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2007 DIGILAW 752 (ALL)

RAM SABAD v. SESSIONS JUDGE BAHRAICH

2007-03-26

ALOK KUMAR SINGH

body2007
ALOK K. SINGH, J. Heard Sri S. P. Dubey learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Sarvajeet Dubey learned Additional Government Advocate for the State and perused the record. 2. At this stage there is no need to issue notices to opposite parties 3 to 12, the prospective accused, hence the same are dispensed with. 3. This petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. has been filed to set aside the impugned order dated 18-11- 2006 passed by the Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich and order dated 29-11-2006 passed by the Incharge Sessions Judge, Bahraich. By means of first impugned order the learned Magistrate treated the application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. as complaint and fixed a date for recording the statement under Section 200 Cr. P. C. By means of second impugned order passed by the learned Incharge Sessions Judge the revision filed by the complainant (petitioner) was dismissed in limine at admission stage. 4. The facts giving rise to this case are that an application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. was filed by the petitioner on 12- 10-2006 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Bahraich against 10 persons (opposite parties Nos. 3 to 12) saying that opposite party No. 3 is a licence holder of fair price shop of Gram Sabha Kursaha while other opposite parties are his companions. On 22-9- 2006 at about 8. 00 a. m. the complainant and his son had gone to take kerosene oil from the house/shop of opposite party No. 3. They were asked to deposit the price of 9 litres kerosene oil at the rate of Rs. 11. 50 paisa per litre and in absence of any loose currency he deposited a note of Rs. 500/- denomination. Though they were asked to stand in a que, but opposite party No. 3 was distributing kerosene oil to other person only. When they raised objection he started hurling cast indicative abuses, beat and threatened them and also refused to return the currency note of Rs. 500/ -. The other opposite parties being his companions also exhorted, abused and beat both of them by kicks, fists, lathis and dandas. When the complainant and his son went to the police station their report was not lodged and their injuries were also not got examined. Then they went to district hospital and got themselves medically examined. 500/ -. The other opposite parties being his companions also exhorted, abused and beat both of them by kicks, fists, lathis and dandas. When the complainant and his son went to the police station their report was not lodged and their injuries were also not got examined. Then they went to district hospital and got themselves medically examined. They also sent a registered complaint to the Superintendent of Police on 7-10- 2006. When no action was taken by anybody, the complainant filed an application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. alongwith injury reports of himself and his son. In both the injury reports only complaints of pain at three places each were found. The learned Magistrate, after considering the matter found that all the facts are within the knowledge of the complainant and he did not find anything which is required to be investigated and which the complainant cannot bring before the Court and, therefore, he did not find any ground for getting the matter investigated by the police. Therefore he passed the order for treating it as complaint and fixed a date for recording the statement under Section 200 Cr. P. C. 5. Feeling aggrieved, the complainant filed a revision. The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not find any illegality in the impugned order and therefore dismissed the revision in limine. 6. The question for determination before this Court is as to whether or not an application under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. can be treated as complaint. 7. The discussion on the subject entails consideration in the following manner wherein I propose to consider some of the oft quoted case laws on the subject in the following seriatim : (1) Gopal Das Sindhi and Anr. v. State of Assam, AIR 1961 SC 986 . The judgment of this case was rendered by three Honble Judges of the Apex Court. The relevant observations are extracted hereinbelow : "if the Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence on the complaint filed before him, he was not obliged to examine the complainant on oath and the witnesses present at the time of the filing of the complaint. We cannot, read the provision of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We cannot, read the provision of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We are unable to construe the word `may in Section 190 to mean `must. The reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint under Section 156 (3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate the cases involving cognizable offences is with the police. On the other hand there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. " (Emphasis supplied) (2) Mudhubala v. Suresh Kumar, 1997 JIC 979 (SC) : 1997 (35) ACC 371 (SC ). After the aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the Honble Apex Court in 1991, the next important verdict of the Honble Apex Court came in the year 1997. In this case the following are the relevant observations made by the Honble Apex Court : "from a combined reading of the above provisions, it is abundantly clear that when a written complaint disclosing a cognizable offence is made before a Magistrate, he may take cognizance upon the same under Section 190 (1) (a) of the Code and proceed with the same in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XV. The other option available to the Magistrate (emphasis supplied) in such