ORDER 1. This second appeal has been filed at the instance of plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed by the learned trial Court and the appeal filed by him before the learned first appellate Court, has also been dismissed. 2. Plaintiff-Amar Bahadur Singh filed suit for injunction and for declaration that he is the owner having half share in the suit property. The suit property is a house, description whereof has been mentioned in the plaint. 3. The pleadings of the plaintiff in the plaint is that vide partition deed dated 21.6.1972 there was a partition in the family and by this document of partition plaintiff Amar Bahadur Singh and defendant No.2 Sheetala Prasad Singh, who are real brothers, partitioned the property mentioned in the partition deed and it was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant No.2 that the property shall be sold and the sale price will be divided in two shares equally. However, the suit property which is a house could not be old and, therefore, the suit property is the joint property of plaintiff and defendant No.2 in which he is having 1/2 share. 4. Defendant No.1 Devendra Singh who is the son of defendant No.2 filed written statement, but defendant No.2 Sheetala Prasad Singh did not file any written statement. In the written statement filed by defendant No.1 Devendra Singh, it has been specifically pleaded by him in paras 1 to 3 that the suit property is not the joint Hindu family property of the parties, indeed, it is his self-acquired property. In para 5 of the written statement, he has specifically pleaded that suit property was purchased by defendant No.1 from his own earning and from the funds gifted to his wife by her parents and, therefore, the plaintiff has no right, title and interest in the suit property. 5. Learned trial Court after framing necessary issues and after recording the evidence of the parties, came to hold that the suit property is not the property of joint Hindu family but the same is self-acquired property of defendant No.1 Devendra Singh and eventually dismissed the suit. The appeal which was filed by plaintiff has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree by learned first appellate Court. 6. In this matter, the present second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. 7. The appeal which was filed by plaintiff has been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree by learned first appellate Court. 6. In this matter, the present second appeal has been filed by the plaintiff. 7. It has been vehemently contended by learned senior counsel for the appellant that the two Courts below by misconstruing EX.P-1 which is an acknowledgement of earlier partition, gave finding that the suit property is not the property of HUF and if that would be the position, there is substantial question of law involved in this appeal. The further contention of learned senior counsel is that if document EX.P-1 dated 21.6.1972 if considered in proper perspective, it would reveal that it is only an acknowledgment of the earlier partition and, therefore, it does not require any registration under section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. 8. The 'alternative submission of learned senior counsel is that if the document EX.P-1 is taken to be a partition deed and even if it is not registered, it can be read and used for colateral purpose under section 49 of the Registration Act, in order to ascertain that plaintiff is in possession of the suit property. 9. Another contention of learned senior counsel is that defendant No.1 Devendra Singh failed to establish that the suit property is his self-acquired property and the source to purchase the suit property has also not been disclosed and proved by him and there is no connecting evidence in that regard and, therefore, two Courts below erred in substantial error or law in holding that the suit property is the self-acquired property of defendant No.1. 10. Having heard learned senior counsel for the appellant, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be dismissed. 11. On going through document EX.P-1 which, according to learned senior counsel, is an acknowledgement of earlier partition, it is gathered that in fact this document is a partition deed and not the acknowledgement of the earlier partition. The opening lines of this document are that in presence of the persons whose names are mentioned in this document, Amar Bahadur Singh (plaintiff) and Sheetala Prasad Singh (defendant No.2) has partitioned the property, the description whereof has been mentioned in the document. Therefore, for no rhyme and reason this document could be said to be a document of acknowledgment of previous partition. Therefore, for no rhyme and reason this document could be said to be a document of acknowledgment of previous partition. Apart from this, it is plaintiffs own case in the plaint that vide partition deed dated 21.6.1972 the property of HUF was partitioned and it is not his case that document EX.P-1 is a document of acknowledgement, acknowledging the earlier partition. It is well settled in law that a new case based on facts cannot be made out in the appeal. {See C. Machertich v. Stuart and Co.Ltd. [ AIR 1970 SC 839 ]}. 12. The question is that whether for colateral purpose EX.P-1 can be read. The contention of learned counsel is that after execution of document EX.P-l since plaintiff is also possessing the suit property, therefore, Ex.P1 can be read and used for colateral purpose in order to ascertain his possession. It be seen that there is no document on record in the order to show that EX.P-l was ever implemented. The plaintiff did not file any Municipal record in order to show that suit property is jointly owned or even after the execution of Ex.P-l, in the Municipal record, it continued in the name of original owner. The plaintiff is real brother of defendant No.2 and uncle of defendant No.1. Though in the written statement it has been denied by defendant No.1 that plaintiff is residing in the suit house nor Sheetala Prasad (defendant No.2) is residing in it. But if the plaintiff was permitted to reside in the suit house by defendant No.1, ipso facto would not confer any right to him in the suit property. 