Judgment I.P.Singh, J. 1. This appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (Act II of 1974) (in short the Code) is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 18.11.1992 passed by Shri A.K. Verma, 6th Add). District & Sessions Judge, Arrah in S.T. No. 27 of 1987 convicting the appellant nos.3 and 5 under Sec.324 of the Indian Penal Code and the rest under Sections 324/149 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years each. 2. The prosecution case, in short, is that on 16.6.1986 at about noon the informant Ramayan Choudhary (P.W.1) was at his house alongwith his mother Panmato Devi (P.W.5). In the meantime, the appellants named above variously armed with lathi and Bhalas entered into the house of P.W.1. Appellant no.1, Rang Lal Choudhary (since deceased) ordered other appellants to kill P.W.5. On this appellant, Ramakant choudhary gave a Bhala blow to him, appellant Tipan Choudhary assaulted him with lathi. When his mother Panmato Devi (P.W.5) came to save him, appellant Ranglal Choudhary (since deceased) ordered to assault her on which appellant, Radha Mohan Choudhary gave a Bhala blow to her. Appellants, Banga and Butu Choudhary also assaulted her with lathis. In the meantime, P.W.4, Ram Awadh Choudhary younger brother of the informant came there and appellant Tipan Choudhary also assaulted him with lathi. Ram Ishwar Choudhary another brother of P.W.1 came there and he was assaulted by the appellants. On hullah people collected there and appellants fled away. The Fardbeyan (Ext.2) of the informant (P.W.1) was recorded at 4 P.M. on 16.6.86 by A.S.I. of PPolice, S.S. Rajak at Udwantnagar Hospital. The police after completing the investigation submitted charge sheet. The case was committed to the court of session in which the appellants have been convicted in the manner indicated above. 3. In this appeal the appellants have contended that the prosecution case is false and no such occurrence as alleged by the prosecution had taken place. P.Ws. examined in this case are not the eye witnesses of the alleged occurrence. The prosecution evidence suffers from material contradictions. The doctor and C.O. have not deen examined in this case No blood was found at the alleged place of occurrence. P.Ws. examined in this case are not the eye witnesses of the alleged occurrence. The prosecution evidence suffers from material contradictions. The doctor and C.O. have not deen examined in this case No blood was found at the alleged place of occurrence. On these grounds amongst others, it has been contended that this appeal be allowed and the judgment of conviction of the learned court below be set aside. 4. The parties have been heard at length on the various points raised in this appeal. So far as the merits of this case are concerned the I.O. has not been examined and the contradictions in the evidence of P.Ws. could not be taken. The Medical Officer who examined the informant has also not been examined. So far as the Fardbeyan (Ext.2) is concerned according to P.W.6 it was recorded by Sheo Shanker Rajak, A.S.I, of Police. He has also not been examined. The formal F.I.R. (Ext.3) has been proved by P.W.6 who was not present at the time when it was recorded. So far as P.W.1 is concerned it is clear that Exhibit 2 is not in his writing. So far as P.W.2 is concerned, according to F.I.R. he reached the alleged place of occurrence after the assault. P.W.3 has stated that when he reached there he saw the accused persons fleeing away. Even the trial court has disbelieved him. From all these it would appear that the prosecution case suffers from a number of defects and it could not have ended in the conviction of the appellants. On this ground alone the appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt and acquittal. 5. It, however, appears that on 20.3.2007 a compromise petition under Sec.320(2) of the Code has been filed on behalf of the parties stating therein that permission may be granted to them to compound this case inasmuch as the offences for which the appellants have been convicted are compoundable with the permission of the court. 6. As against it on behalf of the State it has been submitted that the offence under Sec.324 of the Indian Penal Code is no longer compoundable since by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act 2005 (Act 25 of 2005) sub section (2) of sec. 320 has been amended so as to remove the entry with respect to sec. 324 of the Indian Penal Code from this table. 320 has been amended so as to remove the entry with respect to sec. 324 of the Indian Penal Code from this table. On this basis it has been contended that the offence under Sec.324 of the Indian Penal Code is no longer compoundable and, therefore, this compromise petition can not be allowed. It may be mentioned in this connection that this amendment by Act 25 of 2005 came into force on 23.6.2005. There is nothing in this amendment to show that it was made retrospective. It is well known that all the acts are prospective unless shown otherwise. Since there is nothing in this Act to show that it was made retrospective, it is clear that it will have only prospective effect. In this connection it may be mentioned that the alleged occurrence had taken place on 16.6.1986 and the charge sheet in this case was filed on 15.8.1986. The judgment passed by trial court was delivered by the learned court below on 18.11.1992. it is against this judgment that the present appeal is pending. It is well settled in law that an appeal is a continuation of original proceeding. In this connection a reference may be made to the case of Gariapati Veeraya vs. N. Subbiah Choudhary and others (A.I.R. 1957 S.C 540). In this case the right of appeal against the judgment passed in civil suit was under consideration. The Hon ble Supreme Court has held that the institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. The right to appeal to the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the LIS commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced. The Hon ble Supreme Court has further held that this right can only be taken away by the subsequent enactment providing so expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. 7. Though in this case right of appeal against the judgment passed in a civil suit was under consideration before the Hon ble Supreme Court the principle of law has been properly laid in it by saying that the right to enter the superior court in appeal exists as on and from the date the LIS commenced. 