ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) RESPONDENT/writ petitioner was an employee of the appellant. He was a habitual absentee. In 1983 he was absent for 53 days, in 1985 for 30 days, in 1987 for 58 days (in two phases), in 1988 for 92 days and in 1989 for 72 days. Each time he assured the authority that he would not repeat this in future. Such assurance was performed in breach. Even then the authority condoned the absence and granted extraordinary leave of absence. For the unauthorised absence in later part of 1989, the authority issued a chargesheet after being satisfied that such gross indiscipline must be proceeded with. This time he was absent for 240 days during the period November, 1989 to October, 1990. He was proceeded with departmentally. The Enquiry Officer found him guilty. Ultimately the disciplinary authority imposed a punishment of dismissal from service. Before the order of dismissal was passed the delinquent was given adequate opportunity to defend himself in the proceeding. He approached the learned Single Judge against the order of dismissal. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition by quashing the order of dismissal coupled with a direction to reinstate him in service along with all back wages. Hence this appeal by the appellant. ( 2 ) ALTHOUGH several grounds were taken before His Lordship, His Lordship set aside the order of dismissal mainly on the ground of absence of provision for appeal. His Lordship held that since the appellate authority acted as a disciplinary authority the delinquent lost the opportunity to prefer appeal. Hence, on that ground alone the order of dismissal could not be sustained. Another issue highlighted by the learned Judge was non-furnishing copy of the enquiry report at the appropriate stage. The copy of the enquiry report had been furnished admittedly before the final order of dismissal was passed. His lordship was, however, of the opinion that since the copy of the enquiry report was sent while proposing the punishment the disciplinary authority not only formed a tentative decision in respect of the finding of charge but also proposed a punishment which depicted its firm conclusion on the finding of the charges. These two issues really prompted the learned Judge to quash the order of the disciplinary authority as we find on a plain reading of the judgment. CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT: ( 3 ) MR. These two issues really prompted the learned Judge to quash the order of the disciplinary authority as we find on a plain reading of the judgment. CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT: ( 3 ) MR. Kalyan Bandopadhyay, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that although several grounds were urged before His Lordship since his Lordship's judgment was based upon the above two issues he wanted to restrict his argument on the same. On the issue of enquiry report Mr. Bandopadhyay cited the three Apex Court decisions reported in 1993 (4) SCC page 727 (Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. vs. B. Karunakar and ors.); 2006 (4) SCC page 348 (A Sudhakar vs. Postmaster General, Hyderabad and Anr.); 2006 (8) SCC page 776 (P. D. Agarwal vs. State Bank of India and Ors. ). ( 4 ) CITING the aforesaid three decisions Mr. Bandopadhyay contended merely because the copy of the enquiry report was not furnished at the appropriate stage it would not ex facie make the entire proceeding bad in law unless the delinquent established that such non-furnishing at the appropriate stage had prejudiced him and deprived him of his right to defend the proceeding. On the issue of appeal Mr. Bandopadhyay that there was no disciplinary rule prevalent at that time applicable in the instant case. Hence, the appellant followed the cca Rules applicable to the State Government Employees. The CCA Rules did provide for provision for appeal. However, in the instant case the President of the Board acted as the disciplinary authority before passing of the final order. He got it approved through the Council of which he was a part. By that process the final order of punishment was approved at the highest level. Hence, it was not possible for the appellant to provide him an opportunity for appeal. This could not, in any event, per se vitiate the proceeding or the final order passed thereunder. ( 5 ) MR. Bandopadhyay further contended that the delinquent was a habitual absentee. Each and every time on his assurance that it would not be repeated the management condoned the absence by granting special leave. In the instant case he was absent for 240 days. Hence, the authority had no other option but to proceed against him departmentally. He was duly afforded an opportunity to defend himself in the proceeding. He did not participate in the disciplinary proceeding. In the instant case he was absent for 240 days. Hence, the authority had no other option but to proceed against him departmentally. He was duly afforded an opportunity to defend himself