ORDER Abhay M. Naik, J. This order disposes of W.P. No. 8045/07 as well as W.P. No. 8066/07. Reference to annexures is being taken from W.P. No. 8045/07 except otherwise mentioned. Short facts leading to the petitions are that the petitioner was elected as President Zila Panchayat, Shahdol in January, 2005. On 9-5-2007 a notice to move no confidence against the petitioner was submitted to respondent No. 2, who being the prescribed authority of Zila Panchayat passed an order on the same date as contained in Annexure P/2 fixing thereby the meeting for motion of no confidence on 21-5-2007. It is stated in the petition that the prescribed authority did not record his satisfaction about the admissibility of notice and further did not appoint the Presiding Officer as required u/s 35(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Evam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to the Act, 1993 for convenience) and Rule 3(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-President Ke Virudh Avishwas Prastav) Niyam, 1994. It is further averred that the members of the Zila Panchayat were kidnapped and were confined at some unknown place by Rajkumar Sarawagi, son of local BJP MLA Shri Chotelal Sarawagi. He immediately made representation to the Collector, Shahdol contained in Annexures P/2 and P/3 respectively. Petitioner was not provided with grounds of no confidence motion levelled against him in the notice. He made an application dated 24-5-2007 with a prayer for furnishing certain documents including the notice of no confidence motion vide Annexure P/5 but the same were not furnished to him on the ground that the same may be obtained from the record of office of the Commissioner. It is categorically averred that the members of Zila Panchayat were brought in the meeting hall by Rajkumar Sarawagi, in the, presence of his father local MLA Shri Chotelal Sarawagi. Distt. President of ruling party Shri Anupam Awasthy was also present at the time of voting. An objection about such presence was raised by the petitioner which remained unnoticed and was not recorded in the proceedings. The proceedings of no confidence were drawn without making petitioner aware of the grounds against him and, consequently, the petitioner was unable to speak and clarify his stand. Voting was made under the threat and influence of local MLA and BJP President. The proceedings of no confidence were drawn without making petitioner aware of the grounds against him and, consequently, the petitioner was unable to speak and clarify his stand. Voting was made under the threat and influence of local MLA and BJP President. One Munnibai Bega stated to be signatory of motion of no confidence, refused to put her thumb impression on the proceedings. News item in the local newspaper about the presence of local MLA and District President of ruling party are Annexures P/8 to P/10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the petitioner submitted W.P. No. 6946/2007 which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 7-6-2007 with a liberty to the petitioner to file a reference u/s 35(4) of the Act. Accordingly, the reference petition was submitted as contained in Annexure P/12 which goes to show that various factual as well as legal objections have been raised in the reference. An application for stay was also submitted which was considered by the Hon'ble State Minister for Panchayat and Rural Development Madhya Pradesh on 8-6-2007 as revealed in Annexure P/14. Hon'ble Minister observed that stay order was being passed because balance of convenience was in favour of petitioner. Accordingly, the meeting convened for election of New President of Zila Panchayat, Shahdol on 9-2-2007 was stayed and the case was fixed for further hearing on 16-7-2007. Respondents No. 7 and 8 were not parties to the reference case, so, they submitted an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of CPC for their impleadment along with an application for urgent hearing as contained in Annexures P/16 and P/15 respectively. It will not be out of place to mention here that a detailed order of stay passed on 8-6-2007 is placed on record by private respondents with their reply at Page 28 and 29. Similarly, private respondents along with Annexures P/15 and P/16 submitted objections for dismissal of reference as well as rejection of stay order dated 8-6-2007. These objections are placed on record as Annexure R/l by respondent Nos. 7 and 8 with their reply. Respondent No. 2 (Hon'ble Minister) preponed the hearing to 26-6-2007 and after hearing the arguments vacated the stay order dismissing simultaneously reference vide Annexure P/17. It is specifically averred that respondents No. 7 and 8 were not party to the reference proceedings and they were not even impleaded in the reference case by respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2 (Hon'ble Minister) preponed the hearing to 26-6-2007 and after hearing the arguments vacated the stay order dismissing simultaneously reference vide Annexure P/17. It is specifically averred that respondents No. 7 and 8 were not party to the reference proceedings and they were not even impleaded in the reference case by respondent No. 2. It has been contended by the learned counsel of petitioner Shri Shukla that: (i) the application submitted by the respondents No. 7 and 8 under Order 1, Rule 10 of CPC was not decided at all and without making them party, reference case could not have been heard at their instance. (ii) reference case was preponed to 26-2-2007 merely for hearing on the application submitted by respondents No. 7 and 8 and the reference case could not have been heard and decided in its entirety. (iii) in any case various factual disputes in addition to legal disputes were raised in the reference case and the same could not have been decided without affording an opportunity to produce evidence. Shri Vinod Mehta, G.A., Shri Praveen Pandey with Shri Dinesh Dikhit, advocates for respective respondents made their submissions in support of the impugned order. They inter alia contended that respondents No. 7 and 8 are members of Zila Panchayat and have always a right to have say in the matter. Accordingly, their objections have rightly been considered. They further contended that the objections were duly raised by them against the reference case itself and also against the stay order dated 8-6-2007. This being so, the respondent No. 2 was within his power to pass the impugned order. No confidence was challenged in the reference case and the same has rightly been decided on the basis of arguments. