.291 of 1987, for declaration of its title, lost the title vis-a-vis the respondents herein. Admittedly, the sale deeds in respect of the disputed plots stand in the name of the plaintiffs. The ostensible title of the plaintiffs sought to be assailed on the premise that they were benami and the plaintiffs were mere money-lenders and in reality the transactions were for the benefit of the first defendant-Society in as No.291/87, and since the first defendant-Society lost its suit the stand of the plaintiffs that they purchased the plots under various registered sale deeds is now vindicated. Therefore, the sale deeds clearly prove the title of the individual plaintiffs. Exs.A30 and A31, gift deeds executed by the respondents 2 and 4 herein, further reinforces the title of the plaintiffs who are respondents 2 and 4 herein inasmuch as the appellant-Society accepted the gifts under Exs.A30 and A31 made by respondents 2 and 4 herein while admitting their title in respect of the properties covered therein. 10. Having due regard to the fact that the appellant-Society had no title to the property in dispute and as the suit filed by it ended in dismissal, the reliefs sought for cancellation of the decree passed in O.S. No.291 of 1987 become otiose. Automatically, the other two reliefs for recovery of possession, after getting the superstructures existing on the properties in dispute demolished, shall have to be affirmed in the instant appeals, inasmuch as the appellant lost its title and the title over the disputed plots in favour of the contesting respondents, namely respondents I and 3 in AS. No.873 of 2003 and the first respondent in AS. No.874 of 2003. 11. Sri K. Sarva Bhouma Rao, learned Counsel for the appellant, seeks to contend that the case as set up by the first respondent in A.S. No.874 of 2003 in a suit O.S. No.500 of 1993 that there has been tenant and landlord relationship in between her and the appellant-Society shall not be believed, having regard to the fact that the appellant filed the suit for declaration of its title and that such a lease set up by the first respondent was a collusive transaction in between her and the second respondent Anand Rao, who remained ex parte throughout. It is the contention of the learned Counsel that the second respondent was solely responsible for the entire litigation and acted against the interests of the appellant Society in the capacity of its Secretary. It is his further contention that a huge structure was constructed by the appellant Society for locating the Loyala Pubic School therein covering all the disputed plots and the areas in addition thereto and, therefore, the plea that the plaintiff in O.S. No.500 of 1993 constructed the building and let it out to the first defendant-Society on the face of it is false. The contentions are not quite germane, having regard to the fact that the appellant lost its claim over the disputed property, either in the capacity of the landlord or in the capacity of the owner of the disputed plot, the first respondent can legitimately ask for the vacant possession of the property in dispute. In any view of the matter, the decree passed in her favour in O.S. No.500 of 1993 shall have to be affirmed for vacant possession. 12. Having regard to the two gift deeds executed by respondents 2 and 4 in favour of the appellant-Society in Exs.A30 and A31, the decree passed by the Court below in O.S. No.262 of 1995, in their favour, shall have to be set aside, inasmuch as they clearly parted with the title over the same, after having executed the two gift deeds. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed in favour of respondents 1 and 3 in a.s. No.262 of 1995 shall have to be affirmed and similarly the judgment passed in favour of the first respondent in O.S. No.500 of 1993 shall also have to be affirmed. 13. The other question to be considered is about the profits. The Court below granted an amount of Rs.25,500/- towards arrears of rent from 1.8.1990 to 31.12.1991 and an amount of Rs.54,000/- From 1.1.1992 to 30.6.1993 and for decree for Rs.3,000/per month towards future profits from 26.7.1993 onwards till the date of realisation. O.S. No.500 of 1993 was filed on 24.7.1993. Preceding thereto, for a period of three years, the plaintiff can legitimately ask for the past profits and beyond that period the plaintiff is obviously not entitled to the profits having been barred by limitation. O.S. No.500 of 1993 was filed on 24.7.1993. Preceding thereto, for a period of three years, the plaintiff can legitimately ask for the past profits and beyond that period the plaintiff is obviously not entitled to the profits having been barred by limitation. The Court below, however, granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff in O.S. No.500 of 1993 for profits at the rate of Rs.1,500/- per month from 1.8.1990 to 31.12.1991 and at the rate of Rs.3,000/- from 1.1.1992 to 30.6.1993 and at the same rate for future profits. The basis for the claim of the enhanced rate of rent at Rs.3,000/- per month seems to be the hypothetical rent said to be prevailing in the locality during that period. It is the case of the plaintiff that the building was let out to the appellant on a monthly rent of Rs.1,500/-. The quantum of rent shall obviously be fixed as per the