in the proceeding. He did not participate in the disciplinary proceeding. At one stage he sent his wife to pray for adjournment. He was not at all serious to defend the said proceeding. Even then the authority conducted a regular disciplinary proceedings after giving him all opportunities to defend. The Enquiry Officer found him guilty. The copy of the enquiry report was given to him prior to passing of the final order. Ultimately the final order was passed by the Council. Considering the sum total of the events it could not be said that the proceeding was vitiated by illegality. ( 6 ) MR. Bandopadhyay in support of his contention on the habitual absenteeism relied on two Apex Court decisions reported in 2006 (2) SCC Page 269 (L. K. Verma vs. H. M. T. Limited and Anr.) and 2006 (7) SCC Page 410 (General manager, Appellate Authority, Bank of India and Anr. vs. Mohd. Nizamuddin ). CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: ( 7 ) MR. Milan Bhattacharjee, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/ writ petitioner while opposing the appeal contended that the respondent was not given adequate opportunity to defend himself in the said proceeding. His written statement, was not accepted on the ground of delay. The authority was all throughout bias as against the respondent/writ petitioner. Earlier absences were excused after considering the explanation offered by the respondent/writ petitioner. Hence, those could not be brought to consider the alleged offence for which he was chargesheeted. ( 8 ) ON the issue of bias Mr. Bhattacharjee cited three decisions reported in air 2001 SC page 343 (State Batik of Punjab vs. V. K. Khanna and Ors.); 2002 (2)Service Law Reporter page 266 (Sanjoy Kumar Singh vs. Union of India and ors.) and 2003 (2) Service Law Reporter page 426 (Suresh Chomdhury vs. Union of India and Ors. ). ( 9 ) MR. Bhattacharjee further contended that dismissal was a major punishment under the CCA Rules. Once the CCA Rules were adopted by the appellant they must follow the same in its true spirit. Under the CCA Rules absence was not a major offence for which major punishment of dismissal from service could be imposed. ). ( 9 ) MR. Bhattacharjee further contended that dismissal was a major punishment under the CCA Rules. Once the CCA Rules were adopted by the appellant they must follow the same in its true spirit. Under the CCA Rules absence was not a major offence for which major punishment of dismissal from service could be imposed. ( 10 ) WHILE elaborating his argument on bias Mr. Bhattacharjee contended that the Enquiry Officer was appointed before issuance of the chargesheet. The respondent/writ petitioner was a Hindi speaking person. He was not so literate to contest the proceeding which was being held by the high rank officers of the Council. Hence, the proceeding was nothing but a mockery of adherence of principles of natural justice. Mr. Bhattacharjee further contended that the respondent/writ petitioner was a Class-IV staff and his service was not so indispensable that such absence could not be condoned. He lastly contended that the punishment was harsh and should shock the conscience of the Court. ( 11 ) IN support of his contention on merits Mr. Bhattacharjee cited the following decisions: (i) 1991 (1) CLJ Page 291 (Binayak Dutta vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.) (ii) Managing Director ECIL vs. B. Karunakar (Supra) (iii) AIR 1994 SC page 215 (Union of India and Ors. vs. Giriraj Sharma) (iv) AIR 1999 SC page 3367 (Syed Zaheer Hussain vs. Union of India and ors.) (v) AIR 2000 SC page 1151 (U. P. State Road Transport Corporation and Ors. vs. Mahesh Kr. Mishra and Ors.) (vi) 2001 (2) SCC Page 386 (Om Kumar and Ors. vs. Union of India) (vii) 2006 (5) SCC Page 88 (M. V. Bijalani vs. Union of India and Ors.) ( 12 ) WHILE distinguishing the precedents cited by Mr. Bandopadhyay, Mr. Bhattacharjee contended that the Apex Court decisions on the issue of absence could easily be distinguished on facts as those cases related to high officials discharging emergency duties whereas the respondent/writ petitioner was acting as a Class-IV staff in the Council. ( 13 ) ON the judgments cited by Mr. Bandopadhyay with regard to the enquiry report Mr. Bhattacharjee dealt with each and every cases on facts and contended that the charges involved therein were grave in nature and could not be equated with unauthorised absence. CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT IN REPLY: ( 14 ) MR. ( 13 ) ON the judgments cited by Mr. Bandopadhyay with regard to the enquiry report Mr. Bhattacharjee dealt with each and every cases on facts and contended that the charges involved therein were grave in nature and could not be equated with unauthorised absence. CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT IN REPLY: ( 14 ) MR. Bandopadhyay in reply contended that since the judgment of the learned Single Judge was based upon two issues referred to above the other grounds not being urged before