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties in the light of available record and the legal position governing the situation. It is true that respondents No. 7 and 8 were not party to the reference case. However, it cannot be ignored that they were members of Zila Panchayat, Shahdol and have raised their objections vide Annexure R/1 against the reference case as well as stay order granted on 8-6-2007. It is true that respondent No. 2 ought to have dealt with the application under Order 1, Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code. However, it cannot be ignored that they were members of Zila Panchayat, Shahdol and have raised their objections vide Annexure R/1 against the reference case as well as stay order granted on 8-6-2007. It is true that respondent No. 2 ought to have dealt with the application under Order 1, Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code. On allowing application for urgent hearing submitted by respondents No. 7 and 8 and on preponing the date of hearing it may well be treated that respondents No. 7 and 8 were impliedly made party or rightly permitted to intervene in the reference case. Moreover, hearing after preponement took place on 26-6-2007. From the proceedings it is not revealed that the petitioner raised an objection against the participation of respondents No. 7 and 8 in the arguments which took place on preponed hearing. In this view of the matter, the objections abut the participation of respondent Nos. 7 and 8 in the reference case without application under Order 1, Rule 10 of CPC having been allowed is without substance. Respondent No. 2 on 8-6-2007 passed an order of stay which ran in two pages (Page Nos. 28 and 29 of the reply submitted by the respondent Nos. 7 and 8). On account of the disputed motion of no confidence having been passed against the petitioner a meeting was convened on 9-6-2007 for election of President of Zila Panchayat, Shahdol. Respondent No. 2 clearly observed at Page 29 that it is prima-facie clear that the petitioner was elected as President of Janapad Panchayat in accordance with the legal provisions and in case, if, the proposed election on 9-6-2007 is not stayed, the petitioner will be deprived of his legitimate rights which were being agitated in the reference case. This, obviously, would cause irreparable loss making reference frustrated. It was further observed that the balance of convenience was in favour of petitioner and his legitimate rights could not have been permitted to be affected. Accordingly, the scheduled election on 9-6-2007 was stayed with immediately effect. It was further ordered that the petitioner may be allowed to work on the post of President of Zila Panchayat, Shahdol until decision of the reference case. In the application for urgent hearing it was prayed that a preponed hearing may be granted on accompanying application. Accordingly, the scheduled election on 9-6-2007 was stayed with immediately effect. It was further ordered that the petitioner may be allowed to work on the post of President of Zila Panchayat, Shahdol until decision of the reference case. In the application for urgent hearing it was prayed that a preponed hearing may be granted on accompanying application. Objections to the reference case as well as stay application were submitted vide Annexure R/1 and impleadment was sought by the respondents No. 7 and 8 vide Annexure P/16. This being so, the respondent No. 2 was well within his powers to prepone hearing on stay matter as well as reference case. However, it was obligatory on the part of respondent No. 2 to specify the scope of hearing on the date of preponed hearing. Order of preponement contained in the writ petition does not give any impression that arguments in the matter of stay as well as reference case were to be heard on 26-6-2007 and the matter was fixed for both the purposes. None of the parties to the writ petition has placed on record the copy of notice issued to the petitioner intimating thereby the date of preponed hearing. This notice could have made it clear that whether the petitioner was directed to appear on 26-6-2007 for hearing in the matter on stay alone or on the entire reference case. Moreover, nothing has been recorded in the impugned order dated 26-6-2007 (Annexure P/17) that the arguments were heard on the entire reference case including that of matter of stay. According to the record of respondent No. 2, it is not revealed that the hearing was preponed on the entire reference case and that the reference case itself was heard on merits on the date of preponed hearing. This, obviously, must have caused prejudice to the petitioner because the petitioner could not have made prayer for producing the evidence in support of the disputes raised in the reference case. It may be seen from memo of reference contained in Annexure P/12 that the petitioner made it clear in paragraph 9 that he will cite the witnesses and prove his case. Prayer for adducing evidence was already contained in the memo of reference and the petitioner could have well availed it if he would have been made aware of the scope of hearing on the preponed date. Prayer for adducing evidence was already contained in the memo of reference and the petitioner could have well availed it if he would have been made aware of the scope of hearing on the preponed date. Although, it is submitted by the learned counsel for respondents that no evidence was required in the reference case, it may be seen from memo of reference contained in Annexure P/12 that various factual disputes were raised. Illustratively, it may be seen that the voting is stated to have taken place in presence of local MLA and District President of Ruling Party. Members of Zila Panchayat were stated to have been kidnapped. Presiding Officer