JUDGMENT A.B. Pal, J. 1. The challenge in this second appeal is to the judgment dated 30.8.2001 rendered by the Additional District Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur, in Title Appeal No. 3 of 1999 whereby the judgment and decree for eviction of the Appellant herein passed on 1.12.1998 by the Civil Judge (Jr. Division) Udaipur, South Tripura in Title Suit No. 3 of 1983 have been upheld. 2. The basic question whether the Appellant Rabindra Kumar Bhattacharjee is a tenant under the Respondents in respect of the suit premises measuring 40 ft. x 16 ft. travelled a long path for a decision, assuming in the course a chequered career. The factual matrix may be briefly noticed first before adverting to the substantial question of law this Court is called upon to decide in the present second appeal: The Respondents herein are three brors.. Their father Nishi Kanta Sarkar purchased the suit land along with some other lands in 1962 in the name of his wife Subarna Prabha Sarkar from one Chandrabali Mishra. In 1968 he raised structures on the suit land for his own business purposes. He died in 1975. Thereafter the suit premises were let out to the District Public Relations Officer, Govt. of Tripura till 18.4.1979 for using it as garage. After that period the Appellant approached Subarna Prabha to allow him to use the suit premises for a temporary period in order to enable him obtain a loan to start business. With the understanding that he would vacate the premises immediately after securing the loan, Subarna Prabha allowed the Appellant to occupy the suit premises on 5.3.1980. But though the Appellant got the loan in July, 1981 showing his business in the suit premises, he refused to vacate the same in terms of the understanding. All requests and persuasions were in vain. Subarna Prabha died and her three sons inherited the suit premises. Thereafter, the brors. partitioned all the properties inherited by them and the suit property fell into the share of Amar Ranjan Sarkar, the first Respondent herein. They instituted eviction suit which was contested by the Appellant. The contention advanced by him is that originally he had taken lease of certain structure on rent from Subarna Prabha. The said structure situated on CS Plot No. 153. They instituted eviction suit which was contested by the Appellant. The contention advanced by him is that originally he had taken lease of certain structure on rent from Subarna Prabha. The said structure situated on CS Plot No. 153. Later he vacated that structure and himself construction a new structure on CS Plot No. 1528 which has been recorded as Govt. Khas land in Udaipur town. He had taken permission to possess that khas land from the then occupier Radha Ballav Sutradhar. Thus, he denied the claim of the Plaintiffs-Respondents that he was ever tenant under them in respect of the suit premises. 3. The suit was decreed on 14.7.1986. The Appellant challenged the same in appeal which was dismissed on 15.3.1990 by the Additional District Judge, Udaipur. The Appellant filed Second Appeal before this Court. The precise question which was adverted to in the second appeal was whether the suit premises appertain to CS Plot No. 1528, which is admittedly khas land or plot No. 1529 which is admittedly jote land of the Plaintiffs-Respondents. The simple position which thus emerged is that if the suit premise stood on plot No. 1528 (khas) the Appellant cannot be said to be a tenant under the Plaintiffs-Respondents and, therefore, the question of eviction does not arise. If on the other hand the suit premise is found on plot No. 1529 (jote land) of the plaintiffs-Respondents the question of eviction of the Appellant would definitely arise. Confronted with this question this Court felt that the correct position has to be ascertained by appointing a Survey Commissioner and for that purpose allowed the second appeal remanding the suit back to the trial court to decide only the issue whether the suit premises appertained to Plot No. 1528 (khas) or Plot No. 1529 (jote). 4. Receiving the case on remand the learned trial court appointed a Survey Commissioner. The report of the Survey Commissioner was accepted by that Court without any objection from the contending parties. According to the said report the suit premise situated partly on Plot No. 1528 comprising an area of.008 1/2 acres and partly on CS Plot No. 1529 comprising an area of.011 1/2 acres, the total area thus being.020 acres. The report of the Survey Commissioner was accepted by that Court without any objection from the contending parties. According to the said report the suit premise situated partly on Plot No. 1528 comprising an area of.008 1/2 acres and partly on CS Plot No. 1529 comprising an area of.011 1/2 acres, the total area thus being.020 acres. The Appellant herein amended his written statement contending that he constructed the suit structure on Plot No. 1528 (khas) though part of the same might have covered a vacant portion of CS Plot No. 1529. In a way he thus agreed with the report of the Survey Commissioner that the suit premise stood on both the plots. Once it is found that the suit structure covered part of both the plots, the next question confronted the trial court for decision was who had raised the structure. The Appellant contended that the khas land was in occupation of one Radha Ballav Sutradhar with whose permission he raised the structure and subsequently he obtained licence for the khas land from the Sub-Divisional