the learned Single Judge were not available to the respondent/writ petitioner to be brought before this Court in appeal filed by the appellant. No cross-objection was filed on behalf of the respondent on that score. Hence, they were not entitled to raise those issues not urged before his Lordship. Mr. Bandopadhyay further contended that the issue of bias was never argued before His Lordship. Therefore, such plea was not available to the respondent/writ petitioner in the appeal filed by the appellant and the decisions cited on that score could not be made applicable. On the issue of non-service of the enquiry report he reiterated his argument made earlier. On the appeal issue he drew our attention to section 22 of the West Bengal Council of higher Secondary Education Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act of 1975") and contended that under sub-section (3) the President had the power of general supervision and control over the Secretary and other officers and employees of the Council. He was also entitled to take such other action not inconsistent with the decision of the Council. In the instant case the President got the final decision taken by the Council before it could be implemented. Hence, it could not be said that the respondent/writ petitioner was prejudiced for alleged deprivation of opportunity of appeal. FURTHER CASES CITED: ( 15 ) PARTIES also cited the following decisions: (i) AIR 1993 SC page 1488 (Delhi Development Authority vs. H. C. Khurana) (ii) 1995 (2) SCC Page 474 (Surjit Ghosh vs. Chairman and Managing Director, united Commercial Bank and Ors.) (iii) 1997 (3) SCC Page 371 (Balbir Chand vs. FCI and Ors.) (iv) 2002 (2) SCC Page 290 (Amarnath Chowdhury vs. Braithwaite and Co. Ltd. and Ors.) (v) 2005 (6) SCC Page 321 (Canara Bank vs. V. K. Awasthy)OUR VIEWS: ( 16 ) WE have considered the rival contentions of the parties and the decisions cited at the bar. On perusal of the judgment impugned herein we find that two principal issues were discussed and dealt with by the learned Single Judge. Hence, we should restrict our judgment on that score. Other points, in our view, need not be gone into as the respondent/writ petitioner was not entitled to raise those issues at this belated stage without filing any cross-appeal or cross-objection on that score. ENQUIRY REPORT: ( 17 ) UNDER Article 311 of the Constitution of India prior to 1977 no civil servant could be dismissed from service or imposed any major punishment without affording him an opportunity to offer his views on the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him. Such right was done away within 1977 when it was made clear that it would not be necessary to give such a person any opportunity to make representation on the penalty proposed. Even after this amendment the Apex Court in the case of Ramjan Khan reported in 1991 (1) SCC page 588, observed that when an enquiry had been conducted by the Enquiry Officer appointed by an disciplinary authority before the disciplinary authority considered such report the delinquent was entitled to a copy of the same so that he could offer his views on the said enquiry report. The Apex Court was of the view that this would justify observance of principles of natural justice as guaranteed under the Constitution as a fundamental right. Such decision was clarified by the Apex Court subsequently in the case of Karunakar (supra) that merely non-furnishing of an enquiry report could not itself be a ground for quashing the proceeding or the final unless it was shown that such non-furnishing did cause prejudice to the delinquent. In the instant case the copy of the enquiry report had been served upon the delinquent before the final order was passed. Although not necessary, the disciplinary authority gave him a second show cause notice proposing the penalty and asking for his explanation. Along with the said notice dated December 13,1991 a copy of the enquiry report was also sent. In the instant case the copy of the enquiry report had been served upon the delinquent before the final order was passed. Although not necessary, the disciplinary authority gave him a second show cause notice proposing the penalty and asking for his explanation. Along with the said notice dated December 13,1991 a copy of the enquiry report was also sent. The delinquent by letter dated December 23, 1991 appearing at pages 78-80 offered his explanation on merit and did not make any grievance with regard to the belated supply of enquiry report. The delinquent, however, did not deal with the proposed punishment. He was given a further opportunity by the Council and by letter dated January 21, 1992 appearing at page 81 of the paper book the delinquent was informed that he would be at liberty to deal with the proposed punishment by showing valid reasons why he should not be terminated from service. The delinquent again replied on. January 27, 1992 by almost reiterating his stand taken in the earlier reply. He ultimately prayed for mercy. The Council