did not inform the grounds of no confidence motion to the petitioner which did not enable him to explain/clarify his stand against no confidence. These and other factual controversies could have been established only by producing evidence. This Court in the case of Kandhilal Patel and Others Vs. State of M.P. and Others, has held that the scope of dispute is quite wider than that of appeal. This Court observed as under: The question for consideration still is whether the dispute submitted u/s 21(4) is to be decided as an appeal or is to be decided as original proceedings. One can straightway say that if the intention of the legislature was to treat the dispute at par with an appeal, then instead of using the word 'dispute' in section 21(4), the legislature could use the word 'appeal' in section 21(4). Section 21(4) reads "he shall within seven days from the date on which such motion was carried, refer the dispute to the Collector." The language employed in sub-section (4) of section 21 of the Act clearly shows the intention of the legislature. It never wanted to treat the dispute at par with an appeal u/s 91. It appears that the legislature was alive to the situation that in an appeal, a fact finding enquiry may not be made by the appellate forum, and in a case where the motion is carried, sometimes factual allegations may be made or factual disputes can be raised. The word 'dispute' in its ordinary sense would mean that the person aggrieved by an order is challenging its correctness, validity and propriety not only on the legal aspects but even on the factual aspects as he is dissatisfied with the resolution carrying the motion. The word 'dispute' in its ordinary sense would mean that the person aggrieved by an order is challenging its correctness, validity and propriety not only on the legal aspects but even on the factual aspects as he is dissatisfied with the resolution carrying the motion. When a dispute u/s 21(4) is raised, it cannot be decided as an appeal. The party aggrieved by the resolution can challenge its correctness, as observed, on legal grounds so also on the factual aspects. On the legal aspects, the aggrieved party can always say that because of the infraction or breach of the mandatory provisions or rules, the resolution was bad. While challenging the resolution on facts, the aggrieved party can always say that the manner in which the resolution was carried was bad or there were certain factual disputes or the facts as projected by the aggrieved party if stand proved after recording the evidence and hearing the parties, would certainly affect the validity of the resolution. When such allegations are made, then the authority cannot decide the dispute simply hearing the arguments of the parties. Where the parties agree before the authority hearing the dispute that they do not wish to lead any evidence, then certainly the authority would be competent to decide the dispute after hearing the parties, but where prima facie it appears to the authority that there are certain factual disputes or allegations against the other side, then it is duty bound to call for the reply of the other side. It is obliged to give opportunity to the parties to substantiate their allegations/counter-allegations by producing oral and documentary evidence. The authority would also be obliged to give proper opportunity of hearing to the parties and shall also be obliged to decide the matter in accordance with law. Examining from the aforesaid view, it is crystal clear that respondent No. 2 did not provide an opportunity to adduce evidence to the petitioner to establish the points raised in the memo of reference. This apart, it may further be seen that the petitioner had expressly raised objections on account of noncompliance of provisions of section 35 of Adhiniyam of 1993 and Rule 3 of the M.P. Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-President Ke Virudh Avishwas Prastav) Niyam, 1994. This apart, it may further be seen that the petitioner had expressly raised objections on account of noncompliance of provisions of section 35 of Adhiniyam of 1993 and Rule 3 of the M.P. Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-President Ke Virudh Avishwas Prastav) Niyam, 1994. If the respondent No. 2 wished to decide the entire dispute it was obligatory on his part to deal with the objections including legal one while passing the impugned order. This having not been done the impugned order is not sustainable in law and reference case is liable to be decided afresh in accordance with law. Although respondents No. 7 and 8 have cited the decision reported as 1998(1) MPWN 233 and Meena Bai Prem Lal Chaudhary Vs. State of M.P. and Others, , I find that they do not lay down law that no evidence shall be allowed to be adduced in reference case. An important feature may be noticed that under sub-section (4) section 35, a dispute is liable to be decided as far as possible within 45 days from the date of receipt. Reference case seems to have been received on 8-6-2007. Application for stay was considered in detail as revealed in the detailed order passed on 8-6-2007. Its vacation without considering the points raised in the reference case may not be treated as justified. Moreover, period of more than 35 days has already elapsed and looking to the ceiling of 45 days, it would always be desirable in such cases to decide the matter fully unless the stay order granted ex parte has been procured totally in contravention of law or by fraud or suppression of material facts. Respondent No. 2 is expected to decide the reference case itself within the period prescribed under law. However, this will not preclude him from dealing with the application for vacation of stay for specific inevitable reasons. In the result, both the writ petitions are allowed to the extent of quashing the impugned order contained in Annx.P/16 along with consequential orders passed by respondent No. 2 on 26-6-2007 and Annx.R/17. They are accordingly quashed. Respondent No. 2 is directed to re-decide the reference case as well as stay matter in accordance with law keeping in mind the observations contained hereinabove. No order as to costs. Final Result : Allowed