ORDER T.R. Ramachandran Nair, J. 1. The petitioner herein is the tenant. The landlord sought eviction under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'the Act'). The trial court allowed the petition, which has been confirmed by the Appellate Authority, against which the present revision petition is filed. 2. The bona fide need put forth by the landlord is for starting electrical business for his son. His son is an unemployed graduate. It was alleged that the petition schedule room was let out as per rent deed dated 11-4-1997 on a monthly rent of Rs.1,500. The tenant resisted the same contending that the need put forth is not genuine. It was also urged that the tenancy started more than 70 years back under the erstwhile landlord. The tenant is conducting a vegetable shop in the premises and the initial rent was Rs.4 per month, which was revised subsequently. The tenant further contended that after the purchase of the building by the landlord in the year 1994, he approached the tenant expressing his desire to reconstruct the building into a two storied one. The tenant was offered space for his occupation, after reconstruction. Accordingly, an agreement was executed and he was put in possession of two rooms numbered as 1835 and 1836, which were allowed to be occupied till the reconstruction was completed. The number of the old room occupied by him was C.C.29/1834 which was surrendered for the purpose of reconstruction. After the reconstruction was over, he was allotted room Nos. 1833 A and 1833 B for which separate rent deeds have been executed. It was represented to him that going by the plan, this is the area originally occupied by him. Since the area covered by the two rooms agreed to be given to him was almost equal to the area originally occupied by him, the tenant agreed for executing the two rent deeds. It is further submitted that in view of the agreement executed, the tenancy continues and hence the tenant is entitled to get the protection under Section 11(17) of the Act. 3. On the side of the landlord, P.Ws. 1 to 3 were examined and Exts.A-1 to A-26 were marked. The petitioner examined R.W. 1 and marked Exts.B-1 to B-33. Exts.C-1 and C-2 are the reports of Commissioner. 4. 3. On the side of the landlord, P.Ws. 1 to 3 were examined and Exts.A-1 to A-26 were marked. The petitioner examined R.W. 1 and marked Exts.B-1 to B-33. Exts.C-1 and C-2 are the reports of Commissioner. 4. The two rent deeds executed by the tenant are Exts.A-1 and A-6, Ext.A-1 with respect to the petition schedule property (1833 B) and Ext.A-6 is in respect of room No.1833 A which is situated adjacent to the petition schedule room. Ext.A-9 is the agreement earlier executed at the time of surrender of room No. 1834. 5. Both the courts below concurrently found that the landlord has established bona fide need under Section 11(3). It was found that the son who was examined as P.W.2, had completed graduation and he was having no separate job or source of income. The tenant, when examined as R.W.1, also admitted these facts. Even though the tenant raised a contention that there was another room available with the landlord in the upstairs portion which was rented out to another tenant, the said plea was found against by the Rent Control Court as well as by the Appellate Authority. It was found that the landlord has been conducting hotel business there. This view was taken after referring to the reports of the Commissioner marked as Exts. C-1 and C-2 and the evidence of the Commissioner who was examined as P.W.3. Thus, the objections raised by the tenant against the ground under Section 11(3) of the Act were rejected by the authorities below, after analysing the evidence and by relying upon the reports of the Commissioner. 6. The main point that is urged before us is regarding the protection under Section 11(17) of the Act. Thus, the objections raised by the tenant against the ground under Section 11(3) of the Act were rejected by the authorities below, after analysing the evidence and by relying upon the reports of the Commissioner. 6. The main point that is urged before us is regarding the protection under Section 11(17) of the Act. The said provision is extracted below: Notwithstanding anything contained in this section a tenant who has been in continuous occupation of a building from 1st April, 1940 as a tenant, shall not be liable to be evicted for bona fide occupation of the landlord or of the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him, provided that a landlord of a residential building shall be entitled to evict such a tenant of that building if the landlord has been living in a place outside the city, town or village in which the building is situated for a period of not less than five years before he makes an application to the Rent Control Court for being put in possession of the building, and requires the building bona fide for his own permanent residence or for the permanent residence of any member of his family or the landlord is in dire need of a place for residence and has none of his own.