a case is to send the complaint to the appropriate Police Station under Section 156 (3) for investigation. Once such a direction is given under sub-section (3) of Section 156 the police is required to investigate into that complaint under sub-section (1) thereof and on completion of investigation to submit a `police report in accordance with Section 173 (2) on which a Magistrate may take cognizance under Section 190 (1) (b) - but not under 190 (1) (a ). Since a complaint filed before a Magistrate cannot be a `police report in view of the definition of `complaint referred to earlier and since the investigation of a `cognizable case by the police under Section 156 (1) has to culminate in a `police report the `complaint - as soon as an order under Section 156 (3) is passed thereon - transforms itself to a report given in writing within the meaning of Section 154 of the Code, 1 which is known as the First Information Report (F. I. R. ). As under Section 156 (I) the police can only investigate a `cognizable case it has to formally register a case on that report. " 8. It is argued that in the light of the case of Madhubala v. Suresh Kumar (supra) if cognizable offence is disclosed then the Magistrate is bound to direct the police to register and investigate. This cannot be said to be a correct interpretation of this case. There is no such observation. On the converse it has been left to the discretion/option of the Magistrate either to take cognizance under Section 190 (1) (a) of the Code in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XV when a written complaint disclosing cognizable offence is made before him, or to send it to the police to register and investigate. There is no quarrel on the point that if a written complaint/application disclosing cognizable offence is made and after application of mind the Magistrate finds that cognizable offence is disclosed and particularly if the offence is of serious nature and it will be conducive to get it investigated by the police then the only option before the Magistrate would be to send it to the police to register and investigate. It is also noteworthy that in the case of Madhubala v. Suresh Kumar (supra) the earlier decision of the Honble Apex Court in Gopal Das Sindhis case (supra) has not been unsettled which had clearly laid down that in such matters the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and instead of sending it to the police to register and investigate he may himself take cognizance of a cognizable offence. It is also worthwhile to mention here that the judgment of Gopal Das Sindhis case (supra) has been delivered by a Larger Bench of the Apex Court comprising three Honble Judges while the judgment in the case of Madhubala v. Suresh Kumar (supra) has been rendered by two Honble Judges of the Honble Apex Court. For this reason also the aforesaid interpretation as suggested by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in respect of Madhubalas case (supra) cannot be accepted. It may also not be out of place to mention here that both these cases i. e. Gopal Das Sindhi (supra) and Madhubala v. Suresh Kumar (supra) as also another case of Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. , 2001 (1) JIC 740 (SC) : JT 2001 (2) SC 81, which came in 2001, have been duly considered by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Babu Gupta and Anr. v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 2001 (2) JIC 231 (All) (FB) : 2001 (43) ACC 50, which shall be referred hereinafter at appropriate place : (3) Suresh Chand Jain v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Anr. , 2001 (1) JIC 740 (SC) : JT 2001 (2) SC 81. This is the third important judgment of the Honble Apex Court on the subject which was given in the year 2001. In this case facts were that a complaint was made before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Neemuch (M. P.) with the allegation that the accused had committed offence punishable under Section 420 I. P. C. and under Section 3 of the Prizes, Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Prohibition) Act. Alter perusal of the complaint the Magistrate was of the view that the offence was of serious nature (emphasis supplied) so it required to be investigated by the police. He, therefore, instead of proceeding with the matter as a complaint case, passed an order directing the police under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. to investigate the case. This order was challenged by the accused before the learned Sessions Judge by filing a revision contending that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order on a complaint filed before him. This plea was rejected by the Sessions Judge. Then he moved an application before the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. That application was also dismissed. This plea was rejected by the Sessions Judge. Then he moved an application before the High Court under Section 482 Cr. P. C. That application was also dismissed. Then he filed a criminal appeal before the Honble Apex Court challenging the above order. The Honble Supreme Court holding that the order passed by the Magistrate was absolutely right made following observations in para 10 of the judgment : "the position is thus clear. Any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an F. I. R. