JUDGMENT 1. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court decreeing the suit of plaintiff/respondent on the ground envisagd under section 12 (1) (a) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (in short 'the Act') and the appeal which was filed by defendant/appellant has been dismissed by learned first appellate Court by the impugned judgment and decree, this second appeal has been filed at the instance of the defendant/appellant. 2. In brief, the case of plaintiff is that defendant/appellant is the tenant in the suit premises at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month. The defendant was in arrears of rent and as such quit notice was sent by her and thereafter since the rent was not paid by the defendant/appellant within the statutory period as envisaged under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act, the suit for eviction was filed only on the ground of default of payment of rent. 3. The defendant filed written statement refuting the plaint averments. 4. The trial Court decreed the suit of plaintiff and passed the decree of eviction under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. The appeal which was filedby the tenant has also been dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree and hence, this second appeal. 5. This Court on 10.8.2005 admitted this second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: "(i) Whether the suit being premature, in view of paragraph 1 of the statement of the plaintiff herself, it ought to have been dismissed under section 12 (1) (a) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act? (ii) Whether learned ADJ has committed an illegality in not exercising the jurisdiction to condone the delay under section 13 (2) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act?" 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that this appeal deserves to be allowed and the suit deserves to be dismissed. Regarding Substantial Question No.1. 7. It has been vehemently argued by Shri Sanjay Seth, learned counsel for the appellant, that quit notice Ex. P-2 is dated 24.11.1995 and the postal receipt is also of the same date and the suit has been filed on 24.1.1996, therefore, it is premature as it has not been filed after expiry of two months from the date when notice of demand of rent was served on defendant. P-2 is dated 24.11.1995 and the postal receipt is also of the same date and the suit has been filed on 24.1.1996, therefore, it is premature as it has not been filed after expiry of two months from the date when notice of demand of rent was served on defendant. Thus, the two Courts below erred in substantial error of law in decreeing the suit. 8. The contention of Shri B.M. Dwivedi, learned counsel for the respondent, is that in the notice Ex. P-2 the date 21.11.1995 has been mentioned. On going through the notice Ex. P-2 there is overlapping on the date. It can be read as 21 as well as 24th November, 1995. But the controversy would come to rest on bare perusal of postal receipt Ex. P-3 on which the seal of Post Office date 24.11.1995 has been mentioned. Thus, even if the quit notice Ex. P-2 was prepared and typed on 21.11.1995, since it was sent by registered post/AD only on 24.11.1995, therefore, it will be deemed that the same was sent on that date only and not earlier to it. Apart from this, plaintiff herself is saying in para 1 of her statement that notice was sent on 24.11.1995. In this view of the matter, the suit which is admittedly filed on 24.1.1996 is premature and the two Courts below erred in substantial error of law in decreeing the suit under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. 9. Substantial question of law No. 1 is, thus, answered that the suit which was filed under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act should have been dismissed, since it was premature. Regarding Substantial Question No.2: 10. I have already held herein above that the suit is premature and, therefore, no decree could be granted under section 12 (1) (a) of the Act. An application to condone the delay before learned first appellate Court was filed by tenant/appellant under section 13 (2) of the Act seeking prayer to condone the delay in depositing the subsequent deposit of the monthly rent. There is no dispute to the proposition that the rent was deposited, but it was deposited after some delay and there was consecutive default in depositing the rent. Learned first appellate Court has dismissed the application on the ground that the same is not maintainable in the first appellate Court. There is no dispute to the proposition that the rent was deposited, but it was deposited after some delay and there was consecutive default in depositing the rent. Learned first appellate Court has dismissed the application on the ground that the same is not maintainable in the first appellate Court. It is well settled in law that the appeal is the continuation of the suit (in this regard I may rely the decision of Supreme Court Dilip v. Mohd. Azizul Haq and another [ (2000) 3 SCC 607 ], therefore, the application which was filed before the first appellate Court was maintainable and the appellate Court was having jurisdiction to allow the same. I am of the view that learned first appellate Court erred in substantial error of law in dismissing the application under section 13 (2) of the Act on the ground that the same is not maintainable before it. 11. Substantial question of law No.2 is, thus, answered that learned first appellate Court committed an illegality in not exercising the jurisdiction to condone the delay under section 13 (2) of the Act. 12. Looking to the averments made in the application to condone the consecutive default in depositing the rent, the same is hereby allowed; and the delay in depositing the rent is hereby condoned. 13. Resultantly, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree passed by learned two Courts below are set aside and the suit of plaintiff is dismissed. However, looking to the facts and circumstances, parties .are directed to bear their own costs throughout.