�. True, it confers benefit to the tenant if he is in possession of the building before 1940. The crucial question is whether there is any evidence to show that the tenant herein is in possession of the room prior to 1940 and whether he is in possession of the very same room for enabling him to claim the benefit of the provision. The courts below have relied upon the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in P.M. Narayanan v. P.K. Shalima 2003 (1) K.L.J. 771 , wherein it was held that Section 11(17) of the Act confers only a personal privilege and protection to the tenants who were in possession as on 1st April, 1940 and not to their legal heirs. The said view has been reiterated by a Larger Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Prabhakaran v. Sulaikabi 2007 (2) K.L.T. 103 (F.B.). 7. In the light of the above legal position, the evidence herein has to be analysed. The said view has been reiterated by a Larger Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Prabhakaran v. Sulaikabi 2007 (2) K.L.T. 103 (F.B.). 7. In the light of the above legal position, the evidence herein has to be analysed. Shri V. R. Venkitakrishnan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the landlord is bound by the terms of Ext. A-9, Whereby room No. 1834 was sought to be surrendered for the purpose of reconstruction of the building, in which there was a specific condition that the tenant will be given the same space. Therefore, learned Senior Counsel argued that the tenancy is one, which is in continuation of the earlier one. It is also submitted that the landlord has committed fraud on the tenant by persuading to execute Exts.A-1 and A-6, two rent deeds, that too showing different room numbers, viz. 1833 A and 1833 B. According to the learned counsel, since in Ext. A-9 already the landlord had agreed to provide the very same space, the execution of the two rent deeds, that too providing two different door numbers, is not at all fatal to the contentions raised by the tenant The learned Senior Counsel therefore contended that the right of the tenant that is agreed to by the landlord as per Ext.A-9, cannot be allowed to be defeated. 8. We may refer to the findings rendered by the authorities below on this aspect, before considering the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Rent Control Court considered this question in paragraph 7. The court observed that Ext. A-9 is of the year 1996 and going by the statement therein that the building was entrusted to the tenant 65 years back, the entrustment of the old room should have been in 1931. Ext. A-9 also shows that the entrustment of the new room to be constructed will be in continuation of the old tenancy and therefore, the Rent Control Court concluded that legally it has to be held that entrustment of the petition schedule property is in continuation of the old tenancy. Ext. A-9 also shows that the entrustment of the new room to be constructed will be in continuation of the old tenancy and therefore, the Rent Control Court concluded that legally it has to be held that entrustment of the petition schedule property is in continuation of the old tenancy. But ultimately, the said court was of the view that the tenant could not prove that the area covered by the petition schedule premises is the same area occupied by the tenant in the previously occupied room and in the absence of independent evidence, it is not possible to hold that the tenant is entitled for the benefit of the protection contained under Section 11(17) of the Act. 9. The Appellate Authority examined the question in detail. It was held relying upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in P.M. Narayanan v. P. K. Shalima 2003 (1) K.L.J. 771 , that Section 11(17) of the Act confers only a personal privilege and protection to the tenants who were in possession as on 1st April, 1940 and not to the legal heirs. After referring to the various clauses in Ext. A-9, it was held that the room given to the tenant pursuant to Ext. A-9 agreement is room No.1833A and not the petition schedule room, i.e. 1833B and if at all the protection of Section 11(17) of the Act will be available, it is only to room No.1833A and not to the petition schedule room 1833B. It was observed that there is no acceptable evidence to show that the area occupied by the tenant in the earlier building is the same as the area occupied by the petition schedule room and room No.1833A and so, in fact it was these two rooms that were given to the tenant as per Ext. A-9 agreement. It was also found that the rent deed Ext. A-9 rules out the possibility of the petition schedule room also being given to the tenant, as in continuation of the old lease. The Appellate Authority was of the further view that once the building is destroyed, the tenancy comes to an end. 10. It is true that in Ext. A-9 it is clearly stated that room No. 1834 is in the possession of the tenant for the last 65 years. The Appellate Authority was of the further view