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an F. I. R. involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer-in-charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code that an F. I. R. should be registered, it is the duty of the officer-in-charge of the police station to register the F. I. R. regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter. " (4) Ram Babu Gupta and Anr. v. State of U. P. and Ors. , 2001 (2) JIC 231 (All) (FB) : 2001 (43) ACC 50. It is interesting to note that the aforesaid judgment in the case of Suresh Chand Jain (supra) was passed on 10-1-2001 by Honble Supreme Court and about the same time a matter in respect of Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. vis-a- vis complaint was also pending for consideration before a Full Bench of the this Court comprising Honble Palok Basu, Honble R. K. Dash and Honble J. C. Gupta, JJ. in the case of Ram Babu Gupta (supra ). P. C. vis-a- vis complaint was also pending for consideration before a Full Bench of the this Court comprising Honble Palok Basu, Honble R. K. Dash and Honble J. C. Gupta, JJ. in the case of Ram Babu Gupta (supra ). In this case the judgment was reserved on 27- 11-2000 after conclusion of arguments, but before the matter could be listed for delivery of judgment, the above decision of Honble Supreme Court dated 10-1-2001 in the aforesaid case of Suresh Chand Jain (supra) was pronounced. After getting a copy of the said judgment through the Registry the case of Ram Babu Gupta (supra) was fixed for further arguments, and thereafter the judgment was again reserved. Finally it was delivered on 27-4- 2001. Now I propose to discuss the case of Ram Babu Gupta (supra ). The following two questions were formulated by the Full Bench for its decision : " (1) Should the Magistrate while exercising powers under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. be left to write cryptic orders "register and investigate", or "register and do the needful" or "he has to investigate", or the like? or the Magistrates order should prima facie indicate application of mind; (2) Is the observation of the Division Bench in Suraj Mal (supra) correct when it says that when an applicant before a Magistrate prays only for registration and investigation of a case, such an application will not become "complaint" as defined in Section 2 of the Cr. P. C. " 9. The relevant paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the judgment of Full Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Babu Gupta (supra) are extracted hereinbelow : " (14) In Gopal Das Sindhi and Ors. v. State of Assam and Anr. , AIR 1961 SC 986 , it has been observed : "the provisions of Section 190 do not mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. The word `may in reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify the Magistrate in sending the complaint under Section 156 (3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences is with the police. The word `may in reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify the Magistrate in sending the complaint under Section 156 (3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences is with the police. On the other hand there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. If he does so then he would have to proceed in the manner provided by Chapter XVI of the Code. When a Magistrate applies his mind not for the purpose of proceeding under the various sections of Chapter XVI but for taking action of some other kind, e. g. ordering investigation under Section 156 (3) or issuing a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. " (15) Various observations of the Honble Supreme Court highlighting one or the other aspect inherent in Sections 154, 155 and 190, 200, 202 Cr. P. C. exist in several other cases such as State of Assam v. Abdul Noor, 1970 (7) ACC 299 (SC), Devarpalli Lakshminarayan Reddy, 1976 (13) ACC 230 (SC), Tula Ram and Ors. v. Kishore Singh, 1977 (14) ACC 364 (SC), Gulam Abbas v. State of U. P. , 1982 (1) SCC 71 , Madhubala v. Suresh Kumar, 1997 JIC 979 (SC) : 1997 (35) ACC 371 (SC ). This Court is refraining from referring to those decisions in detail for the reason that in Suresh Chand Jain (supra), the decision in Gopaldas Sindhi (supra) has been quoted with approval. Tula Rams case (supra) has also been referred to as reiterating the legal position as interpreted in Gopaldas Sindhi. The two paragraphs from Suresh Chand Jain may be usefully quoted now : "the position is thus clear. Any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an First Information Report. There is nothing illegal in doing so. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an First Information Report. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an First Information Report involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer-in-charge of the police station as indicated in Section 154 of the Code. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code that an First Information Report should be registered it is the duty of the officer-in-charge of the police station to register the First Information Report regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complaint because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII only thereafter. " "though the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana (supra) made reference to two decisions rendered by this Court Gopal Das Sindhi and Ors. v. State of Assam and Anr. (supra) and Tula Ram and Ors. v. Kishore Singh (supra) learned Single Judge fell into error in formulating a legal position which is quote contrary to the dictum laid down by this Court in the aforecited decisions. In Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam (supra) a three Judge Bench of this Court considered the validity of the course adopted by a Judicial Magistrate of the 1st class in ordering the police "to register a case, investigate and if warranted, submit charge-sheet". Learned Judges repelled the contention that the Magistrate ought to have examined the complainant on oath under Section 200 of the Code. Dealing with the said contention their Lordships stated thus: "if the Magistrate had not taken cognizance of the offence on the complaint filed before him, he was not obliged to examine the complainant on oath and the witnesses present at the time of the filing of the complaint. We cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We cannot read the provisions