agreement in between the parties inter se or the fair rent, if any, as fixed by the Court, after having heard either side. There has been no basis whatsoever for the plaintiff in O.S. No.500 of 1993 in asking the past profits at the rate of Rs.3,000/- per month from 1.1.1992 to 30.6.1993 and future profits at the same rate. 14. During the course of trial, it appears, the second defendant, Anand Rao, was examined as a Court witness. It is quite surprising as to how the party to the suit, who remained ex parte, was called as a witness by the Court. This witness, however, was cross-examined by either parties to the suit. The witness deposed in the chief-examination that the plots 142, 143, 144, 145, 146 and 147 were purchased from the original owners, namely, P. Basavaiah and Mallappa along with other plots by the Father Balaiahnagar Co-operative Housing Society and the Government granted exemption from Urban Land Ceiling as per G.O. Ms. No.1326 dated 18.9.1982 and plaintiffs in both the suits and himself being the members of the society, purchased the plots and got the registered sale deeds executed in their favour and that he was the President of the first defendant Society from 1984 to 1986 and in that capacity he executed the sale deeds in favour of the plaintiffs and that after the year 1987, he was sent out of the defendant-Society. This witness did not speak anything about the jural relationship of landlord and tenant in between the plaintiffs in O.S. No.500 of 1993 and the appellant-Society. However, in the cross-examination made on behalf of the plaintiff in O.S. No.500 of 1993 and the plaintiffs in O.S. No.262 of 1995 it was elicited from him that the first defendant Society took the building constructed on plot No.l44 by the plaintiff in O.S. No.500 of 1993 on lease agreeing to pay the rent at Rs.1,500/- per month and EX.AI5 letter was issued by him in that regard as the Secretary of the Society. At the end of the cross-examination it was again elicited from him that the present rental value of the building was about Rs.3,000/- per month. That admission made by C.W.1 in the cross-examination of the plaintiffs presumably was the basis for the Court below to have granted the profits at the rate of Rs.3,000/- per month for the period in between 1.1.1992 to 30.6.1993 preceding the date of filing of the suit and the future profits even at that rate. De hors the said admission on the part of C.W.1, at the end of his cross-examination for the plaintiffs in both the suits, there has been no evidence whatsoever for fixing the profits at Rs.3,000/- as aforesaid. Can the evidence of C.W.1 be valid and legitimate basis for fixing the profits, becomes mute question, more significantly when C.W.1 is the Court witness examined at the end of the evidence on either side by the Court for a different purpose. When a witness be called as a Court witness by the Court, more particularly when he is a party to the suit and remains ex parte becomes also relevant. 15. In order to unravel the truth or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, the Court may examine any party appearing in person or present in Court under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and further under Order 16 Rule 14 of the Code, it may of its own accord summon as witness any person including a party to the suit. The Court, however, cannot compel either of the parties to the suit to examine any particular witness. To that end, ample discretion is vested in the Code. The Court, however, cannot compel either of the parties to the suit to examine any particular witness. To that end, ample discretion is vested in the Code. Under Order 10 Rule 2, at the first hearing of the suit, the Court with a view to elucidating the matters in controversy in the suit shall examine orally such of the parties to the suit appearing in person or present in Court or may orally examine any person who is able to answer any material question relating to the suit. Under Rule 14 of Order 16 if the Court thinks it necessary to examine any person including a party to the suit and not called as a witness by a party to the suit, it may of its own motion call such person to be summoned as a witness to give evidence or to produce any document in his possession. Under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Judge may ask any question he pleases in any form at any time of any witness or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant and may order the production of any document or thing, in which event neither parties to the suit shall be entitled to make any objection nor without the leave of the Court cross-examine any witness on any answer given in reply to any such question by the Court. 16. In Agha Mir Ahmad v. Mudassir Shah, AIR (31) 1944 PC 100, the Privy Council held that the power of the Court under Order 16 Rule 14 to examine witnesses On its own motion is discretionary. 17. The Apex Court in R.M Seshadri v. G. V. Pal, AIR 1969 SC 692 , held that the power of a civil Court to summon Court witnesses is contained in Order 16 Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. In Bishwanath v. Sachhidanand, AIR 1971 SC 1949 , the Apex Court held that when an application to summon a witness as a Court witness was filed at very early stage before examination of witness of the parties has commenced that it was too early a stage for the Court to come to a finding whether the examination of the witness as a Court witness was necessary and such an opinion could only be formed after evidence of the parties was over. The Court, therefore, directed to move the application at the appropriate stage. 