13. So far as the contention of learned senior counsel that defendant No.1 failed to prove that the suit property is his self-acquired is concerned, suffice it to state that there is specific pleading of defendant No.1 in para 5 of his written statement that from his own earning and from the funds given by his father-in-law to his wife which is her Stridhan, the plot was purchased on which the house was constructed and which is the disputed property. In order to substantiate the stand, registered sale-deed Ex.D-1 executed by Ran Bahadur in favour of Devendra Singh (defendant No.1) dated 2nd August, 1965 has been placed on record which shows that the suit property was purchased by Devendra Singh (defendant No.1). In order to substantiate the stand, registered sale-deed Ex.D-1 executed by Ran Bahadur in favour of Devendra Singh (defendant No.1) dated 2nd August, 1965 has been placed on record which shows that the suit property was purchased by Devendra Singh (defendant No.1). Unfortunately, Ran Bahadur could not be produced as witness, since he already died when the evidence was recorded but the above said sale-deed EX.D-1 has been proved by the Devendra (defendant No.1) by his own statement as well as by examining DW3 Surendra Singh who is the son of Ran Bahadur. In his statement Surendra Singh has proved the signature of his father Ran Bahadur on the sale-deed EX.D-1. Thus, the sale-deed executed in favour of defendant No.1 has been duly proved. On bare perusal of the evidence of Devendra (DW1) it is gathered that at the time of his marriage, according to the custom, some cash money was given to him and to his wife by the family members of his wife. Apart from this money he was also doing tution privately, and from all these funds he purchased the suit property. Thus, the source of income to purchase the plot on which suit house is built, has also been proved by defendant No.1. 14. The finding arrived at by learned two Courts below are pure findings of fact and cannot be interfered in the second appeal, even if they are held to be grossly erroneous. In this regard the decision of Supreme Court in Ramacandra Ayyar and another v. Ramalingam Chettiar and another [ AIR 1963 SC 302 ], and Baidyanath Bhattacharya and another v. S. Kannakar [ (2000)9 SCC 505 ], may be seen. 15. In the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court Gurdev Kaur and others v. Kaki and others [ (2007)1 SCC 546 ], it has been held that even before the amendment of 1976 in CPC, the scope of interference under section 100, CPC was limited and did not extend to interference with the concurrent findings of fact if they are on the basis of cogent evidence. According to the apex Court, the amendment of 1976 clearly indicates that the legislature never intend the second appeal to become a third trial of facts. 16. The words "substantial question of law" have not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure but the said expression has been used in the Constitution. According to the apex Court, the amendment of 1976 clearly indicates that the legislature never intend the second appeal to become a third trial of facts. 16. The words "substantial question of law" have not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure but the said expression has been used in the Constitution. The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the right of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by the Supreme Court or by Privy Councilor by Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law. {See Sir Chunnilal v. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co.Ltd. [ AIR 1962 SC 1314 ]. The same principle has been reiterated by the apex Court in a later decision Govindaraju v. Mariamman [ (2005)2 SCC 500 ]. 17. No exhaustive list that what are the substantial questions of law can be given but the basic ingredients constituting a substantial question of law has been enumerated in Gurdev Kaur (supra), and Govindaraju (supra). If a case would fall under the following circumstances, it may raise a substantial question of law: (i) The question of law on which there is conflict of judicial opinion and not finally decided by Supreme Court, Privy Council; or by Federal Court [See Sir Chunnilal v. Mehta (supra)]. (ii) The Finding which has been arrived at by Courts below without any evidence on record. (ii) The Finding which has been arrived at by Courts below without any evidence on record. (See Sree Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and others [ (1999)3 SCC 722 ] and Rohni Prasad and others v. Kasturchand [2000 RN 141 (SC)= (2000)3 SCC 668 ] } ; (iii) Inference from or legal effect of proved or admitted facts; (iv) Disregard or non-consideration of relevant or admissible evidence {See Sri Chand Gupta v. Gulzar Singh and another { AIR 1992 SC 123 ], and Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohanlal [ (2000)1 SCC 434 ]}. (v) Taking into consideration irrelevant or inadmissible evidence {See Santakumari and others v. Lakshmi Amma Janaki Amma [ (2000)7 SCC 60 ], Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E-Ismail Madris-Un Niswan [ AIR 1999 SC 3067 ], and Kondiba Dagadu Kadam and lshwar Dass Jain (supra)}. (vi) Misconstruction of evidence or document {See Sundra Naicka Vadiyar v. Ramaswami Ayyar [ AIR 1994 SC 532 ], and Sukhdei v. Bairo [ (1999)4 SCC 262 ]). (vii) Interpretation or construction of material documents {See Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra) and Mehrunnisa v. Visham Kumari [ (1998)2 SCC 295 ]); (viii) A question of admissibility of evidence {See Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra) and Banarsi Das v. Brig. Maharaja Sukhjit Singh and another [AIR 1998 SC 179]}; (ix) Disposal of appeal by first appellate Court by allowing application to adduce additional evidence by one party without giving opportunity of rebuttal to the other party; (x) New plea on pure question of law going to the root of the matter; (xi) Rejection of admissible evidence on flimsy ground {See Major Singh v. Rattan Singh [ AIR 1997 SC 1906 ], and Ishwar Dass Jain (supra)} ; (xii) Gross miscarriage of justice {See Rohini Prasad (supra) and Mohd. Yunus v. Gurubux Singh [1995 Supp.