Officer, Udaipur. But, in support of this contention he did neither examine Radha Ballav nor could produce any scrap of paper to show that he was ever a licence under the Government. His own witnesses deposed that the suit premises in occupation of the Appellant was constructed by the predecessor of the Plaintiff-Respondents. What has thus come to be firmly established from the Survey Commissioner's report and the depositions of the witnesses is that the suit structure was constructed by the predecessor of the Plaintiffs-Appellants and the same covered part of Plot No. 1528 (khas) and Plot No. 1529 (jote). The Appellant himself admitted that he was originally a tenant under Subarna Prabha in a structure on Plot No. 1531, but later he himself raised a structure on Plot No. 1528. But the witnesses stated that he had been in the suit structure from the very beginning and, therefore, in view of the Survey Commissioner's Report the trial court had no difficulty to hold that the Appellant was the tenant under the Plaintiffs-Respondents. The suit was thus decreed for eviction of the Appellant which again came to be challenged in Title Appeal No. 3 of 1999. The learned appellate court found no reason to take a different view and so affirmed the same. 5. The suit was thus decreed for eviction of the Appellant which again came to be challenged in Title Appeal No. 3 of 1999. The learned appellate court found no reason to take a different view and so affirmed the same. 5. In this second appeal the substantial question of law which was formed by this court (H.K.K. Singh, J.) on 22.2.2002 at the time of admission reads as follows: Whether the courts below committed any error in the substantial question of law in decreeing the suit land with building which is partly private land and partly Government land, without impleading the State Government as a party? 6. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. 7. Mr. A.K. Bhowmik, learned Sr. Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned trial court declared possessory right of the Plaintiffs-Respondents in respect of a part of the CS Plot No. 1528, which is admittedly a khas land, without impleading the State Government and, therefore, this part of the decree is liable to be set aside and quashed. Mr. B. Das, learned Sr. Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Respondents on the other hand controverted this submission arguing that the court has not decided the right between the Plaintiffs-Respondents and the State Government. It has decided the dispute between the Appellant and the Respondents with regard to the part of the CS Plot No. 1528 meaning thereby that the Plaintiff-Respondents gained possessory right against the Appellant only. In view of this position the decree cannot be said to be unsustainable in law because of the absence of the State Government, Mr. Das submits. The submissions of the learned Counsel and the facts and circumstances of the case discussed above would leave no doubt that the decree in question declaring possessory right of the Plaintiff-Respondents in part of the CS Plot No. 1528 where a part of the suit structure stands is not a decree in rem but a decree in personam. In other words, the possessory right declared does not in any way affect or obliterate the right of the State Government over the said land. The dispute raised in the suit being between the Appellant and the Respondents, the outcome of the same cannot affect any other person including the State Government. This being the legal position the decree does not suffer from any illegality only for not impleading the State. 8. The dispute raised in the suit being between the Appellant and the Respondents, the outcome of the same cannot affect any other person including the State Government. This being the legal position the decree does not suffer from any illegality only for not impleading the State. 8. The upshot of the above discussions brings forth the following admitted position: (i) the suit structure stands partly on C.S. Plot No. 1528 (khas) and party on CS Plot No. 1529 (Jote); (ii) the Plaintiffs-Respondents are the owners of the CS Plot No. 1529 over which the Appellant does not claim any right; (iii) the lands of Plot No. 1528 is khas land of the State Government; (iv) the suit structure was built by the predecessor of the Plaintiffs-Respondents and it stood partly on Plot No. 1528 and partly on Plot No. 1529. 9. Both the Courts after placing reliance on the report of the Survey Commissioner and other materials on record came to hold that the Appellant entered into suit structure as a tenant and, therefore, he cannot question the title of the landlord on the plea that a part of the structure stands on khas land. The provision of Section 116 of the Evidence Act has been pressed into service as the same prevents the tenant from raising such a question. It is to be noticed with Consternation that the long drawn legal battle helped the Appellant-tenant to continue in possession of the suit structure in spite of his defeat every time in the trial court and the first appellate court. He thus successfully kept the rightful owner at bay for a long period since 14.7.1986. 10. The substantial question of law having been answered above I find no other question to advert to. In view of above, there is no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. The second appeal thus has no merit and, therefore, the same is dismissed without any order as to cost. Appeal dismissed