19. In Pratap Singh v. Rajinder Singh, (1975) 1 SCC 535 , in Para 25 the Apex Court held that the Tribunal is not powerless in the performance of its duty to ascertain the truth and there is not only Section 165 of the Evidence Act which enables the Court to put any question it likes to a witness, but there are also the provisions of Order 16 Rule 14 of the Civil Procedure Code. 20. In ps. Chetty v. K.E. Reddy, 1988 (1) ALT 279, a learned Single Judge of this Court held thus : "Order 16 Rule 14 CPC provides that the Court may of its own initiative or suo motu cause any person to be examined as a witness though either of the parties did not choose to take steps for summoning such person as a witness. This power obviously intended in the interests of justice is aimed at clarifying certain situations and remove ambiguities and fill up lacuna and thereby further justice. The parties may refrain from summoning a crucial witness in the event of their apprehension of full-fledged support and in such a situation the Court may summon such person to give evidence to arrive at the correct factual picture and this witness is called a 'Court witness'. Order 16 Rule 14 visualises the initiative by the Court only to examine any person and it is for the Court to consider of its own accord the necessity of invoking power under this rule without propulsion or application by the parties. The exercise of this power is in the nature of "self-starter" without extraneous pressure or pull........... It is true that the Court is not obligated to invoke the power at the instance of the parties and the parties have no right to move an application under this rule. But however either of the parties can bring to the notice of the Court the necessity for examining any person as Court witness. On such application the Court may scan the totality of facts and circumstances apart from the situations projected by the parties and arrive at an independent conclusion as to the necessity of a Court witness. But however either of the parties can bring to the notice of the Court the necessity for examining any person as Court witness. On such application the Court may scan the totality of facts and circumstances apart from the situations projected by the parties and arrive at an independent conclusion as to the necessity of a Court witness. The parties are not totally barred from bringing to the notice of the Court by application or otherwise and the Court is not bound to take action on the averments or allegations contained in the application and it is the sole discretion of the Court. The application by the parties may be considered as passing on the information so that the Court may examine the issue in depth on the facts and circumstances set out in the application and other aspects." 21. From the above it is obvious that ample discretion is conferred upon the Court to call either of the parties to the suit as a witness or any person as a witness so as to ascertain the truth inasmuch as it cannot compel the parties to examine a particular person as a witness. The opinion as regards the necessity of such examination; although it is said that the Court can examine any person as a Court witness at any stage, may have to be formed only after the parties to the suit adduced their evidence. Once the witness is called as a Court witness, the answers given by the witness to the Court which are reduced into writing might prejudice the interests of either of the parties, in which event, the Court shall permit the parties to cross-examine the witness. On such answers, which are given by the witness when asked by the Court, however, cross-examination shall not be permitted on general lines by either of the parties to the suit. 22. In Coulson v. Disborough, (1894) 2 Queen's Bench 316, it was held thus: "At the trial of an action the Judge has power to call and examine a witness who has not been called by either of the parties, and, when he does so, neither party has a right to cross-examine the witness without the leave of the Judge. 22. In Coulson v. Disborough, (1894) 2 Queen's Bench 316, it was held thus: "At the trial of an action the Judge has power to call and examine a witness who has not been called by either of the parties, and, when he does so, neither party has a right to cross-examine the witness without the leave of the Judge. If the evidence of the witness given in answer to questions put to him by the Judge is adverse to either of the parties, leave should be given to that party to crossexamine the witness upon his answers, but a general cross-examination ought not to be permitted." 23. It is, therefore, obvious that the cross-examination of the Court witness by either of the parties or by both shall be limited to those questions put by the Court to the witness unlike other witnesses tendered by either of the parties, the crossexamination cannot be on general lines. 