7. Though in this case right of appeal against the judgment passed in a civil suit was under consideration before the Hon ble Supreme Court the principle of law has been properly laid in it by saying that the right to enter the superior court in appeal exists as on and from the date the LIS commenced. In the present case the LIS commenced on 16.6.1986 the alleged date of occurrence, therefore, the law as existing on the said date will prevail. This can be explained by an example. Suppose a person plants a mango sapling in the field. That sapling will grow and will have the branch of a mango tree and also will bear the mango fruit. By any amendment it can not be made a Guava tree or made to bear a Guava fruit. Therefore, the LIS existing on the alleged date of occurrence confers the various rights including the right to appeal as existing on that date and it can not be altered subsequently by any enactment unless that enactment shows that it is being made retrospective. As noticed above in the present case this amendment (Act 25 of 2005) has not been made retrospective. Therefore, the net result would be that the old law will continue to remain in force by which the offence under Sec.324 of the Indian Penal Code was compoundable with the permission of the court. 8. In this connection a reference may also be made to the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Radha Devi vs. Mani Prasad Singh & Anr. ( 1978 BBCJ 626 ) (F.B). In this case a proceeding under Section 145 under Old Code was pending when New Code came into force with effect from 1.4.1974. it was held by the Full Bench that the proceeding will continue under the Old Code notwithstanding coming into force of the New Code. From this it would appear that if a proceeding or case is pending from before the coming into force of an amendment the same will continue under the procedure prescribed by the old law except in such cases in which the amendment has been retrospective. 9. From this it would appear that if a proceeding or case is pending from before the coming into force of an amendment the same will continue under the procedure prescribed by the old law except in such cases in which the amendment has been retrospective. 9. Further a reference may also be made in this connection to a Division Bench decision of the Hon ble Calcutta High Court in the case of Gopal Chandra Pal and others vs. State of West Bengal (1983 Cri.L.J. 1540). This was a case under the Essential Commodities Act which was amended by Essential Commodities (Special Provision) Act, 1981. This amendment had come into force on 1.9.1982. Before this amendment the District Judge was the appellate authority against the orders of confiscation passed under the Essential Commodities Act. By this amendment the District Magistrate was made appellate authority with effect from 1.9.1982. It was held by a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court that notwithstanding this amendment coming into force on 1.9.1984 in the cases pending on this date from before the District Judge will still continue to be the appellate authority and not the District Magistrate. From this it would appear that earlier law which was prevailing at the time of the alleged occurrence will prevail over the amended law unless shown otherwise. 10. In this connection a reference may also be made to the case of Lallan Singh vs. State of U.P. and another (2002 Cri. L.J. 1242) (S.C.) In this case the definition of Juvenile in sec. 2(h) of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 and sec. 2(K) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (which came into force on 1.4.2001) was under consideration. The Hon ble Supreme Court while interpreting sec. 20 of the Act of 2000 has observed as follows: "The wording of the above section are clear enough to show that if any proceeding is pending, on the date of enforcement of the new Act, that proceeding shall be concluded under the provisions of old Act." No doubt expressed provision in this regard has been made in sec. 20 itself. However, the Hon ble Supreme Court was clearfying the obvious position of law on the subject by making this observation noted above. 20 itself. However, the Hon ble Supreme Court was clearfying the obvious position of law on the subject by making this observation noted above. Similary the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka vs. K.h. Annegowda and another (A.I.R 1977 S.C.357) while interpreting the provision of section 484 (2)(a) of the Code has held that the trial pending herein at the time when the New Act (Code) (1.4.1974) came into force shall be continued under the provision of old Code of 1898 as if the New Code of 1974 has not come into force. No doubt in sec. 484(2) (a) of the Code the provision in this regard has been made on behalf of the appellants it has been submitted that what the Hon ble Supreme Court has held in the above noted two cases was the obvious namely that all the laws are prospective and unless expressly provided they can not be made retrospective. 11 From the detailed discussions made above it becomes perfectly clear to me that this amendment by Act 25 of 2005 with respect to section 324 of the Indian Penal Code can not be made retrospective. This will mean that the Old Law on this point will still continue to apply to the present case namely that the offence under Sec.324 of the Indian Penal Code will continue to be compoundable with the permission of the court. These discussions will show that this case will be governed by the Old Law under which sec. 324 of the Indian Penal Code was compoundable and not by the New Law by which it has been made non compoundable. 12. From the detailed discussions made above it becomes perfectly clear that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubts and this appeal is fit to be allowed. Under the facts and circumstances of this case the leave to compound this offence under Sections 324 and 324/149 of the Indian penal Code is granted and the appellants are acquitted under Sec.320(8) of the Code of the charges framed against them. 13. In the result this appeal is allowed and judgment of conviction of the learned court below is set aside. The appellants are directed to be set at liberty High Court Patna.