thereafter considering his reply passed the final order after observing that no valid cause was shown. The decision of the Council was communicated to the delinquent by the Secretary vide letter dated February 14, 1992 appearing at page 84 of the paper book. We do not find any prejudice caused to the delinquent for belated furnishing of the enquiry report. PROVISION FOR APPEAL: ( 18 ) THE main principle to be followed in disciplinary proceedings as time to time observed by the Apex Court as well as High Courts, is to observe the principles of natural justice in its true letters and spirit. In the instant case admittedly there was no disciplinary rule prevalent at the material time. Hence, it could not be said that a final order passed by a disciplinary authority would per se be illegal in absence of any provision for appeal. Under the said Act of 1975, President is the supreme authority whose powers are guided by section 22. Such powers are to be controlled by the ultimate authority being the Council. Under section 22 the President being the highest authority was to act not inconsistent with the decision of the Council meaning thereby his each and every action must have explicit and /or implied approval of the Council. Such powers are to be controlled by the ultimate authority being the Council. Under section 22 the President being the highest authority was to act not inconsistent with the decision of the Council meaning thereby his each and every action must have explicit and /or implied approval of the Council. In the instant case the President issued the chargesheet. He appointed Enquiry Officer. However, he did not pass the final order without having it discussed in the council. Council is a body of persons. President is also a part of it. When the enquiry report was placed before the Council it must have been considered by each and every member of the Council. The Council decided to invite his views on the proposed punishment although not required in law. The Council also sent a copy of the enquiry report to him so that he could offer his comprehensive views. He submitted his views. It was considered by the Council. Council was not happy with the reasons disclosed. They intended to give one more opportunity to the delinquent and informed him accordingly. The delinquent thereafter submitted his second reply. The Council considered the second reply and thereafter passed the final order. If this be not the true observance of principles of natural justice we do not know what more it could be. CONCLUSION: ( 19 ) LAW has to be interpreted and applied by considering each and every aspect including the factual scenario. From the chronological events so discussed above it would appear that the delinquent was a habitual absentee. On each and every occasion the Council condoned his absence on the assurance of the delinquent that it would not be repeated in future. Each time such assurance was performed in breach. Hence, the Council had no other option but to proceed as against him departmentally. This time he was absent for 240 days (we cannot lose sight of this special fact ). He was given adequate opportunity to face the enquiry. He did not appear and sent his wife. Enquiry Officer after giving him appropriate opportunity held him guilty. Such report was placed before the council. The Council decided to invite the views of the delinquent not only on the enquiry report but also on the tentative finding of the Council. Accordingly, show-cause notice was given. He replied to the show-cause notice. The same was considered. Enquiry Officer after giving him appropriate opportunity held him guilty. Such report was placed before the council. The Council decided to invite the views of the delinquent not only on the enquiry report but also on the tentative finding of the Council. Accordingly, show-cause notice was given. He replied to the show-cause notice. The same was considered. The Council was not satisfied. They asked for further explanation thereby giving him another opportunity to offer his explanation. He availed such opportunity and submitted his second reply. The Council then, after considering each and very aspect, imposed the punishment. We do not find any scope of interference with such decision of the appellant. Learned single Judge interfered with the punishment and directed his reinstatement with all back wages. With deepest regard we have for the learned Single Judge, we respectfully record our disapproval on that score. We feel that it would carry a wrong signal to the disciplined employees of the Council. Once the principles of natural justice are followed in its true letters and spirit and the court is satisfied on that score there is no scope for interference with the decision of the authority, especially in the facts of this case so discussed above. ORDER: ( 20 ) THE appeal thus succeeds and is allowed. The order of the learned Single judge is set aside. The writ petition is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.