24. In the instant case, the Court below committed an error in calling the second respondent who remained ex parte throughout as a Court witness without caring to know the necessity to examine that witness. When the evidence of that witness is perused, it is obvious that he was examined to ascertain the nature of the sale transactions effected in favour of the plaintiffs and himself. However, this witness was allowed to be cross-examined by either of the parties in their own way eliciting the necessary information, more particularly by the plaintiffs to buttress their case. At the end of the cross-examination of this witness by the plaintiffs it was elicited from his mouth that the present rental value of the building concerned in O.S. No.500 of 1993 was about Rs.3,000/- per month. Indeed, that forms the basis for the Court to award profits at the rate of Rs.3,000/- for some 1 period and also at the same rate for the future profits. In view of the above discussion, I am of the considered view that C.W.1 ought not to have been examined by the Court as a Court witness since he is very much a party to the suit and remained 1 ex parte and more significantly when collusion was ascribed to him in between himself and the plaintiff who are his close relations. Furthermore, the witness ought not to have been permitted to be crossexamined by the plaintiffs in general. Furthermore, the witness ought not to have been permitted to be crossexamined by the plaintiffs in general. Therefore, the evidence of this witness shall have to be eschewed from consideration. However, this will not affect the merits of the case. As discussed by me hereinabove, the appellant-Society which lost the suit O.S. No.291 of 1987 cannot now validly resist the claim of the plaintiffs for possession. Therefore, even when the evidence of C.W.I is eschewed from consideration it has no effect of altering the result in the suits or the merits of the case. 25. As per the own case of the plaintiffs the building which is the subject matter of the suit O.S. No.500 of 1993 is concerned has been fetching a rent of Rs.l,500/-, which is the agreed rent in between the parties. The plaintiff in O.S. No.500 of 1993 prayed for the mesne profits or damages for use and occupation both past and future. The expression "mesne profits" is defined under Section 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It reads as under : "mesne profits" of property means those profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received• there from, together with interest on such profits, but shall not include profits due to improvements made by the person in wrongful possession." 26. In Chandra Kali v. Jagadish Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 402 , the Apex Court held that the mesne profits cannot be calculated on the basis of the standard rent or maximum rent that the landlord could have received if the premises were let out afresh and although amount of standard rent is a relevant factor for calculating mesne profits, it is not decisive. 27. Therefore, the judgment to the extent of granting past mesne profits for the period from 1.1.1992 to 30.6.1993 at the rate of Rs.3,000/- per month and granting future profits at the same rate is erroneous and is liable to be set aside. Either as rents or profits the plaintiff is entitled to for a period of three years preceding the date of filing of the suit. Either as rents or profits the plaintiff is entitled to for a period of three years preceding the date of filing of the suit. The suit in this case was filed on 26.7.1993 and preceding that date the plaintiff is entitled to the arrears of rent or past profits at the rate of Rs.l,500/- even the future profits shall be granted at the same rate from the date of suit till realisation. 28. For the above reasons, A.S. No.873 of 2003 is allowed in part and the judgment and decree passed by the Court below in favour of respondents 2 and 4 are hereby set aside and the appeal qua the respondents 1 and 3 is hereby dismissed confirming the judgment and decree passed in their favour by the Court below. 29. A.S. No.874 of 2003 is allowed in part while confirming the judgment of the Court below for the relief of possession is concerned and insofar as the relief of profits is concerned the judgment and decree are modified to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to the arrears of rents or profits at the rate of Rs.1,500/- per month for a period of three years preceding the date of filing of the suit and at the same rate towards future profits as directed by the trial Court on payment of the necessary Court fee. Both parties, however, shall bear their respective costs. 30. After the pronouncement of the judgment, learned Counsel for the appellant represents that since the institution is in existence and is located in a building constructed on the land in dispute, it is expedient in the interest of justice to grant sometime for eviction. 31. Heard both the learned Counsel. 32. In view of the same and having regard to the date of institution of the suit and the time occupied till now for the disposal of the appeals, I am of the considered view that if a period of three months is granted, it would meet the ends of justice. 33. Accordingly, three months time is granted for eviction.

Loyola Public School Society, Secunderabad v. P. Anil Kumar