that once the building is destroyed, the tenancy comes to an end. 10. It is true that in Ext. A-9 it is clearly stated that room No. 1834 is in the possession of the tenant for the last 65 years. There is also a recital that after its reconstruction the landlord will entrust the same room to the tenant in continuation of the tenancy arrangement and till the reconstruction is over, the rooms 1835 and 1836 will be made available for the purpose of the tenant. Ext. A-1 is the rent deed in respect of the petition schedule room. Therein, there is nothing to show that it is in continuation of the earlier tenancy relating to the room 1834. This is so, in the case of Ext. A-6 also. 11. It is admitted by the tenant in his evidence that his father died in the year 1947. Therefore, admittedly he was only of the age 19 at the time of the death of the father, as going by the age recorded when he was examined his age is 74. Going by the decision of this Court in Prabhakaran v. Sulaikabi, heirs of a tenant, who was in occupation of the building from 1-4-1940 and has been in continuous occupation of the same till his death, are not entitled to the protection under Section 11(7) of the Act from being evicted on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord. The relevant findings are extracted below: A reading of the various provisions of the Act shows that a tenant includes a contractual tenant and a statutory tenant. The heirs of a statutory tenant are also entitled to inherit all rights of the tenant. But to claim protection under Section 11(17) of the Rent Act, it must be shown that the tenant came into occupation of the building as a tenant prior to 1940 and he has been in continuous occupation since then. If the tenancy started long prior to 1940 and if the original tenant died prior to 1940, his heirs who came into occupation of the building prior to 1940 are also entitled to claim protection provided they satisfy the other requirements of the sub-section. There is no question of giving any restricted meaning to the word 'tenant'. If the tenancy started long prior to 1940 and if the original tenant died prior to 1940, his heirs who came into occupation of the building prior to 1940 are also entitled to claim protection provided they satisfy the other requirements of the sub-section. There is no question of giving any restricted meaning to the word 'tenant'. If the person occupied a rented building as a tenant as defined in the Rent Act prior to the cut off date and he has been in continuous occupation of the same, he is entitled to claim privilege conferred on him under Section 11(17) of the Rent Act. But the protection provided under Sec. 11(17) is a personal privilege available to the tenant who came into occupation of the building on 1-4-1940 and has been in continuous occupation of the same. The question of inheritance is not decided in accordance with the provisions of Rent Act. The Rent Act does not create any new rule regarding succession of the estate of the deceased tenant. It is governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and by the personal law applicable to parties. If on the date of death of a tenant, he had a right or estate in the tenancy, that right will be inherited by his heirs irrespective of the date of death. Whether the tenant dies before or after 1965 will not make any difference. But if it is a personal privilege, it will come to an end by the death of a person who was in occupation as a tenant from 1-4-1940. The benefit conferred on a tenant under Sec. 11(17) of the Rent Act is a personal right or benefit conferred on a tenant and not a right. If the tenant who came into occupation prior to 1940 dies after that date his heirs will not inherit the benefits conferred on the deceased tenant under Sec.11(17) of the Rent Act.� (Paragraphs 127 and 128) Therefore, the crucial question is whether the tenant herein was occupying the premises by himself on the crucial date namely, 1-4-1940. He himself has stated in his chief examination that his father died in the year 1947. It is also stated that he continued the business after the death of his father. So, it is clear that as on 1-4-1940 his father was the tenant. He himself has stated in his chief examination that his father died in the year 1947. It is also stated that he continued the business after the death of his father. So, it is clear that as on 1-4-1940 his father was the tenant. In the light of the dictum laid down by the Full Bench in Prabhakaran v. Sulaikabi 2007 (2) K.L.T. 103 (F.B.) (supra), the petitioner being a legal heir of the father is not entitled to protection under Sec. 11(17) of the Act. The privilege for non-eviction is only on the tenant who was occupying the premises as on 1-4-1940. In view of the above legal position the contention raised by the petitioner that the landlord should be compelled to adhere the terms of Ex-9is not sustainable and we reject the plea raised by the petitioner claiming the benefit of Sec. 11(17) of the Act. 12. The learned Senior