(1) SCC 418]}; (xiii) Biased approach of the Courts below [See Banarasi Dass (supra)]; (xiv) Reversal of finding by first appellate Court without evidence [See Mehrunnisa (supra)]; (xv) Perverse finding recorded by the Courts below {See State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh {[ (2000)5 SCC 652 ]; and Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji SV. Mahadev Chiannabasappa and others [ (2000)6 SCC 120 ]); (xvi) Inconsistent and contradictory finding of the Court [See Harphool Singh (supra)]; (xvii) When appeal is decided only on equitable ground and without application of mind {See Md. Mahadev Chiannabasappa and others [ (2000)6 SCC 120 ]); (xvi) Inconsistent and contradictory finding of the Court [See Harphool Singh (supra)]; (xvii) When appeal is decided only on equitable ground and without application of mind {See Md. Hadi Hussain v. Abdul Hamidi Choudhary and others [ (2000) 10 SCC 248 ]}; (xviii) When the Court has no jurisdiction [See Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)]. 18. Similarly following are some instances which cannot be said to be the substantial question of law: (i) Where question has already been decided by Privy Council, Federal Court, Supreme Court or even by larger Bench of the High Court {See Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)]. (ii) Concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below or correct appreciation of evidence. {See M. Nadar Kesavan Nadar v. Narayanan Nadar Kunjan Nadar [ (2000) 10 SCC 244 ] and Mohd. Abdul Muqtedar v. Shaikh Fakruddin and others [ (2000)9 SCC 384 ]}; (iii) The Finding of fact recorded by first appellate Court on cogent evidence and material or record. {See Smt. A.N. Kapoor v. Shrimati and Guro v. Atma Singh and others [ (1992)2 SCC 507 ]}; (iv) Where an facts and evidence two views are possible. [See Kondiba Dagadu Kadam (supra)];• (v) When new case is sought to be made in second appeal not going to the root of the matter. {See Babu Ram v. Indra Pal Singh [ (1998)6 SCC 358 ] and K. Chelliah Servai Y.P. Muthusami Servai [[1995 Supp.(l) SCC 202]}; (vi) When new plea is raised which is either based on fact or on mixed question of law and fact. {See Shankarlal Narayandas Mundade v. The New Mofussil Co. Ltd. and others [AIR 1946 PC 97] and Smt. Chander Kali Bail and others v. Jagdish Singh Thakur and another [ AIR 1977 SC 2262 ]}; (vii) When question sought to be raised is too general and omnibus in nature; or is a mere question of law. {See K. C. Mathew & Sons and another v. A. Sulaikha Beevi and others [ (2000)9 SCC 276 ]}; (viii) Where inference as to finding of fact has been drawn on the basis of evidence and material on record. {See Thimmaiah and others v. Ningamma and another [ (2000)7 SCC 409 ]}; (ix) Whether the finding of fact has been attacked on ground that it is erroneous or even grossly erroenous. {See Thimmaiah and others v. Ningamma and another [ (2000)7 SCC 409 ]}; (ix) Whether the finding of fact has been attacked on ground that it is erroneous or even grossly erroenous. [See Ramchandra Ayyar and another (supra) and Baidyanath Bhattacharya and others]; (x) Where High Court feels that the reasoning given by first appellate Court was not proper. {See Arumugham v. Sundarmbal and another [ (1999)4 SCC 350 ]}. 19. Apart from the above said illustrations that what are the substantial questions of law and what are not under section 103, CPC the legislature has given power to this Court while hearing a second appeal to determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal : (a) which has not been determined by the lower appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower appellate Court; or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in section 100, CPC. Thus, it is clear on bare perusal of section 103, CPC that this section appears to be proviso and explanation to section 100 and empowers the High Court to determine any issue on two contingencies : (i) When determination of such issue is necessary for the disposal of the appeal and the evidence on record is sufficient and yet it has not been decided either by the trial Court or by the lower appellate Court or by both the Courts; or (ii) When an issue has been wrongly determined either by the trial Court or by the lower appellate Court or by both the Courts by reason of a decision on substantial question of law. 20. In the present case, no case has been made out even to exercise powers conferred to this Court by legislature under section 103, CPC and, therefore, those powers also cannot be exercised. In the instant case the issues have been rightly determined and there is no such issue the determination of which has not been decided "either by the trial Court or by the first appellate Court. 21. No perversity or illegality has been pointed in the impugned judgment and decree. No substantial question of law is involved in this second appeal and the same is hereby dismissed summarily.