of Section 190 to mean that once a complaint is filed, a Magistrate is bound to take cognizance if the facts stated in the complaint disclose the commission of any offence. We are unable to construe the word `may in Section 190 to mean `must. The reason is obvious. A complaint disclosing cognizable offences may well justify a Magistrate in sending the complaint under Section 156 (3) to the police for investigation. There is no reason why the time of the Magistrate should be wasted when primarily the duty to investigate in cases involving cognizable offences is with the police. On the other hand, there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. (Emphasis supplied ). " "in Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh (supra) a two Judge Bench of this Court, after referring to the earlier decision, reiterated the same legal position. It is unfortunate that when this Court laid down the legal position so explicitly in the above two decisions which reached the notice of the learned Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court he had formulated a position contrary to it by stating that "the Magistrate has no power within the contemplation of Section 156 (3) of the Code to ask for registration of the case. " It appears that the judicial officers under Punjab and Haryana High Court who were, till then, following the correct position, were asked by the learned Judge to follow the erroneous position formulated by him in the aforesaid judgment. " (16) Having thus noticed the observation aforesaid in Suresh Chand Jain, it may be desirable to revert to the facts in Suresh Chand Jain. The Magistrate in that case received a complaint submitted by the complainant and expressed his opinion that from the allegations therein, serious offences were disclosed (emphasis supplied) and the complaint was required to be investigated by the police and thus forwarded it to the police station with the direction to register the First Information Report and initiate investigation and called a copy of the FIR immediately on registration of the case. (17) In view of the aforesaid discussion on the legal provisions and decisions of the Supreme Court as on date, it is hereby held that on receiving a complaint, the Magistrate has to apply his mind to the allegations (emphasis supplied) in the complaint upon which he may not at once proceed to take cognizance and may order it to go to the police station for being registered and investigated. The Magistrates order must indicate application of mind. If the Magistrate takes cognizance, he proceeds to follow the procedure provided in Chapter XV of Cr. P. C. The first question stands answered thus. (18) Coming to the second question noted above it is to be at once stated that a provision empowering a Court to act in a particular manner and a provision creating a right for an aggrieved person to approach a Court or authority, must be understood distinctively and should not be mixed up. While Sections 154, 155 sub-section (1) and (2) of 156 Cr. P. C. confer right on an aggrieved person to reach the police, 156 (3) empowers a Magistrate to act in a particular manner in a given situation. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that where a bare application is moved before Court only praying for exercise of powers under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. it will remain an application only and would not be in the nature of a complaint. It has been noted above that the Magistrate has to always apply his mind on the allegations in the complaint where he may use his powers under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. In this connection it may be immediately added that where in an application, a complainant states facts which constitute cognizable offence but makes defective prayer, such an application will not cease to be a complaint nor can the Magistrate refuse to treat it as a complaint even though there be no prayer seeking trial of the known or unknown accused (emphasis supplied ). The Magistrate has to deal with such facts as constitute cognizable offence and for all practical purposes even such an application would be a complaint. This Court can do no better than refer to the following observations in Suresh Chand Jain (supra) : "the position is thus clear. The Magistrate has to deal with such facts as constitute cognizable offence and for all practical purposes even such an application would be a complaint. This Court can do no better than refer to the following observations in Suresh Chand Jain (supra) : "the position is thus clear. Any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code. . . . . . could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII of the Code only thereafter. " (19) In view of the aforesaid discussion, the observations in the two paragraphs noted above in Suraj Mal (supra), cannot be said to be laying down correct law, therefore, those observations shall remain confined to the decision in Suraj Mal. The second point formulated above stands also answered. " Thus after considering the aforesaid cases i. e. , Gopal Das Sindhi (supra), Madhublas case (supra), Suresh Chand Jains case (supra) the Full Bench of this Court answered both the questions which were formulated by it. At the cost of repetition the answers to those questions may be summarized as under : 0 Answer to question No. 1 : The Magistrate while exercising powers under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. should not write cryptic orders like register and investigate or register and do the needful or the like. Instead, on receiving a complaint/application the Magistrate should apply his mind to the allegations and then pass an order which must indicate application of mind. Answer to question No. 2 : The observation made by the Division Bench in Suraj Mals case (supra) is not correct when it says that when an applicant before the