Counsel contended that the said right engrossed in Ext. A-9 of the tenant cannot be denied. We find that the right, if any, flowing from Ext. A-9 is only subject to the requirements of Sec. 11(17) of the Act. The said condition in Ext. A-9 will have to conform to the stipulations contained in the statute, especially in view of the fact that the tenant herein is relying upon the said provision to seek protection. Therefore, the said contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel also cannot be accepted. The learned Senior Counsel for the landlord Sri O.V. Radhakrishnan submitted that Ext. A-1 is the rent deed in respect of Room No.1833 B. The landlord has sought eviction of the petitioner from the said room. It was also urged that going by the decision of the Full Bench reported in Prabhakaran v. Sulaikabi 2007 (2) K.L.T. 103 (F.B.), the petitioner herein who admittedly continued the business only on the death of his father will not be entitled for the privilege under the protection of Sec. 11(17) of the Act. The learned Senior Counsel further explained that Exts. A-1 and A-6 were executed after the reconstruction of the building-and no fraud has been committed by the landlord by insisting on the tenant to execute the two documents namely, Exts. A-1 and A-6. In the light of the conclusions we have already arrived at, the tenant is not entitled for the privilege of protection under Sec. 11(17) of the Act. A-1 and A-6. In the light of the conclusions we have already arrived at, the tenant is not entitled for the privilege of protection under Sec. 11(17) of the Act. 13. The room originally occupied by the tenant was room No.1834. According to him, after reconstruction the said room was divided into two and numbered as 1833A and 1833B and in relation to those rooms Exts. A-1 and A-6 were got executed by him. Therefore, for both the rooms, he is entitled to get continuity for his tenancy from a date earlier to 1-4-1940, it is submitted. So, he is entitled to get the protection of Section 11(17) in relation to both the rooms. Even if the said contention is correct, in view of the larger Bench decision in Prabhakaran v. Sulaikabi (supra), the petitioner being only a legal heir of the original tenant, is not entitled to get the protection of Section 11(17). There was some arguments at the Bar concerning the point whether after reconstruction, the tenant is entitled to get the very same space occupied by him before reconstruction. For many old buildings, there is no open space between the building and the public road in front of it. Their courtyard is the road. When reconstruction is made, it is mandatory to leave open space in fit of the building, in view of the provisions of the Building Rules. Further, in some cases, the entire ground floor may be left for car parking. So, it is impossible to get the very same space occupied earlier, after reconstruction. In such cases, the reasonable construction which should be placed on the provision may be that the tenant is entitled to get the area equal to that occupied by him in the old building. So, a tenant may get protection under Section 11(17) to the extent of the area occupied by him in the old building. But, in this case, as found earlier, for the entire area, the protection is not available, as the present tenant is only a legal heir of the original tenant. 14. As regards the findings rendered by the Rent Control Court and by the Appellate Authority under Sec. 11(3), no arguments have been raised disputing the correctness of them. The room in question is required for the unemployed son of the landlord for starting a business in electrical goods. 14. As regards the findings rendered by the Rent Control Court and by the Appellate Authority under Sec. 11(3), no arguments have been raised disputing the correctness of them. The room in question is required for the unemployed son of the landlord for starting a business in electrical goods. Both the courts found that the need projected is a bona fide and genuine need. The other contention that the landlord was having a vacant room was also rejected by the Appellate Authority as well as by the Rent Control Court. There are no reasons to disturb the above findings. The authorities have examined the question in detail in the light of the facts and evidence in the case and the view taken is a plausible one. It cannot be said that the said finding on the bona fide need is vitiated by any other circumstances. Therefore, we confirm the judgment of the Rent Control Appellate Authority and dismiss the Rent Control Revision Petition. The petitioner is granted six months time to vacate the premises on his filing an unconditional undertaking in the form of an affidavit before the execution court/rent control court within three weeks from today undertaking to vacate the premises within six months from today. Arrears of rent, if any, shall also be deposited within one month from today and the monthly rent from time to time shall also be paid to the landlord till the room is vacated.