JUDGMENT K.L. Manjunath, J.— The appellant was the respondent in the Company Petition No. 180 of 2001 (Standard Industrial Engineering Company v. Bellary Power (India) P. Ltd. [2006] 133 Comp Cas 787 (Kar) ), which petition was instituted by the respondent herein under Section 433(e) and (f) read with Section 434 of the Companies Act, 1956. 2. On November 21, 2005, the company petition filed by the respondent has been allowed and the appellant-company is ordered to be wound up. According to the respondent, the petitioner herein had placed a work order on November 11, 1998, for fabrication of 440 metric tons of steel structures for boiler house roof trusses, for its thermal power plant at Bellary at a total value of Rs. 23,32,000. The appellant having supplied the required raw material to the respondent herein to complete the job of fabrication and the same was fabricated by the respondent to the satisfaction of the appellant herein. Accordingly, the respondent raised a bill dated November 26, 1998, for Rs. 12,56,540.32 and another bill for Rs. 1,39,504.48 on December 24, 1998 and one more bill dated July 24, 2000, for Rs. 9,681.99. The appellant having received the bills raised by the respondent herein deducted the tax at source amounting to Rs. 25,111, Rs. 3,069 and Rs. 213 against the bills raised by the respondent, respectively. However, the appellant failed to pay the amount payable to the respondent. In the circumstances the respondent called upon the appellant to pay the undisputed amount of Rs. 13,76,333 by issuing a statutory notice under the Companies Act, 1956. Though the appellant received the notice, the said notice was neither complied with nor sent any reply. In the circumstances, the respondent filed the company petition. 3. Before the company judge, the objections were not filed by the appellant herein when the case was taken up for final hearing after advertisement. The appellant's counsel made an attempt to file the objections, which was rejected by the learned company judge on the ground that the same has not been filed on time. After hearing counsel for both the parties, the company judge has allowed the petition. Challenging the same, the present appeal is filed. 4. We have heard learned Counsel appearing for both the parties. 5. According to the appellant, the company judge has committed an error in not allowing the appellant to file the statement of objections. After hearing counsel for both the parties, the company judge has allowed the petition. Challenging the same, the present appeal is filed. 4. We have heard learned Counsel appearing for both the parties. 5. According to the appellant, the company judge has committed an error in not allowing the appellant to file the statement of objections. It is further contended that nowhere in the company petition, the respondent has averred that the appellant is incapable of paying the debts to the respondent. It is further contended that when the respondent has obtained a decree from the Andhra Pradesh Industry Facilitation Council under the provisions of the Industrial Undertakings Act, the company petition under Section 443 of the Act was not maintainable. He alternatively contends that the company petition was barred by the principles of res judicata. 6. According to learned Counsel for the respondent even though sufficient opportunity was given by the company judge to the appellant herein to file the statement of objections, the same was not filed. According to him, even though objections were not received by the company judge, on the ground of delay and laches, the company judge has considered all the points raised by the appellant herein during the course of the arguments. He, however, submits that the appellant herein has produced the copy of the objection statement sought to be filed by the appellant herein before the company judge and on perusal of the statement of objections, no valid defence has been raised by the appellant herein. He further contends, nowhere in the statement of objections or during the course of arguments before the company judge, it was contended by the appellant that the appellant-company is viable and capable of discharging all the debts and that there is actually a serious dispute in regard to the amount payable by the appellant to the respondent. He lastly contends that the principles of res judicata will not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case and that the decree obtained from the council has nothing to do with the winding up of this petition. He further contends that mere obtaining of a decree from the council or a civil court will not disentitle the respondent to file a company petition for winding up when the appellant-company is incapable of discharging the debts. 7. He further contends that mere obtaining of a decree from the council or a civil court will not disentitle the respondent to file a company petition for winding up when the appellant-company is incapable of discharging the debts. 7. Having heard counsel for the parties what is required to be considered by us in this appeal is whether the company judge has committed an error in ordering winding up of the appellant-company. 8. Admittedly, the bills raised by the respondent are not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the appellant has received the statutory notice got issued by the respondent under the Companies Act. It is also not in dispute that no reply has been sent by the appellant to show that there is really a dispute in existence between the appellant and the respondent. 9. Either before the learned company judge or in the statement of objections sought to be filed by the appellant, nowhere it is mentioned by the appellant that the appellant-company is viable one and is capable of discharging the debts either to the respondent or to any other creditors. It is also not in dispute that the respondent herein has obtained a decree from the Council under the provisions of the Industrial Undertakings Act. On perusal of the said Act, it is clear the Act has been incorporated to give benefit only in regard to the interest and not in regard to the actual debt. Therefore, the appellant relying upon the provisions of the above said Act can best contend that it is not liable to pay interest contrary to the provisions of the Industrial Undertakings Act. Even if such a decree is obtained, there is no prohibition under the Companies Act preventing the respondent from filing a company petition for winding up of any company, if such company is incapable of discharging its debts. 10. As a matter of fact at the time of admission of this appeal, the appellant was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 permitting the respondent herein to withdraw the same. Accordingly, the said amount has been withdrawn. 10. As a matter of fact at the time of admission of this appeal, the appellant was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 5,00,000 permitting the respondent herein to withdraw the same. Accordingly, the said amount has been withdrawn. When the amount has been permitted to be withdrawn by the respondent, when a decree has been obtained by the respondent under the provisions of the Industrial Undertakings Act on September 29, 1993, when the appellant has failed to discharge the decree even after four years, we do not see any error committed by the learned company judge in ordering the winding up of the appellant-company. 11. In the circumstances, we dismiss the appeal.