learned Magistrate prays only for registration and investigation of a case, such an application will not become complaint as defined in Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words it can be said that when an application/complaint is submitted before a Magistrate praying for registration and investigation of a case, the Magistrate, after application of mind, can treat the same as complaint as defined in Section 2 Cr. P. C. It would be relevant here to extract the definition of complaint given in Section 2 (d) Cr. P. C. It would be relevant here to extract the definition of complaint given in Section 2 (d) Cr. P. C. : "2 (d) `complaint means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. " 10. Thus, it comes out that no particular form is prescribed in which the complaint may be filed. The only requirement is that there must be allegation which may, prima facie, discloses commission of an offence with necessary facts for the Magistrate to take action : 5. Joseph Mathuri and Anr. v. Swami Sachidanand Harisakshi and Anr. , 2001 (Suppl) ACC 957. This is the fifth important case on the subject in which also the Honble Apex Court has propounded the law on the point in the following manner : "heard learned Counsel for the appearing parties. 1 (2) This appeal is directed against the impugned order dated 3-8- 2000 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 1520 of 2000 filed by respondent No. 1 herein. The High Court held that the application under Section 156 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code moved by respondent No. 1 before the Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun for directing appellants to register the case against the appellants cannot be treated as a complaint. The impugned order, on the face of it, is totally erroneous and cannot be sustained in law as the said order ignores Section 190 and Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Further, the High Court has not considered the previous order dated 19-7-2000 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Rishikesh. In this view of the matter the appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. " 11. Further, the High Court has not considered the previous order dated 19-7-2000 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division), Rishikesh. In this view of the matter the appeal is allowed and the impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. " 11. Thus in the conspectus of the principles enunciated in the aforesaid case laws it emerges out that when an application/complaint is submitted before a Magistrate praying for registration and investigation of a case, and particularly if the allegations are of serious nature as was found in the case of Suresh Chand Jain (supra) and cognizable offence is disclosed and it is found to be conducive to get the matter investigated by the police then the proper course for the Magistrate would be to direct the police to register and investigate in the manner as provided in Chapter XII of the Code. Because after all it is the primary duty of the police to investigate in respect of a cognizable offence and normally an aggrieved person should not be forced to proceed in the manner provided under Chapter XV and to produce witnesses at his own cost to bring home the charges. On the other hand as has been held in the case of Gopal Das Sindhi (supra) there may be occasions when the Magistrate may exercise his discretion and take cognizance of a cognizable offence. In other words he may treat such application as complaint and proceed in the manner provided in Chapter XV/xvi of the Code. He is not bound by the caption mentioned in the application/complaint or the prayer made at the foot of such application/complaint. At times such caption/prayer may be wrong or it may be otherwise defective. If he adopts the second course, the decision cannot be faulted for not accepting, the request of the complainant for investigation by the police. But in either of the courses which a Magistrate may adopt, he is supposed to apply his mind to the allegations and his order must necessarily indicate such application of mind. The present age is of transparency and right to information. Therefore, any such judicial order should not be passed in a slip shod or cryptic manner because it may entail unnecessary harassment and deprivation of personal liberty of a person. 12. The present age is of transparency and right to information. Therefore, any such judicial order should not be passed in a slip shod or cryptic manner because it may entail unnecessary harassment and deprivation of personal liberty of a person. 12. Having considered the legal aspect of the matter, now I take the thread of discussion about the case in hand which was noted inconclusively in para 4 of this judgment. In this case the allegations were not of very serious nature and except complaints of pain no injuries were found. After application of mind, the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order dated 18-11-2006 treating it as a complaint. Similarly, the learned revisional Court below dismissed on 29-11-2006 the memo of revision in limine on the ground that the order dated 18-11-2006 was passed in accordance with relevant provisions of law and the principle laid down by Honble Apex Court as well as Full Bench of this Court. There was therefore no occasion for the revisional Court to have entertained the me mo of revision. 2 13. Therefore, in view of the discussion made hereinabove I do not find any blemish either in the first impugned order dated 18- 11-2006 passed by the learned Magistrate treating the application as complaint or the second impugned order dated 29-11-2006 dismissing the revision in limine challenging the order of Magistrate. 14. Accordingly this petition under Section 482 Cr. P. C. deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Petition dismissed. .